1 1 STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT 2 COUNTY OF CARVER FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 3 4 In Re the Estate of Transcript of Proceedings 5 Prince Rogers Nelson, File No. 10-PR-16-46 6 Deceased. 7 8 The above-entitled matter came on for probate 9 hearing before the Honorable Kevin W. Eide, one of the Judges 10 of the First Judicial District, at the Carver County Justice 11 Center, 604 East 4th Street, City of Chaska, County of Carver, 12 State of Minnesota, on April 7, 2017. 13 14 APPEARANCES: 15 Joseph Cassioppi and Mark Greiner, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A. appeared on behalf of 16 Comerica Bank & Trust, NA. 17 Patrick Cousins, Cousins Law, APA, appeared. 18 19 20 21 22 23 Jacqueline J. Knutson, Official Court Reporter 24 25

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THE COURT: Good morning, folks. We'll go on the record in the matter of the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson. This is Court File PR-16-46.

Can I ask the parties to note your appearances.

MR. CASSIOPPI: Good morning, Your Honor. Joe Cassioppi and Mark Greiner from Fredrikson & Byron on behalf of the Personal Representative, Comerica Bank and Trust, N.A.

THE COURT: Very good.

MR. COUSINS: Good morning, Your Honor. Good day. I'm Patrick Cousins from Cousins Law, APA, West Palm Beach, Florida. We're here on behalf of Cousins Law, APA.

THE COURT: Very good. Thank you.

Folks, I just wanted to clarify a couple of things before we get started with the argument. By my looking at things, the record for this motion would constitute the following: There was a petition that was filed with the Court on February 8th. Comerica has brought a motion to dismiss the petition and filed a memorandum with that. Mr. Cousins has filed a reply memorandum and Comerica filed a response to that. There are a number of attachments that would include written statements of claims, disallowance notices, those types of things. On behalf of Comerica, do you believe that

constitutes the record for this motion?

MR. CASSIOPPI: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: And Mr. Cousins.

MR. COUSINS: No, Your Honor. I would think that the record would also include the December 6th, 2016, the file that we made -- that we believe was the -- THE COURT: The December 6th.

MR. COUSINS: Right. On December 6th --

THE COURT: Well, let me stop you. That is an attachment to, I think, more than one of the documents that I just referred to.

MR. COUSINS: It may be, but we went ahead -initially on December 6th we sent -- to start the action
with the Court -- we sent it certified mail, the Court
received it, and after not getting a hearing date, that's
when we filed the document you're referencing in
February -- it was actually filed sometime in January -requesting that the Court set this matter for hearing.

THE COURT: Very good. I'll ask you, Mr.

Cousins, it may be different than most courtrooms, but to stay seated while you're speaking. The reason for that is just that the microphones pick up better when you do so.

MR. COUSINS: No problem. I'm from Florida and we normally have to stand. So thank you for that.

THE COURT: Yes. And as I travel to different courthouses, they all stand there too. It's something that's more -- we have an excellent sound system.

Particularly with the cameras here, it's helpful, but even without, it's nice to make sure the microphones are working.

So, secondly, on behalf of Comerica it would appear to the Court that this motion for dismissal is based on either Rule 1203, a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, or summary judgment motion under Rule 56 and they are somewhat interrelated in the rules. Again, on behalf of Comerica, would you agree?

MR. CASSIOPPI: I would, though we brought the motion under Rule 12 and for purposes of our argument are relying strictly on the pleadings as they were submitted to the Court.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Cousins, would you also agree?

MR. COUSINS: I would agree that -- I was prepared to argue on Rule 12 and not 56 on summary judgment because I didn't see it that way.

THE COURT: All right. Then, on behalf of Comerica, go ahead.

MR. CASSIOPPI: Thank you, Your Honor. Joe Cassioppi on behalf of Comerica.

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As the Court mentioned, we're here on a motion to dismiss the Cousins Law, APA, petition for allowance of a previously disallowed claim. And by way of brief background, Minnesota Probate Code has a specific and straightforward requirement for a creditor of an estate to present a claim and then to bring a challenge if that claim is disallowed. And those requirements are set forth in Minnesota Statute Section 524.3-804.

