Jacqueline J. Knutson, Official Court Reporter

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THE COURT: All right. Good morning, Ladies I did have an opportunity to meet with and Gentlemen. the attorneys here today. I think the manner or the order in which we will handle things today are the motion requesting that the Court make a formal order determining the heirs of the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson; secondly, that we address the motion for dismissal of the claims of Brianna Nelson against Paisley Park and others; that, third, we will address an issue regarding the quashing of a subpoena that has been served on L. Londell McMillan; and then, finally, that we will address an issue regarding the dissemination of information from the personal representative to heirs or their designated representative regarding any licensing agreements that may occur.

I have indicated to counsel that I will ask them to be conscience of any information that has been deemed to be confidential business transactions and that we address that in a manner that we will proceed with as much as we can in open court.

If necessary -- if there are comments that you feel are necessary regarding confidential information, that at the end of this hearing we would close the hearing to the media and public and continue with it. Or my preference would be that you could submit it under

seal after the fact.

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With respect to the first matter of discussion, the designation of the heirs of the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson, I did present to counsel a summary of some thoughts that I had.

The Court has been concerned about the fact that this matter is before the Court of Appeals, and at least two separate categories of appeals by heirs that this Court has excluded, and that those appeals are ongoing and that there may be a stay of proceedings that presents the District Court from addressing issues regarding a determination of heirs.

I presented to counsel a manner of drafting an order that I would hope would protect the interests of those excluded heirs that are before the Court of Appeals, or similarly situated individuals, and I'm inviting counsel to address any comments regarding the Court's thoughts in that regard.

So with that, we will formally go on the record in the matter of the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson.

This is Court File PR-16-46.

We will also be addressing the matter of
Brianna Nelson versus Paisley Park Facility, LLC; Bremer
Trust NA; Norrine Nelson; Sharon Nelson; John Nelson;
Tyka Nelson and Omarr Baker and Alfred Nelson. This is

in Court File CV-17-37.

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The first matter, as I said, is the determination of heirs issue, and I believe a motion was filed with the Court that I think was signed by all heirs or counsel for all of the non-excluded heirs.

Who would like to address it first?

MR. KANE: Thomas Kane, Your Honor. We represent Omarr Baker, Tyka Nelson. And Mr. Bruntjen represents Alfred Jackson, also joined with us on that issue.

I only have --

THE COURT: Mr. Kane, your announcing your appearance makes me realize that I forgot to get all of the attorneys to announce theirs, so if I could just ask you to have a seat for a minute.

And we have the appearances for Mr. Kane and Mr. Bruntjen. Can we start over on my left and work around the courtroom and get the other appearances.

MS. MISTRY: Sure. Armeen Mistry, Your Honor, on behalf of Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson.

THE COURT: Could I get a spelling of the first and last name?

MS. MISTRY: I have a card as well to give to the court reporter. A-R-M-E-E-N. Last name is M-I-S-T-R-Y.

1	MR. SILTON: Steven Silton, Your Honor, on
2	behalf of Omarr Baker and Tyka Nelson.
3	MR. GRANATH: Nicholas Granath on behalf of
4	Alfred Jackson.
5	THE COURT: Nicholas, your last name?
6	MR. GRANATH: G-R-A-N-A-T-H, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Thank you.
8	MR. CROSBY: David Crosby and Laura Halferty on
9	behalf of Bremer Trust, the former special administrator.
10	I'll move up when our motion is up.
11	MR. LOFTUS: Alex Loftus for Brianna Nelson and
12	the minor, V.N.
13	THE COURT: Can I get the last name again?
14	MR. LOFTUS: Loftus.
15	THE COURT: Okay.
16	MS. SANTINI: Jennifer Santini, also for
17	Brianna Nelson and V.N.
18	MR. STOLTMANN: Andrew Stoltmann for Brianna
19	and V.N.
20	MR. SILVER: Good morning, Your Honor. Alan
21	Silver on behalf of L. Londell McMillan.
22	MS. WILLIAMS: Good morning, Your Honor.
23	Robin, R-O-B-I-N; Ann, A-N-N; Williams, W-I-L-L-I-A-M-S,
24	for L. Londell McMillan.
25	MR. DAHL: Nathaniel Dahl on behalf of Sharon,

Norrine, and John Nelson.

MR. CASSIOPPI: Good morning, Your Honor. Joe Cassioppi and Mark Greiner on behalf of Comerica. We also will be here representing Paisley Park Facility, LLC. And with us here today from Comerica is Angela Aycock.

MR. BERG: Marc Berg, M-A-R-C, B-E-R-G, here on behalf of Venita Jackson Leverette.

MR. PARKHURST: Good morning. Cameron

Parkhurst here on behalf of Darcell Gresham Johnston.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Kane, I've had you in front of the Court enough. We have a microphone that is giving us some static. And, unfortunately, it's the one in front of you, so I'll just ask you to speak loudly.

MR. KANE: Thank you, Your Honor.

Again, Thomas Kane, appearing relating to the motion to determine heirs.

The -- first, let me address what I think are the major issues that have been raised by the people who opposed that motion, and that is that they do not believe they are adequately protected by the statute. And they don't believe that they are adequately protected by the Court order in the event that the one-year time period that's in the statute goes by and they somehow will be

precluded from proceeding.

We believe, Your Honor, as we've indicated in our papers, that they -- that it is an incorrect reading of the statute. Minnesota Statute 524.3-412 says:

"Formal Testacy Proceedings; Effect of Order; Vacation."

And it goes on to read, "Subject to appeal and subject to vacation..."

All of those words have been precluded from most of the briefs provided by the individuals who have objected to the determination of heirs.

It is clear to us, Your Honor, that that statute was designed exactly for this situation; namely, to protect people in the situation whose case is on appeal. And, therefore, it says specifically, "subject to appeal and vacation..."

The second part is I would read down to Romanette 3, under arabic 3, it says, "12 months after entry of the order sought to be vacated."

That's our main basis for making an argument. We want that 12-month period start to run. And the purpose of that 12-month period is, once this Court signs an order, everybody in the world has 12 months to make a claim. And we have already had a little over a year since Prince's death, so we would have had, in essence, a little over two years for everybody in the world to make

a claim. And we've had during this period of time people from all over the United States and outside the United States come forward and make claims.

So I don't think, even though I obviously don't know, that this hasn't been disseminated throughout the whole world, that everybody basically knows -- who knew of Prince knows that he died. And so if there's any claim, I think they are well protected.

And the statute contemplates the one-year period of time. The statute imposes on the parties who are running the estate, who is Comerica, and it imposes on the Court to set that time period to start to run.

So when the Court rules, which we request that it do so this week or next week or whenever it chooses to do so, if it does do so, everybody will have one-year to make a claim.

Now, as to those people who are already on appeal, they are covered by the first half a dozen words of the statute. They are on appeal, so they are fully protected.

And as we talked off the record, the issue was raised, well, what about those folks who actually aren't subject to the appeal because they didn't appeal. There are other people, but they are in the same situation. If the Court puts that language in, "similarly situated," I

think that will be adequate to protect them as well.

So as it relates to the statute and the common law, everybody is fully protected, the people who are on appeal and the people who have made a claim.

Finally, the only other issue that I'd like to address is that, as I was taught many years ago when I first started practicing law, the only way to reduce costs in litigation is to reduce the time.

These lawyers will fill the time no matter what. And so we need to end the time. And we need to start the time as quickly as possible and end the time. Because the longer it runs, the greater the costs are to the Estate, the greater the costs are to the heirs and potential heirs, and the greater dissipation of the assets.

So, for those reasons, Your Honor, we would request the Court enter the order that we proposed or something similar.

Unless the Court has some questions, I'll sit down.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Bruntjen.

MR. BRUNTJEN: Your Honor, I would just like to say that I agree with everything Mr. Kane said. I would just like to add -- I mean, I think the heirs have waited

long enough. It's time to make a determination and let the clock start running.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I'm going to let Mr. Cassioppi go next and raise the issue regarding the issue of the intestacy that you raised.

MR. CASSIOPPI: Yes, Your Honor, a few things. First, from a procedural standpoint, we support the motion of the non-excluded heirs. From the procedural standpoint, the Court has done everything it needs to do to enter this order.

No person has credibly challenged the fact that any of the six non-excluded heirs are anything but that, the heirs of the decedent.

No person has come forward with a will. And Bremer Trust, the former special administrator, did a substantial and thorough search for a will. None was found. And so the Court is at a position now where it is -- this issue is ripe and the time has come, in our view, to enter this order.

We support everything that Mr. Kane stated, but wanted to emphasize a few points. We, just within the last two or three weeks, received yet another individual wanting -- applying to be tested for DNA and to be determined whether he was a child of the Decedent. And

that coincided with the one-year anniversary of Prince
Rogers Nelson. Our concern is and why we support this
one-year clock getting started is that if we don't do
that and if we wait until every single person who brings
a challenge, their challenge goes all the way through the
Courts and this could go for years. And so in the
interest of finality and certainty, we support this
order.

The point that the Court raised as to intestacy, the Court has entered a number of orders in this matter that are premised upon the fact that Prince Rogers Nelson died without a will. And, in fact, the Court has in certain orders made specific findings to that effect.

But just like how a determination of heirship starts the one-year clock running on any new heirs coming forward, a determination of intestacy does the same thing.

So if the Court as part of this order, which -- and the non-excluded heirs specifically requested this relief in their petition. If the Court as part of its order determined that Prince died without a will, it will start a one-year clock for anyone to come forward with a will. And if they don't, then that ends the matter under the Minnesota Probate Code.

And so for the same reasons why we want a determination of heirship -- certainty, finality -- we also ask the Court formally enter an order that Prince Rogers Nelson died intestate, without a will, so that we can start that one-year clock running for the time for anyone new to come forward with a will.

THE COURT: I'd invite anyone else that wishes to address this issue. When you do so, please give us your name. And, secondly, try not to be repetitious.

MR. LOFTUS: Alex Loftus for Brianna Nelson.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOFTUS: Your Honor, the issue here with the timing is the issue currently up on appeal could create new avenues for additional heirs that haven't brought claims presently. So what could happen is if a ruling on the appeal -- in one of the two appeals six months from now, eight months from now, ten months from now -- if ten months from now we have a ruling on appeal, it creates a law or creates a new avenue for heirs to claim and then people are left with only two years to file -- two months to file their claim. And that's -- the whole purpose of the statute is that you have one-year from the time that you knew you potentially had a claim.

So if the appellate court makes a ruling that

opens the door, then any outstanding claimant would be incredibly prejudiced if they only had the two months left to claim.

The other issue is -- I'm new to this case, and I've read everything coming in. I've seen that everything has been handled very carefully and cautiously. It's been, you know, kind of a "measure twice, cut once" case all through the proceedings. And as of January, it was too soon to determine the heirs. And as of January, I'm sure everything is the same as it was now. Nothing has changed since then.

In order to, you know, grant this motion, the potential risk of creating, you know, a determination of heirs, everything that follows from that and the risk of having to unwind all of that and the expense of having to unwind that weighed against potentially waiting another -- I mean, to enter any of the motions in three months to wait on one of the appeals, or six months later when the other appeal is on.

THE COURT: Let me throw this out -- and I throw it out as a question to you but to the media and the public as well. It's very possible that the Court of Appeals would say, "Judge Eide, you didn't do everything you needed to do. We are remanding it back to the District Court for further proceedings."

And then we do what we need to do down here, and I make a determination yes or no, thumbs up or down regarding the heirs. And then it goes back up to the Court of Appeals, and then there is a request that the Supreme Court review it. We could be looking at a couple of years before we could make this determination.

MR. LOFTUS: No one is asking you to wait a couple years. What's being requested is to immediately determine heirs.

THE COURT: What I'm asking is: What's going to be different in three months?

MR. LOFTUS: The appellate court could -- well, we could lose in appeal. Or the other appeal could lose. Or, you know, it depends on how we lose the appeal too. The way that order is entered could change, you know, how to handle the case.

