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STATE OF MINNESOTA HENNEPIN COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

State of Minnesota

Plaintiff,

The Honorable Regina M. Chu

VS.

Kimberly Ann Potter

Dist. Ct. File 27-CR-21-7460

Defendant

AFFIDAVIT OF LEITA WALKER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION OF MEDIA COALITION TO UNSEAL JUROR IDENTITIES AND OTHER JUROR MATERIALS

STATE OF MINNESOTA) ss COUNTY OF HENNEPIN)

LEITA WALKER, being first duly sworn, states:

1. I am an attorney with Ballard Spahr LLP, representing intervenors American Public Media Group (which owns Minnesota Public Radio); Association of Minnesota Public Educational Radio Stations; The Associated Press; Cable News Network, Inc.; CBS Broadcasting Inc. (on behalf of WCCO-TV and CBS News); Court TV Media LLC; Fox/UTV Holdings, LLC (which owns KMSP-TV); Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC (which publishes USA Today); Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. (on behalf of its broadcast stations, KSTP-TV, WDIO-DT, KAAL, KOB, WNYT, WHEC-TV, and WTOP-FM); Minnesota Coalition on Government Information; Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder; NBCUniversal Media, LLC; Sahan Journal; Saint Paul Pioneer Press; The Silha Center for the Study of Media Ethics and Law; Star Tribune Media Company LLC;

DMFIRM #401466240 v1



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TEGNA Inc. (which owns KARE-TV); and WP Company LLC (which publishes *The* Washington Post) (collectively, the "Media Coalition").

- 2. I submit this Affidavit in support of the Motion of Media Coalition to Unseal Juror Identities and Other Juror Materials. This Affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge and my review of the files, records, and proceedings in this action.
- 3. Attached as the indicated exhibits are true and correct copies of the following documents:

EXHIBIT A Tami Abdollah, Minnesota judges hide jurors' names when police go on trial in killings, USAToday.com (Sept. 1, 2021)

EXHIBIT B Transcript of Proceedings, State v. Chauvin, et al., Case No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Sept. 11, 2020).

Further, Affiant sayeth naught.

Leita Walker Leita Walker

This record was signed and sworn to or affirmed by use of communication technology on January ____, 2022, by Leita Walker who declared that she is located in Hennepin County, State of Minnesota.



Notary Public – Minnesota

My Commission Expires: January 31, 2025



Notarial act performed by audio-visual communication



Exhibit A

Minnesota judges hide jurors' names when police go on trial in killings

Abdollah, Tami . USA Today (Online); Arlington [Arlington]. 01 Sep 2021.

ProQuest document link

FULL TEXT

Anonymous juries are supposed to be a rarity in U.S. courts, a way to protect jurors from influence, retaliation and even harm, typically in cases involving gangs and terrorists.

In Minnesota, judges hide jurors' names from the public when the cases involve a police officer who faces criminal charges for killing someone while on duty.

Since 2016, four law enforcement officers have been put on trial in Minnesota for killing someone on duty. All but one of those cases have been decided by an anonymous jury.

In April, an anonymous jury convicted former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin of murder and manslaughter for George Floyd's death. Four months later, their identities are still being withheld by the judge. "Anonymous juries are supposed to be very rare, and historically, they have been very rare," said Minneapolis attorney Leita Walker, who represents a coalition of news outlets seeking to unseal the names of the Chauvin jurors.

"What we're seeing in very recent history in Minnesota is trial courts developing an exception for cases that involve police officers," she said in an interview. "And that exception is not recognized in the law."

Chauvin verdict analysis: Anonymous jury in Derek Chauvin trial part of a growing trend that has some legal experts worried

Jury makeup: Here are the jurors who will decide whether Derek Chauvin is guilty of murder in George Floyd's death

The latest Minnesota officer expected to face an anonymous jury is former Brooklyn Center officer Kimberly Potter. She is scheduled to stand trial this fall on a charge of second-degree manslaughter in the killing of Daunte Wright, 20, during a traffic stop.

Juror names are supposed to be public in the U.S. An open and transparent judicial system is meant to build confidence that the process is fair and jurors are not corrupt or tainted.

The one trial of a law enforcement officer in which jurors' names weren't hidden involved two white men. Washington County Sheriff's Deputy Brian Krook was acquitted of manslaughter in the fatal shooting in 2018 of firefighter Benjamin Evans, 23, who was suicidal.

In all the cases in which jurors' names have been hidden, the victim or the officer was Black. Mohamed Noor, the first police officer to be convicted of murder in modern Minnesota history, is Black. He was convicted of killing a



white woman.

"I don't think that it's difficult to draw a straight racial argument," said prominent civil rights lawyer John Burris, who represented Rodney King. "Racial judgments are being made here as to the publication of jurors' (names) and the anonymization of them. It should not be."

Rodney King trial, 30 years later: Trials of police who beat King compared to Chauvin, who kneeled on George Floyd's neck

Kim Potter case: Prosecutor assigned to case of ex-cop charged in Daunte Wright's death resigns over 'vitriol' and 'partisan politics'

News outlets want judge to release jurors' names in Chauvin trial

Floyd's death was captured on bystander video and spurred weeks of protests, some of which turned violent. That led defense attorneys and Hennepin County District Court Judge Peter Cahill to worry they wouldn't be able to find an impartial jury.

Cahill decided to withhold jurors' names, so they wouldn't be subject to public pressure or harassment. Because the courtroom couldn't accommodate four defendants during the pandemic, he split Chauvin's trial from the three other officers involved in Floyd's death. Chauvin's trial was livestreamed because the courtroom was closed to observers.

Jury selection process: 12 jurors must set aside what they saw in the George Floyd video. How will lawyers find an impartial jury?

During jury selection, some potential jurors expressed comfort in knowing their names would be hidden from the public for some period, said Mary Moriarty, the former chief public defender for Hennepin County.

After jurors convicted Chauvin in April, Cahill decided their names would remain hidden until at least October.

The media coalition, which includes USA TODAY, filed a motion to unseal jurors' names and other materials, including questionnaires they filled out during the selection process.

The coalition said in a court filing that "the public interest in this case and the national reckoning to which it gave rise make transparency regarding the identities, backgrounds, and predilections of the people who handed down the verdict more important, not less."

The Minnesota Attorney General's Office opposes releasing the names. It argued in a court filing that identifying jurors would "hamper efforts to assure prospective jurors in the March 2022 trial involving Mr. Chauvin's three codefendants that their identities will be protected."

In a possible preview of arguments, they said the court shouldn't revisit its order "mere months" before that trial and potential federal proceedings.

It's unclear whether jurors in the other officers' trial will be anonymous.

The Attorney General's Office said in its court filing it doesn't know of any harassment faced by jurors, but it said



that could be because their identities remain under seal. Two jurors and an alternate in Chauvin's trial went public and have not publicly commented on any harassment.

Prosecutors reverse position on unnamed jurors

Last September, the Minnesota Attorney General's Office took the opposite position, strongly objecting to an anonymous jury, according to a filing Friday by the media coalition.

In a court hearing in September 2020, prosecutor Matthew Frank argued that the case didn't meet the standard for shielding jurors' names, which he said is an "extreme measure" that isn't taken even in some cases involving retaliatory gang murders.

Frank said shielding jurors' names is akin to closing a courtroom, where "we're conducting business to an extent secretly."

Cahill said that his primary concern was not jurors' safety but their impartiality and that the names would be released "shortly" after the trial as long as there was no civil unrest, the media coalition said in its filing.

Officials were on guard for violence after the verdict. Barricades and razor wire were set up near the courthouse, and thousands of National Guard troops were called in.

But the guilty verdict was met with "community relief rather than unrest," the coalition's filing said. "And yet the jurors' names remain secret."

One of Chauvin's co-defendants wants jury to be identified

Former officers Thomas Lane, J. Alexander Kueng and Tou Thao face charges of aiding and abetting Chauvin in committing murder and manslaughter.

Kueng's attorney, Thomas Plunkett, told the court last fall he opposes an anonymous jury because it violates his client's constitutional right to a fair and open trial.

"It reflects the general rule that judges, lawyers, witnesses and jurors will perform their respective functions more responsibly in an open court than in a secret proceeding," Plunkett told the court.

Plunkett told Cahill that shielding jurors' names "sends a message" that the jury is in danger. He declined to comment to USA TODAY.

Trial delayed: 3 former police officers accused in George Floyd's death won't stand trial until March 2022

A study in 1998 examined the impact of juror anonymity in university disciplinary hearings. It found that anonymous juries convicted at a higher rate than named juries –70% compared with 40% –when evidence against the defendant was strong.

Defense attorneys say jurors typically give police officers the benefit of the doubt when they're charged with a crime.

Anonymous juries, according to the study, imposed the harshest punishment available more often than identified



juries. The study did not find that anonymous jurors felt less accountable than named ones.

Judge in Kim Potter case shields jurors' names

Wright's death, which occurred during Chauvin's trial, also led to protests, but they calmed down after several days.

Brooklyn Center's then-police chief said Potter, a 26-year veteran of the department, accidentally fired her handgun rather than her Taser. The department released body camera footage that shows Wright struggling with police and Potter shouting, "Taser!" three times before firing.

Hennepin County District Court Judge Regina Chu issued an order last month shielding jurors' names in the Potter case. The order said their names will be hidden until Chu decides otherwise.

"The judges in both cases are balancing the safety of the jurors against the public's right to know," said Joseph Daly, emeritus professor at Mitchell Hamline School of Law.

To properly strike a balance, judges need to assess whether there are facts —not just speculation —indicating jurors are in danger, Daly said. Judges must carefully analyze their own possible implicit biases.

Under state law, a judge must have a strong reason to believe there are external threats to juror safety or impartiality to restrict access to their names and other identifying information.

According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, a trial judge must include in the record "a clear and detailed explanation" of the facts that show a jury needs protection.

Chu didn't explain her reasoning in her three-page order; she simply cited state law.

It's unclear how the issue came up in the Potter case. Chu's order was issued after an off-the-record scheduling conference, so no transcript exists, court spokesman Spenser Bickett said in an email. USA TODAY reached out to Chu and lawyers for both sides; none responded.

Minnesota Attorney General's Office spokesman Keaon Dousti said in an email that "as far as I know, this was Judge Chu's decision on her own."

Potter in court: Ex-Brooklyn Center police officer Kim Potter appears in court as Daunte Wright's family demands accountability

Though Potter's fatal shooting of Wright occurred within miles of where Floyd was murdered, Moriarty said it's a completely different case. Wright's death didn't last $9\frac{1}{2}$ minutes, and video didn't spread around the world. "Transparency is very important, and it should be rare that a judge takes the extreme step of making the jury anonymous," Moriarty said. "That shouldn't be automatic in a case where a police officer is on trial."

Why are jurors' names public?

The use of anonymous juries has grown over the past several decades as technology has made it easier to track people down and harass them.

Jurors' names have been hidden for high-profile cases involving O.J. Simpson, Mafia boss John Gotti, R&B star R.



Kelly and two of the Los Angeles police officers accused of assaulting Rodney King.

Minnesota's first anonymous jury, in 1995, convicted an alleged street gang member for an assassination-style slaying of a Minneapolis police officer.

One reason their names were hidden was that a witness had been killed, allegedly because gang members thought he was talking to the police about the killing, according to a state Supreme Court opinion.

In his order sealing jurors' names for the police involved in Floyd's death, Cahill cited harassment and threats against the defendants and their lawyers, including incidents outside the courthouse and a defendant's home.

When jurors remain anonymous, "no one can question them or their decisions," a William Mitchell Law Review article noted in 1996. "Scrutiny by the public of a jury's decision will likely have no impact on the fate of the defendant. A jury which knows that others will examine its decision, however, might feel more societal pressure to render a fair verdict."

A.L. Brown, a St. Paul, Minnesota, attorney, said he "could make a very strong argument that (the names) should absolutely be made public. Maybe someone says, 'John on the jury, he drops the n-word every other day.'

"The other side of the argument," he said, "is, 'Oh my gosh, Sally on the jury lives next door, and I'm going to torment her for the next month on this trial until she convicts this guy.""

Brown said it would be unfair for all officers charged with crimes to face unnamed juries by default, especially given their positions of power compared with other defendants. A high-profile case isn't enough of a reason to justify anonymity, he said.

In the cases of Chauvin, his co-defendants and Potter, the jury had not been selected when the judge decided their names would be hidden. "At least get a jury in the room and ask them if it's a concern," Brown said.

If security is such a concern, he said, the judge should sequester the jury, even if it is inconvenient.

"You can inconvenience the 12," Brown said, "or you can inconvenience the 5 million Minnesotans."

Tami Abdollah is a USA TODAY national correspondent covering inequities in the criminal justice system. Send tips via direct message @latams or by email tami(at)usatoday.com

This article originally appeared on USA TODAY: Minnesota judges hide jurors' names when police go on trial in killings

DETAILS

Subject:	Juries; Murders &murder attempts; Manslaughter; State court decisions
Location:	United StatesUS Minnesota
People:	Potter, Kimberly Chauvin, Derek King, Rodney Glenn Wright, Daunte Floyd, George



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Exhibit B

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    STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                              DISTRICT COURT
                                   FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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    COUNTY OF HENNEPIN
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    State of Minnesota,
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               Plaintiff,
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                                  TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
                                 D.C. File 27-CR-20-12646
                                  D.C. File 27-CR-20-12949
 6
      VS.
                                  D.C. File 27-CR-20-12951
7
                                 D.C. File 27-CR-20-12953
    Derek Michael Chauvin,
    Tou Thao,
8
    Thomas Kiernan Lane,
    J. Alexander Kueng,
               Defendants.
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                        ______
      The above-entitled matter came duly on for hearing
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    before the Honorable Peter A. Cahill, one of the judges
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    of the above-named court, Courtroom 630, in the Hennepin
    County Family Justice Facility, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
14
    on the 11th day of September, 2020.
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           APPEARANCES:
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          MATTHEW FRANK, ESQ., Assistant Attorney General,
19
    appeared on behalf of the State of Minnesota.
20
          NEAL KATYAL, ESQ., Special Assistant Attorney
21
    General Neal, appeared on behalf of the State.
22
          ERIC NELSON, ESQ., Attorney at Law, appeared on
    behalf of Derek Chauvin, Defendant.
23
24
          ROBERT PAULE, ESQ., Attorney at Law, appeared on
25
    behalf of Tou Thao, Defendant.
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1 EARL GRAY, ESQ., Attorney at Law, appeared on 2 behalf of Thomas Lane, Defendant. THOMAS PLUNKETT, ESQ., Attorney at Law, appeared 3 on behalf of J. Alexander Kueng, Defendant. 4 5 (The following proceedings were had in 6 7 open court:) 8 THE COURT: Good morning, everybody. This is State of Minnesota versus Derek Chauvin, 9 No. 27-CR-20-12646; Tou Thao, District Court File 10 No. 27-CR-20-12949; Thomas K. Lane, District 11 Court File No. 27-CV-20-12951; and J. Alexander 12 13 Kueng, District Court File No. 27-CR-20-12953. 14 Counsel, note your appearances beginning 15 with the State. MR. FRANK: Good morning, Your Honor. 16 17 Matthew Frank, Assistant Attorney General on 18 behalf of the State. To my right is Special 19 Assistant Attorney General Neal Katyal. 20 Katyal will address the joinder arguments, and I'll address the remaining issues. 21 22 THE COURT: Thank you. 23 And for Mr. Chauvin. 24 MR. NELSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Eric Nelson appearing on behalf of Derek Chauvin, 25

1 who appears to my left. 2 THE COURT: For Mr. Thao. 3 MR. PAULE: Good morning, Your Honor. Robert Paule, P-a-u-l-e, along with Natalie 4 Paule, on behalf of Mr. Thao, who's present as 5 Good morning, Your Honor. well. 6 7 THE COURT: Thank you. For Mr. Lane. 8 MR. GRAY: Good morning, Your Honor. 9 10 Earl Gray representing Thomas Lane, who's present 11 and sitting next to me. 12 THE COURT: And for Mr. Kueng. 13 MR. PLUNKETT: Good morning, Your Honor. Tom Plunkett on behalf of Mr. Kueng, who's 14 15 present in the courtroom. THE COURT: All right. Good morning, 16 17 everyone. Just so we're aware, there are very 18 few seats available in this courtroom because of 19 social distancing, so we ask that you maintain 20 social distancing to the amount possible. 21 While you are speaking to the Court, 22 because we have overflow courtrooms, we would ask 23 that you actually approach the podium. 24 don't need permission to approach the podium if 25 it's your turn to speak, simply head up there and

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make sure you use the microphone. With all the Plexiglass it's sometimes hard for even the court reporter to hear.