As relevant here, a creditor presents a claim by either submitting it to the fiduciary here with the Special Administrator, or the creditor can file that claim with the Court. If the claim is then disallowed by the Estate, the creditor has two months to commence a proceeding after receiving notice of disallowance. Failure to do so acts as a bar to the creditor proceeding on the claim unless the Court extends the deadline on a petition by the creditor, quote, "to avoid injustice," close quote. But before the Court does that, before the Court could even extend a deadline, the statute specifically requires the Court to look at whether by extending the deadline they would impact the Statute of Limitations. So the claim statute itself requires, as a step before the Court would ever extend that two-month deadline, specifically requires the Court to look at the applicable limitations raised on the claim.

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With that legal framework, it is clear that

Cousins' petition is barred both under the claim statute

and by the six-year statute of limitations in Minnesota

for breach of contracts' claims. Cousins presented its

claim to the Special Administrator on September 2nd,

2016, and it is undisputed that Cousins received the

Special Administrator's notice of disallowance of the

claim on October 27th, 2016. If you look at the Notice

of Disallowance, which is attached as Exhibit D to

Cousins' response, it clearly and unambiguously notified

Cousins, quote: "Your claim will be barred unless you

file a petition for allowance with the Court or commence

a proceeding against the Special Administrator not later

than two months after the mailing of this notice to you,"

close quote.

Cousins did not comply with the statutory deadline. Instead, it waited more than three months to file this petition. As a result, under the plain language of the claim statute, the claim is barred as a matter of law. Because it's barred, the Court doesn't need to look any further. But to the extent that the Court does decide to look at the Statute of Limitations, it's also time barred as a matter of Minnesota law under the applicable limitations period. If you look at Exhibit A to Cousins' response, the claim that was

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submitted to the Special Administrator consisted of a one-page summary letter and a one-page summary invoice seeking just under \$600,000 in legal fees for services rendered. The invoice doesn't have any detail on it.

But the letter states that the claim is for services rendered in connection with the Decedent's divorce. And if you look at Judge Fraser's order from Hennepin County, which is attached to my February 28th declaration, which the Court can consider on a Rule 12 motion because it's a public record, the Decedent's divorce closed in October of 2007. So any claim based upon legal services rendered in connection with that divorce is time barred at 2013 at the absolute latest.

Cousins raises two arguments on why his claim is not time barred. First, if you look at paragraph 16 of his response, it states without any explanation that this bill did not become due until April 1st, 2016. The problem with that argument is, if you just look two paragraphs earlier, paragraph 14, paragraph 14 states: "Claimant has a claim against the Estate for accounts stated and for legal services rendered based on the fact that Decedent did not contest or challenge any of the billing statements he received from claimant during the time claimant rendered legal services to Decedent."

Right? So, Cousins cannot on one hand say, "Well, our

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bills weren't even due until April of 2016." And then on the other hand say, "Well, the Estate is barred as a matter of account stated because we submitted bills back in '06 and '07 when we were doing our work and the Decedent didn't respond to those or oppose those so the Estate is bound by that. Cousins' very arguments establish that these invoices were due and outstanding as of the time services were rendered -- which at the latest, again, based upon what's in the pleadings, what's in the four corners of the pleadings -- was services rendered in connection with the Decedent's divorce.

The other argument raised by the Cousins' firm is that it states that Cousins represented the Decedent on nondivorce matters. Again, that's not in the pleadings so we can't consider it, but conspicuously absent from any submission we've received from Cousins whatsoever is any assertion that there were any services rendered within the limitations period. And for that reason and for all the reasons stated in our briefing and here today at the argument, we respectfully request that the Court grant the Personal Representative's motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: So I may be doing some of Mr.

Cousins' work for him, but I think that an argument may be made that the written statement of claim that Mr.

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Cousins referred to in -- on December 6th, 2016, constitutes a petition before the Court under 524.3-804. Can you respond to that?

MR. CASSIOPPI: I can, and I'll tell you why. If you look at the claim statute, what that filing with the Court did and what that would have been sufficient for, and, in fact, what that form is for, that was used, that is how you present a claim. That is how you present a claim. So if that had been the initial presentation, that would have been sufficient under the claim statute. But what is clear under the claim statute and is crystal clear in the notice of disallowance, there is no question here that notice was provided to Cousins' firm, and Cousins' firm, of course, is a law firm and should be presumed to have read what was provided to it and should be required to comply with Minnesota law. The notice of disallowance under Minnesota law requires a petition for allowance or an actual claim be asserted against the Neither of those took place here. And so while that notice, notice of claim, may have been sufficient, in fact, would have been sufficient to present a claim, it was not sufficient under Minnesota law to constitute a petition for allowance of a disallowed claim.