So the harm of waiting for a couple months until that appeal is decided, weighed against the harm of making a decision too early and the potential risk of the appeals being successful and the mess that would ensue and the expense that would ensue compared to just a couple of months of simply entering a continuance order, I guess that's all that needs to be done. It doesn't need to be denied. Just simply enter and continue it. Hang on to the order. You can enter an order the day the

appellate ruling comes out.

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THE COURT: What is the briefing schedule or oral argument schedule or the timing that you would anticipate the Court of Appeals making a decision in your matter?

MR. LOFTUS: My brief -- my reply brief is due,
I think, on the 18th. And then they have the argument,
what's that, about 60 days out. And they have to rule
within 90. My assumption is -- I'm not terribly familiar
with Minnesota Appellate Court, how they handle things,
but if they're aware that there is an urgency, hopefully
things would move faster.

THE COURT: By your schedule, I think I can extrapolate that the Court of Appeals would rule probably by October.

MR. LOFTUS: Okay. So we're talking about waiting until October versus all the attendant risks to enter an order too soon. It's the balancing of that, which it seems like the cautious, measured approach would be to enter a continuance until October.

THE COURT: You've looked at my thoughts or jottings that I disseminated in our meeting a few minutes ago, and you've heard Mr. Kane's comments about the way the statute is written. You don't believe that your clients would be protected?

MR. LOFTUS: Not entirely.

THE COURT: Or I should say your clients or similarly situated people.

MR. LOFTUS: I'll be honest, Your Honor. If this was a question of waiting for three years versus adopting what you proposed, then what you are proposing makes sense.

If it's a question of waiting until October, might as well not create the risk of -- there's all sorts of things. I mean, we're smart lawyers. We can pick at that order forever. It's just not worth the risk for just a couple months.

And then -- certainly this is not -- by entering and continuing the motion, come October you could enter what then makes sense then to enter that type of order. But for now, after how long we have already waited versus how much longer we need to wait for a determination of the appeals, it just seems that the safe course is to hang on for a couple more months.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Continuing around the room.

MR. BERG: Your Honor, Mark M. Berg on behalf of Venita Jackson-Leverette.

Venita Jackson-Leverette is a party to the first filed appeal with respect to your protocol order.

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That is what we appeal. Our appeal is scheduled for oral argument at the end of June. The argument -- I don't want to add much to what we put in our memorandum of law that we filed and that the other parties have responded to. We do just have a side note. We do not want this matter to drag on forever. Nobody does. All that we're asking is that the determination of heirship, with all the -- with everything that that incidentally implies, be deferred until after the appeals. Now, we don't want that to run on forever. We appreciate the work that the Court put into the proposals that you discussed with us back in chambers.

We also appreciate the pointing out that it's unclear as to whether or not this order at this point would be subject to a stay of proceedings because the matter-related issue is on appeal.

What we struggle with, however -- first of all,

I agree with everything Mr. Loftus says about we think on
balance that there will be more harm than good in not
deferring this decision until some later point in time.

Second, I'm not clear what the compulsion is to need to determine heirs at this point. From what I saw from the moving papers was simply an a fortiori argument, that it's time to do this now, although nothing has changed since January.

THE COURT: Could you define your Latin term 1 2 for my court reporter? MR. BERG: Okay. Just, you know, by the mere 3 fact of -- by the mere fact. 4 5 THE COURT: And can you say it one more time? MR. BERG: A fortiori. 6 7 THE COURT: Thank you. I see from the motion they don't 8 MR. BERG: 9 want to do anything with respect to distributing assets or anything that substantive, and so it's kind of unclear 10 11 to me why that requires a compulsion that they determine 12 heirs now. And, also, if they are confident that they are 13 14 going to be determined as heirs right now, again, I'm not 15 seeing what the compulsion is to do this now. 16 We would respectfully weigh that this be 17 deferred at least until -- at least until the first round 18 of the Court of Appeals with respect to our appeal, which 19 is consolidated with the Gresham Johnston appeal, as well 20 as the Brianna Nelson and V.N. appeal, be determined by 21 the Court of Appeals along with the 30-day period for 22 either party to seek further review from the Supreme 23 Court. At least to revisit it then. 24 THE COURT: Thank you. 25 Mr. Parkhurst, any thoughts?

MR. PARKHURST: Your Honor, I won't belabor it, representing Darcell Gresham Johnston.

Mr. Loftus and Mr. Berg have made some very great points. I think that if you are inclined to make a determination now, that other "similarly situated" language that we discussed, I think, is pretty important because of the one statute that has the "and" piece where they didn't know about death and, as in this case, it was hard to argue his passing, that Prince Rogers Nelson had died.

So that would be my one caveat if you are inclined to do it now, but I also agree with them that a short period of -- a shorter period of time would not cause a problem.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else?

MR. DAHL: Yes, Your Honor. Nathaniel Dahl on behalf of Sharon, Norrine, and John Nelson. We join in the request for determination of heirs. As presented by the Court in the proposed order that we had discussed, that would protect the interests of the appellant.

The issue is: What do we do about additional claims? We want to avoid having the Estate spend resources into perpetuity addressing those matters and start the statutory deadline.

1 THE COURT: All right. Anyone else? All right. We will close the hearing with 2 3 respect to that issue. MR. PARKHURST: I think our party -- can we be 4 excused? 5 6 THE COURT: Why don't we just take a two-minute 7 recess here. Let some people move around. If there is 8 somebody at the table that doesn't feel that you're going 9 to be needing to be heard on the other matters, perhaps 10 you could yield to other counsel. 11 MR. PARKHURST: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 13 (Recess in the proceedings.) 14 THE COURT: All right. We'll go back on the 15 record. The second matter before the Court today is that 16 of the complaint by Brianna Nelson versus Paisley Park Facility and the other Defendants I previously noted. 17 A motion for dismissal under Rule 12 of the 18 19 Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure has been brought. 20 don't know exactly who brought the motion for dismissal 21 to start out with, but a memorandum has been filed with the Court and it's been signed by attorneys for Comerica, 22 23 as well as for, I think, all but one of the non-excluded 24 And I'm going to let Mr. Cassioppi start us out.

MR. CASSIOPPI: Thank you, Your Honor.

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As you just mentioned, we are here on actually two motions to dismiss: one brought by Paisley Park Facility, LLC, and then five of the non-excluded heirs, everyone with the exception of Ms. Tyka Nelson.

And then Bremer Trust has its own separate motion to dismiss that Mr. Crosby will be addressing because there is -- there are two substantive claims that are brought against Bremer Trust specifically.

The Plaintiff here, Brianna Nelson, raises four substantive claims arising out of a draft consulting agreement between Paisley Park and the Plaintiff related to the Paisley Park museum.

First, there is a breach of contract claim, and the Defendant in that claim is only Paisley Park Facility, LLC.

Second, there is a promissory estoppel claim, and that is asserted only against Bremer Trust.

Third, there is a tortious interference claim, and that is asserted only against the non-excluded heirs.

And, fourth, there is a fraudulent inducement claim that is asserted against all Defendants.

And we in our motion are moving to dismiss all four of those claims against all Defendants. And the reason for that is that as a matter of law, just on the pleadings -- and the pleadings encompass the exhibits to

the pleadings, including the draft consulting agreement -- just on the pleadings and the allegations in the pleadings, Ms. Nelson has not asserted or adequately pled any of her claims as a matter of law.

Let's start with the breach of contract claim.

There are at least two fatal flaws with that claim, based upon the way it's pled in the complaint.

First, the draft consulting agreement, which is attached as an exhibit to the complaint, is not signed by Paisley Park Facility.

THE COURT: Can I stop you for a moment?

MR. CASSIOPPI: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's referred to in your memorandum as a "draft consulting agreement." I'm familiar with documents that have been drafted by attorney's offices that have, I'll call it, a "watermark" type of thing where it says "draft" across the front of it. Was there anything about this document that identified it as a draft?

MR. CASSIOPPI: Based upon the allegations in the pleading, in the complaint, and the actual document, there was no watermark or anything of that nature. It was sent to Brianna Nelson unsigned by Bremer Trust or any of its representatives. But that is all we have in the record currently before the Court. So no watermark

or anything of that sort.

THE COURT: So I'm going to tell you and the other counsel that perhaps something that I'm most interested with respect to this argument is -- to go back to contract law 101 in our law school days -- there's an offer. You send the agreement, and there is an acceptance, you sign it and you return it. Address that now or whenever it fits into your argument.

MR. CASSIOPPI: Yes. We cited the asbestos products decision from the Minnesota Supreme Court on that point, Your Honor. And that is, yes, under basic contract law, if I make an offer and you accept it, under many circumstance that creates a contract. But there is an exception to that, and that exception is that if parties reduce an agreement to writing and specifically make the fact that the agreement is not final until that — until the writing is signed by both parties, then you don't have a contract unless it's signed by both parties.

If you look at the agreement here, which we can because it's in the record, it has some language on it that states -- above the signature block that states "accepted and agreed." And based upon that language, we are within that exception recognized by the Court in the asbestos products case where, despite the fact that one

party sends a contract and the other party signs it, there's not a valid agreement because the parties using the language that they chose to use in the agreement specifically made both parties signing it a condition precedent to the agreement being finalized. So for that reason, based on the asbestos products case, there was not a final binding agreement here.

In her response, Ms. Nelson points out that there's an exception to the exception. And that is also recognized in the asbestos products case, which is that if you have an agreement that is set forth in writing and only one party signs it, or even if no one signs it but the parties actually move forward and start performing on it, well, then you can have an agreement even if it isn't signed.

The problem with that exception is that it doesn't apply here, based upon the allegations in complaint. There are no allegations in the complaint that the Plaintiff here did anything to perform under this agreement after she signed it. Because of that, the exception to the exception does not apply.

The second reason why this agreement cannot form the basis for being a contract claim is that this agreement required court approval. The Court in June entered an order June 8, 2016, and at that point --

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and this is important -- Brianna Nelson was an interested party. She was receiving notices of all filings entered by the Court.

On June 8th, the Court entered an order that requires specific court approval for any, quote,
"entertainment or intellectual property exploitation agreement which the Estate grants rights that extend beyond November 2nd, 2016."

Because the consultancy agreement here had a one-year term and it was related to an estate entertainment asset, it required court approval to be effective and binding.

And, in fact, with respect to the six other consultancy agreements that Paisley Park Facility entered into with the non-excluded heirs, Bremer Trust sought and obtained court approval before those agreements were approved.

THE COURT: Can you tell me where that is in the record?

MR. CASSIOPPI: The Court entered an order on November 8, 2016, approving consultancy agreements. You see that that order was filed under seal, but the Court did, in fact, enter that order on that date.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. CASSIOPPI: And so based upon the plain

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language of the Court's June order, this agreement could not be valid and binding until the Court approved it.

Ms. Brianna Nelson is presumed to have knowledge of that, having received a copy of the June order. And, therefore, this agreement, unsigned agreement, cannot form the basis of a breach of contract.

The next claim is tortious interference, and this claim, as I mentioned, is asserted only against the non-excluded heirs. Here too there are two fundamental problems with the Plaintiff's claim.

The first is the claim is premised on the existence of a valid and binding contract, the tortious interference with a contract. So for the reasons we just discussed, there is no valid and binding contract, and so one of the essential elements of the tortious interference claim has not been met.

The second reason why this claim fails as a matter of law is, in addition to the requirement that there be a contract that was interfered with, Plaintiff was required to plead that the non-excluded heirs engaged in an action that was either independently tortious or in violation of state or federal law or regulation.

Here, if you look at the allegations and complaint, the only allegation against the non-excluded heirs upon which the Plaintiff here basis or approaches

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interference claim is in paragraph 27 of the complaint.

And it states: "Upon information and belief, the individual Defendants have induced Bremer Trust and Paisley Park to breach the expeditious consultancy agreement."

That's it. And so there is no allegation of independent tort. There is no allegation of any violation of state or federal laws or regulation that would give rise to a tortious interference claim. For that reason, Plaintiff has not pled an adequate claim.