Also because we have the overflow courtrooms, I would advise everyone in those rooms that they are courtrooms and accordingly we expect that the appropriate decorum will be kept in those rooms as well. That is there is no loud talking, there's no verbal reaction to whatever is going on in court, no eating, and no drinking.

Counsel, you may have water, of course, at counsel table.

Furthermore, there is no recording of any of the proceedings. The only recording is done by the official court reporter. And so we expect that if there are any electronic devices in the family overflow rooms, that's permitted. As to the public overflow courtroom, any electronic devices that you've been allowed to keep with you are not to be out. They're to remain in your pocket, backpack, purse or whatever, but they are not to be out in the public overflow courtroom. Again, there is no recording of any type by anyone in any of the overflow courtrooms.

There's a media overflow room, but they have already been advised by the chief judge what the rules of decorum of that room are as well.

With that, let's get to the motions.

I'd first of all note, it was in the footnote of my scheduling order that we're not going to address argument on probable cause. I think we have more than enough to make that decision.

That decision is not going to be made today, the Court is going to take it under advisement and issue an order.

It seems that we have -- that that is however a threshold motion, for example, if I were to dismiss all the cases, there's no need to go to the other motions, but we are going to go to the other motions. I don't want everybody reading into this that I've made a decision on those. For efficiency's sake, and to move these cases forward, we are going to discuss these motions and we were going to consider them in their normal course. So do not read into the fact that we are continuing with our motions that there's a decision made or will be made today on the motions to dismiss for lack of probable cause.

1	So the first one is a motion for joint
2	trial. Mr. Katyal, I think I was going to simply
3	just take it under advisement since that's the
4	only thing we've got today. Would you like to
5	address the Court on that issue?
6	MR. KATYAL: Sure.
7	THE COURT: If you would.
8	MR. KATYAL: Thank you so much, Judge
9	Cahill, and may it please the Court.
10	THE COURT: And you can remove your mask
11	when you're at the podium.
12	MR. KATYAL: Okay. Great.
13	THE COURT: I think that will help all
14	of us.
15	MR. KATYAL: The State respectfully
16	requests that the four defendants be tried
17	together. And the evidence will show that the
18	defendants were present on the scene together,
19	the defendants acted together, the defendants
20	watched the air go out of Mr. Floyd's body
21	together, and the defendants caused Mr. Floyd's
22	death together.
23	Minnesota law is clear that joinder is
24	appropriate. Rule 17.03 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure provide that two or more defendants,

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quote, may be tried separately or jointly at the court's discretion, and the court must consider four factors. First, the nature of the offense charged. Second, the impact on the victim.

Third, the potential prejudice to the defendant.

And, fourth, the interests of justice.

And, of course, all four are necessary for joinder; joinder is evaluated on the factors as a whole. But the striking thing about this case is that each of the four factors points in favor of joinder. First, the evidence and charges against the four defendants are similar. Second, the impact on eyewitnesss and the family members is dramatic as they are likely to be traumatized by multiple trials, and notably some of that trauma will occur on minor child witnesses. Third, the defendants won't be prejudiced by joinder because their defenses are not antagonistic, which is a specialized term of art under Minnesota law.

THE COURT: Let me stop you there. The State issued a -- or filed a notice last night regarding defendant Chauvin on like about six different prior incidents. Does that change the analysis on the antagonistic defenses, and if

not, tell me why not.

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MR. KATYAL: Not at all, Your Honor. And there's no case that suggests as much. indeed, I think the most striking thing about all four briefs that my friends on the other side have filed, they cited a total of 18 cases, not a single one is one in which a district court denied joinder. And with respect to your specific question about these -- about the priors and stuff like that, that's true in every case, Your Honor. There will be differences in defendants' prior criminal history, the levels of experience, all sorts of things; that's never been enough to deny joinder. And the reason for that is that the Minnesota Supreme Court has been very clear that the antagonistic defense is defined really narrowly. It's defined in Justice Anderson's opinion in Santiago versus State at page 446. And that definition is defendants' have antagonistic defenses when the defenses are inconsistent and when they seek to put the blame on each other and the jury is forced to choose between the defense theories.

So it's about basically is one of the defendants becoming effectively a second

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And the introduction of some prosecutor. evidence against -- about priors or something like that doesn't at all render a defense antagonistic. The jury can credit all of that evidence that we seek to introduce, or not credit it, and it won't have an impact directly on the other defendants, it's not mutually exclusive. And so for that reason, we don't think that the antagonistic defense threshold is met. You know, it's a very hard thing to show. Indeed, Santiago is the only case cited in which you get there. But that's one in which you had a shooting, one shooter, two different defendants tried. when one defendant said, hey, I didn't do it, by definition, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, it rendered that person a prosecutor as to the other. That type definition of antagonistic defense is nowhere close to being met.

We concede that's the best argument they've got is some sort of antagonistic defense. We think factors 1, 2, and 4, the interest of justice as well overwhelmingly favor joiner. But even there, at best what they have is something hypothetical and speculative. And the Minnesota Supreme Court has been clear time and again in

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cases like *Powers* that that's not enough, that kind of generalized defense concern.

Now, it might be that something might They've had a lot of different happen. speculative arguments and so on about what might be an inconsistent defense. I don't think anything they've identified to this point meets that threshold of what an antagonistic defense But if it does, if there is something, I is. think the Minnesota Supreme Court in Powers is very clear that at that point then you have remedies from cautionary jury instructions to possibly even granting severance. But what the court has said is that the one thing you can't do is try and join -- is try and deny joinder now at this early stage based on some speculation or some hypothetical that they've raised. think here maybe one of the more interesting things is that for all of their defenses, as you mentioned, they have four different briefs dismissing probable cause, there's nothing antagonistic in them. Not a word that is antagonistic, everything is the same. basically say, you know, two defenses. which is the level of force used was reasonable,

1 and they all make that argument. And number two, 2 they say that Mr. Floyd overdosed. He managed to 3 miraculously take the amount of drugs necessary to kill him at the very moment that he had been 4 -- had neck on his -- had his knee on his neck 5 for over eight minutes. You know, we think that 6 7 argument is ludicrous as we will show at trial --8 Judge, I object to that. 9 MR. GRAY: Wе 10 weren't supposed to address probable cause. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Gray, he's just 12 referring to it as part of the joint trial, I'm 13 fine with him arguing that way. Your objection is overruled. 14 15 But I do want you to move on to the other factors. 16 17 MR. KATYAL: Sure. 18 THE COURT: And let's not get too deep 19 into the probable cause, that's under advisement. 20 MR. KATYAL: Absolutely. I don't mean 21 to argue that as all. I just mean to say that 22 the defenses so far that are offered up are not 23 antagonistic, and so that's all. 24 THE COURT: Yep. 25 MR. KATYAL: So the first factor is the

nature of the offense charged. The most important point here is Thao's own brief at page 4 admits this. He says, quote, the offenses are similar, that Thao is charged with similar offenses to the other three. And they are, they're identical for three of the defendants. And with respect to the fourth defendant, Mr. Chauvin, they are virtually identical. And the courts time and again have said that when you have circumstances like this that are overlapping and have the same evidence or substantially the same evidence, that that is enough.

Now, Mr. Chauvin says in his brief, well, there will be introduction of personnel records and that will be the bulk of the trial. He says that at page 5. So he says the evidence wouldn't be different. The problem with that is twofold. Number one, at page 7 he says the bulk of the charges is actually the body cameras and the medical autopsy reports. And we agree with that, we don't think that the personnel records are what's going to be the bulk of the evidence at trial, as he himself admits at that page.

And number two, that's never been the standard. The standard is is the evidence

substantially the same for one defendant to another. And here that is overwhelmingly this case. I mean, these defendants acted together, they're on the scene together, they're talking to each other during the almost nine minutes that take place in this and the like. And we think, you know, this -- that puts this case squarely in the heartland of what joinder is about, and they can't cite a single case to the contrary. So that's factor one if there are any other questions about factor one.

THE COURT: No.

MR. KATYAL: And then factor two is the trauma or the impact on the victim or other witnesses. With respect to that, we think, again, putting these -- putting these eyewitnesss, some of whom are minor -- like the woman who goes by the initial D.F. -- is traumatic. The case law recognizes that that is a factor. We don't want to, you know, place too much emphasis on that. We think my friends on the other side are right that the Minnesota Supreme Court in Blance has cautioned that this factor shouldn't swallow the others. But we think forcing the family, victims and eyewitnesss

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to go through not just one, not just two, but three and four separate trials in front of four separate juries and four separate time and places really does force the reliving of the trauma and makes this case very much, you know, far stronger than cases like Belfield in which just the expense of a bank's witnesses were considered enough to tip this factor in favor of joinder. Here you have something really far more dramatic. And my friend's brief on the other -- one of them says, well, this video and this incident is not that traumatic. And I think that that, you know, really is an astounding argument. I've seen a lot in my life, I can barely watch these videos of what happened. And the idea that it wouldn't cause trauma particularly to someone who is closely connected to the events, whether a family member or a minor witness who saw them, I think is a really, really tough argument. THE COURT: Let's go to the interest of

THE COURT: Let's go to the interest of justice.

MR. KATYAL: So the interest of justice, we think there are five separate reasons why the interest of justice favor joinder. The first is that the length of separate trials make it the

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case. That if you were to try, as they would like, four separate trials we're talking about delaying justice for months, if not years. And the Minnesota Court of Appeals opinion in Jackson I think is very strong in saying that the length of separate trials can be important consideration in delaying justice and things like that.

The second is that because the evidence against the four defendants overlap so much, forcing the four separate trials, to use the language of the court decision in Carlson, places undue burden on the state and the court system. Here it's not just a burden on the witnesses as we were talking about with respect to factor two, but the burden on this court and other defendants. As we know from the orchestrations to just get this proceeding together today, to have four of them, four separate trials as opposed to a day of hearings, will really tax the resources of the court, and also, ultimately, you know, make it more difficult for other trials to take place with other defendants and the like. Again, we don't want to place too much emphasis on that, but we do think that is a factor that is at issue here.

And the third is the availability and convenience of the witnesses, which I think overlaps a bit with factor two. But there's also a risk as these witnesses are forced to go through and relive the trauma time and again, they may become unavailable in the second, third, or fourth trial. We could, you know, imagine a circumstance like that occurring.

And then the last two reasons are that separate trials, to use the language of Powers, run the risk of prejudicing potential jurors through the publicity related to each trial. And we agree there's been pretrial publicity, of course, in this case, but that is both quantitatively and qualitatively different than when you have a verdict. Because when you have a verdict, you have the judicial seal of the judicial imprimatur on whatever that verdict is, which we suspect will lead to much more publicity, and a different kind of publicity. And that will make subsequent trials, so trial two, three, and four more difficult.

And then the last argument for the public interest is an important one, which is joinder would allow the community to absorb the

verdicts at once instead of seriatim and piecemeal. And in a case like this with so much attention on it, we think the community shouldn't be put through the trauma of four separate verdict days.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Keeping in mind that I think the service of the Spreigl notice might change the defense analysis or argument on joint trial, I'm going to give the defense a chance to file a reply, yet another reply on joint trial if you wish. I'm not mandating it. But if you think that the Spreigl notice that was filed -- and just assume for the sake of argument, I've just read it last night when it was filed -- assume for the sake of argument that it comes in, how does that affect the joint trial analysis? But beyond that, for today's purposes, did anyone wish to argue on behalf of their client? Otherwise we can rest on the briefs.

Mr. Paule.

MR. PAULE: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. If you could approach the podium.

MR. PAULE: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd

like to respond. I know that I briefed the issue, it's been briefed extensively by everyone else. I think given the late notice of the Spreigl notices, and I've only looked at the one that I received regarding my client. Regarding the others, I would like some time to submit an additional brief. I think this is an important area. It's important for the attorneys to make the proper record so that any reviewing court, if there is one, can actually look at what factors the Court considered.

I'd like to talk about a couple of things. One is just initially what Mr. Katyal is saying is that the defense somehow hasn't presented anything as what we're dealing with is talking with hypotheticals and speculative notions. I would point out that that's one of the issues that the Minnesota Supreme Court took the district court to task for in Santiago. And I think also, in case the Court doesn't know it, I was one of the lawyers on Santiago. I actually gave the closing argument, and I was the one who was referred to as the second prosecutor.

When I was assigned that case, because I worked at the public defender's office at the

time, I actually talked to the prosecutor and I said why are you doing this? And he pointed out from his perspective they needed my client seated in the same courtroom as Mr. Santiago to, quote, convict him. And I pointed out to him that, okay, he can do whatever he wants as he sees fit but that he is a minister of justice whereas I'm the zealous advocate, and I'm allowed to do certain things that ministers of justice aren't able to do. And I told him I would do that, and I did.

Because if you look at the Santiago case, the trial court judge, I think there were seven motions for severance ultimately filed, some pretrial, some mid-trial, some after closing argument. But one of the things that the trial court did is they applied a heightened standard of review to positions the defense would put forward about what potential prejudice was; that's exactly what Mr. Katyal is doing.