THE COURT: Taking it one step farther then -- and you alluded to this, I think, in your initial

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comments -- the statute allows me to extend the time period to avoid injustice to the Court, assuming that Mr. Cousins intended to file a petition but filed a written statement of claim. A lot of people would say we're talking about wordsmithing. Why shouldn't I extend the time period?

MR. CASSIOPPI: The Court is permitted to extend the time period as a matter of discretion. But it's not -- it really requires more than a showing of potential harm. It shows -- the legislature used the term "injustice." And there are maybe certain circumstances under which that escape hatch would be warranted, but this is not one. Here we had a notice of disallowance provided to a law firm that had all of the available means to comply with what is required by Minnesota law. In fact, a law firm that is seeking \$600,000 from the Estate for legal services performed on behalf of a Minnesota client. So they should have required -- the Cousins firm should be required to comply with Minnesota law, and not having read the notice of disallowance, or not having done the required research necessary to know what is necessary to bring a petition, that does not justify -- that does not create injustice. It does not reach the high standard required to reach injustice.

And, again, if you look at Subdivision 3 of the claim statute, before doing that, the Court needs to look at the next issue which is the limitations period issue, and these claims are clearly time barred. And so because of that reason, because there is not a valid claim on the merits that can proceed, the Court should not use its discretion to extend the filing deadline.

And as a final matter, I will say also that this requires a petition, petition requesting an extension of the deadline, and no petition has been filed.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Cousins.

MR. COUSINS: Your Honor, if it may please the Court. Your Honor, several issues I'd like to bring up and not in much detail but as a preliminary observation.

As you can see in my memo, and obviously Your Honor read it, there has been some difficulties, it appears, from the Special Administrator and the Personal Representative in just reaching me. My address hasn't changed in several years. My phone number, e-mail, fax hasn't changed, but yet when the first disallowance of claim was trying to be sent to me, the document came weeks late from the day it was mailed. Then when I tried to reach the Special Administrator at the time to discuss it, no returned phone calls, no response to e-mails.

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Then, finally, after pursuing the thought of trying to find out whether or not the document that I received, which was a document that was meant and intended for someone else, they had filed a disallowance of claim to another entity and sent it to me instead, I then received a notice of disallowance using the very same dates that the document originally was supposed to come to me.

And I only bring that up because I could have sat and done nothing on that statement of claim and let the time run and then turn around and go, "Oh, you guys blew the deadline in disallowing my claim." But I thought the whole process, especially when you're dealing with lawyers, is to just try to get to the truth of the matter and get things resolved as quick as we can. I can appreciate that we obviously have to meet deadlines, I can go through and show Your Honor that the question you asked to opposing counsel as to the December 6th document that we filed, when I look at the statute -- and I didn't just look at it myself. other lawyers in Minnesota look at it also -- and when we filed our claim, which we believe was an action on December 6th, there wasn't any doubt that we were putting the Court on notice that we had previously been denied by the Special Administrator and we now are coming to the Court for its assistance in helping us bring this claim

forward. This case has had many moving parts to it, so many lawyers and litigants, we weren't trying to create a firestorm. We were just trying to put the Court on notice to be put in line to the fact that we had this claim.

THE COURT: I think you're clear -- the Cousins

Law, APA's response to Comerica's motion to dismiss

acknowledges that you received the notice of disallowance
on October 27th, correct?

MR. COUSINS: That's correct. As best I can remember, based upon the -- when the document finally came in. We had stamped it in the office, but the date of the letter was, I think, the 18th. So the only thing I could go by was that. And the exhibit I'm referencing now is our Exhibit E to our response, which is the December 6, 2016, certified letter to the Court which we believe was our proper claim that was made to the Court to start the action.

Now, the Personal Representative has argued that we should have filed a petition for allowance.

Well, I look through the statute, and I look through it then, I looked through it the subsequent months, and I looked through it again this morning and I just don't see that language. And so that term "in its totality" doesn't exist in the statute.

THE COURT: Let me stop you there.

MR. COUSINS: Okay.

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"The Court: In 524.3-804, subd. 1, refers to

"The Claimant may deliver or mail to the Personal

Representative a written statement of claim."

Subdivision 2 starts out, "The claimant may commence a

proceeding against the Personal Representative in any

court where the Personal Representative may be subjected

to jurisdiction." Now, this would occur after there had

been a notice of disallowance. One refers to a written

statement of claim. The other refers to a proceeding

against the Personal Representative. You used the same

form for both. Why -- it appears to me that it's obvious

the legislature intended two separate types of actions.