If you look at her opposition, Ms. Nelson requests a leave to amend, but the Court shouldn't grant doing that on this count because any amendments would be futile. The only grounds for proposed amendment that are set forth in the opposition is a reference to, quote, "e-mail exchange detailing the fact that the corporate Defendants required that all heirs had to assent to payment to Brianna." Again, this suffers from the same problem. There is no allegation of a tort. There is no allegation of a violation of a law or regulation.

And so for those reasons, the Court should not grant leave to amend because then the amendment would be futile.

Briefly, on the last two claims, fraudulent inducement. We set forth in our brief why there is not

an adequately pled fraud claim as to any of the specific elements of a fraud claim under Minnesota law, and I want to talk about just two of them here today.

First, this is a fraudulent inducement claim, and it is a fraudulent inducement claim based upon fraud by omission. And to plead a fraud by omission claim under Minnesota law, the Plaintiff needs to plead with particularity, among other things, that the Defendant had a legal or equitable duty to communicate facts to the Plaintiff. There is no such allegation in the complaint here, so for that reason alone the fraudulent inducement claim fails.

Second, the Plaintiff was required to plead with particularity reliance. And what she alleges as far as reliance is that she was induced to give up objection she had to Graceland Holdings operating the Paisley Park museum based on this consultancy agreement.

But there's a temporal problem here, and that is Brianna Nelson gave up any objection to Graceland operating the museum during August, and it wasn't until October that she received this consultancy agreement. So it is impossible, as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, for Brianna Nelson to have relied on a contract that she did not receive for another two months to give up any potential claims or objection to Graceland Holdings

operating the museum.

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So for those reasons and the reasons set forth in our brief, there is not a valid fraud claim here.

Finally, for promissory estoppel, that is served only against Bremer Trust. But to the extent that that is construed as being in reality a claim against the Estate, it fails for three reasons.

First, there is no valid or enforceable promise. The only promise that is alleged here is, well, the draft consultancy agreement was sent to me. A promissory estoppel claim does not lie simply because the parties did not finalize the contract. And without some sort of other or additional affirmative promise, there is no valid claim.

Second, Ms. Nelson needs to plead reliance.

And she pleads the exact same reliance that she pleads with respect to her fraud claim: I relied on this promise about the consultancy agreement in giving up objection two months earlier.

Well, it's that same temporal problem. She gave up those objections in August, didn't receive this agreement from Paisley Park until October.

Finally, the Plaintiff has not pled justice.

She has not pled any out-of-pocket damages, any

out-of-pocket costs, anything else that would give rise

1 to injustice upon which a promissory estoppel claim would 2 attach. 3 So for all of those reasons, we respectfully request that the Court grant our motion to dismiss and 4 5 dismiss all claims against all Defendants with prejudice. Okay. Why don't you go ahead with 6 THE COURT: respect to Bremer, Mr. Crosby. 7 Thank you, Your Honor. I'll speak 8 MR. CROSBY: 9 up with no mike, but I will be short. 10 All the claims in the complaint with respect to 11 Bremer are aimed at Bremer and its role specifically as 12 special administrator; in other words, a fiduciary to the 13 Estate. It is no longer a fiduciary to the Estate. 14 role now is being fulfilled by Comerica. And so, as we 15 noted in our brief, on the substantive arguments that 16 Comerica relied upon, we adopt those arguments as well. 17 As for the procedural argument as to why Bremer 18 Trust itself should not be a Defendant in the case, we 19 will rely upon what we put in our brief. Unless you have 20 any questions, I'm happy to sit down. 21 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Crosby. 22 All right. Who would like to speak in favor of 23 the motion at this point? 24 MR. DAHL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Dahl.

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MR. DAHL: Your Honor, joining in the motion for dismissal -- and I don't have anything to add with respect to the pleadings. I just want to particularly note the lack of specific allegations involving my specific clients: Sharon, Norrine, and John Nelson. It's sufficient as a matter a law, but for purposes of the complaint, we ask that it be dismissed.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Give me just a minute. All right. Anyone else?

All right. Who would like to speak against the motion?

MR. LOFTUS: Alex Loftus for Brianna Nelson.

I'll start with the contract formation. So the contract formation is a question of intent. Here you can infer a lot of the intent from the offer that was sent. The offer doesn't have any markings that indicate it's a draft. The offer is dated August of 2016. There's no future dating in there. There is no reference to court approval included in the offer. There's no express language as to any condition requiring signature for performance. So that's all right included in the offer.

The other thing that's included in the offer, and it's most important to -- I'll keep on addressing it as we go forward -- is performance. So the offer defined

what performance is required of Ms. Nelson, and it is extremely minimal.

Full performance is don't sell any memorabilia. Don't otherwise give it away or make it unavailable. So the key thing is that she had stuff and that her stuff and the other people who signed consultancy agreements may be useful to the museum. They don't know what it is, but just hang on to it. And all you have to do to fully comply is hang onto this stuff. And then, if we want you to come do an interview or come do something, be available for it.

It doesn't say she'll take two interviews per year. It doesn't say, you know, attend the facility on these holidays. It just says "be available." It's this extremely low standard. And that's in -- you know, part 1A is the "be available" language, and part 4B is, "Do not do anything to impair ownership of material," which is the memorabilia stuff.

The other thing that goes to what Defendants knew is part B, which is just kind of a whereas provision: "Consultant possesses certain unique information, history, stories, photographs" --

THE COURT: Slow down.

MR. LOFTUS: Oh, I'm sorry.

"Consultant possesses certain unique

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information, history, stories, photographs, and other memorabilia about Prince."

So in the offer, they communicate that you, Brianna, have stuff that we want. Hang on to it. what does Brianna do? She hangs onto the stuff. doesn't sell any of it. Right when -- right after Prince died, that summer and into that fall, that's when all this memorabilia had peak value. And she didn't sell any of it. Now it's been -- outside of this little area of Minnesota, Prince is just -- is not fresh news and not a hot commodity. But she didn't sell any of her memorabilia during that time. She didn't go try and make any other deals to sell her rights to her stories or to do more interviews. So she didn't -- she limited herself in reliance on this agreement during that time period. These are all valuable commodities, whether it's the things, her time, her stories. These are all valuable items that she didn't otherwise sell or transfer to anyone else on reliance of the agreement. I mean, it's a low standard for what performance is, but she fully performed every part of this agreement.

The other issue is when we get to the Court approval, which may be an affirmative defense, but this is an extremely fact-intensive inquiry as to whether performance was possible. Essentially, that's what they

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are arguing, that they could not perform because of court approval.

But I don't understand why -- and it will be a weird issue to litigate as the case goes on -- the Court wouldn't approve this. There's nothing wrong about it. It's not argued that the Court would never approve this agreement. It's just this -- you know, the connection between court approval is necessary and the court actually not approving it. That's their burden to prove in an affirmative matter. And at this stage on a motion to dismiss with no affidavit before the Court, they just can't get there.

The other thing that's interesting is that the Court order asking for approval of the contract is three and a half months after the contract is dated in August. This was long after, you know, Ms. Nelson signs the agreement that there is any court order regarding approval. And, again, this may be an appropriate affirmative defense to litigate later, but it's not a basis for a motion to dismiss.

The other thing, as to formation, so you have -- you have the offer communicated. Then you have -- Brianna does -- fully performs by this minimal performance necessary. And then after that, during her performance, it's communicated by Defendants that we are

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going to pay you. We're awaiting payment. The payment is delayed for X, Y, Z reason. Nothing about we don't have an agreement, we never agreed to this. Instead, it's explaining delays for why payment hasn't come, which, again, is operating against their performing and operating pursuant to the agreement that already existed.

Moving on to tortious interference. As pled, I think we have it titled as "Tortious Interference With Contract." Here in Minnesota we can also -- we don't need to have -- actually have an existing contract for a tortious interference claim. It can be tortious interference for economic opportunity. Even if there weren't a contract in existence, there clearly was the potential for a contract that was known to all the Defendants. And that would be sufficient even if the Court found a contract didn't exist. You'd still have a tortious interference claim of that sort.

THE COURT: How was it tortuously interfered with?

MR. LOFTUS: The economic --

THE COURT: According to the pleadings.

MR. LOFTUS: According to the pleadings, it's a contract. The complaint is drafted pretty narrow.

THE COURT: But who did what to interfere with the performance in the contract?

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MR. LOFTUS: I can't address that fully without getting beyond the pleadings. So, no, it requires amendment. There should be a lot more meat on the bones.

I'm kind of Monday morning quarterbacking this, but -
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOFTUS: -- it needs more meat. I'll be perfectly honest.

And then, in responding to the motion to dismiss, I can't add more meat to it without turning it into a motion for summary judgment. I would rather have leave to amend to add to that than fight a motion for summary judgment by adding a bunch of new evidence in response. Procedurally, it seems safer that way.

We have some of the same issues on the fraudulent inducement with lack of meat on the bones. We still -- we covered every element necessary to the stated claim of fraudulent inducement. The key issue that was addressed was duty. And this is a fundamental thing that comes up over and over again in fraud cases. You have a duty to tell the truth the moment you open your mouth, and that's just fundamental. So when Defendants communicated this offer, they assumed the duty to be honest about it.

What we believe discovery will show is that there was an intent to secure compliance early in the

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process. And then once they waited for a determination of heirs, then not pay in order to secure compliance as early as possible and pay as late as possible in order to achieve everything they wanted without having to pay for it. So, again, amendment could probably illuminate this some more. Certainly discovery will illuminate this some more. But as to the duty issue, it's pled as stated.

Finally, promissory estoppel. This goes right back to the breach of contract argument. So the promise is contained in the offer. It's a clear, explicit promise. It's relied on. It's relied on by not selling any of the material. It's relied on by not making other It's relied on by not doing anything else to interfere with the Defendants' financial interest in the museum. And then that reliance was justified because she's promised \$100,000 plus \$25,000 every year thereafter so long as she continues this barely minimal So in reliance on that promise that's clear performance. and definite, there is justified reliance and actual damages. And the actual damages came out of the contract.

So I think that covers -- yeah, that covers my whole position. If you have any questions.

THE COURT: Any response, Mr. Cassioppi?

MR. CASSIOPPI: Very briefly, Your Honor.

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Just so that we have a clear record, the consultant agreement is not dated. It references the exhibition operating agreement, which was dated during August, but the exhibition consultant agreement, which forms the basis for this claim, is not dated. And in the complaint, Brianna Nelson alleges in paragraph 22 that she signed it on October 6th, 2016. Just so we have a clear record on that.

With respect to the arguments about performance under the contract, all that the complaint says -- and this is paragraph 34 -- is that "Brianna Nelson has performed and continues to perform her obligations under the exhibition consultant agreement, including being available for personal interviews, being available to provide background information and personal stories for the exhibition and available to review and authorize elements of the exhibition. Brianna Nelson has also offered to loan photographs, letters, and memorabilia to the exhibition."

That is it. So anything that Mr. Loftus said beyond that is not on the record in front the Court. But if you look at paragraph 4A of the agreement, which is attached to the complaint, it does not say that Brianna Nelson is prevented from selling any memorabilia or doing anything else. It's much more limited than that. It

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says: "Consultant at its discretion shall loan to company for use and in connection with the exhibition such photographs, letters, memorabilia, and other material pertaining to Prince as are owned by consultant and available for use in connection with the exhibition."

So it is -- what records or materials she decides to provide to the museum is completely at her discretion.

So this entire argument that Ms. Nelson has shifted to try to prove reliance for purposes of promissory estoppel and to try to prove performance of a contract is not supported by the plain language of the contract. There was no duty, no obligation whatsoever to provide any specific materials, and so there is no -- there was no prohibition on Brianna Nelson selling anything under the plain language of the agreement.

As to fraud, Mr. Loftus mentioned the fact that they covered every element. Well, that's not enough under Minnesota law. You just don't have to recite the specific elements of the claim. You have to plead every single one with particularity, and they've admitted they haven't done that.

And if they want to amend -- if their defense is we have a good-faith basis for amending, we can meet all of these elements, they had an obligation to come

forward with what those allegations would be. They haven't done so, and a need to amend should be denied.

Finally, as far as promissory estoppel is concerned, the only element that the Court needs to focus on is injustice. There is no allegation -- there's been no allegation today and there's no allegation in the pleadings of the injustice element of that claim.