If you look at the *Santiago* decision, on page 442 they talk about there are two ways an attorney can make an offer of proof, and they cite Mauet and McCormick on Evidence. First, the attorney can tell the court what the proposed

testimony of a witness will be. Second, the attorney can present the witness for testimony. And unless there's some reason to believe that an attorney's offer of proof is suspect, the court should accept it at face value. We're officers of the court just as the prosecutors are. And actually in the analysis they talk about Spreigl evidence, so the court system doesn't require a mini trial on the evidence because they view the prosecutorial standards of conduct as a means to weigh in and make sure that they aren't misstating their case. So I think that some of the --

THE COURT: Let me ask you though.

Don't -- up until the *Spreigl* notice, wouldn't you agree that most of the evidence sounds like it's going to be the same or very similar in all four trials?

MR. PAULE: I think that some of it, but simply volume of evidence isn't what controls.

THE COURT: Well, not even just volume, but the major evidence. I assume we're going to have the body cam, other bystander video, surveillance video, medical evidence, medical experts perhaps. Doesn't the bulk of the

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majority of the evidence, isn't it similar?

Again, putting aside the *Spreigl* evidence that was just noticed.

MR. PAULE: Your Honor, I think that one thing that the Court has to look at is Mr. Katyal kept using the term "substantially similar." you look at the State v. Johnson case, what it requires is the overwhelming majority of evidence. And I think when the Court looks at it, you could look at it and say, okay, if we have one trial all the evidence would be the same as defendant. If my client who is charged singularly has his own trial, the evidence will be different in terms of what is presented. Also, from my client's perspective, I'm not dealing with one prosecutor, I'm dealing with three other lawyers who are zealous advocates and who have an ethical duty to defend their client at the expense of all others.

And I would point out to the Court that's exactly what I told the prosecutor in Santiago. I'm putting everyone on notice, I intend to do the same thing here. The duty of a defense attorney demands no less.

THE COURT: But isn't that true in every

trial? So any joint trial that's going to be the case.

MR. PAULE: It could be.

THE COURT: Really that doesn't distinguish this case whether it should be joined or not because that's always true.

MR. PAULE: No, it isn't, Your Honor.

Because it depends on what the theories of the case of the defense are. And I think you can see — and another thing that I think the State has misplaced in its logic is they try to take what our positions are attacking probable cause as defenses. Probable cause attacks are very different, you're arguing about the sufficiency of the charges versus putting forth a defense in what your strategies are.

One of the things I also mentioned in Santiago, if I was a less than ethical prosecutor, any case where I had multiple defendants I could file a notice of joinder and try to bait the defense into displaying what their defenses were ahead of time.

My client is presumed to be innocent.

We have no burden at all, including a burden to establish what our defense is, and that seems to

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be what Mr. Katyal wants us to do. But the analysis in terms of our argument on probable cause is an attack on the State's charge, it's not the defense that it will be at trial.

To the Court's question though, our defense may be very different at trial within If I was trying this case other ones. singularly, my defense might be laid out in one If I'm forced to stand trial, or my manner. client is with the other people involved in the case, they're going to be side attacks that I'm going to have to deal with that are going to prejudice me on some level. The question becomes is it become a manifest necessity, which is if the defendants do not consent to joinder -- or excuse me, to severance. But when we're opposing it, we're consenting to severance, which ultimately means the Court's analysis is what is a fair determination of quilt and would severance be necessary to do it.

The same analysis should be looked at in terms of joinder. Because if the Court -- to the argument about interest of justice and expediency, if we spend multiple weeks in trial, and then even at closing argument there becomes

an issue for severance, then all of a sudden you've got other trials that come on. What the prosecution is trying to get you to do is say, don't worry about that, just trust us, this will all go forward. Okay. And I can tell you from experience that that is not how this case is going to go, it's not how joint trials go.

I've actually tried six joint trials in state court, all of them in Hennepin County. I would guess I've had more joint trial than anybody in this courtroom in state court.

THE COURT: Perhaps.

MR. PAULE: I speak from experience.

And every judge that I've had that has done one of these at the end says I'm not sure I would do that again for a variety of reasons. Essentially you're bringing in a group of bobcats in a bag and trying to deal with them letting them loose in the court at once. And I think that's what the Court really needs to think about.

With regard to just the analysis on the case, the four factors.

THE COURT: You need to wrap it up.

MR. PAULE: The nature of the offense charged. When you look at the nature of the

offense, the analysis, and it's pre Santiago, but they looked at essentially two situations where they would join. One is where there was a complex, essentially white collar case, I believe that's Strimling. And then you look at cases like Southard where they're just heinous offenses and you've got juvenile victims. That has essentially been changed in the analysis to any sort of a violent case.

With regard to the impact on the victim, I know that victim can be broadly defined. But when you look at the impact on the victim, it's should a surviving victim, say of a robbery or criminal sexual conduct, what impact would that have on them. It's been blended to include family. Basically the only people who are going to be calling family as witnesses is the State with their attempt to do the spark of life.

With regard to the eyewitnesss, I'm not intending to call the juvenile. The one juvenile witness who probably would come would be the juvenile who has be identified by initials who filmed this incident, and she's probably going to be 18 years old and an adult when this case occurs. The other two, I'm not intending to

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call; I don't know if they're even competent given the factors.

And then finally the interest of justice. One of the things that the State is arguing that if we have one verdict that it will taint the jury pool. I think they'd be well advised to look in the mirror about tainting the jury pool because they're the ones who have been talking, they're the ones who generated the change of venue. It has not been me commenting to the press on this case or bringing out any of the evidence in this case. They're the ones who have done that. And if there is a verdict, whatever that verdict will be, there are means to deal with that through voir dire and other things that we're going to talk about when we deal with change of venue issue. So I'd just like to point that out.

Also, they sort of misstate the idea of antagonistic defenses. If the Court looks at Santiago, and it's quoted on page -- excuse me a second, Your Honor. I believe it's 444, they talk about Hathaway defining antagonistic or inconsistent defenses exist when defendants seek to blame each other. And I think the Court can

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glean that from even some of the filings. If you look at perhaps Mr. Lane and Mr. Kueng's positions, at least in some of these filings, they're trying to point out that they're rookie officers and that Officer Chauvin was their senior officer who did them, and they did certain things. One of the positions we had at least with regard to probable cause is that our client was not involved in the physical restraint, that he never touched Mr. Floyd. That he was simply acting as an assisting officer to keep the bystanders under control. So when you look at those things, there's already the foundation being laid on this case for antagonistic defenses, and I don't think that's something that should be sort of brushed away as the State would have you do. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anybody else wish to -- I have read the briefs, and I think I don't have any questions based on that, but I will give anybody a chance to speak.

Mr. Gray.

MR. GRAY: Thank you. This will be very short, Judge. With respect to prejudice, in prejudicing the jurors, if Mr. Chauvin is tried

first, which I assume the Court will do. If he's tried first and acquitted, that would end this case because all the other defendants are charged with aiding and abetting Mr. Chauvin. And if Mr. Chauvin is acquited, I doubt very much if they'd be able to proceed on the other three defendants. So the prejudice to the jurors I don't think is an argument at all.

With respect to the undue burden on the State, they're the ones that charged the case, Your Honor. And the availability of witnesses, the State, they are the ones that have the ability to have the witnesses for every trial. So I'd ask the Court to deny the joinder motion. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further, otherwise I'll take it under advisement.

Mr. Plunkett.

MR. PLUNKETT: Thank you, Your Honor.

Really I'm not going to reargue these things, but just to fill up the record -- fill out the record in my case, I want to make sure that it's known that I'm adopting those arguments and endorsing those arguments as part of my record. I'd also point out that I do believe Mr. Paule has the

I have one, and it was with 1 most joint trials. 2 Mr. Paule. Irony. 3 Thank you. If the Court had specific questions, of course, I'd answer those. 4 5 THE COURT: I'm fine. Mr. Nelson, do you join in all the 6 7 arguments? MR. NELSON: Yes, Your Honor. 8 9 MR. KATYAL: May I have two minutes? 10 THE COURT: No. 11 All right. This matter is under 12 advisement. 13 As to the next motion on our agenda. The next thing was the Blakely factors. 14 actually going to hold off on that and put that 15 to the end, that may take a little bit of 16 17 discussion. I think we can move through some of these others. 18 19 The State had a motion for expert 20 witness disclosure. First of all, does anybody 21 on the defense side have an objection to the 22 concept, not to the actual time frame but to the 23 concept of what is laid out in the proposed order? 24 25 MR. NELSON: I do not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Nelson does not, anybody else?

Okay. As far as timeframe, Mr. Paule.

MR. PAULE: I'll speak loudly so everyone can hear me. I do object to their proposal that we submit them jointly at the same time. I think if the State is going to ask for expert witness disclosure, they should be the ones to put their expert witnesses -- have their deadline, and then we can respond. Because in part our need for expert witnesses will be based on what evidence and what expert witnesses they are going to propose.

I would also point out that we're still getting the discovery. We will deal with the issue of the medical examiner's file, but if indeed we have the entire file, it was just turned over to us, I believe last week.

THE COURT: Several comments on that.

And the reason I reserved the timing is that was the first thing I thought of was that the defense is probably still talking to experts so I don't have a problem with the staggered -- it won't be too far staggered. For example, I think the State I could hold to the guidelines that were

1 put in the proposed order, but as far as the 2 defense, I think I would give them more time. 3 Mr. Frank, did you want to speak to that? 4 I do, Your Honor. MR. FRANK: 5 If you would. THE COURT: 6 7 I think one of the main MR. FRANK: 8 reasons that we proposed the same deadlines is because that's contemplated by the rules, 9 10 simultaneous discovery. This is not one goes 11 first and then the second. They are -- both 901 12 and 902 talk about the date of omnibus hearing. 13 So the rules contemplate simultaneous discovery, that's what we do. We set the dates out, the 14 15 proposed dates. Maybe I'm --16 THE COURT: Have you ever experienced a criminal case in Minnesota where it truly has 17 been simultaneous? 18 19 MR. FRANK: Truly simultaneous. 20 say to Your Honor, and I have been doing this for 21 quite a while. 22 THE COURT: That's why I ask. 23 MR. FRANK: We usually don't get 24 discovery from the defense. But the point is 25 it's supposed to be simultaneous.

32 1 THE COURT: All right. 2 Not to be anything hidden. MR. FRANK: THE COURT: Ultimately it's in the 3 Court's discretion though on how to regulate 4 discovery to provide fair trial for both sides; 5 would you agree with that? 6 7 MR. FRANK: Our rules lack anything 8 specific about this subject, so I think it is the Court's discretion. 9 10 THE COURT: All right. But go ahead. 11 And maybe I'm getting ahead MR. FRANK: 12 of the Court in trying to talk about dates, but 13 we thought very hard about those dates with the March 8th trial date in mind. 14 So we tried to set 15 them out enough with the understanding that, yes, discovery is ongoing. But also the defense, 16 17 I think, has a pretty good idea what the case is

about. Obviously, their PC motions raise obvious

issues. So we think these are dates that

accommodate both sides very well and should be

simultaneous to keep the case moving.

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THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right. I'll take that one under

24 advisement. I'll be issuing some kind of order

25 that talks about expert witness disclosure. That

will be on a separate date.

Regarding defense motions. Motion for change of venue. Before anyone gets up to argue that, I want to give you the Court's thoughts.

The record is not very complete at this point for a proper motion to be decided. I know everybody filed a motion for change of venue because we had a motion deadline, and I appreciate you meeting that; however, I'm not sure we have it. I'm actually going to have Mr. Paule talk about some things he raised as an alternative to pretrial publicity, a standard, but we'll get to that in a second.

The Court's intent, and what we're trying to work with administration, is to do a jury summons, to have a panel pulled earlier than normal. The normal jury summons goes out six weeks before the person has to report for trial. We're trying to get a panel to be pulled long before that, possibly several months. The district court because of COVID has been sending a general questionnaire to all summoned jurors already for general background, as the questionnaires that are typical in -- typical in all criminal cases, although it includes

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discussion of domestic violence and guns and other things. My thought was if we are pulling a separate panel, or pool actually, for this trial or trials, we will talk about -- and when I say "trial," again, don't take anything from that, I'm going to talk about March 8th is trial, whether it's one or four, but whatever that trial is, I expect that we will have a jury summons sent out well ahead of time with a questionnaire. And there is a deadline on when counsel is supposed to provide the Court with an agreed-upon questionnaire, or if you can't agree, then to send me your individual thoughts. The Court will put together a questionnaire and it will address pretrial publicity, it will ask for questions regarding bias, things like that. obviously, that's where I would welcome the input of counsel on what type of questions you would want in that questionnaire. Pretrial publicity has got to be a part of that questionnaire so that we have an idea of what is the exposure to pretrial publicity. And I don't even think we're going to ask have you read or seen anything about this case, it's going to be what have you read or seen, and has this made up your mind, and et

cetera. The typical things we try and do on determining if pretrial publicity has been so prejudicial that a person cannot be fair to all sides.

Again, I ask counsel to assist the Court in what you think would be good questions to uncover the bias that may have been engendered by pretrial publicity. There would be a deadline to get those back, and we would -- our jury office is very good about following through to make sure we get those back. Then counsel would be provided -- and at that point, because there is no deadline on a change of venue. As I read the rule it's even during trial. I don't expect that we're going to wait that long, I hope we would not wait that long, but in enough time for everyone to look at the responses and see who our pool is.

I notice counsel in their memoranda have indicated that they're doing surveys of Hennepin County, which is fine and certainly will be considered by the Court if provided, and I know you need time to finish those. Again, why this motion isn't really ripe at this point. But this is basically a survey of the actual people who

1 might be jurors. And so I think it's more 2 focused. I think it's more useful for everyone. 3 And so that's the Court's plan going forward, which is why I'm not sure we need an 4 argument today on change of venue. 5 I would allow you -- and I'm not even -- would not even do a 6 7 briefing schedule because we'd have to find out what our timing is, what can we do as far as 8 summoning jurors and getting them the 9 10 questionnaire ahead of time so you can look at 11 what the effect of pretrial publicity has been 12 and everything else. 13 So with that foundation, does anyone feel compelled to say something today? 14 Mr. Plunkett. 15 16 And, Mr. Paule, we are going to talk 17 about your proposed standard. 18 Mr. Plunkett. 19 MR. PLUNKETT: Thank you again, Your 20 Honor. I don't want to argue the venue issue, 21 but I did want to note an objection to the 22 method, the process that the Court has just 23 outlined. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. PLUNKETT: So what my objection is

would be that you're relying on essentially the voir dire process to address the jury select -the venue issue. I think that's inappropriate to just rely on that solely so that's why I'm objecting.

Also, what the Court has outlined is essentially sending out a questionnaire that's, you know, preapproved. I'm objecting to the questionnaire being used that way right now because you're sending out a questionnaire that would be responded to in an unsworn manner.