MR. COUSINS: Okay. I see, Your Honor.

Respectfully, I didn't use the form for the first one.

We wrote a letter and we attached the statement of claim that we made. So that's what we did. The form came in after the research that we did in believing that that was the proper document to use. And what I was saying was the words that I didn't find was "petition for allowance." Because that's what -- the argument was made that we should have filed a petition for allowance. And we looked.

When we got their notice that they're

disallowing the claim, I then looked at the wording and I couldn't find that to match up. So when we did send in what we thought was proper and followed up with the Court and we didn't get a hearing, we said, "Well, okay, we'll file for a hearing." Because that is obviously what is needed to get us to this point to make a determination.

In the meantime, the Special Administrator had been moving to be relieved of his duties. The Personal Representative was coming in and we didn't hear heads or tails -- I'm not saying it's their responsibility -- but we didn't hear anything from the other side regarding it. And, again, as you brought out, it almost appears that it is form over substance because we did everything that we thought we were doing necessary to make the Court aware that the Special Administrator had denied our claim and now we're coming to the Court for its assistance. And that was the basis for doing that.

When I went through the rules to determine the definitions of the various sections, for instance, "What does a claim mean under 524.1-201?" Even "What does Court mean?" "What does petition?" "Proceedings?" And it got to the point where I said, "Well, it would seem to me that we were trying to start a proceeding, trying to get this in front of the Court." And then I tried to find what the definition of that was and it says, under

524.1-201(42), "Proceeding includes an action at law or inequity." No definition of the word "action" was in the statute. So I went to *Black's Law Dictionary* and it says, "Acquiring a benefit, interest or right by enforcing a remedy, action or procedure established by a court decision." Then I looked up probate proceeding. "A probate proceeding is a court action that deals with the matters of an estate and wills."

So in looking through all of that, I came to the understanding that the way the rules are written in Minnesota, it almost appeared that the founding fathers wanted them to be liberally applied because they weren't specific in points even consistent with the notice that we received of what we were supposed to file, again, when they said we needed to file a petition for allowance. So that's our position as it relates to that part of the argument.

And if you look at the facts as to what we've done, we filed within the time the documents that we believe are sufficient. We then filed another document on January 26th, after not receiving a hearing date. Still didn't hear anything from anyone. Comerica says that the only thing that I'm claiming the bill is for is for Prince Rogers Nelson's divorce. In the petition and every document we filed, I wrote in, "Amongst other

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things." I noticed that any time that I would even raise my hand as anything relating to this case I would either end up in newspaper, on the television, or somewhere that was bringing light to the case that was unnecessary. So I didn't go into a lot of details as to all that would come out in an evidentiary hearing.

And I've been keeping things close to the cuff. I represented Mr. Nelson for a long time. I've got 120 boxes of files that I still keep in storage that I keep paying for every month. And there's a lot of things that I know that I've just been keeping quiet. So in filing my petition, in filing my documents, again, even in these responses I try to be as close to the cuff as I can and at the same time getting the information that is necessary to help us to move forward. I read the statute on "motion to dismiss" and they're similar to the ones in Florida, where I practice, where you base it on the documents that were filed. You don't go beyond them. And if the Court can find a way to save the claim, the documents that are -- the pleadings that are put forward could create a claim. If they were true, then the Court denies the motion to dismiss.

The fact that there was a condition precedent to our payment is nothing new with Mr. Nelson and myself.

That's how most of our interactions were. He had a

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different way of looking at things. But it was very clear, and I could proffer that if we had an evidentiary hearing I would be able to testify to the admissions that he made to me, the fact that he never disputed a bill. And it wasn't that he didn't dispute the bills when he received them. We would continue to send him bills. would continue to get them to the point that he would tell me, "Stop sending them. You know what the arrangement is." So the statements that were made as to the bills being sent and he acknowledged that he didn't dispute them. He never disputed them. He eventually always paid all of his bills to us and we never really had a problem. Some may say, "Well, why did this bill linger so long?" Well, to us it wasn't that long when the evidence comes in as to other things that we were doing for him.