And for all of those reasons, we ask that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.

THE COURT: Mr. Crosby, anything else?

MR. CROSBY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anyone else?

Mr. Kane.

MR. KANE: Thomas Kane again, Your Honor.

I'd like to reiterate what Mr. Dahl said as to his three clients. We would like to make the same position known on the record, that there is no specific allegation as to any wrongful conduct by Tyka Nelson or Omarr Baker relating to any comment relating to fraudulent inducement in any way, shape, or form.

And there is no suggestion, reiterating what Mr. Cassioppi said, that they can make such a good-faith allegation in the future that there is any evidence that somehow they fraudulently induced anybody.

There is no fact in front of this Court for the

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THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Bruntjen.

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MR. BRUNTJEN: Your Honor, Justin Bruntjen for Alfred Jackson. I would just reiterate what Mr. Kane said in regards to Alfred Jackson as well.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Back to you.

MR. LOFTUS: One narrow point in response to what Mr. Cassioppi said. So paragraph -- Mr. Cassioppi addressed that there was no duty to maintain the materials that the -- or the souvenirs. So paragraph 4B of the contract provides that "consultant agrees that it will not at any time do or permit to be done any act or thing contesting or in any way impairing or tendering to impair any part of consultant's rights, title, or interests in the materials."

And "materials" is defined earlier as "any photographs, letters, memorabilia, and all other materials pertaining to Prince as are owned by consultant and available for use in connection with the exhibition."

So those two combined would seem to be interpreted that -- and certainly a reasonable

1	interpretation by Brianna Nelson that she couldn't sell
2	anything.
3	MR. CASSIOPPI: Briefly, Your Honor, ten
4	seconds just to respond to that?
5	THE COURT: Sure.
6	MR. CASSIOPPI: What 4A makes clear is that it
7	is only those materials that consultant provides to the
8	museum in her discretion. So if you read both 4A and 4B
9	together, it makes clear that the only materials that
10	Brianna Nelson is prevented from selling or otherwise
11	impairing are those materials that in her discretion she
12	makes available to the museum.
13	THE COURT: All right. Anyone else on this
14	issue?
15	All right. Hearing none, we'll take a
16	15-minute recess. And we can maybe shuffle some people
17	around. We'll address the motion to quash the subpoena
18	as well as the issue regarding the confidentiality.
19	(Recess in proceedings.)
20	THE COURT: All right. We'll go back on the
21	record.
22	The third matter that we're addressing today is
23	the issue of the subpoena that was served on L. Londell
24	McMillan to request the production of certain documents.
25	I believe that subpoena was served by the Hansen Dordell

1	law firm. But in any event, they have
2	MR. DAHL: Your Honor?
3	THE COURT: Yes.
4	MR. DAHL: If I may, I don't think that's an
5	accurate reflection of the record.
6	THE COURT: Who
7	MR. DAHL: It was served by Omarr Baker's
8	counsel, as I recall.
9	MR. KANE: That's correct, Your Honor.
10	THE COURT: Mr. Kane.
11	MR. KANE: Omarr Baker's counsel served the
12	subpoena. Mr. Dahl opposes that on behalf of his
13	clients, who were not subject to the subpoena.
14	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you for straightening
15	out the record.
16	All right. And so there is a motion, then,
17	filed today to quash that subpoena. Who would like to
18	address the issue in favor of the issuance or the
19	performance of the subpoena?
20	MR. SILVER: Well, I'm we moved to quash the
21	subpoena.
22	THE COURT: Correct.
23	MR. SILVER: Is that what
24	THE COURT: No. What I'd first like to hear is
25	why this subpoena should go forward.

MR. KANE: Your Honor, our office, on behalf of Omarr Baker, issued the subpoena to Londell McMillan, served it in his home state, New York, at his place of business and/or home.

THE COURT: Okay. Just for the record, it's Mr. Kane speaking. Go ahead.

MR. KANE: I'm sorry.

I'll deal with one administrative issue before I get to the request, Your Honor. The issue is -- because it's been raised several times -- namely, did we give notice. And the purpose of the rule, and it's always been the purpose of the rule in giving notice is so that a party receiving the subpoena, or a party such as Mr. Dahl's clients who believe they have interest in the documents, have a right to object.

And what both parties have said -- Mr. Dahl and Mr. Silver have said, we didn't serve the subpoena, the notice exactly the same time. What we did do, which is not really what the rule says, but it says, basically, "at the same time."

Once the subpoena was served, we gave notice. And they had adequate time to object, which is the only purpose and basis of the rule. And that's how it's been interpreted for as long as that rule has been in place; namely, that was put in the rules so somebody can't come

in and say, well, we didn't know you served the subpoena so we had no way -- we had no way to object.

We gave them notice early February. It wasn't responded -- they didn't have to respond for another month. So they had adequate time. They have responded. They have objected. All of their rights are fully protected. So I just want to get that out of the way at the beginning.

The reason for the subpoena is two-fold.

First, the heirs -- the non-excluded heirs believe they have claims against Bremer Bank and, potentially, Londell McMillan and Mr. Koppelman.

Now, I'm going to try to go over some things so we don't have to go off the record and exclude the public. So the Court has got all of it in front of it, so I'm not going to go into a great deal of detail in terms of the mechanics in terms of what the claims are, et cetera.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kane.

MR. KANE: We have two claims that we are aware of now. Those are set forth in our redacted papers involving two events. They involve lots of money, and we want the documents relating to those claims. Now, one of the first questions that's going to be asked is, "Well, what's the reason for drafting this subpoena as you did?"

The subpoena basically has five parts. Three of those parts go to communication with the non-excluded heirs -- four of them go to the non-excluded heirs. One of them relates to our clients, and they have objected to giving us the documents that they have relating to us.

We want to know what information they have attained from us, and they have not stated any reason why they wouldn't give us information relating to us.

Second, the issue is related to the Sharon,
Norrine, and John clients that are represented by
Mr. Dahl. And they have objected, and what we've said is
what we want to do is find out what it is that
Mr. McMillan told them relating to the transactions and
the entertainment deals. That's what we want to know.
We don't want to have all the side information. That's
why it was very limited and very narrow relating to what
we asked for; namely, just tell us what you told the
other non-excluded heirs. Because the other information,
we don't know what it is or where it is. We're not
interested. We are not interested in some personal
issues. What we are interested in is the communication
between and among Mr. McMillan and all the non-excluded
heirs relating to the Prince information.

Now, as is acknowledged in their pleadings, it basically says that -- it's basically after Prince died.

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Now, that relates to everything except subpoena number four, the fourth item, and I'll get to that in a second. So we have two major claims involving a significant amount of money, which is addressed in our papers -- and I'm not going to go into that here -- and we want that information because our clients have a right to know whether or not they have a claim, whether or not they have a right to support Comerica.

And my understanding is, from working with Mr. Cassioppi, that they support us getting Item No. 4; namely, all the information relating to McMillan and Prince. Give us all that information so we can determine whether or not there is, in fact, any claim that exists against McMillan and/or Koppelman.

There's another lawsuit that's been filed.

There's a claim by another party for rescission, which is set forth in our papers, and we would like the information regarding that independently.

The second major issue is whether or not

Comerica decides to make those claims. It's up to

Comerica. For example, today we had the motion to

determine the heirs. Comerica didn't make that motion.

We made the motion. So there are some motions and some

pleadings that the heirs have to make independent of the

personal representative.

THE COURT: Why? Mr. Kane, raise that in the context that all six heirs suggested, at least in the end, that Comerica be appointed the personal representative. One of the issues that was brought up was whether I should appoint L. Londell McMillan or another person as an individual personal representative to work with Comerica. The Court made a decision to just appoint Comerica and encouraged the parties to establish an open line of communication between them.

What I'd really like to see is that everything funnel through Comerica so that we're not having multiple heirs raising multiple issues before the Court. Why can't you talk to Comerica and express your concerns and let Comerica do their job?

MR. KANE: Your Honor, we have done that. And I think Mr. Cassioppi will tell you that, as it relates to our clients, we've raised all of these issues with Comerica. Comerica made a decision not to make the motion to determine the heirs. I asked that question. They said, "We want you to make the motion."

So we have cooperated fully. There isn't any issue that we have brought without talking to Comerica as it relates to the heirs. We specifically asked them.

They said, "We think it's more appropriate that the heirs bring that motion."

We said, "We support it." We said, "We fully support it, but it's your motion." That is the reason we did that.

THE COURT: Thank you for explaining that.

MR. KANE: And that's -- I don't know what's going to happen in the future, Your Honor, but as it relates to all of these issues, but -- I'll digress for a second because we just argued the Brianna Nelson issue. If the Court will remember, our office took the lead on making the motion to determine that Brianna Nelson was not an heir. We did that after talking to the Special Administrator, saying, "Are you going to do this?"

And they said, "No, we're not going to do that. So if it's going to be done, you have to do it."

So we did it. That's the reason we did it. It isn't that we went off on our own. I mean, with all due respect to myself -- I mean, I know how it works, and the special administrator and the personal administrator is supposed to do all this stuff. And we expect Mr. Cassioppi and his colleagues to do all that.

If they ask us to do it because they think it's more appropriate for us to do it, then we will do it because they asked us to do it, which is the reason we're here.

As it relates to the information regarding the

subpoena, let me address number four. Four goes to all of the issues related to communication between and among Prince and anything related to Londell McMillan. We want all that information to determine whether or not that is a claim.

I believe -- and I'm not speaking for him -they will say the special administrator wants that
information. Now, the reason we served the subpoena at
that point in time, because the special administrator was
going to end, theoretically, his role on January 31. And
then we were going to get a personal representative, and
all the non-excluded heirs agreed to a personal
representative. We believe -- I'm just speaking for the
heirs we represent now -- we had to move forward as
quickly as possible to get this moving and not wait until
the process.

We talked to the personal representative. They said, "Listen, we've got to catch up. We've got to get all this stuff done." We didn't specifically ask them at that time, but they said, "We can't -- we've got a lot of issues to deal with."

And so we made an independent decision to serve the subpoena right then and there to get the ball rolling relating to these claims, which we knew existed at that point in time because we talked to the parties that are

objecting to the process and are saying that the deals weren't done right or there's a potential claim against Mr. McMillan or Mr. Koppelman or Bremer Bank.

So that's the reason we did it. We are not trying to step on their toes or go outside the sidelines or anything else, Your Honor. We are trying to work as best we can. And we intend to do it, and we're not going to sit there and make our own independent -- let's pick a fight here, pick a fight there. That's not our goal. That's not what we are doing. We're trying to coordinate, and we're doing it the best we can.

And in this particular case, we went ahead because of the timing between the end of the special administrator and the personal representative because we knew it would take months to get a subpoena served. We knew that it would take a long time to get this process worked out.

And when the personal representative was able to deal with it, we did it. We talked to the personal representative, asked them, "How do you want to handle this?" And that's why we are here today. The reason we needed it is because of the two claims, and we are more than happy -- in fact, we would request -- that the personal representative take the lead on this.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MR. SILVER: Your Honor, if I may be heard first. Mr. Dahl and I both filed a motion to quash.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Silver.

MR. SILVER: The subpoena is directed at Mr. McMillan. I'll lead on this one.

First of all, I should state for the record that Mr. McMillan is in the courtroom today, along with Chrystal Matthews, who is the general counsel of the North Star Group, which is Mr. McMillan's company.

A moment ago, Your Honor, you said that you would prefer that matters be funneled through the personal representative. I think it's important at the outset to state this is a subpoena that was served by counsel for Omarr Baker. It was not served by the personal representative. They've tried to piggyback on the subpoena to a limited extent with respect to one of the requests, but this is not a request that was served by Comerica.

When Comerica first came into this case and -which was around the time that I was retained by
Mr. McMillan, we met with Comerica and we offered to
provide any documents that they might want. We offered
at that point to do it informally. We've never received
a document request from Comerica, whether formal or
informal. And so this is the wrong procedure. This is

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the wrong way to approach this to have one group of heirs serve the subpoena.