THE COURT: Oh, no, it would be under penalty of perjury.

MR. PLUNKETT: I want to respectfully disagree that you can put somebody under the penalty if they haven't been given an oath.

THE COURT: 358.116 says otherwise.

MR. PLUNKETT: And I'm respectfully objecting to it.

THE COURT: Understood.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ PLUNKETT: I disagree that that's possible.

Also, some of the things that would be important for a jury to have before they start filling out a questionnaire, in particularly a

bias, some sort of bias instruction.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. PLUNKETT: I would not agree to use the district court or the Minnesota state court jury video which does address bias. I historically ask to use the state of Washington Federal Court which is a -- I can certainly provide the Court with a copy of it or a link to it. Those are certain issues, that would just be one of several issues that I would want a juror to have in mind before they started answering those or responding to a questionnaire.

Finally, I think the fact that the questionnaire shows up essentially taints the jury before we even get the questionnaire back because the questionnaire is being received at home, you know, I think that jurors listen to judges in a courtroom and obey what the judges say. But I don't know that that's true when they get a letter in the mail and the fine print says under penalty of perjury. I mean, the old cliche, the big print giveth, the small print taketh away. I don't know that everyone is going have that.

Also, it's a very informal thing. It

does not put any process on the person who's filling out the questionnaire. So much of the solemnity of a court adds to the, I think the veracity of people who are in it. You know, the judge is talking to you, you know, it's a very important thing, most people have never experience that. So I think I've noted my objection. If there's a specific question on the objection, I of course want to answer it.

THE COURT: I guess that begs the question, do you object to even the process that we're using now during the COVID era about sending out a questionnaire, a general questionnaire on criminal issues before trial for any jury we have, whether it's an aggravated robbery or whatever?

MR. PLUNKETT: First I've ever heard of it, Your Honor. I wasn't aware that that was the practice so I --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. PLUNKETT: -- guess I'll object to it, but I don't know what I'm objecting to.

THE COURT: Understood. Understood.

And you do make good points regarding the solemnity of the proceedings and the seriousness,

but I think the feedback we've received is that it does tend to work and it does tend to speed up jury selection, which in this case -- I'm getting way ahead of myself -- will probably be one by one in any case.

MR. PLUNKETT: My objection is noted.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anyone else wish to join that objection or otherwise argue?

Mr. Paule, you want to join that objection?

MR. PAULE: I'll join the objection with regard to sending a questionnaire out ahead of time.

THE COURT: I want to talk to you about that other thing.

MR. PAULE: Your Honor, I, too, share
Mr. Plunkett's concerns. I have heard that the
Hennepin County Bench has been sending out a
questionnaire during the pandemic; I've never
seen the questionnaire. The same concerns he has
about the solemnity of court and people coming in
and being placed under perjury. It's different
to maybe not read the fine print versus being
told by a judge this is what they have to do.

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I think one of the -- and I haven't fully thought through the Court's thought process on this, but the idea is if we somehow notify jurors that they may be potential jurors before they're brought into court, they may well go talk to their family or their friends, hey, guess what, I got a jury summons, I may be on this case, I've got notice. I think that's ripe for problems.

Ironically enough, Doonesbury right now is running in the Star Tribune, they're talking about the OJ Simpson jury. They're doing essentially replays of the strips they ran during that time. But the issue is the same, we want to make sure we're getting information from people that is accurate and that is free from outside influence. And I think the more notice we give, and I don't know what the answer is, I'll give it some thought, Your Honor, but I think there's -it's fraught with peril to say send out a questionnaire to people saying three months from now you're going to be brought in on the George Floyd case. I think the chances are every one of those jurors is going to talk to people no matter what it says in the fine print.

1 THE COURT: Well, I don't think we would 2 be quite as obvious as that. It would be you may 3 or may not be. MR. PAULE: Subtlety sometimes eludes 4 5 me. THE COURT: Same here. But I think we 6 7 would be very clear to the jurors that they may 8 or may not be selected as a juror on this case 9 and go from there. But in any case, your 10 objection is noted. 11 MR. PAULE: Thank you. 12 THE COURT: You did want me to adopt a 13 new standard based on statements made by other 14 people in this case? 15 MR. PAULE: I do. THE COURT: Would you like to argue 16 17 that? 18 MR. PAULE: Sure. 19 THE COURT: Or rest on the brief? 20 MR. PAULE: I'll rest essentially on the 21 briefs for the time being on change of venue. 22 would point out that all of the prejudicial 23 pretrial publicity has come from either the 24 prosecutors on this case, or elected officials, 25 or other public figures. And, again, the Court

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doesn't need the litany of people that have commented on this case, but I have -- I personally have never had a case where I've read in the newspaper or seen on the news a prosecutor announcing my client is guilty.

And I think the traditional analysis in the change of venue, which stems from the Shepard case, and then its acceptance in the Thompson case, the T. Eugene Thompson case, is almost outdated. Because the *Thompson* case involved an attorney, ironically enough, who was convicted of hiring somebody to murder his wife. He was apparently a prominent St. Paul attorney. back in those days there were multiple papers, and then multiple papers in Minneapolis. publicity was such in the St. Paul papers that they moved it to a venue theoretically that did not have -- where the jury pool would not have been exposed to that, so they moved it to Minneapolis. I think it's an arcane, outdated standard.

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. PAULE: So I think the issue becomes
-- because if we are going to even entertain
change of venue motions, we have to look at a

different standard because with the Internet, I can read what's going on on BBC by looking at my phone. And I would guess that most of our jurors, once we get them in the room and start questioning them, have heard about this case.

And the idea is, okay, if we were to move it to a different county or a different jurisdiction, they're still going to be exposed to the same thing.

But getting to the Court's question, the prejudicial publicity has come from prosecution and their agents. We've got the chief of police, we've got the head of the bureau of -- Department of Public Safety, we have Mr. Ellison, making comments on national news programs. We have Mr. Freeman making comments.

THE COURT: Let's not rehash that. I'm aware of all that. And, plus, there have been some defense articles as well. Let's just get to what is the effect in your mind with that?

MR. PAULE: The effect is at this point we have a jury that has been -- or potential jurors that have been told by people in positions of power that my client is guilty and that's going to have some impact on our potential jury

pool. That impact would be lessened, I think, if we were to move it out of the area.

The second thing, and it's difficult to find proper phrasing for this, is if I was a Minneapolis resident and I was selected as a jury in this case, one of the things that might be on my mind is what effect would it have if, I were to vote to acquit, on my community and on me personally. That goes to --

THE COURT: Despite the Court's instruction that you'll not consider the effect of your -- or consequences of your verdict in any way, shape or form?

MR. PAULE: I think despite that. If you look at this case -- and I mean no disrespect to the Court, but I think you've got to look at this realistically. We had following the death of Mr. Floyd, three or four days of just out-and-out lawlessness in our community.

THE COURT: If I move it to Moorhead they're not going to worry because it's going to be Minneapolis that goes up in flames?

MR. PAULE: I think to some degree that's accurate. It might be callous, but I think that's a way of looking at it. If I lived

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in Moorhead I wouldn't necessarily be worried about the streets of Moorhead being burned as I would if I lived in Minneapolis.

THE COURT: Understood. I'm more interested in the proposed rule you have.

MR. PAULE: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm not going to entertain that -- and when I said that it's an arcane rule, I agreed with you on that, that's the proposition that one side of the river doesn't know what's going on on the other side of the river.

MR. PAULE: Yes.

THE COURT: They have their own newspapers. I mean, obviously what you just stated about BBC on your phone is true. I mean, it's not going to be a question of have you heard about this case, that's -- but that's also true on a change of venue, where have they not heard about it in the state of Minnesota? So if we move venue, we're stuck with the same problem of what have you heard, what have you not heard, and how has it affected you, has it closed your mind regarding a decision in this case. There really isn't a -- would you agree a county or even a state in this country where there has not been a

lot of publicity about George Floyd's death?

MR. PAULE: I agree with the Court, this case is everywhere given digital network, news, and the era we live in. However, the issue is what impact is that going to have on a jury -- a juror being impartial? I think, again, one of the issues that you're going to have is if you keep the case here is the fact that we had basically cities ablaze as a result of this case. And I think if I was a juror and I lived in the city, I might be very concerned about that. My office --

THE COURT: I want to take you to the rule you proposed though.

MR. PAULE: Sure.

THE COURT: Basically what you're saying is it doesn't matter about the pretrial publicity if the prosecution or its agents have made statements that are prejudicial. Is that --

MR. PAULE: Yes.

THE COURT: It's much more artfully drafted in your memo. But I'm going to tell you right now, I'm not even going to consider it, that's for the Supreme Court. If you want to have them -- have some kind of amendment to the

1	rule on change of venue, I think that's
2	appropriate, but it's not appropriate for me to
3	address it. I'm taking the rule as it's written
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_	by the Supreme Court now.
5	MR. PAULE: Would the Court entertain
6	certifying the issue as important and doubtful
7	and setting it up on a pretrial?
8	THE COURT: No, because it's not
9	doubtful; the rule is very clear.
10	MR. PAULE: And I'll perfect the record,
11	but I want to make sure that I've done so, no
12	disrespect to the Court.
13	THE COURT: No.
14	All right. Anybody else need to talk
15	about change of venue at this point?
16	MR. NELSON: Your Honor, only to say
17	that I think it's premature.
18	THE COURT: All right. Anybody else?
19	Otherwise you wish to adopt the arguments
20	made, Mr. Gray?
21	MR. GRAY: Yes.
22	THE COURT: All right. That's noted.
23	Mr. Frank.
24	MR. FRANK: Thank you, Your Honor, just
25	a couple of points. Just to clarify that I

understand the Court's position is that you're either going to deny the motions as premature or at least defer their consideration until...

THE COURT: The latter.

MR. FRANK: Okay. Because we certainly will brief the issue of change of venue. We obviously would like to brief the issue of a change in standard, maybe that's not necessary --

THE COURT: No.

MR. FRANK: And couple of concerns about the Court's proposed process. One is that, you know, in the case law when deciding on a change of venue the court is to consider where it should go. And so if you're sampling just a Hennepin County jury pool, you're only getting part of that equation, I think, and maybe a skewed part of that equation, or that consideration. The other --

THE COURT: Let me stop you. My -- the implication was that other counties that were proposed as receive counties would also be surveyed; am I correct on that? I'm not sure where I got that. Mr. Plunkett. You can just speak from there, if you just answer that question quickly.

MR. PLUNKETT: That is what the proposal would be, Your Honor, is that Hennepin County would of course be surveyed, but then to specifically address the Court's question about is there any place we can move it, we would -- if properly funded, we would do a similar questionnaire process in other counties, probably first looking at demographics, facilities and things like that to try to find a place that's appropriate.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Frank.

MR. FRANK: Well, if that's the defenses' effort, that's one thing, but if it's the court's, then I think we want to be heard. What I'm saying -- talking about is the court sending out questionnaires to jurors ahead of time with the summons months ahead of time.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FRANK: You're only going to be asking Fourth District jurors what they've heard, and you won't have information about other areas. The defense is going to submit that that would be ordinary evidence for a change of venue motion would be my understanding.

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THE COURT: Well, I think it's getting the cart before the horse to talk about other counties. Don't you agree that we talk to Hennepin jurors first and if we have a pool -- of course, there will be some people that say they've made their minds up, they can't be fair and impartial, if they're being honest. there may be in the questionnaires -- I think sometimes we get so wrapped up within our world in the criminal justice system that we think that everybody knows everything we do, and has made up their minds when half the time they'll read it in the paper, forget about it, and they don't have an opinion. Isn't the first step to actually look at the Hennepin jurors and see if we have a pretrial publicity problem? And if we don't, we don't have to worry about St. Louis County, we don't have to worry about Dakota County, Stearns or wherever. MR. FRANK: I mean, a good illustration of that is the Noor trial. We were able to pick a jury here. THE COURT: Right. MR. FRANK: And so I don't --

I think everyone will agree

THE COURT:

this has gotten even more publicity than the Noor trial, but that said --

MR. FRANK: Closest example I have.

THE COURT: -- you were able to pick a jury without going through the entire pool that was drawn.

MR. FRANK: Your Honor, I will try to chose my words carefully because I know how the Court feels about --

THE COURT: You can say that I'm not being very smart on this. I --

MR. FRANK: No, no, no. I want to just talk briefly about the pretrial publicity, because it's certainly not true that it's all come from us. And I think the publicity that our office has been responsible for has been nothing other than what a jury is going to hear anyway, what the charges are, and then they will be instructed that's not evidence.

THE COURT: And when I lifted the gag order, I think I made note that much of the publicity and the release of the videos were things that were going to be in trial anyway. My concern being more about the prejudicial things that might not be evidence.

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MR. FRANK: Prejudicial things like misrepresenting what the evidence is and what the law is, and interviews with the media. That did not come from our office. My point is there is a certain amount of pretrial publicity that's unavoidable and that a jury is going to hear about anyway. They're going to know we charged these individuals, they're going to know a complaint has been filed, and then they're going to be told to set that aside. So and that's -that's what the standard is. It's not whether St. Paul and Minneapolis read the same newspaper. But, you know, I want to -- I want to argue about that arcane test but it seems like I don't need to.

THE COURT: The test is not arcane but the rationale is now, I think, pretty arcane that you have to look at how much pretrial publicity when the whole world has heard about this case.

MR. FRANK: I think the reality gained from all our experience in this field is that when a potential juror gets a questionnaire they think, oh, what's this about, I better look it up on the Internet because it's really easy for me to do. We have, you know, been asking courts to

put in bold giant letters on the front do that, and, you know, hopefully that would help. But the longer we give them to do that, the more likely it is they will do it and try to find ways to get out of jury duty. Not that the average citizen I'm suggesting tries to get out of jury duty. But -- and maybe I'll have an opportunity to note these concerns before the court sends out its questionnaire, but these are the things that I'm concerned about with the process you're suggesting.

THE COURT: Let me throw this out to all counsel. Instead of just sending out a cold questionnaire, what if we actually summoned people for the week but said that you also have to appear on X date, and at that time we have a hearing and we give them the instructions and they fill out the questionnaire there but in enough time -- because if we do it the normal way and do the questionnaire on the first day of trial, we're going to be wasting a lot of time.

MR. FRANK: I agree, Your Honor. And I do think counsel legitimately raises a concern about the solemnity of the court. I think the courts -- or the potential jurors looking you in

the eyes, or another judge in that setting, probably has a little more impact on them than just getting it in the mail. It's something to consider certainly. I'm not taking issue with the Court's idea, just maybe some of the practical aspects of it.

THE COURT: And I'm not wedded to all the fine details. As we are here on the fly talking, it may be better that we actually summon people in for a day, have the solemnity of the court.