Nobody thought that Mr. Nelson was going to die when he did. And clearly if we did, we might have gone about things a little differently. But it doesn't change the fact that the statements, the account stated, and the condition precedent, there were certain things that he needed us to get done, it still related some to his divorce and some other matters, that he said until we got those done, he wasn't going to pay us. Didn't dispute the bill. Didn't have any issue with it. But that's how

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And, of course, our bill with him was before that went. he died, it wasn't something that was done after. And as each subsequent time, we'd bring up the bill on the system -- as you might notice you'll see September 22nd, 2016 -- every time we run the bill the program caused the bill to kick forward to the date that you ask it to run. So I just want to take a second and make sure that I covered all the points that I wanted to make. just... THE COURT: Take your time and make sure you got everything covered. Your Honor, to the extent that --MR. COUSINS: between the arguments that were made and the questions that I didn't want to be repetitive on, I believe that I covered it. If Your Honor has a question that I might have missed that you were inquiring about in your mind, I'm sure I'd have the answer for it. THE COURT: I haven't been bashful. When I've had a question, I've asked. MR. COUSINS: All right. Thank you, Your I didn't mean to be disrespectful in that statement. THE COURT: Not at all. Mr. Cassioppi. MR. CASSIOPPI: Just a few points, Your Honor.

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First, with respect to the difficulties that were referenced with respect to the Special Administrator, I can't speak to those other than to say that ultimately that's a red herring because the notice of disallowance was timely provided to Cousins Law and they simply did not respond. Much of Cousins Law's argument revolved around this notion that the firm didn't understand what type of form to use and they did a fair amount of research and it still -- it had a -- it is almost an ignorance of the law argument. Ultimately that doesn't work. And that is not sufficient. And it's not an excuse for not complying with the law. Ultimately Cousins Law would have been well served by retaining a Minnesota law firm or an attorney licensed to practice in Minnesota law -- in Minnesota who could advise them on the law rather than trying to analyze it from outside the jurisdiction. And having not done that, ignorance of the law simply is not an excuse.

Again, the notice of disallowance provided -used very specific language and advised Cousins Law
exactly what it needed to do, which was: File a petition
for allowance with the Court or commence a proceeding
within two months. They didn't do that. It's time
barred.

Finally, on the limitations period. With

respect to what the Court looks at and what the Court can analyze, I'd refer the Court to the Jacobson and Peterson decisions, which is cited in our briefs. And what they state is that if the Court looking at the pleadings and looking at what is actually been alleged, if as part of that analysis it is clear that the claims are time barred, then the Court should dismiss the pleadings. And the pleadings as what was actually submitted -- and we have haven't heard anything to the contrary here today even -- that all services provided were provided more than six years before this claim was submitted.

Finally, with respect to this argument that there was a condition precedent or that this bill didn't really become owing until April 1st, 2016, that's contrary to Minnesota law. A creditor cannot reap, unilaterally reaffirm a debt by sending a new invoice. What is crystal clear following the comments by Cousins Law here today, is that they -- the firm was invoicing the Decedent for services rendered as they were rendered. And, in fact, it sounds like the Decedent was even making payments on those from time to time. A cause of action for breach of contract or account stated accrues as soon as that initial invoice is due. As soon as that initial invoice is due and these items were being -- these services were being invoiced at

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the time they were rendered based upon the admissions of Cousins here today. And so for all of those reasons, we'd ask the Court to grant the motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: With respect to the last point that you made, are the *Jacobson* and *Peterson* cases that you referenced, do they stand for the proposition that the contract is established and a debt is due as soon as the initial invoice is sent or are they on a different point?

MR. CASSIOPPI: The Peterson case is a breach of contract case, and I don't think it uses that specific language because I don't think it is an invoice case.

What it says is that a cause of action accrues at the time that performance is due under the contract. And under that particular contract, it was clear from the pleadings, even without looking at the contract, that the cause of action had accrued 20 years earlier when performance was due, and that was read in the complaint. So based on that, the Court was able to say "This is clearly time barred." And I don't even need to look at the contract and we don't need to do discovery. I can —the Court decided that on a motion to dismiss standard that it was time barred and could not proceed beyond the initial pleadings stage.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Cousins, any last word?

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MR. COUSINS: One moment, Your Honor.