And what Mr. Lund said, I think, is helpful in that he divided the subpoena into two parts. It's clear that three or four of the requests specifically request communications between Mr. McMillan and non-excluded heirs, and then two of the requests deal with respect to music entities. And it's helpful to address those two parts separately.

When you talk about -- when we look at the request that asks Mr. McMillan to provide documents with respect to the heirs, to the non-excluded heirs, in essence you have one group of heirs trying to obtain confidential information about Mr. McMillan's relationship with another group of heirs.

If Omarr Baker and his counsel hadn't said -served a subpoena directly upon Sharon Nelson or Norrine
or John Nelson and said, "We would like you to turn over
all of your documents relating to your business plans and
your financial advice and any advice that you received
from Mr. McMillan," this Court wouldn't hesitate in
saying that one group of heirs shouldn't have to turn
over that kind of information to another group of heirs.
And they shouldn't be allowed to do indirectly what they
couldn't do directly.

This is a broad, all-encompassing request.

Mr. Kane just said -- just in response to one of your questions said, "This is a narrow and limited request."

Well, it's not narrow and limited, Your Honor. It is not limited in time. There is a definition section that reports to limited time. But right in their brief -- on page 14 on their brief, when they talked about request number three and four that asks for information about the music entities, they say right in their brief that that request would relate to Mr. McMillan's relationship relating to decedent before his death. So they interpret their own request as not being time limited.

And so Mr. McMillan, as the Court is aware, has had a long relationship with Prince going back to the 1990s. This request is not narrow. It is not focused. It's not directed at the two issues that Mr. Lund indicated to the Court, which was the basis of the subpoena.

You know, lawyers who are in my position that bring motions to quash often use the word that this is a "fishing expedition." And, frankly, I don't like that terminology because it's somewhat trite and people always use it. But, frankly, I have trouble in this case thinking of any other way to describe this because these requests are extremely broad. They basically ask

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Mr. McMillan to produce all documents relating to communications with any of the heirs, whether it's the propounding party or the other, as is the case.

They ask for all communications regarding any music entities, which would go back, as I said, to the 1990s. It's hard to imagine a broader request and a request that is more imposing not only on Mr. McMillan, but basically asking for confidential information about the other parties.

Now, the procedural history is also important, Your Honor. This is not the first time that there has been a request to Mr. McMillan to produce documents. As the Court will recall, there was a prior request and a motion to compel. A document request was served on January 10th, and that was attached to Mr. Dahl's papers that he filed with the Court. And the sole basis of the claim at that point for production of documents was the fact that Mr. McMillan was being proposed as co-personal representative of the Estate at that time. And the Court will also recall that at the January 12th hearing on the determination as to who would serve as personal representative, that Mr. Silton said that he wasn't going to ask Mr. McMillan any questions because he wanted to receive documents.

And then, ultimately, this Court ruled on

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January 18th that Mr. McMillan would not serve as co-personal representative. And the Court ruled specifically at that time that no documents needed to be produced. Well, rather than vacating that order or asking the Court to reconsider that order, instead a subpoena was served, a broad, all-encompassing subpoena. And the only thing that the other -- that Omarr Baker's lawyers have said -- with respect to the basis of the subpoena in their papers, in their opposition papers they said there were two grounds for obtaining this information. One was because they wanted to determine whether there was a conflict between Mr. McMillan's representation of Bremer as advisor to the special administrator and any relationship with the non-excluded heirs.

Mr. McMillan's affidavit or declaration that we submitted in response to this motion made it clear he did not enter into any formal contract with any of those heirs until after this Court's January 18th order, so there couldn't possibly be a conflict. There have been allegations of conflicts. There have been allegations of wrongdoing, but there is simply no evidence to support any of that, Your Honor.

Mr. McMillan has served initially Bremer and now in connection with his contracts for the now admitted

heirs, he's served them well and diligently. And there's no evidence of any kind of wrongdoing here. If Mr. Lund and his client believe that there has been some kind of wrongdoing, the remedy ought to be a lawsuit, if they can do that without violating Rule 11, which we seriously doubt. But there's no basis in the law for any kind of pre-suit discovery.

If you take what Mr. Lund [sic] just told the Court, the reason they want this information is to try to decide whether or not they have a claim. I don't think that's the way the law works, Your Honor. If the party believes they have a claim, they ought to assert that claim and not serve this kind of all-enclosing document request.

The other basis that was alleged -- and I have to be careful how I say this in open court -- but there is a separate lawsuit that was filed, and they -- in their papers, they say that they want information with respect to the allegations that were made in that separate lawsuit.

The fact is that that lawsuit alleges allegations about Mr. Koppelman, not about Mr. McMillan. And Mr. McMillan, again in his affidavit that was filed to this Court, made it clear, to the extent there is an allegation involving a loan transaction, he had nothing

to do with that transaction. He knew nothing about it.

He wasn't involved in it. It had no bearing on him. And
there is nothing in the subpoena that is going to come up
with helpful information with respect to that.

Mr. McMillan is not a party to this case. And so to the extent that this is a subpoena of a nonparty witness, it is governed by the provisions of Rule 45. Rule 45(a) says that the Court is supposed to prevent a nonparty from being subjected to an undue burden in connection with a subpoena. And Rule 45.02D requires that the arrangement for compensation of nonparty be made before the party is required to turn over any documents.

Neither of those rules has been complied with in the case. There has been no offer of reasonable compensation to Mr. McMillan as a nonparty.

The subpoena really raises the broader issue, I guess, of Mr. McMillan's role in this case. He has been subjected to unjustified attacks in a variety of papers that have been filed with this Court over the course of the last month. He is in a very difficult position because he is not in a position to be able to respond to those or, for that matter, even see the matters that have been presented, in some cases, because they have been filed under seal.

We've seen hints of allegations. We've seen redacted documents that appear to be making allegations about Mr. McMillan, but he is in a position where he can't defend himself against these unsubstantiated attacks.

And as a result of that, we have filed a separate matter, which I know the Court doesn't want to address directly today, but a motion that he be allowed to intervene with respect to matters that relate directly to him. And I don't think, Your Honor, that you can really address this current motion effectively without dealing specifically with that intervention issue.

It seems to us that the proper remedy in this case is, number one, for the Court to quash the subpoena on the grounds that it is overly broad, it's unnecessary, it's not tied to any relevant issue of the case.

Mr. McMillan with a more narrowly drawn request that relates specifically to the music entities or some issue that appears to be relevant in the case, we will cooperate with that. Or if Mr. McMillan is named as a party, he will have the normal remedies that a party would have: a right to object to a document request, a right to have this Court ultimately rule on that determination.

But, ultimately, Mr. McMillan needs to be allowed to have access to the documents. If people are going to be making these kind of crazy allegations against him, he should have a right to see what those allegations are and to be able to defend himself. The way to do it is not to serve a subpoena to him as a nonparty asking to produce virtually every document that he might have in his possession.

That's all.

an order dated March 27th. I don't know of the exact filing date at this point, but I directed Comerica in that to make an investigation and to make an informed decision regarding a couple of concerns regarding the first attempt at a Tribute concert. And I think you stated very early in your remarks that you were ready and willing to cooperate with Comerica and provide them documents that would assist them in making -- completing that investigation and making a decision. Towards the end of your comments, you started talking about Comerica issuing a more limited-in-scope subpoena. Could you clarify that?

MR. SILVER: Yes, Your Honor. First of all, as I indicated at the beginning of my remarks, Comerica has not made any request to us for documents, whether by

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subpoena, a document request or informal request. we've never said that we wouldn't produce documents. Mr. McMillan is more than willing to produce documents if they're relevant to any issue in the case. Your March 27th order directed them to pursue an investigation to a narrow and specific point. And if Comerica requests relevant documents with respect to that, we'll produce those documents. This is not about an unwillingness to produce documents. It's an unwillingness to produce every document under the sun in response to such an all-encompassing request, and it's about who is making the request. If Comerica, which is the proper party that was charged by this Court with investigating that issue, wants documents that are relevant to that issue, we will produce them.

Now, in terms of the format, the reason I talked about a formal document request is that right now Mr. McMillan is a nonparty. The subpoena has to be considered in the context of the fact that he is not a party to this case. No one has made any claims against him. There's no allegation, specifically of any kind of wrongdoing, other than these innuendos that are contained in a variety of papers. But no one has made a claim against him. And so his rights should be protected. They're the rights that any nonparty or third party has

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when it comes before this Court in response to a subpoena.

If, in fact, anybody brings a claim against him, then the proper procedure is a Rule 34 document request. Although, again, we offered to provide Comerica informally with documents. But if they make a claim -- if there is a claim that's made in the future -- and we don't think there's any basis to do that, but if there is a claim that is made, well, then we may be talking about more formal procedures at that point. But, at this point, we have been willing to cooperate, and Comerica has not asked us to produce anything.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. CASSIOPPI: Your Honor, if I may -- well, actually, Mr. Dahl, if you want to go first.

MR. DAHL: Briefly, Your Honor, if that's okay with the Court.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Dahl.

MR. DAHL: Your Honor, something has become very evident today as we've proceeded, and what I've observed to be, in watching the counsel for Omarr Baker, retreat from the initial document requests that were attached to the subpoena. There was an effort to characterize those requests as being narrowly tailored to particular issues in the case.

Respectfully, the document requests speak for themselves, the number 5 particularly: "All documents in possession or control of L. Londell McMillan relating to Norrine Nelson, Sharon Nelson, John Nelson, Alfred Jackson, Tyka Nelson and/or Omarr Baker."

There are no limitations there with respect to subject matter, with respect to allowing for protection of my client's personal, financial, business information and of the sorts.

The -- I also want to call attention to the timeline. You saw numerous references in the pleadings to development and things we've learned since this subpoena was served. The -- I ask the Court to take notice and question the true purpose of these requests.

Other things that are readily apparent now -- and I don't think there's any dispute on this -- there is no claim currently asserted against Sharon, John, or Norrine, and certainly not Mr. McMillan, as of yet, although they've suggested they're going to.

I respectfully submit that you can't invoke the Rules of Civil Procedure to go and seek discovery from my clients, nonparties, while at the same time not be subject to the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure and allow the parties a chance to, you know, examine these claims before we go and burden all these --

the parties in the claim.

an attempt to dismiss claims. They haven't brought -- I think Minnesota law is pretty clear on that point.

Absent certain exceptions, we don't get to invoke the Rules of Procedure and seek formal discovery without a claim. We don't have that. And, you know, I think

Mr. Silver's point is well taken, and I will stand by the briefing on this issue with respect to the relevance and the burden.

And, as the Court is well aware, the Rules of Civil Procedure changed in 2013, and we have to have a balancing test -- look at proportionality, the resources of the parties, do the analysis. In this case, my clients, they are not -- they don't have the resources of Comerica. They are not L. Londell McMillan. These are three individuals that had lives outside of these proceedings before all this happened and they were thrust in the middle of this estate matter.

I respectfully submit that we balance those factors and resources of the parties and, you know, blatant over-broadness of these requests, that those factors weigh in support of quashing that subpoena.

With that, I will turn it over to Mr. Cassioppi.

1	THE COURT: Thank you. Before you go,
2	Mr. Silver, I forgot to ask you, during your argument,
3	you mentioned a couple of times the name of "Lund."
4	MR. SILVER: My co-counsel just advised me that
5	I misspoke. You know, when I first met Mr. Kane, one of
6	his partners was Mr. Lund, who I had a great number of
7	dealings with.
8	THE COURT: Okay.
9	MR. SILVER: I think I just sort of in my mind
10	switched those two, so I apologize.
11	THE COURT: I thought that Mr. Lund might have
12	been an attorney that issued the subpoena
13	MR. SILVER: No. I apologize to Mr. Kane and
14	to the Court also.
15	MR. KANE: I don't look like Mr. Lund at all.
16	MR. SILVER: You're a far cry from Mr. Lund.
17	THE COURT: Mr. Cassioppi.
18	MR. CASSIOPPI: Joe Cassioppi on behalf of the
19	personal representative here.
20	Your Honor, we submitted a very limited brief
21	in support of the subpoena as to one of the five issues.
22	Four of the issues deal with Mr. McMillan's dealings with
23	the non-excluded heirs and, at least at this time, we
24	don't care about those.
25	One, though, asked about all documents sent to

or received by any music entity related to Prince Rogers Nelson, and I think that we -- as we construe that subpoena -- though as counsel we have a different opinion on that, we construed it as being limited by the timeframe comment in the definitions which limits documents to those created after April of 2016.