Mr. Plunkett, is that kind of what you were thinking might be an alternative? I know you still object to the whole process.

MR. PLUNKETT: I object to everything.

Yeah, I mean, we're -- it's a moving target right now, Your Honor. We've already changed what the proposal is since it was first proposed, and, you know, until I see the final product, I don't know. How do I object to something that --

THE COURT: Well, this is where I would like the parties to go for now is work on your joint questionnaire. How we do it -- we are going to do a questionnaire. The rules provide for it and so I am going to do one. The question

is how we do it, and those are more
administrative matters. The content of the
questionnaire is more important at this point.
And so what I'd like counsel to do is work on
that. We can have a conference call to work on
the administrative part of it and perhaps kick
around some ideas. It would not be an on the
record hearing, just an administrative conference
on how to accomplish the use of a questionnaire
with the jury. And then I'd issue a jury
management order based on what I think is the
best way to manage that.

But other than that, Mr. Frank, I think you had some other points to make.

MR. FRANK: I think that's a great idea, Your Honor, as long as all of us understand that this questionnaire is not about indoctrinating jurors to your side of the case, and it's about addressing that issue.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm going to have final say of what goes in it.

MR. FRANK: But it's that previous concern, indoctrinating jurors, that to me always leads to the difficulty in agreeing on a juror questionnaire with defense counsel. I mean,

nothing negative towards the four defense counsel in this case, just my experience has been, you give us free rein, defense attorneys like to start indoctrinating jurors in that questionnaire.

THE COURT: Well, let me be a little more clear. I hope you can come to consensus on what should be in the questionnaire as appropriate questions for jury selection. And I agree, and I think those who've tried cases before me know that I'm fairly strict on not allowing indoctrination questions, and that is to get information, not to give information.

may not be able to come to a consensus. And if that's the case, you all submit what you want and I will draft it myself based on -- but I would appreciate the input one way or the other, whether it's a consensus questionnaire, or it's something you can't agree on but you want in there, I will consider anything that's brought to me, but it has to go toward appropriate voir dire topics. Not indoctrination, not hypotheticals, not imparting facts about the case. I think you just simply indicate to the jury panel that they

1 may sit on a case involving the George Floyd 2 homicide, that would be enough. Or the George 3 Floyd death is how the defense would prefer I characterize it. 4 My comments have been a 5 MR. FRANK: little all over the place. I don't have anything 6 7 else unless the Court --THE COURT: Well, it's my fault, 8 Mr. Frank. I've kind of led you around the 9 10 mulberry bush here. 11 MR. FRANK: Thank you. 12 THE COURT: Anything else on that? 13 MR. FRANK: No, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Anything else on that, 15 Mr. Paule, briefly. MR. PAULE: I do want to make two 16 17 One is it seems like the prosecution is points. 18 creating their own narrative with regard to 19 pretrial publicity. I would point out that both 20 Mr. Ellison and Mike Freeman have spoken publicly about it. 21 22 With regard to Mr. Frank's comment about 23 it's nothing the jury isn't going to hear. 24 would point out specifically that Mr. Freeman 25 talked about potential negotiation. That is

something that never comes before a jury. And not only is Mr. Freeman and Mr. Ellison both lawyers, they're politicians, and the lines sometimes seem to blur. I don't mean any disrespect. But I will point out what history tells us is they did make comments that go well beyond what a jury would hear.

The second thing is, and I mean no disrespect to Mr. Gray, but when we talk about -- or Mr. Frank talks about defense publicity, he's not talking about State versus Thao, he's talking about -- without saying it, Mr. Gray's appearances on national TV, not mine.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right. Let's move on to the next motion. I plan on taking a break at 10:30 just so you're aware; that will be a 20-minute break.

Okay. Jury sequestration motion. So we're talking about Rule 26.03 subdivision 5. It appears with the standard that some form of sequestration would be required. Again, I'm just going to give everyone the Court's thoughts at this moment but I'll take input. Paren 2 of subdivision 5 notes that any party may move for sequestration and sequestration must be ordered

if the case is of such notoriety or the issues are of such nature that in the absence of sequestration highly prejudicial matters are likely to come to the jurors' attention. Also when sequestration is ordered, the court in advising the jury the decision, must not disclose which party requested sequestration.

With regard to sequestration, the

Court's plan, I think given the nature of this

case, at the very least the jury will be

sequestered, they will be kept together, kept in

a hotel, all the accourrements of sequestration

for deliberation. I think it would be almost

cruel to keep them for weeks at a time.

And for that, I'm going to have to ask counsel start thinking, and we'll probably ask you this after the break, what your estimation of time for trial. How long does the State think it's going to have. How much does the defense think it's going to have, each of you. If it were joint or if it were separate, just so that we can think about that. Even then, I don't know that I would order sequestration, instead would allow the jurors to go home at night, but their movements would be -- they would be

1	semi-sequestered, let me put it that way.
2	Talking about where they would park at an
3	undisclosed location, be escorted to the
4	courthouse by the sheriff's office, taken up to
5	the whatever jury room they have without
6	access to the public. Lunch would be brought in.
7	And at the end of the day, the reverse process.
8	They would be taken down through a secure
9	elevator down to where they'd be transported to
10	transportation to their cars by the sheriff's
11	office. So that's what the Court's current
12	thought is, but I know that others may request a
13	full sequestration for the full trial.
14	Mr. Gray, I think you mentioned that in
15	yours. Did you wish to have any comment on that
16	or
17	MR. GRAY: I did not mention it, Your
18	Honor.
19	THE COURT: I'm thinking of something
20	else then.
21	MR. GRAY: I would object to
22	sequestration in fact.
23	THE COURT: You don't want any
24	sequestration?
25	MR. GRAY: No sequestration. Send them

home. Otherwise by the second week, they're all so upset that as soon as the defense starts the case, they're -- it's over for them. And I've experienced that through the years, Judge. It's much better just to send them home because wherever they go -- and they're either going to follow your rule or not. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anybody else? Mr. Plunkett, how about for your client? Do you have a position regarding sequestration, semi-sequestered, fully sequestered, no sequestration?

MR. PLUNKETT: Your Honor, what the

Court outlined of semi-sequestration, I would not

object to that. I would object to full

sequestration for all the obvious reasons. I

don't think you need me to state them.

THE COURT: I think it's only new lawyers who ask for full sequestration throughout. Maybe I'm wrong, maybe the State wants it. But after doing it once, I think lawyers realize it just leads to a very upset jury, and they just want to go home. And if you let them go home at the end of the day at least, they don't have that -- when we're talking a

four- to six-week trial, that's a long time to keep people away from family.

What is the State's position regarding this proposal?

MR. FRANK: Your Honor, we are not asking for sequestration during the trial. The rule obviously contemplates sequestration during deliberation, but we're not asking for it during trial. The accommodations the Court is talking about, I don't even see it as a sort of sequestration, I think those are sensible protections to put in place to avoid any accidental even -- I want to say influences, but information coming to the jurors. I think that makes sense.

THE COURT: And with all due respect to the media, I don't want jurors who are coming up on the public elevator being chased with cameras just to get a little video shot. That's -- the Court wants that not to happen. Because even that can be intimidating for jurors.

MR. FRANK: And, Your Honor, when I say accidental, I mean the courthouse is a busy place. It's so easy for us to -- we have to remind ourselves every morning that person could

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be a potential juror. You know, not see a juror and accidently have them hear things we talked about in the courthouse, you know, nothing intentional. So that's why I say I think the Court's plan there is a sensible one, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anybody else have any thoughts? Mr. Paule.

MR. PAULE: I would request full There are two reasons for that. sequestration. One is I think -- and with all respect to Mr. Gray, I think the idea of how are we going to control what jurors have access to through the media, what sort of coverage. I would note that we have any number of reporters sitting in this courtroom. I would note that we have reporters sitting out front when we arrived, which will be the same during trial. And we're going to have protesters out there, at least during parts of These are things that normally jurors the trial. don't get exposed to, and I think we need to shield them as much as possible. Particularly if we're talking about the issue of anonymous jurors as well.

THE COURT: Mr. Nelson, what are your thoughts?

MR. NELSON: Your Honor, I'm undecided on full sequestration versus the plan outlined by the Court.

THE COURT: And you can send me a letter brief outlining your position if you'd like after you've had a chance to talk to your client about it.

MR. NELSON: I need that opportunity.

But also, Your Honor, I do -- I think that the safety of the jurors is a significant concern as well.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. Anonymous jury. The idea being that counsel, at least this is my read on your motions and the rules, counsel would have access to names. You would have all the information you normally would during trial but with an instruction from the Court that you not reveal those names, that you not refer to jurors by name but instead by number. For example, Juror No. 1, good morning, during jury selection, and leave it at that.

What are people's thoughts on that? For the State, do you think this is an appropriate case for an anonymous jury where they are by

number, with the understanding at the end of the trial it's -- those names are probably going to be released to the media. Mr. Frank.

MR. FRANK: I don't want to scare you by bringing up my whole binder.

THE COURT: You did a little bit.

MR. FRANK: I will only argue so far as the Court wants me to. We do not agree with having an anonymous jury. And I think what the Court is proposing is an anonymous jury in fact, or at least -- and I would worry that that would look like an anonymous jury to an appellate court.

THE COURT: Oh, it would be anonymous under the rule, yes.

MR. FRANK: And I don't think we have met the standard. You know, again I won't make a lengthy argument here, unless the Court wants me to go into it, but the standard from the Bowles case was adopted into Rule 26.02 subdivision 2(2). And I don't think there has been any showing sufficient under that rule to have an anonymous jury. I think it's particularly helpful to look at the Wren case, W-r-e-n, which is 738 N.W.2d 378, the most recent time the

Supreme Court has talked about anonymous jury.

And the flavor from that case is clear that it's disfavored, and that the standard is quite high.

And that Bowles, and the other four cases that came out of the murder of Officer Hoff were very unique. And so to have currently an anonymous jury requires a pretty high showing --

THE COURT: Well, let's go to the rule.

The rule says that on party's motion, and there has been a motion by Mr. Paule, the court may restrict access to prospective and selected jurors' names, addresses, and other identifying information if a strong reason exists to believe that the jury needs protection from external threats to its members' safety or impartiality. The court must hold a hearing and make detailed findings supporting its decision.

This is that hearing, so anything you'd like to make as part of the record I'll welcome.

MR. FRANK: Right. And so the court has to have a hearing and has to make detailed findings. But it's an extreme measure. And the court said in Wren not every retaliatory murder involving gang activity meets the extreme measure of impaneling an anonymous jury. So what are

those extreme circumstances that would require it when there is --

I don't think there's any allegation here that a jury would worry if they found a defendant guilty that they would be subject to violence from any of the parties. What I'm more concerned about here is that there are external threats to members of the jury's safety or impartiality. I assume -- and has the Attorney General's Office gotten any unsolicited input from the public about what should happen in this case?

MR. FRANK: Your Honor, I can't speak personally for the entire office obviously.

THE COURT: But...

MR. FRANK: I'm not aware of any personally.

THE COURT: I get them daily. In fact, luckily I was working from home yesterday and so I didn't have to answer the phone. Mr. Schaefer unfortunately had to whether all the calls, a barrage of calls giving me advice. Many polite, and I've only gotten one semi-threatening call, but most were polite, but they are clearly trying to influence me and my decision, and this is just

on a motion hearing. And I'm going to ask other counsel if they received any unsolicited calls from the public, because I think that should be part of the record. Because just on the basis of what I've received as the judge in the case, I think there's a significant and strong reason to believe that there would be attempts made to influence the jury in an ex parte fashion if we are not anonymous, and people can find out through the many Internet tools where they live and what their phone number is. Would you disagree with that, Mr. Frank?

MR. FRANK: I don't think it's to that level. And the reason is because we have not had -- Okay. Look. In the *Bowles* case the court sort of made a list of the cases where it has been allowed, a lot of them are organized crime cases where witnesses had been threatened, where witnesses had been killed --

THE COURT: And I think --

MR. FRANK: And that's true of the four Officer Hoff cases, four or five, right, where one potential -- well, who they thought was a witness had been murdered. And so the -- the threats were directed by people who wanted to put

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a stop to that jury, to that jury trial, and was by, you know, the intention is that by the defendants, and that's what intimidates the jury.

THE COURT: That's -- and that's not a gang related, this is not those cases. grant you that. It's more the language about because this is a not just excess surplusage here, it's as to their safety or impartiality. If they're getting barraged by the public with unsolicited comments, you better find these guys or you better not find these guys guilty, whatever that input is, I've gotten a little bit on both sides, it's very heavily weighted to not dismissing the case. And I've noted it only so that it could factor into whether we have an anonymous jury. It's been a lot. And if a jury who isn't as much as a malcontent as I am have to hear that kind of stuff, they may have their -they may feel pressure and their impartiality may be influenced; wouldn't you agree with that?

MR. FRANK: It may be, but what I'm saying is we don't know right now that that is happening. And the public outcry is directed at the defendants. And, unfortunately, this Court as a public servant is accessible and people are

sharing their opinions as well. But we don't know right now that jurors have been threatened, are going to be threatened. Because the public wants the trial to proceed. And it's different than those organized crime cases where there are attempts made to put a stop to the trial for the defendants, and that's not our case. This case the public wants a trial.

THE COURT: What would be -- well, and they know they're going to have a jury. And what is the harm to the public? Because counsel is going to know who the jurors are. What's going to be the harm to the public if they don't get their names until after the trial is done?

MR. FRANK: Obviously the case law talks about the need for an anonymous jury stemming principally from a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury and a fair trial. We recognize that, but I've never understood why this isn't also a question of a public trial. You know, when we -- when we interview an individual juror outside the presence of the public for very good reasons.

THE COURT: Wait, I didn't say we were going to close the hearing --

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MR. FRANK: No, but when we do that, it's treated as a courtroom closure, outside of the public's trial right. So this is, to me, somewhat analogous because you're excluding from the public trial who the jurors are. And so I'm not saying it can't be done but it has to be done for the right reason. And then there is, of course, in the case law and in the rule now, the court has to take steps to minimize the prejudice to the defendants. You know, so you tell them don't worry about the fact that we're not letting your names out there in the public, does that really minimize the prejudice? And --

public trial. The jury selection, aside from the questionnaire, which might even be public itself, aside from the questionnaire, they would be individually questioned in open court with the public able to attend to hear all about that juror except for their name, address, contact information. How is the public -- how is that a closure of the courtroom any more than a court's ruling that certain evidence will not come in?

MR. FRANK: I'm saying it's analogous to a courtroom closure.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FRANK: I think there's a public right -- a public trial right aspect of this. The public trial right doesn't belong to the defendants, really it belongs to the public.

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. FRANK: And I'm just saying it's analogous to that. We're conducting business to an extent secretly. In the same way that when we interview individually outside the presence of the public there has to be strong showings made to do that. I'm just saying there's an analogy here that way.