The only thing I can say, Your Honor, is that there was word made by opposing counsel as to the Court basically not using its power and discretion if they did find -- the Court found that the claim was untimely filed that the word "injustice" doesn't exist here. this would be one of the biggest injustices in this whole case because not only did we do work for Mr. Nelson when he was alive and continued to do it up until his death, but the work that we did was significant and has kept the Estate in the position that it was in prior to his death. Saved a lot of money for the Estate. And to deny work that's clearly done -- and I have the bills, I have all the time tickets, I have them all but, again, didn't submit them because it's not the evidentiary hearing standpoint -- would be an injustice because from my brief cursory look at the files and what has happened so far, it just shocks me that nobody has reached out to me to ask me some of the questions, to get some of the answers that they could have gotten in this Estate. And it would have saved thousands and thousands of dollars and time in doing so.

I can't opine to as why not, but I do know the work that we did was valuable and I know Mr. Nelson never doubted the benefits of what we did for him, and I would

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clearly state, unequivocally, that there's not a document you're going to find where he has written or said otherwise. So that's the only thing that I have left to say, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very good. Thank you.

MR. CASSIOPPI: Your Honor, if I may, one final comment with the respect to the notion that Mr. Cousins' law firm has not been reached out to.

The Special Administrator did reach out to the Cousins Law firm and requested access to its files, and the Cousins Law firm responded by demanding literally hundreds of thousands of dollars in copying charges as a condition and without that payment refused to provide anything. So the notion that there has been no contact between the Cousins firm and the Estate is completely false.

MR. COUSINS: May I respond to that, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. COUSINS: Okay. That's a shocker. A request was made to us sort of strong-handedly that I had to turn over all my files or else. And I explained that we've been holding these files for sometime and they're full of very sensitive information so I can't just ship you all these boxes and hope that everything works out.

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I don't even know specifically what's in each and every box and what might be co-mingled in there with other documents. So when I was asked by the Special Administrator -- and when I say "communication," I mean communication regarding the merits of the case of what can be done to determine -- the communication that he's referring to is "Send me your boxes."

So the communication that ensued after they asked for the boxes was -- after consulting with counsel -- was what do you do? Well, in this very case the Special Administrator asked a particular firm to go through one of their boxes for a file that they worked on with Mr. Nelson and they paid them. What I asked for them to do the same task was about a third of what the per box rate was for what this particular firm was paid -- and I don't know if they just said no or they never Then there was a petition that was filed at responded. some point, my chief judge down in West Palm Beach brought it to my attention that it was never acted upon seeking those boxes through subpoena. I didn't hear anything more.

So when I speak about communication, I'm saying Special Administrator and others have gone and sought out experts and other folk that helped them understand Mr. Nelson's estate. And here you have a lawyer that

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represented him from 2004 on a daily basis all the way through 2009 and then thereafter did other work for him. Never was there a conversation or a return phone call on my volley of "What can I do to help?" That's their prerogative, but I'm just saying to turn and say the work that I've done is not valuable, I sit back and look at some of these issues that are going on and I go, "I knew Why didn't they call me about that? I know that answer." They spent time with a firm that we hired to help us to do his divorce because I'm not licensed in Minnesota, that very fine law firm helped us, but I was the one that signed the documents and made the arguments in that divorce case. And when it came time to finding out about the divorce, they asked that firm to help, didn't ask me. Which, again, is their prerogative. But my point simply is we've done a lot of work, Judge. We're not in here trying to ask for something we don't deserve. If we called it X and it should have been Y, I don't think it stops the fact that we did everything we believed possible and we did consult with lawyers in Minnesota and they didn't seem to have a problem with that document.

So folly on me for getting bad advice if the Court finds it.

THE COURT: Well, with respect to the last

1	comments Mr. Cassioppi brought up the issue, I allowed
2	you to respond just to keep the record fair, but when I
3	talked with you folks at the beginning of the hearing we
4	talked about what this motion is. This is a motion on
5	the pleadings and that is what I'll be ruling on.
6	MR. COUSINS: I understand, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: All right. Then unless there's
8	anything else to address today, we'll conclude the
9	hearing.
10	Mr. Cassioppi.
11	MR. CASSIOPPI: Nothing from the Estate, Your
12	Honor.
13	THE COURT: Mr. Cousins.
14	MR. COUSINS: Thank you, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Thank you. Have a great day.
16	(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded.)
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## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

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I, Jackie J. Knutson, Official Court Reporter in and for the County of Carver, First Judicial District, State of Minnesota, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript consisting of 28 pages constitutes a true, complete and accurate transcript of my Stenographic notes taken at the time and place indicated above in the matter of the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson.

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12 Dated this 25th day of

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August, 2017.

/s/ Jackie Knutson Jackie J. Knutson Official Court Reporter First Judicial District