The Court is correct that the Court has directed Comerica to investigate -- to make various investigations relating to the Tribute concert, including related to the commission that Mr. McMillan received related to the Tribute concert. And we've been doing that, although it's been a very fluid situation, as I'm sure the Court is aware.

Because since that has arisen, there has now been another publicly filed lawsuit that has resulted in a situation where the Estate, Bremer, Mr. McMillan, Mr. Koppelman are all Defendants in a lawsuit, all on the same side, of a claim that has been asserted by the party that originally was going to be putting on the Tribute concert. And so our ability and our motivation and confidentiality and privilege issues related to that investigation has been affected by that.

As the Court is also aware, there has also been another subsequent development related to the services

Mr. McMillan performed for the Estate. That has also

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affected the investigation. And while Mr. Silver is right that we did meet with -- or we did meet with Mr. Silver and Mr. McMillan recently, he is overstating a little bit what their offer was.

We, in fact, had requested some information in writing from Mr. McMillan, and they declined to provide that to us and wanted to meet with us instead. And so while they have been willing to provide some information, they certainly -- I believe that Mr. Silver was overstating that position.

The Court is right that it is primarily

Comerica's role and Comerica's job to conduct

investigations for the Estate for the benefit of the

Estate. The reason why we support this subpoena, at

least this limited component of it, is that seeking

records from a nonparty in a different state is a wrong

procedure. And it can take several months. We are at a

point now, with respect to these records, which we do

need for purposes of not only our Court-ordered

investigation related to the Tribute concert, but also

the other subsequent event that has come up, and -- and

just the need to see all correspondence related to all

entertainment deals as a result of the fact that we now

have disputes related to two of them; that it would be

beneficial for Comerica to have these records sooner

rather than later.

And for that reason, that we support the subpoena to the extent that it has been requested and the issue is now ripe that these records be turned over.

As far as proportionality is concerned, I just wanted to -- the defenses that were raised in the motion to quash, again, as we have construed the subpoena, or at least as we read it, the request is only for communications or other documents involving these music entertainment deals for a period of only approximately 12 months is -- you know, it may be a lot of documents, but it's certainly not a lot of documents in light of the compensation that Mr. McMillan received as a result of services that he performed for the Estate.

And so for the reasons set forth in our memorandum, we support the subpoena to the extent that it seeks only these records. In the event the Court denies it, then we will move forward accordingly. And that may require us serving a separate subpoena on Mr. McMillan and Mr. Koppelman. It may involve us working with Mr. Silver and whoever Mr. Koppelman ends up retaining here as counsel to obtain documents informally, or it may involve some combination of both.

But just to be clear, Your Honor, we are well aware of what our role is. And we intend to fulfill

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that, but we do see this aspect of the subpoena as assisting us in obtaining information we need in the administration of the Estate.

THE COURT: I think you've advocated that the Court support the subpoena in Item No. 4. Is that the right number?

MR. CASSIOPPI: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you mentioned the definitional section of the subpoena. If you incorporate that information, do you believe that the subpoena request is sufficiently clear and sufficiently narrow, or should it be redrafted in some way?

MR. CASSIOPPI: I think it could be -- I think it could be judicially construed in a manner that is narrow and proportional. And the way that we would do that is by taking the timeframe language, which is defined from April 2016 to the present, and then just limiting those records that would be responsive to this aspect of the subpoena as records from that timeframe.

To the extent that there are any concerns about the term "music business entity," I think we could -- I think we could make clear, although I think this is implicit in the request, that it's only those music business entities that have proposed deals or actual deals with the Estate.

THE COURT: Who else would like to be heard with respect to this issue?

Very good.

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MR. KANE: Your Honor, I'd like -- may I respond to a couple of points?

THE COURT: Mr. Kane.

MR. KANE: I think there is some -- I think it's helpful if I put into context how document requests work in large electronic cases. The reason it was drafted the way it was is rather than -- there's two basic ways you can ask for documents. There's other ways, but for our purposes there's just two basic ways:

One, give me documents relating to this subject matter, which then requires the party receiving it to read every document and figure it out; or, two, give me documents relating to and from, which only then requires you enter into the computer or you look at your file is it to or from so and so. And then those documents are pulled out.

In many cases, and in this particular case, I believe it's much more limiting and much more decisive just to say we want the documents sent to so and so and from so and so relating to -- after this date. That's the reason it was done that way.

So I think it's -- at least in my experience was a complete overstatement to suggest that this is some

broad-reaching document demand. If you say I want documents to so and so and from so and so, that's a much easier way to deal with it.

Second, we -- the cases that are recited by the -- Mr. Silver related to a claim really go the issue has a lawsuit been started. It kind of -- namely, or are you just serving a subpoena with no frame of reference?

We have an ongoing process here. We are in probate court. The Court is the general jurisdiction that can issue subpoenas, and the parties can receive protection, to the extent that they need any protection.

There is no suggestion that there is not a claim. There are two lawsuits. I mean, there's one lawsuit and then one specific claim, both of which allege very wrongful conduct against Mr. McMillan and Mr. Koppelman. And to the extent that Mr. Silver states that Mr. McMillan is not named, he is a named party and it is alleged that he did those wrongful acts.

Now, I'm not here to say whether he did them or didn't do them. I'm just saying he is party to that and the other parties, not us, have made these allegations: first, as to the Tribute concert; and then, second, as to the other major transaction that was entered on January 31, 2016.

THE COURT: But you are talking about a matter

that is not 10-PR-16-46, the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson.

MR. KANE: I'm not.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KANE: So -- as to the first one. The second one, yes, we are because that's part of the claim, and Mr. Cassioppi has advised the Court of that issue.

There's specific conduct that has been alleged against Mr. McMillan which has caused Comerica, then, to have to make this claim.

We knew about that at that time, so to suggest that there is new information -- we were aware of all that at the time the subpoena was issued. We talked to people. We've been advised by people. That's the reason we issued the subpoena. So the information relating to those two claims is not after-the-fact information.

The other issue that I'd like to point out is -- is that, as it relates to our clients -- and I do want to correct something. We had two clients, and I want to make it clear on the record that the claim relating to Mr. McMillan is by Omarr Baker, not Tyka Nelson. They have different interests, and I want to make it clear on the record as it relates to that issue.

As it relates to the concern that the Court asked me directly, which I think is a key issue in this

case, which is, in my words, why isn't Comerica doing these things and why are you doing these things, because I, the Judge, would like Comerica to do them because that's the way I view it should be done. And I agree with that.

THE COURT: Let me stop you there. I as a judge don't care. I as a judge am very concerned about the amount of attorneys' fees that are building up in this case. And I think if we can funnel it through one entity and do things in a smooth, orderly fashion, the heirs will all benefit in the end.

MR. KANE: And I'm just trying to tell the Court, we totally agree with that, and we're trying to do it. But, as the Court knows, there is a common interest agreement between Bremer and Comerica, which we believe on behalf, at least, of Omarr Baker that there is a potential issue that Comerica may not be able to assert certain claims. We don't know the answer to that.

We're not trying to get in the middle of that, but we need this information to make an evaluation relating to that. We have to get the documents in to proceed as the PR if Comerica had to sign a common interest agreement which limits their rights. And we, therefore, believe we have to go forward to protect our clients' interests regarding those matters independent of

what Comerica does.

THE COURT: I agree with you on that point.

MR. KANE: The other issue that we have, Your Honor, is that -- that, obviously, Mr. Cassioppi and his colleague, Mr. Greiner, have an obligation to all of the heirs. And to the extent that they want to get in the middle of that, they really can't do that, at least from my perspective, and it's awkward. And, therefore, to the extent that there's issues that we believe that need to be addressed, such as is there a claim by our client, our client Omarr Baker, that there is a dispute relating to how this Estate is going to be run, we need to have that information. And that's one of the reasons that we served that subpoena.

Now, I could -- if you go to the other points that have been raised, there's only -- really, fundamentally two points that have been raised by both Mr. Dahl and Mr. Silver: One, there's no claim against Mr. McMillan; there is a claim against Mr. McMillan. You know, we're making a claim. There may not be a lawsuit, but there is a claim. And we're in the parameters of the Court, which gives us the full protection; second, the issue is irrelevant.

Those are the only two points that they've raised. All of this information is relevant as it

relates to at least the two claims that we've talked about; namely, the first -- the Tribute issue; and, second, the issue that arose regarding the contract that was entered on January 31.

So we believe that sooner or later we'll have to get these documents. We believe that Comerica would be well served to get all these documents right now. Our heirs would be well served to get these documents right now to determine is there a claim that can go forward, lawsuit. And if there is, then we do it. If there isn't, then it puts an end to it. Otherwise, we're just -- you know, we just keep pushing it.

And we have to keep pushing it, Your Honor, because we have an obligation to our clients. And, you know, if we think there's something out there, we just can't sit on our hands and say, well, you know, there's all these other people that are making these allegations of this wrongful conduct, but we're not going to do anything. We have to act, and we need the documents to support it.

Once that comes about, we can then sit down with Comerica and say we think there's a claim or there's not a claim and go forward. And that's what we'd like to do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And with respect to your final

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comments, Mr. Kane -- we're repeating things we've already gone through, but just to make clear, yes, you can sit on your hands if Comerica is taking the lead. You've mentioned some reasons why Comerica may not be able to take the lead in certain things, and I do agree with you in that regard.

MR. KANE: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. SILVER: Your Honor, can I --

THE COURT: Any -- Mr. Silver.

MR. SILVER: -- respond briefly?

Mr. Kane just said there is a claim against
Mr. McMillan. I don't know what he's talking about. I
know that there is a separate lawsuit. Not this action,
a separate lawsuit. But I think he's referring to
something more than that, and I think -- more than
that -- and I think that illustrates the problem that we
have in representing Mr. McMillan and the problems
Mr. McMillan has.

There's all of these allusions to a claim or references to some kind of wrongdoing, but much of that has been filed under seal. There was, I understand, a conference with the Court a couple weeks ago in which Comerica talked about some of the concerns that had been raised. But we weren't privy to that. We don't know what those allegations are. And so if Mr. Kane or

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Mr. Cassioppi or the Court knows what the claim is, we don't. We don't know what he's referring to.

THE COURT: Mr. Silver, let me assure you that we have not discussed anything as to the merits of any claim against Mr. McMillan without Mr. McMillan having an opportunity to have counsel present.

MR. SILVER: I certainly appreciate that, Your Honor. And, certainly, as Mr. Cassioppi has advised us of a hearing that may be scheduled later at the end of this month, and we certainly would want to participate in that hearing if these kinds of allegations are going to be made against our client.

Another thing Mr. Kane said is that I said that Mr. McMillan was not named as a defendant in that separate lawsuit. I don't think I said that because he was named as a defendant. But what I said is the allegations that were made relate largely or perhaps solely to a loan that Mr. Koppelman is involved in.

And Mr. McMillan has filed an affidavit in this case saying that he was not involved in that. He didn't know anything about it. The first he learned about it was when that lawsuit was filed and when he was presented that information by counsel in this case.

So to the extent there is any allegation of wrongdoing in connection with that lawsuit, the

allegations -- yes, he's named as a defendant, but it does not appear that those allegations are directed against him.

Finally, Your Honor, I think the concern that we really have here is that this is a subpoena that was a broad, all-encompassing subpoena that has been issued on behalf of one set of heirs against another set of heirs but doing that indirectly by serving it upon

Mr. McMillan. If the Court opens the door to that, are the other -- are SNJ going to then be allowed to serve subpoenas on Mr. Baker? Are the parties going to get into a fight with each other? I think that the Court's concept that this should be funneled through Comerica makes sense.