THE COURT: I'll take it for that.

MR. FRANK: Your Honor, the -- the other concern that I have is the defendants have brought this to you -- and one defendant has, and may agree with it today, but that won't stop them from raising it on appeal. You know, obviously our court -- our courts are very willing to review things on plain error review, and there's no invited error exception to the plain error doctrine. So nothing will prevent them from raising this on appeal. So to have this stand up on appeal, the Court is going to have to almost

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act as if everybody is objecting to it and make those detailed findings. And I just don't think it's enough to say -- and I appreciate the Court's concerns about the calls you're getting, really it's awful, and I'm sure --

THE COURT: I don't care about the calls for me, but it's an indication of how the public is reacting to this trial and not just sitting back and waiting or coming in and watching, they are -- they are contacting the person making the decision. And I don't care if they do that to me, I am an elected official, I am a judge of the district court, that's fine. But it shows me that we're going to have -- the problem is jurors. And I think as you know, judges are very protective of jurors and try and keep them from threats. I don't think it's threats here, although I got one that was close to threatening, but I think it's more just the input to try and sway their impartiality on an ex parte basis, talk about your lack of a public trial. You've got people in the public talking to jurors outside the courtroom that nobody is aware of.

MR. FRANK: And that information will be out in the public regardless of their anonymity.

And I just -- our position is that we are not in the position of having the Court able to make detailed findings that this is the kind of case where threats are being made that could intimidate jurors.

THE COURT: All right. I'd like to hear from defense counsel. As far as the record goes, and I know we're quasi taking evidence here, but I think it's just -- I need to know from counsel if you received any type of input from the public unsolicited.

MR. GRAY: Your Honor, I'd ask for an anonymous juror -- jury.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GRAY: I would tell the Court that
I've experienced since I started representing
Mr. Lane many, many, many threats. Obscene phone
calls threatening my parents, thank God they're
dead. And a classic example is what happened at
Bob Kroll's house last week or two weeks ago
where there were threats, they did --

THE COURT: Beat a piñata.

MR. GRAY: Yes. Those are the kinds of things you do not want jurors to have during the jury trial and the deliberations. And I would on

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behalf of Mr. Lane ask for an anonymous jury.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Plunkett.

MR. PLUNKETT: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm opposed to the confidential jury or anonymous jury; I'm specifically objecting to that. think that, on behalf of Mr. Kueng, this is a Sixth Amendment issue, it's been discussed, due process issue, Your Honor. It's been discussed in terms of a First Amendment issue, which it certainly is, but I don't have a standing to raise those. I'm looking at Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39. I'm looking at Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, and State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, and the Sixth Amendment's bedrock right to a public trial is for the benefit of the accused. It reflects the general rule that judges, lawyers, witnesses and jurors will perform their respective functions more responsibly in an open court than in a secret proceeding. And I'm specifically objecting to the secret jury, confidential jury, whatever term you choose to assign to it.

THE COURT: You would characterize a public voir dire with counsel having all the

information about the juror as a secret proceeding?

MR. PLUNKETT: It's been called an anonymous proceeding; I don't think that's a secret proceeding. Whatever term you want to use, I think that it's a depravation of the right to a fair and open trial.

THE COURT: Well, you were on the Noor case, did Judge Quaintance order an anonymous jury?

MR. PLUNKETT: She sua sponte ordered an anonymous jury to the extent that -- it's kind of what the Court has outlined, everyone -- all the lawyers know who the jurors are and the public doesn't.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PLUNKETT: Frankly, it wasn't specifically objected to. My experience with it was a -- I think it -- you also have to understand that it sends a message to the jury that, you know, you're in danger, that this is so important that -- of course, the judge gave instructions to say don't read anything into this. But ultimately in that case also the jurors' information was kept secret in perpetuity

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until just recently. And at that point, all the information was not released. That's a different case, and I think the judge -- this Court is not proposing to do something like that.

THE COURT: In perpetuity, no.

MR. PLUNKETT: Well, 6, 12 months.

THE COURT: Let me be very candid, my intent would be -- if we have an anonymous jury, and you can see which way -- yes, you can read into what I am saying, you can see which way I'm leaning, is to have an anonymous jury at least through the trial, to release their names after the trial is done -- trials are done. With the only exception if there's civil unrest, I'm not going to release juror names in the middle of civil unrest. I hope there is no civil unrest. I hope people attend the trial, watch the trial, see that everyone is getting a fair shake and civil unrest doesn't break out, but I'm not naive either. But my intent would be to issue in an appropriate timeframe shortly after trial the list of names to the public.

MR. PLUNKETT: And I'm -- if there's -I can't object to it yet because you haven't done
it but --

THE COURT: Yeah, you can note your objection.

MR. PLUNKETT: -- you know, for secrecy of that information, I'm objecting to that. But right now we're talking about a secret jury I think during voir dire and trial.

THE COURT: All right. Have you received calls from the public unsolicited?

MR. PLUNKETT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. You don't have to go any further than that.

Mr. Paule.

MR. PAULE: Your Honor, to the Court's question about receiving phone calls and threats, yes, that's been occurring. I would also note that there's been significant media attempts to contact me, including media members trying to seek out my client at his house.

I would point out that the Bowles case dealt with an anonymous jury from a different perspective. There the court's concern was that the jury would be essentially sought out for influence or threats by the defendants. In this case, we're not talking about any of us, the Court, the lawyers, or any jurors being

influenced by any of the defendants in this case. That was a gang case involving murder of a police officer. What we're talking about here is members of the public who take it upon themselves to try to promote their agenda and try to influence other people through whatever means. I would point out, I know for a fact --

THE COURT: As I said, the calls I'm getting actually go both ways. They are predominantly on one side, but I've gotten them for both ways.

MR. PAULE: Well, I'm getting them one way. And I would assume the majority of this is going one way as well, too. I don't have any way of knowing that except by my own experience.

But I would point out that what we're talking about here is trying to keep a jury free from outside influences. And this is not going to come from the defendant's side, this is going to be coming from members of the public, who I would assume, based on my own experience, are trying to influence them to convict. And when you talk about impartiality or safety of it, you also have to be worried about the safety of potential jurors. Because we now had people

being threatened, public figures. I know by experience that at least one lead prosecutor has moved out of his house because of people coming to his house and protesting. We had protests of the Mayor, protests of the Governor. We can only imagine what would happen to these jurors if they were made public. And I think this is an unusual case because I'm not as concerned about the jury thinking that they have to be kept anonymous from the defendants, it's from the public at large.

And to Mr. Plunkett's point, the right to a public trial is the defendant's constitutional right, okay. We're not talking about the public's right to do that as much as we're talking about a fair trial for my client. And I don't want to have a jury out there that's going to be having to deal with people trying to influence them, threaten them, cajole them, whatever, to try to influence their decision against my client.

So I am for an anonymous jury. And just so the record is clear, I'm asking for sequestration from the start of the trial.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Nelson.

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MR. NELSON: Your Honor, I have no objection to the anonymous jury and would, in fact, join in the request for an anonymous jury.

To the Court's question perhaps because my client is sort of the -- seen as persona non grata number one in this trial, I have perhaps received more of unsolicited offers to help, offers to provide services for free, but more importantly threats. Threats to myself, threats of my professional colleagues, threats to my family. Within the first week I think I logged -- and I've saved every single one of these -close to 1,000 unsolicited e-mails, many of them threatening. It's gone so far that other lawyers who share my name have had to modify their business practices because they, too, have been receiving calls simply by virtue of a common name.

So this is a unique case insofar as it's not a gang case where we have to worry about defendants or their families retaliating against these potential jurors. This case -- this incident has -- I mean, this is what everyone is thinking in the back of their mind, has caused civil unrest, not just locally, nationally and

internationally. And every single person that I have spoken to about this case in my professional career, this is a concern that is ongoing. any verdict regardless of the verdict, if there's a conviction, the sentence won't be long enough, it's going to cause civil unrest.

So the Court is rightfully concerned about the safety of the jurors; I am, too. mean, you know -- so I join in the request. join, and I think that the -- there can be appropriate measures to quarantee the public trial. And I just -- I'm kind of mystified by the State's objection to this. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. We're going to take a 20-minute break. reconvene at 10:50. Thank you.

(Court in recess.)

THE COURT: Motion to disqualify the Hennepin County Attorney's Office. I think, Mr. Paule. Mr. Plunkett, I dealt with yours earlier.

Mr. Paule, I think this is your motion.

MR. PAULE: I believe it's Mr. Nelson.

THE COURT: Mr. Nelson, to the extent that you argued the same thing as Mr. Plunkett,

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I'm going to deny it without any further argument. But you have the additional ground that they are a necessary witness. Would you approach the podium.

And I apologize to the people in the overflow rooms, I fell into the bad habit of letting lawyers speak from the counsel table, the overflow rooms can't you hear. So we're going to get more religious about getting up to the podium.

Mr. Nelson.

MR. NELSON: Certainly, Your Honor. Ι think the additional ground that we reference in connection with this motion is what was discovered during the course of our review of the discovery in this case, specifically a memorandum was prepared my Amy Sweezy of the Hennepin County Attorney's Office, who was originally tasked with the prosecution and, I believe, signed off on the original complaint in this case. It was dated May 27th, also had a reference to May 26th, about a meeting that she, Mr. Lofton from the Hennepin County Attorney's Office, as well as Hennepin County Attorney Mike Freeman himself, had an in-person -- had an in-person meeting with Dr.

Andrew Baker, who is the medical examiner in this particular case.

If you look at the previous memorandums that were submitted, those notes of those conversations, prior conversations included witnesses from the Hennepin County Attorney's Office or BCA agents; however, this one particular meeting where they discussed the autopsy of Mr. Floyd and the findings of Mr. -- excuse me, Dr. Baker's autopsy were discussed at length. A memorandum was produced, however there was no non-attorney witness present, at least listed in the memorandum that was prepared by Ms. Sweezy.

Because in this particular case the cause of Mr. Floyd's death will be one of the principle defenses, I anticipate in all four -- or of all four defendants, Mr. Freeman has made himself a potential witness should Dr. Baker testify inconsistently with what Mr. Freeman wrote, or Ms. Sweezy wrote regarding that conversation. And that's essentially what the rule -- the professional rules are specifically designed to prevent.

I would also note, Your Honor, and just

to put this into context one additional ground in terms of the entirety of the Hennepin County
Attorney's Office. I think the Court needs a little understanding of the mountain of discovery in this case. To date we've received approximately 35,000 Bates-stamped items. Many of those Bates-stamped items are not a single piece of paper. For example, Bates stamp No. 4, I believe, or maybe No. 8 consists of 92 recorded interviews. So one Bates stamp, 92 recorded interviews. We're up to 35,000 pages.

There is a large portion of this discovery which is training materials from the Minneapolis Police Department. And as I've gone through all of this, I have discovered that many of the trainings that were presented, and potentially several of the trainings that may be pertinent in this particular case were presented by senior members of the Hennepin County Attorney's Office. So, again, you have Mr. Freeman, Ms. Sweezy, Mr. Lofton at a bare minimum who should be disqualified, but you also have numerous other county attorneys who are training the Minneapolis Police Department relevant to the law and the requirements of the

law, which based on the *Spreigl* notice we received last night, may very well become pertinent in this particular case. I know Al Harris, senior prosecutor led several of those trainings.

So on that basis, Your Honor, I think that the State appears to have, at least Mr. Freeman's office violated the attorney/witness rule. There is legal precedent suggesting that at a very minimum Mr. Freeman, Ms. Sweezy, Mr. LeFevour, and Mr. Lofton should be disqualified.

THE COURT: All right. Does the Attorney General's Office have a position on this? And if you could come to the podium, Mr. Frank.

MR. FRANK: Your Honor, I certainly -we certainly do oppose this. Counsel cites the
Fratzke opinion, which is very clear. Well, let
me back up a little bit because there's a factual
issue potentially here.

The memo relied on by counsel regarding the meeting with Dr. Baker does not say it was only the three of us there; we are still trying to figure out if that's even true. But that

meeting may potentially cause a disqualification of Ms. Sweezy, Mr. Lofton, or Mr. Freeman, but not all three. You're only going to need to call one of them as a witness if for some reason there's need for impeachment of Dr. Baker's testimony. So it doesn't disqualify all three of them; it certainly doesn't disqualify the entire office.

THE COURT: Isn't it an imputed disqualification to the entire firm so to speak if --

MR. FRANK: It's not. Because it's not a conflict of interest, it's not a bias, it's simply an inability to be sitting at that table and that witness stand. That's why I'm saying it's only a potential disqualifier for one of those three because they can't do both, they can't be in both chairs, that's the problem with it.

And so having the three of them there means that potentially only one of them would be disqualified, and probably not. But even it's all three of them, it's not imputed to the entire office. The last paragraph of Fratzke points out it does appear in any way that the remedy is not

to disqualify the entire office. So just that fact that if it was just the three of them and not an additional witness there would not disqualify the entire office. It's not imputed, it's not a conflict of interest.

THE COURT: Do we know the answer to was somebody else -- it appears that Mr. Lofton in his prior memo, or the memo that is dated, I think it's the day before May 26th, he noted everyone who is there including BCA, FBI by name, and that is conspicuously missing from his May 26th memo in which he states that Patrick Lofton, Amy Sweezy, Mike Freeman and Andrew LeFevour met with Hennepin County Medical Examiner Dr. Andrew Baker in person in a socially distanced room. He seems to be pretty good at documenting who's there. Do you have any information as to whether there was somebody there?

MR. FRANK: I don't, Your Honor. I have asked, I have not got an answer to that yet. I don't think it actually even matters. The Court knows full well that, you know, prosecutors are under an obligation to prepare their witnesses. For instance, defense attorneys often argue there

was an error made at trial because the State

didn't prepare its witnesses. Well, how do we

prepare our witness if we don't sit down with

them and have -- and talk to them. And so when

we do that, sure, we are trying to have somebody

else present to avoid this particular problem.

That's what they did. They had two or three, you

know, at least two other people in addition -
THE COURT: The problem is they're the

lawyers, and that's the whole point about the

advocate witness rule is --

MR. FRANK: Right.

THE COURT: -- you can have your victim witness advocate there, you can have an investigator there and they become the witness, but now we're talking about attorneys as witnesses.

MR. FRANK: But what difference does it make in that sense that they are an attorney as opposed to an advocate or an investigator, they can still be called as a witness. So if everybody to that conversation could be called as a witness, there would be no way to prep witnesses because we would all be potentially called as a witness if we were there. That's why

1 you have an extra person there, that person gets 2 called for the limited purpose of presenting 3 impeachment of testimony. THE COURT: But that gets back to the 4 standard where -- the question has the attorney 5 become a necessary witness; wouldn't you agree? 6 7 That's why the investigator, if they could 8 testify, they are a witness so it's not necessary 9 to call an attorney. 10 MR. FRANK: Right. 11 Here it may be necessary to THE COURT: 12 call one of the attorneys. 13 MR. FRANK: Right. And one of them becomes a necessary witness and would be 14 15 disqualified from being the attorney asking the question. 16 17 Who picks the attorney? THE COURT: 18 MR. FRANK: Who picks the attorney to... 19 THE COURT: Disqualify. 20 MR. FRANK: Good question. 21 I think it's me. But that THE COURT: 22 seems odd that I would essentially tell 23 Mr. Nelson who he's going to call as a witness to 24 impeach. 25 Well, maybe they pick. MR. FRANK:

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FRANK: Because it's for the purpose of impeachment. And, you know, technically it should be the author, right, it should be who wrote the notes. Because the only value to that memo is what the author thought the witness said. So if Patrick Lofton wrote those notes, you can't ask Amy Sweezy about those notes because it's Patrick Lofton's hearsay, right.

THE COURT: Let's also jump to the reality of this, I don't see the County

Attorney's Office here today. Are you planning that they be at counsel table during trial?

MR. FRANK: They may or may not be at counsel table at trial; we haven't made that determination.

THE COURT: Well, I have. They're disqualified. I'm not going to allow those four attorneys to be in this trial as potential witnesses since they, I think, have violated the attorney/witness rule. So because they are all potential witnesses to what Dr. Andy Baker said, and since cause of death is an issue, they're not going to be on this case anymore.

But having said that, I'm not going to

disqualify other attorneys in the office. I'm not going to disqualify victim witness certainly in any case, so Ms. Boswell can still work on the case, nor their support staff. Because IT staff could certainly be helpful to the Attorney General's Office because they're more used to working in this courthouse.

MR. FRANK: My understanding is that Mr. Freeman, Ms. Sweezy and Mr. Lofton are disqualified from being at counsel table?

THE COURT: And Mr. LeFevour, yes.

Well, they're actually -- they're removed from the case.

MR. FRANK: I'm...

THE COURT: It's a bit heavy-handed but it's like the State is suffering no prejudice from this, all I see is the Attorney General's Office. Those four lawyers -- I know there are other lawyers in the County Attorney's Office who are probably working on this case, I'm not excluding them, but those four are to be kept out of this case, period.

I think it was sloppy not to have someone present on one of the primary witnesses in this case, and they made themselves attorneys

1	(sic), and I think I'm not going to say one,
2	Mr. Lofton because what if Mr. Nelson wants to
3	call somebody else to impeach? I'm essentially
4	by saying this person is off but these aren't,
5	I'm essentially directing his case, and that's
6	not supposed to be my function.
7	MR. FRANK: I don't think he can call
8	anybody but the author. But if
9	THE COURT: Oh, I think he can call
10	anybody he wants to say isn't this what happened?
11	All right.
12	MR. FRANK: So
13	THE COURT: They're off.
14	MR. FRANK: Those four attorneys.
15	THE COURT: Those four attorneys are
16	off.
17	MR. FRANK: Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: They're not to participate
19	in the prosecution of the case any further,
20	they're now witnesses.
21	MR. FRANK: Obviously, Mr
22	THE COURT: You can talk to them as
23	necessary to prepare them as witnesses if it
24	comes to that.
25	MR. FRANK: And, obviously,

1 Mr. Freeman's office is responsible for some of 2 the administrative part --THE COURT: That's fine. 3 The administrative things -- and, particularly, I'm 4 5 not going to remove Ms. Boswell, who is the victim advocate, as I understand, who's been 6 7 working with the Floyd family. She can still 8 participate as much as she wants, as other administrative staff. But those four attorneys, 9 10 they're off, they're now witnesses. You can have 11 contact with them to the extent that they are 12 witnesses. In other words, prepare them or ask 13 them what their testimony would be for trial if 14 called as a witness. All right. 15 MR. FRANK: Your Honor, if I may just change topics for a brief minute. 16 17 THE COURT: Sure. 18 MR. FRANK: There were two things I 19 wanted to revisit from earlier. 20 THE COURT: Sure. 21 MR. FRANK: One is with regard to the 22 jury anonymity issue. 23 THE COURT: Yes. 24 MR. FRANK: I raised appellate review. 25 I did that because I didn't know at the time that

some defense attorneys were going to oppose that, and so it was sort of a caution I had for the Court that even if they all want it, you still have to make those findings.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. FRANK: We certainly appreciate, we don't intend to minimize the threats the Court has been receiving and counsel have been receiving. It's also important to remember that threatening jurors is a crime. Threatening me, unless it's a, you know, in nontransitory anger, terroristic threat, is not such a crime, so there is some difference there. And so that was the reason for bringing it up. I'm not saying --

THE COURT: I'm fine with that.

MR. FRANK: One other thing I do want to say, Your Honor, with your indulgence.

Mr. Paule, I think, was right to suggest that I casted too broad a net when I talked about defense publicity. And to him I apologize for that. I assumed the Court knew who my comments were directed at. I apologize to the rest of them.

THE COURT: Let's just say, I'm aware of most of the publicity that's been going on.

MR. FRANK: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Next on our agenda. Rule 404 evidence, I'm going to put aside the *Spreigl* that the State just served. I'm going to give -- actually, Mr. Frank, I need to speak to you on that on the 404 *Spreigl* notice you just filed yesterday. I'm not criticizing it was filed just before this hearing because you met the deadline, which was make sure that *Spreigl* notices have to be filed before omnibus. So I'm not criticizing that, I'm just saying it may affect how things go forward.

MR. FRANK: And, Your Honor, you'll see the last paragraph in our notice talks about, you know, we're still getting discovery, we're still reviewing discovery. We felt almost a little premature in filing those, but we knew that it would be something to discuss today that we are going to file them and that there will be potential issues for the Court regarding not only their notices but ours. So we didn't expect the Court to, you know, address them today, I assumed there would be briefing and motions in limine regarding admission of those incidents, and they probably will be supplemented over time

obviously.

THE COURT: Mr. Nelson has noted the volume of discovery. So I am sympathetic to that, but at the same time, the omnibus hearing is supposed to be when we have Spreigl notices and other notices. If it's just in a pile of papers that have been sitting for three months, and it's suddenly been discovered, you're not going to find me real sympathetic to notice on that. If you receive information obviously just recently or in the near future, I understand that you can't predict the future and you provide notice as soon as possible.

MR. FRANK: That is true, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. That said, I think your notice is deficient in that it does not state the specific purpose for which the evidence is being offered as required by 404(b)(2).

MR. FRANK: We did list a number of purposes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. FRANK: That was not done to --

THE COURT: I have that same issue with the defense. Listing everything in 404(b),

motive, intent, opportunity, is not sufficient notice. I've never thought it was no matter who is putting it out there. It's just a laundry list. I can read 404(b) as well as anybody, you've got to tell me what the specific purpose is. And I assume you'll follow up with that.

MR. FRANK: We will do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. FRANK: Actually, the list is fairly descriptive of how we see it today. I understand it looks like a laundry list, but certainly we will flesh out those things more fully on the record. Nor did we think that, you know, our late -- I shouldn't say --

THE COURT: It's not late.

MR. FRANK: Disclosure of those really has any impact on the joinder analysis. There are going to be issues in individual trials as well because you can't try, for instance,

Mr. Kueng without essentially trying Mr. Chauvin. So that evidence, as I sit here this morning thinking, well, I guess maybe we should have filed those in each individual case, all of them but --

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. FRANK: -- we don't think that changes the joinder analysis because of it.

THE COURT: Well, that actually was the question I had because I only had it filed in one so the thought being if that's the evidence in one case that does change it from the calculus from the evidence is pretty much going to be the same in all trials. That would be different.

But you're saying you're saying -- your intent is to offer in all four trials.

MR. FRANK: In all candor, when we did that yesterday, I thought, well, we're serving them all in every case without really thinking that there actually should be notices for every case.

THE COURT: Understood. And I understand you basically had to get it in under the deadline.

MR. FRANK: We felt it was better to do that for today's purposes.

THE COURT: Okay. With regard to the State's Spreigl notice. Mr. Frank, I'd like to give you two weeks from today to file supplemental basically briefing, or -- and I really do want to know the specific purpose under

1 404(b). I do not abide the laundry list of 404 2 possible topics. 3 So with that, and then the -- any defense who wishes to respond to that, 4 5 particularly Mr. Nelson, since currently you're the only recipient, but it sounds like everybody 6 7 is going to get one, is two weeks after the State's brief is due so a month total, four weeks 8 from today. Okay. Any questions about that? 9 10 Now, as far as the defense 404(b), who 11 would like to speak to that? Mr. Plunkett, I've got one from you. Mr. Nelson, I've got one from 12 13 you. And they appear to be identical as far as what you are offering; is that correct, 14 Mr. Nelson? 15 16 MR. NELSON: I think they are very similar, yes. 17 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 Mr. Plunkett, do you want to come to the 20 podium then? 21 MR. GRAY: Your Honor, may I orally join 22 in this 404(b)? 23 THE COURT: That is Mr. Gray on behalf 24 of Mr. Lane joins the motion. 25 Mr. Plunkett.

1 MR. PLUNKETT: Thank you, Your Honor. 2 It seems like the Court's biggest concern is the 3 notice portion of the purpose? THE COURT: Well, I've also got one with 4 number three. 5 MR. PLUNKETT: That's the Harris County. 6 7 THE COURT: Harris County, Mr. Floyd 8 engaging in an aggravated robbery. MR. PLUNKETT: Case No. 1143230, which 9 10 is I think --11 THE COURT: What is the possible 12 relevance of that to this case? 13 MR. PLUNKETT: Well, Your Honor, the 14 State been trying to say that Mr. Floyd 15 essentially wasn't doing anything wrong, he wasn't engaging in any criminal contact, and that 16 17 he wasn't struggling, and that he wasn't doing 18 What we have here is a situation where anything. 19 we had -- I concede at the beginning that the 20 officers involved wouldn't have known this, but 21 he had a clear propensity for violence. It's a 22 person that not only knows how to fight but knows 23 how to exert influence. 24 When we look at what 404(b) is, absence 25 of mistake, we look at -- or accident, you know,

it's specifically showing that he had some familiarity with what inappropriate -- illegal conduct is, and I think it's relevant for 404(b) purposes in that regard.

THE COURT: All right. With regard to the May 6th, give me a little more idea there.

Is this something that one or more of the defendants was aware of, this May 6, 2019 incident?

MR. PLUNKETT: To the best of my knowledge, none of the defendants were aware of that. I cannot speak, of course, for all of the defendants, but I'm fairly certain that -- I'm completely certain that Mr. Keung was not aware of it.

THE COURT: Well, let me just stop you.

MR. PLUNKETT: Yes.

THE COURT: Raise your hand if your client knew about this May 6, 2019 case when they had contact with Mr. Floyd? Seeing none. Go ahead.

MR. PLUNKETT: Thank you, Your Honor. I think that's quite a bit more important because what we show here is that Mr. Floyd is in the habit of ingesting drugs when he's confronted

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with police. What we see here is that Mr. Floyd is in the -- it's his practice to engage in diversionary behavior. We have requested the body camera videos to find out exactly what Mr. Floyd said in that situation. The written reports that we have simply tell us that he was He went to the hospital, we know this crying. from the reports. And he at the hospital disclosed that the last time that he had taken drugs was when he was being arrested. this is what the Government -- Mr. Katyal says, oh, it's just outrageous to even suggest that Mr. Floyd would take drugs when he's arrested. But what we see here is a year prior that he did that.

This Court has been around a little bit more than I have, and I think that anybody that has practiced criminal law would know that it is actually not uncommon that people swallow drugs to avoid their detection, especially if they're experienced drug dealers. You know, so I think this one, the May 6, 2019 event is actually quite a bit more relevant, or if anything, you know, stands -- jumps to the top, that would be it.

THE COURT: Did you get the discovery on

that? You said the police reports but not the body cam?

MR. PLUNKETT: We have not received the body camera. We just got a -- buried in the reports we found, you know, this specific incident involving Mr. Floyd. We do know that there's body camera because we've read the reports and it says there is. We've asked for disclosure of that. I think that's another motion that's in front of this Court. But, I mean, the body worn camera would be certainly much better than the written report.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Frank.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ FRANK: Do you want me to address that specific --

THE COURT: Yes. Well, actually --

MR. FRANK: I can tell the Court that I looked through a batch of discovery we received yesterday, or I got a chance to look through it yesterday, and I believe that body worn camera was in there. My motion -- my responsive motion to compel, which I filed to sort of try to help this along, I said we would -- we had requested it. I'm pretty sure it's in the group that we

had that I reviewed quickly yesterday, which we obviously will get out as soon as possible to counsel. Do you want me to --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. FRANK: -- argue the merits or --

THE COURT: I think the discovery is fine. You're going to provide it, you're going to get it, you're going to provide it, that's fine.

MR. FRANK: Correct.

THE COURT: Don't talk about the Harris County case because I'm denying the request to allow that in evidence. I don't think it has anywhere close to a relevancy talking about Mr. Floyd's actions down in Texas.

But with regard to the May 6th -- and they're broken out separately, but it appears one is medical center and one is with police, but they're pretty much the same it sounds like as far as incidents so I'll treat them as much.

Mr. Katyal did say, you know, miraculously overdosed at the time he was meeting police.

Well, if the answer is, well, it's not miraculous because he swallowed drugs. How do we know that?

He's done it before, you can see it on the body

cam of Officer Lane. So tell me why that should not be -- that part, only that part that on a prior occasion when he had contact with police he swallowed drugs.

MR. FRANK: Because it's just propensity. Mr. Plunkett used the word, I think probably referring to the Harris County incident, but it's just propensity.

So what are the two things that we get criticized, the State, the most about 404(b) evidence, the inadequacy of our notice, I understand, and just arguing propensity, and that's all this is. Because he did it before, must be what he does. So that's all it is. I think Mr. Plunkett used the word practiced. Does that -- is that sufficient?

In my opinion, if this is being offered -- not my opinion, in what I think the law requires is the same standards apply to defense bringing in 404(b) evidence. Articulate the standard, what fact -- what fact it applies to and show by clear and convincing evidence. This is a Ness situation, right. If anything, it's going to fall under Ness. So make that showing. Make sure it's markedly similar.

THE COURT: Well, Ness was like an incident 30 years before.

MR. FRANK: All I'm saying is what came out of Ness, what was the -- if there was some kind of change brought about by Ness, it's putting restrictions on that markedly similar reason for getting 404(b) in.

THE COURT: Well, plus, Ness dealt with a criminal sexual conduct case, and that's certainly the idea of propensity is much more prejudicial than when this person is stopped they take drugs.