And with respect to Mr. Cassioppi's comments, what he has said is that he wants to use the existing subpoena and have the Court narrowly construe it or construe it in a different manner. It seems to me that's a very convoluted way for Comerica to try to get the information it wants.

Again, they never specifically asked us for documents. They asked us written questions, which we responded to orally instead, but they never requested any documents. It seems like rather than trying to take somebody else's subpoena and try to construe it in a more

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narrow manner, it makes more sense for Comerica to direct any questions it has to us or request any documents that it wants from us. If we can produce them informally, we will. If it requires a more formal subpoena, then so be it. But I believe that we can probably produce any information they want in an informal matter. It just depends, you know, of course, on what it is they request.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SILVER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Dahl.

MR. DAHL: Your Honor, I don't think I need to address the claims made by Mr. Kane at this point. I think those positions are well stated in that the positions they're taking are inconsistent. We have a claim, but we need discovery to go find out if we have a claim. I think it's inconsistent and, as I stated before, improper under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

But I would like to follow up Mr. Cassioppi's comment. And in the event that the Court is inclined to and traditionally interpret the subpoena that's in a narrow a way as proposed by Mr. Cassioppi, we respectfully submit that it be done in a way that protect my clients' interests.

It's beyond dispute that they have communicated with Mr. McMillan regarding their personal, financial,

and business dealings. The -- those matters, frankly, should be excluded from such a requirement. And if they are going to be produced, they need to be protected.

And I agree with Mr. Silver in that we are opening up a different path in the case, potentially, if we are going to allow one group of heirs to peer into the business dealings of other heirs in a case like this, in a case as unique as this involving the assets and interests of a party implicated by a death.

Finally, I just note the burden that we're imposing on the parties and various participants in these proceedings.

Now, as the Court has noted, we've seen influxes of litigation, both early on and building up again in late 2016 or the fall of 2016, and we really hate to see the parties continue to be burdened by significant expense over, well, what has been characterized as a "fishing expedition."

So just to reiterate, there is no claim. If there is, it needs to be thoroughly vetted before we start burdening the parties.

To the extent the Court is inclined to agree with Mr. Cassioppi's interpretation of the request and direct communication through Mr. Cassioppi, I would ask that my clients' interests be protected.

Thank you.

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THE COURT: Thank you.

Any further response?

Okay. Hearing none, then I will move to the final issue that will be addressed by the Court today. This Court in the fall of 2016, or early during the administration of this Estate, has issued orders that may be referred to as "protocols" or "direction" to the special administrator as to trying to make sure that the non-excluded heirs' concerns were considered and at the same time allow the special administrator to proceed forward in a prompt and orderly fashion to enter into licensing agreements or other contracts to attempt to raise funds necessary for the administration of the Estate and the payment of taxes.

Once the special administrator's term ended and the personal representative was appointed here, the Court issued an order which generally extended those protocols to apply to the personal representative as well, and we have a discussion now about the release of certain information regarding that. It was brought to the Court's attention by Mr. Dahl, but I know that Mr. Cassioppi is very concerned about this as well.

Who would like to address the Court first?

MR. DAHL: I will, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Dahl.

MR. DAHL: Yes, Your Honor. Sharon, Norrine, and John, they acknowledge the Court's previous order for protocol and appreciate the role of the personal representative in this case. The protocol has allowed the personal representative at this time to maintain a certain amount of control over information. At the same time, the order was very clear, to the extent of certain transactions, in that the non-excluded heirs could retain a third party of their choosing subject to a non-disclosure agreement as approved by Comerica and its counsel.

Now, bearing that in mind, there are several facts that really shouldn't be in dispute in this case. First of all, Sharon, Norrine, and John, they constitute half of the non-excluded heirs. If we presume that we move forward with those six heirs, ultimately, they are going to have half of the Estate. There is no suggestion anywhere that they wish to harm the Estate or otherwise impede its progression.

It's also beyond dispute that Mr. McMillan has unique knowledge of Prince, Prince's assets, Prince's business, extensive business relationship with him, and he knows the entertainment industry. He served as the entertainment advisor to the special administrator

previously, and he is certainly well qualified.

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Sharon, Norrine, and John would like his advice in matters regarding the Estate as well as their personal, business, and financial matters, and particularly those matters that the Court has carved out an exception for information to be provided to them with an opportunity for at least some input. There's not a surplus of individuals that are available to provide advise to clients similar to mine with respect to matters related to Prince and the assets.

And it's also beyond dispute they've already retained Mr. McMillan to do that. They have an ongoing relationship, and, you know, precluding him from participating in that impedes that relationship.

And, finally, perhaps most importantly, there's no suggestion at this time that Mr. McMillan would violate a non-disclosure agreement if one were to be provided. The -- under these circumstances, the March 22nd, 2017, order speaks for itself. And my clients' relationship with Mr. McMillan was known at that time. There had been open testimony before. And the parties and the other non-excluded heirs were aware of them having a relationship.

The -- so based on the plain language of the order, my clients should be able to proceed with seeking

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a non-disclosure agreement for the third parties and advisors that they deem necessary to protect their interests in the Estate and otherwise.

The objection in this case sets a dangerous precedent, and it seems to be suggesting that anyone who even has a hint of a potential conflict or being involved in other estate matters should somehow be precluded from participating.

Now, with respect to certain transactions that have been raised and potential issues there, lots of different parties and individuals have all participated there. I respectfully submit it's inconsistent to preclude Mr. McMillan while everyone else moves forward.

These other conflicts that were originally raised, number one, they remain allegations. As submitted previously, we have a slew of allegations.

Mr. Silver has done an excellent job of pointing out that right now it's a lot of conjecture. And if we are going to impede my clients' ability to get the advice they need from somebody that's a recognized expert in the field, we need more than that.

The original basis cited was a particular investigation noted by the Court in a previous order.

But, as the memorandum under that order indicated, the basis for that request was because of the request from

other heirs, non-excluded heirs, to look into that issue and follow up on it. And the Court indicated, you know, we're not sure we'd even hear anything further on that issue.

Now, moving on from that, the -- there was no attempt in this matter to even try to craft a non-disclosure agreement that could protect those interests. You know, Comerica took a firm and straightforward position saying no with respect to providing that agreement for Mr. McMillan.

Under these circumstances, we submit that's inappropriate. Our client, again, has significant interests in this matter, both as part of the Estate and individually. Mr. McMillan is certainly well qualified to address those interests. And, you know, but for the repeated allegations and filings we've seen from certain parties in this case, it would be to the benefit of the Estate to have somebody like that involved.

Just like before when we addressed a certain protocol, in at least one of those deals we made some improvements. And my clients would like to have that continued opportunity.

I would also like to address a specific proposal, and I request that that be done in a closed proceeding. But I want to make sure I save that issue.

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The long and short of it here is that the -
Comerica's actions regarding the non-disclosure agreement

for Mr. McMillan, it seems to be a big deviation from

what's typically provided to known heirs in estates. We

don't have that when heirs want to speak to their tax

preparers, their business advisors, their accountants.

But, admittedly, this estate is different, and everybody acknowledges that. And we know that. But those concerns can be addressed with a non-disclosure agreement. Which, again, there's no evidence to suggest he would violate that. You know, Sharon has known

Mr. McMillan for well over a decade, and Norrine and John have developed relationships with him. They know him, trust him, and they want his advice. They acknowledge the special relationship he had with Prince. And I think my clients are entitled to continue their relationships and utilize Mr. McMillan's expertise in benefitting the Estate and protecting their interests, and, frankly, the other interests of the other heirs as well.

I respectfully submit that Comerica should provide a non-disclosure agreement to Mr. McMillan, and I'll reserve comments on the proposal.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Cassioppi.

MR. CASSIOPPI: Thank you, Your Honor. Joe

Cassioppi on behalf of Comerica.

As Mr. Dahl referenced, the Court in its

March 22nd order set forth a few provisions as to certain
types of deals in the notice and information that

Comerica should provide to the non-excluded heirs. And
relevant here, this provision stating that we are to give
at least 14 business days notice prior to entering into
any deal where the Estate reasonably anticipates that we
will receive more than \$2 million over the life of the
deal.

With respect to this specific transaction -and I'm not going to get into the specifics of it, and
it's not necessary for purposes of this argument -- it
did fit neatly within this provision. Because if you
actually go forward and read on the provision, it states:
"It is the intent of the Court that the personal
representative not be required to provide advance notice
or to seek the approval of the non-excluded heirs for
routine licensing, exploitation, and other contractual
matters."

This was not a new deal. This was a proposal based upon rights that had already been granted to a third party. But Comerica decided to err on the side of caution, provided notice, gave as much information as possible under the circumstances to counsel for the

2.2

non-excluded heirs. But because this was a very commercially sensitive deal and because of very strict confidentiality provisions in the agreement between the Decedent and our primary partner on this deal, we asked that it not be provided any further beyond the non-excluded heirs' counsel of record and the non-excluded heirs themselves.

We got a response back from Mr. Dahl requesting a non-disclosure agreement, that it be provided to an unnamed adviser. We asked who that was, and we were told it was Mr. McMillan. We noted that the circumstances really had changed since March 22nd with respect to Mr. McMillan and Comerica does not feel comfortable providing this specific information to him, and we asked if that was something the clients were willing to agree to. And if they weren't, we offered to go to the Court and seek guidance on the issue so that we could make sure that we were not in any way running afoul with what the Court's direction was. Didn't receive a response to that. All we received was a request for additional information, which we immediately provided, and then we received this letter.

This is not something that Comerica wants to do, wanted to do. It's something -- it's a position it took only after a lot of consideration. And it's taken

with a lot of hesitancy because Comerica respects and appreciates why Sharon Nelson, Norrine Nelson, and John Nelson want advice on these types of transactions.

But because of circumstances that have arisen since March 22nd, we just really do not believe it is in the best interest of the Estate that this type of sensitive commercial information be provided to Mr. McMillan.

And it is really three things. The first is the Court's April 5th order which specifically put us in a position where we are adverse to Mr. McMillan because we were required to investigate him. And so because of that adversity, we feel uncomfortable providing confidential business information about the Estate to Mr. McMillan.

Second, as has been referenced a few times here today, an additional claim has been filed in Carver County District Court alleging inappropriate conduct by, primarily, Mr. McMillan's partner, Mr. Koppelman. But claims have also been asserted against Mr. McMillan, and that causes us additional concerns.

And, finally, as has also been referenced here today, there will be a motion hearing on May 31st regarding an additional transaction in which allegations have been made about Mr. McMillan. It is a transaction

2.2

involving Universal Music Group. And what causes us a substantial amount of concern about providing confidential business information to Mr. McMillan is that, in connection with the Universal Music Group transaction and the discussions that have taken place in connection with that, we specifically requested that Mr. McMillan not reach out directly to Universal. And he did not follow that and has been trying to have discussions on the side with Universal, which has caused a substantial amount of problems for us as we try to do everything we can to resolve that matter in the way that is most efficient for the Estate.

And so I'm not saying -- I'm certainly not saying and certainly not seeking to imply that if we provide confidential information to Mr. McMillan that he would disseminate it, specifically under an NDA. But there are enough things here, particularly like in a situation where we are now adverse with him, where we are not saying that Sharon Nelson, Norrine Nelson, and John Nelson can't provide information under an NDA to advisors. And there are any number of advisors with whom they could -- they could contact or otherwise seek counsel on for this.

But as to this specific person, as to -- based on the specific circumstances as they exist now, we do

not believe it's in the best interest of the Estate.

Ultimately, we will follow whatever the Court directs us to do on this, but we -- that is Comerica's position. We felt that it was important to bring that to the Court before we provided any of those types of information to Mr. McMillan.

THE COURT: Mr. Silver, did you want to be heard on this?

MS. WILLIAMS: Actually, I'm going to cover this, Your Honor. Robin Ann Williams for L. Londell McMillan.

Your Honor, Mr. McMillan doesn't want to be the tail wagging the dog here. Mr. McMillan appreciates this issue about what Sharon, Norrine, and John want, and that is what should be the outcome of this particular matter.

SNJ -- if I may use that moniker -- SNJ has expressed what they want. They have entered into a management agreement with Mr. McMillan, and Mr. McMillan is their adviser and manager now. And if Mr. McMillan is not able to receive information about proposed deals to or by the Estate, he will be hobbled and they will be hobbled in providing information that they want to receive from him.

And, as Mr. Cassioppi has pointed out, there are three reasons why Comerica is concerned about

2.2

Mr. McMillan receiving that information. The first is that Comerica feels that it is officially adverse to Mr. McMillan because it has been appointed to investigate the commission from the concert. And while Mr. McMillan feels no adversity toward Comerica, the reality is that that investigation is a side show. We don't know the outcome of the investigation. It could be Comerica would decide the Tribute concert is an Estate asset. It could be they'll conclude that Mr. McMillan did a spectacular job. But none of that matters because it has nothing to do with present and future dealings that are being presented to the Estate.

The second issue that has been raised, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Can I stop you for a minute?

MS. WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm going to ask a question of Mr. Cassioppi, but then -- so that I can get back to you.

You indicated that the matter of current concern is a renegotiation or an additional component to an agreement that had already been reached by the Estate with this partner; is that correct?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ CASSIOPPI: We are -- I think to answer this question fully, we may need to do it outside the presence.

1	THE COURT: And maybe we don't need to go
2	there. My question was: Has Mr. McMillan been involved
3	in negotiations with this partner?
4	MR. CASSIOPPI: He was involved in negotiations
5	with this partner when the deal was originally entered
6	into.
7	THE COURT: Last fall?
8	MR. CASSIOPPI: Last fall. And it went
9	through through January.
10	THE COURT: Okay. That's what I was looking
11	for.
12	Back to you, Ms. Williams.
13	MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, do you have any
14	follow-up questions about the concert issue before I move
15	on to the second point?
16	THE COURT: No, I don't.
17	MS. WILLIAMS: All right. The second point is
18	this lawsuit involving Mr. Koppelman, and I think that
19	folks have been, frankly, sloppy with the language they
20	are using about this lawsuit. And I don't know if there
21	has been any submission to the Court calling
22	Mr. Koppelman "Mr. McMillan's partner," but certainly in
23	correspondence with Comerica that has been suggested.
24	Mr. Koppelman was an adviser to Bremer and the
25	Estate. Mr. McMillan was adviser to the Estate and to

2.2

Bremer. That does not make them partners. I'm

Mr. Silver's partner; I'm not Mr. Cassioppi's partner.

And so there should be no concern that there is a

partnership between Mr. Koppelman and Mr. McMillan that

would preclude Mr. McMillan from receiving information

about, again, present and future deals. So that is

another distracting injury here and another excuse that,

frankly, does not hold water as to why SNJ's wishes

should not be followed.

And last but not least is this deal that we are speaking of. To drive home Mr. Silver's point, again we are at a bit of a disadvantage here, Your Honor, because we are not parties. There are -- there is information being submitted under seal that we are not able to read, et cetera, so it's difficult to respond. I will say that Mr. McMillan has been very open, and we have communicated openly to Comerica that he stands ready to assist Comerica with that particular issue.

Mr. Cassioppi just mentioned that Comerica believes that Mr. McMillan may be having side conversations. I don't know the details of those, again because we are here with one hand tied behind our back. But I will say, Your Honor, that a protective order solves that problem because Your Honor can order in a protective order that any adviser to any non-excluded

2.2

heirs is not to have side conversations with the principals of any proposed deal.

And I would hope what's good for the goose is good for the gander; that if Mr. McMillan would be restricted in so doing, so would everybody else, except Comerica because, as Your Honor has pointed out, the Court's wish is to funnel everything through Comerica.

So a protective order solves the problem, and there's no suggestion that Mr. McMillan would not follow the terms of a protective order. And a protective order protects Comerica's concerns, and it also allows SNJ's wishes to be met. And it allows Mr. McMillan to fulfill the terms of the contract that he has with SNJ.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anyone else wish to be heard?

MR. CASSIOPPI: One final comment on behalf of Comerica, Your Honor. Joe Cassioppi.

To be clear, it is our belief and our hope that this restriction would be temporary. We have no interest in these disputes going on any longer than they need to. And once everything is resolved with respect to the issues that we've discussed in our correspondence and that we've referred to here today and the adversarial nature in the current relationship is put aside, then

1 this type of restriction wouldn't be necessary anymore. But, as things stand, it is our belief that it 2 3 is in the best interest of the Estate to have this type of information not be provided to Mr. McMillan. 4 5 THE COURT: Thank you. 6 Ms. Williams, I'll give you a moment. 7 Mr. McMillan, your attorneys can come back and 8 talk with you. 9 MS. WILLIAMS: Can I have one moment, Your 10 Honor? 11 THE COURT: We'll go off the record. 12 Anybody wants to just stand, stretch, talk to 13 your neighbor, feel free. 14 (Discussion outside of the record.) 15 THE COURT: We'll go back on the record. 16 Anything further? 17 MS. WILLIAMS: Yes. And I thank the Court's 18 indulgence for that brief recess. We were having a bit 19 of difficultly from time to time with these coded 20 questions and answers in the room, again, because we 21 aren't parties. 2.2 We believe that Your Honor asked Mr. Cassioppi 23 about whether -- with respect to a deal presently pending 24 before the Estate, whether Mr. McMillan was previously 25 involved in that deal. And we don't know what deal is

2.2

presently being offered. We don't know what deal Comerica does not want to tell us about, but we do not believe that Mr. McMillan was previously involved in the deal that is presently before the heirs. And, again, we don't know what the deal is because we haven't been given the information, but we wanted to make that clear to the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. CASSIOPPI: Your Honor, I may have misunderstood your question too, but this may be something that we should talk about outside of the presence of the public just to make sure that I understood you correctly and didn't.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BRUNTJEN: Your Honor, I have one thing to say.

THE COURT: Note your appearance.

MR. BRUNTJEN: Justin Bruntjen on behalf of Alfred Jackson.

Your Honor, in the February 9th interview with Billboard Magazine, Mr. Koppelman and Mr. McMillan were interviewed. And in that interview from the article, Mr. Koppelman says, "That why it's always good to have a lawyer as a partner" -- "as your partner," in regards to Mr. McMillan.

1 And in response, Mr. McMillan says, "We've got another big, huge deal." After that. 2 MS. WILLIAMS: May I respond? 3 THE COURT: I don't know that you need to, but 4 5 go ahead. 6 MS. WILLIAMS: This is why we should not have a full cast in the courtroom. I would just point out, to 7 8 the extent that article exists, I'm not aware of it. I 9 haven't read it. But it was available on February 9, and 10 it -- you know, this is trial by ambush presented kind of 11 like that today. 12 By while Mr. Koppelman may say whatever he 13 means to say by identifying Mr. McMillan as a partner, 14 these stray comments in a news article, it certainly does 15 not make them legally partners. And they are not and 16 were not legally partners. 17 THE COURT: They were partners as advisors to 18 the Estate, and I recognize that. 19 Thank you, Your Honor. MS. WILLIAMS: 20 THE COURT. Okay. Anyone else? 21 MR. KANE: Your Honor, I just have one quick 22 comment, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Kane. 24 Thomas Kane on behalf of -- these MR. KANE: 25 comments are on behalf of Omarr Baker. I just want to

2.2

make it clear that once the motion to quash was served, we were requested -- we, our office, was requested to provide to Mr. Silver and Ms. Williams information that was under seal. As far as I know, everything they asked for we provided to them, and it included the information that we are talking about right now. So all that information was provided under the seal. In terms of what our brief was, the affidavits, the transcript, et cetera, it was provided.

Now, whether or not there is something else, I'm not going to get into that, but I -- my comment is not to disagree with Mr. Silver and Ms. Williams, but just to make sure that the Court understands we are trying to cooperate and give other parties the information they need so we can have a full and open discussion on the record.

The second point I would make is that -that -- as you heard Mr. Cassioppi, the personal
representative is in a position, and my word is it's an
awkward position relating to Mr. McMillan at this point
in time. Our view is that we have to -- we, on behalf of
at least whatever heirs want to participate, have to come
in and try to protect the interests as it relates to
those issues. And in this particular matter, we are
trying to protect the issue by getting in the subpoena.

And I'm not trying to go back to that, but as it relates to the -- and Mr. Cassioppi mentioned it -- the UMG deal involves specific allegations relating to wrongful conduct. We were aware of that. That's why we are trying to go forward with that, and it relates to the concert issue that we previously discussed.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anyone else?

MR. DAHL: Yes, Your Honor. Nathaniel Dahl again on behalf of Sharon, Norrine, and John.

In listening to the comments today, we have not heard a justification for a blanket exclusion. We've heard general references to one particular situation, as addressed by the Court in its previous orders, and another dealing. To go so far as to make a blanket exclusion, not even attempt to craft an NDA for Mr. McMillan, imposed a significant burden upon my client, as previously articulated.

And also just note, you know, these proceedings don't occur in a vacuum. You know, we've had, you know, well over a year of proceedings. And as Comerica is aware, they watched the proceedings with Bremer, and I suspect at least in part they are taking a very cautious approach how to handle these things in light of the environment currently present in this Estate.

And so when we talk about the burden to my client, we're not just talking about the motion to quash. We're not just talking about the NDA issue of Mr. McMillan. The overly litigious approach to some of these issues in this case is really extracting a toll, and I just want to highlight that issue for the Court.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Anyone else at this time?

MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, just briefly. We've asked for privileges, but we'd like to acknowledge the courtesy that the Cozen firm extended to us when they served their reply last week. The memorandum cited documents that were sealed or redacted, and Mr. Kane appreciated that we would have difficult times with regard to the motion to quash if we did not have those kind of materials. So he gave them to us with the understanding that we would follow confidentiality restrictions on those materials.

Our point is not in any way, shape, or form to suggest they didn't give us what we asked for, but we asked for a very small amount because we are aware of the fact that many things have been filed under seal. So for the vast majority of what's happened in this file, Bassford Remele has not accessed that. But certainly Mr. Kane was kind enough to give us the materials we

needed for the immediate motion present before you.

THE COURT: Okay. Then, at this time, the

Court will conclude the public hearing in this matter.

We will adjourn for about ten minutes to allow some folks

maybe to leave, the media to get their stuff out of here.

We will re-adjourn in a private session only to address

the more specific questions that Ms. Williams or

Mr. Cassioppi have raised as to what the current deal is

and whether Mr. McMillan was involved in a related deal.

I expect it's going to be about a two-minute discussion regarding that sole issue, and then we'll adjourn for the day.

Mr. Cassioppi.

MR. CASSIOPPI: Your Honor, there is one other issue, as Mr. Dahl referenced. Setting aside the issue of the NDA and Mr. McMillan, Mr. Dahl's clients have challenged the specifics of this deal now in their letter, and we would like to address that too as part of the closed session.

THE COURT: Very good. We will do so.

So any parties -- in other words the non-excluded heirs and their counsel, as well as the personal representative and Mr. -- or yeah -- and Mr. McMillan and his counsel can stay in the courtroom for that.

1	We will reconvene in about ten minutes.
2	MR. CASSIOPPI: Thank you.
3	THE COURT: Mr. Cassioppi?
4	MR. CASSIOPPI: Yes. Sorry, Your Honor.
5	I have no objection to Mr. McMillan and his
6	counsel staying for the first portion dealing with the
7	clarification of what the deal is. I'd ask that after
8	that part of the closed hearing is finished, that
9	Mr. McMillan and his counsel leave.
10	THE COURT: So ordered.
11	MR. CROSBY: As to David Crosby for Bremer.
12	As to Bremer, whether Bremer can be there for part or all
13	of the closed session.
14	THE COURT: Anybody wish to respond?
15	MR. CASSIOPPI: As to the first part. The
16	first part I think it is all right for Bremer to be
17	there. And they may have some input on it.
18	As to the second, it doesn't involve anything
19	with which they are related, so I would ask that they be
20	excused as well.
21	THE COURT: Very good. Thank you. We will be
22	in recess.
23	(Recess in proceedings.)
24	
25	