I'll just put it this way, I agree that
I think it has very limited value, and so at this
point I deny it. But if the State does argue,
I'd let the defense open -- or bring in evidence
that he's done it before, that it was not a
miraculous overdose, if it was an overdose. If
they're saying that he did not take -- if the
State's position is on the date that he died,
Mr. Floyd did not ingest drugs when the police
came into contact with them, I think the defense
has a legitimate argument that it's relevant to
say, this is how he reacts when he comes into
contact with police. You're right. It does

border on propensity, so at this point I'm saying no. I'm just saying we can revisit based on how the trial itself goes.

Hold on, Mr. Gray.

MR. FRANK: And that's what my point is,
Your Honor. Even if there is that evidence -THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. FRANK: -- they still have to make a showing that it's markedly similar because otherwise it's just plain old propensity, it's just habit. I mean, it's not even habit because that's a term of art, of course.

I'm denying it at this time, but they can renew it. Partly of which might be an offer of proof with body worn cameras or police reports showing a modus operandi that is similar. Because right now I think it borders too close to propensity and I agree with you. But if the State takes advantage of that and starts saying, you know, it's how could he have overdosed, the police were with him. It's like, well, it's legit. I'm not saying I believe that's what happened.

Obviously, it's a matter of does it fit a modus operandi theory, which is what they're saying, I

assume.

At this point it's denied, it's too close to propensity. If the defense or the State -- because my understanding, if I recall, and I could be wrong, I'm not trying this case, but for probable cause purposes, looking at the video that there was -- you could actually -- a drug or a pill was visible in his mouth at one point. Or am I wrong?

MR. FRANK: I don't agree with that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I could have just --

MR. FRANK: Certainly that was

Mr. Gray's argument that he made to the Court and
other --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FRANK: -- members of the public.

But that may be an argument that a jury has to resolve, but I don't think that's as clearly established as Mr. Gray wants to pitch it.

THE COURT: Understood.

Mr. Gray, I'll let you speak since I'm about to deny it.

MR. GRAY: Yes. Your Honor, with respect to markedly similar, it corroborates --

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or circumstantial evidence, they contest the fact that Mr. Floyd would not show his hands, that he was cooperative, he was surprised. The May incident, the year before, he did exactly the same thing, he didn't show his hands, he was moving around the vehicle, and drugs were involved. It corroborates my client's -- because you can see if you look closely, but when he approaches that car, they're moving their hands. He tells Mr. Floyd to put his hands on the wheel, and he didn't do it right away. Well, you go to that May 2019, and you'll see the same conduct, which corroborates what he says, that they challenge, and they're -- which I won't mention their other memo, they challenge that. that's our proof, circumstantial evidence, that what my client is saying is the truth. you.

MR. PAULE: May I be heard briefly?
THE COURT: Briefly.

MR. PAULE: Your Honor, I was going to ask to join in the 404(b) motion, but I think it's actually premature. Until we get the body worn cameras, which apparently the State is going to give to us, I don't have a complete picture of

what did happen a year earlier. So I would like to reserve my motion with regard to that issue.

One of the issues we have is discovery is ongoing, and I'm not faulting them at this point for that, but I don't have everything I need to make a proper motion that was required by the Court's scheduling order. So I would ask leave to do that and to brief that.

But two other things. One is the issue of causation. Because what the State has been saying, at least publicly, is that the cause of death was essentially prone asphyxia, whereas it might well be an overdose or drug intoxication. We don't know that, but his actions on that date, and the actions on the date in question on this case may well go to the issue of causation.

The only other thing I would point out is with regard to the Harris County incident that the Court has denied. I think that -- I would ask leave if the State opens the door by making allegations that Mr. Floyd was peaceful or had a peaceful character, that the Court should revisit that particular issue. Because the allegations in that Harris County incident are quite violent on behalf of Mr. Floyd.

THE COURT: All right. State have any such plans? And I don't include spark of life testimony as part of that.

MR. FRANK: I guess I'll just say we understand opening the door and what that means, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Understood. The ruling stands on that. I am going to deny the May 6, 2019 issue at this time. I actually think it might be premature. I tend to think of 404(b) issues as falling more under a motion in limine. So I'm going to direct you all to the motion in limine deadlines and make those deadlines applicable to this May 6, 2019 case. But the Harris County case, we're not bringing up again, that's denied.

Okay. Discovery motions. I thought this was going to be a bit of a mess, but,

Mr. Frank, thank you for kind of combining them into one, and I'm going to use your response to try to go through things to see where we are at on discovery. Maybe you could approach the podium because I'm going to ask you to respond to the various ones that have not been met yet.

With regard to -- skipping through your

1 analysis, which I appreciate but don't need to 2 talk about today. Medical examiner's file, that has been disclosed; is that correct? 3 MR. FRANK: That has been disclosed, 4 5 Your Honor, yes. THE COURT: Independent medical 6 7 examiners Dr. Michael Baden and Allecia Wilson. Is the State intending on calling those people as 8 a witness? 9 10 MR. FRANK: I can't say that, Your 11 Honor, right now. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. FRANK: Because we don't have their 14 reports either. 15 THE COURT: And what is your position on the request for discovery? 16 17 MR. FRANK: As we stated, we don't have 18 possession of those, and we don't have control 19 They are not -- we didn't hire them, over them. 20 they're not reporting to us. So under the rules, 21 we do not have any way to compel them to produce 22 it, and I don't think this Court does either, 23 being not part of our staff or being somebody 24 that regularly reports to us, nor a state agency. 25 THE COURT: But if you call them as an

expert witness, they're your witness.

MR. FRANK: Granted.

THE COURT: And you're not going to do that cold.

MR. FRANK: Granted. I mean, one of the reasons I can't tell you is I don't have their reports either. We would like to get those reports. We have asked for them, we just don't have the mechanism to force it. And so I think the Court has to deny it at this point. And, you know, subject to the understanding that we are trying, and we understand certainly that if they are our witness, we have obligations then.

THE COURT: They're going to be subject to all the expert witness disclosures we talked about earlier.

MR. FRANK: I would assume so.

THE COURT: If you decide you're going to call them as witnesses, expert -- they are going to be as expert witnesses, they're not fact witnesses. And if you are to tell me that because you don't control them, you couldn't get their reports, they're not going to testify; that's going to be a discovery violation. But if you get their reports, you provide them in a

1 timely manner, you provide CVs and -- the only 2 thing I think we're missing is Mr. Paule, I 3 think, asked for a copy of all autopsies in which they have participated. I'll let him speak to 4 that one point, but otherwise I think we're at 5 the point of if anybody is going to call him as a 6 7 witness, you've got to get reports, you have to 8 comply with the expert witness disclosures, otherwise they're going to be suppressed. And if 9 10 they don't want to give you their reports, 11 they're not going to testify, period. All right. 12 MR. FRANK: That's clearly understood, 13 Your Honor. THE COURT: 14 Great. Next, Armed Forces medical examiner 15 file. What's the status on that? 16 17 MR. FRANK: Your Honor, again, not an 18 agency we have control over. Not a government 19 agency we have control over because it is a 20 federal military agency. 21 THE COURT: How did they become 22 involved? 23 MR. FRANK: I can represent to the 24 Court, I think, that I believe the U.S. 25 Attorney's Office instigated that, requested it.

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THE COURT: I was wondering given

Dr. Baker's military background that he had asked for it.

MR. FRANK: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Because clearly if he had asked for it, I think it would be technically a part of his file and should be turned over.

MR. FRANK: I don't think it went in that direction. I'm still trying to figure out what other file there is besides the report we've disclosed, or if everything that medical examiner, and I should say medical examiners, had has already been disclosed. Because my understanding is that agency got records to review, so it may be everything they have has already been disclosed, but I'm still trying to find that out. I think, again, the Court has to technically deny it at this point for the same reasons as Dr. Baden and Wilson, and for the -with the same understandings that if they're called as witnesses, we will have separate obligations because of witnesses to disclose the basis of their opinion and then that would be fair.

1 THE COURT: If they're not going to 2 disclose their file, and you want to -- again, if 3 you're going to call them as a witness, they have to disclose their entire file in a timely manner, 4 5 otherwise I'm not going to let them testify, or even refer to them in cross-examination. 6 7 Understood, Your Honor. MR. FRANK: 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. FRANK: And assuming those expert 10 deadlines apply as well. 11 THE COURT: Yes, expert deadlines apply 12 as well. 13 Okay. We've already talked about the May 6th incident, you're getting what you can and 14 15 you're going to provide it; is that correct? MR. FRANK: Your Honor, there's a couple 16 17 of different aspects of this one, the body worn 18 camera we've already talked about. I agree with 19 Mr. Nelson, we are upwards of 35,000 individual 20 Bates numbers. It is ongoing in mass of the 21 discovery and so I really wanted to be able to 22 tell the Court for sure I have that and got it 23 out, I just couldn't get it done yesterday. 24 THE COURT: Understood. 25 MR. FRANK: I have on occasion

1 hand-served counsel with discovery trying to 2 speed --THE COURT: I'm not worried about the 3 documentation, just whether you're going to do it 4 5 or not. MR. FRANK: We will do it. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MR. FRANK: The rest -- Your Honor, they're asking for the prosecution file. 9 10 know, the Hennepin County Attorney's Office has 11 indicated they have had no referral of that 12 incident so there's nothing to disclose, and some 13 of that would be probably work product anyway. So we are -- we believe the Court has to 14 15 completely deny the request for prosecution file and reports. 16 17 Beyond the police reports THE COURT: 18 and other reports from agencies, it appears that 19 the request is for their like charging memos or 20 things like that. 21 MR. FRANK: Right. 22 THE COURT: I'll ask counsel to speak to 23 that, but generally that is going to be denied as 24 work product. So please don't argue that it is 25 not.

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All right. Informant files.

MR. FRANK: Your Honor, as we argued in our memo, counsel has not come forward with any information to believe that Mr. Floyd was an informant, nor have they come forward with any threshold showing that that would somehow, even if true, be relevant or material to this case. There's no search warrant where information was provided by an informant. There's no allegation that this is related to work as an informant. Νo allegation that these officers knew whether he was an informant or how could that possibly have any relevance, we don't understand. certainly have made no showing. I think this is either a boiler plate motion or one just with an attempt to throw informant and gang affiliation out regarding Mr. Floyd.

THE COURT: Same thing is true for the gang affiliation?

MR. FRANK: Correct.

THE COURT: Training video links.

MR. FRANK: Your Honor, I will admit that the answer for me personally as a Luddite is I don't know. It's an issue that Mr. Nelson and I think I talked about early on that we do have a

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lot of PowerPoints in the training videos and some of them appear to have links to videos and they don't work. And I don't know if that's because that's the way we got them or it's the way we disclosed them. I'm still trying to figure that out. We want them equally. know we had people trying to figure that out, and we will go back to MPD if there is a format in which they exist that we can disclose them. Some of them, I think, have worked actually, but I will commit to you that we are working on that to figure that out. We would want them as well. THE COURT: All right. That's the best I can do MR. FRANK:

MR. FRANK: That's the best I can do today.

THE COURT: Committing to work on it is enough for me today.

Your state document index. To some extent, this was prepared by members of your staff. I assume defense is talking about basically an index of the 35,000-plus pages. Is that what we're talking about?

MR. FRANK: What we refer to as our document index is, you know, a paralegal going through everything and making a list of what it

1 is, that's work product. That's our work, not 2 theirs. THE COURT: As a matter of professional 3 courtesy are you're willing to provide it? 4 Not that. Because --5 MR. FRANK: THE COURT: That's a lot to throw on top 6 7 of a bunch of lawyers and say good luck with 8 that. MR. FRANK: Your Honor, if I could 9 10 prepare a list of what each Bates number is 11 alone, I might be willing to do that as a 12 professional courtesy. But when they ask for a 13 document index, nope, that's our work; it contains work. It's not just a simple table of 14 15 contents. THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's what I 16 17 was thinking. Do you have anything like a table 18 of contents you can give them? 19 MR. FRANK: Not currently. Can we 20 produce such a thing? THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to make 21 22 you because that's not within discovery rules, 23 but if you do, are you willing to turn over a --24 MR. FRANK: As a matter of professional 25 courtesy, if I can have something like that -- if

1 I have something like that or can produce it, I 2 will try to do that. 3 THE COURT: All right. MR. FRANK: It just can't be ordered. 4 Okay. Well, I agree with 5 THE COURT: you on that, but I would encourage any 6 7 professional courtesies to make this case go more efficiently. 8 All right. Mr. Chauvin's personnel 9 10 records. I think this is pretty clear. Question 11 came up in my mind after reading your Spreigl 12 notice from yesterday, did those come from Internal Affairs files? 13 They did not. 14 MR. FRANK: 15 THE COURT: Okay. How were they discovered? 16 17 MR. FRANK: Use of force reports obtained from MPD. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. FRANK: And so the specific motion was for the disciplinary file, and then also the 21 22 pre-hire screening and psychological, that I think is a separate issue. I don't know how the 23 24 psychological reports and pre-hire prescreening 25 process could potentially have any relevance or

materiality to this case. So I think that is just separately...

THE COURT: All right. Civil case; it might be relevant, you would agree?

MR. FRANK: I think my response mentions in this criminal trial.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FRANK: Because, yeah, that may be a different issue.

THE COURT: Have you disclosed the final disciplinary -- if discipline was imposed, I believe you said there was...

MR. FRANK: So for Mr. Chauvin there was one incident where there was discipline imposed. First of all, let me back up a little bit. We have each personnel file for each officer so this puts us in a little different footing than Renneke and Demers, I understand. So we disclosed each officer's personnel file to each officer and not the others. They can have their own. And we talked about this early on in the process, I talked to counsel about doing it that way so we can figure out what can and cannot go out. So each counsel has their own client's personnel file that we have.

But because of 1343 and Renneke, the disciplinary file is a specific -- I think as a specific problem to deal with. And so what we're asking the Court to do, we are willing to disclose the records related to the sustained discipline to opposing counsel. I will tell you that there's not much there, I assume that's because it's old, but that I think because it's public, we can disclose to other counsel. The rest of what I see as the discipline file, the Internal Affairs file, I think has to go through -- well, first of all, any showing that it would be -- lead to relevant or --

THE COURT: I can cut to the chase here. You're ordered to disclose anything that falls under 1343(5) final disciplinary action that results in -- or final action. Anything that did not result in disciplinary action is not disclosed under the statute and so I'm not requiring you to do that. You have met the obligation for each individual officer by providing them their files, and I'm going to consider that sufficient under the statute and the rules.

Anything else that I've forgotten that

you would like to address as far as discovery?

MR. FRANK: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: With regard to discovery, anybody wish to speak to the issues that were outlined?

MR. PLUNKETT: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Plunkett.

MR. PLUNKETT: On the ME file, I'd just like to make sure that it's -- it had better be the full file. That's what I'm led to believe, that we have been disclosed the full medical examiner's file, and there's no holdback on that. And I just want to make it clear on the record that's what the request was for. And I took the response to be that they met that -- that they've given us the full file. If we find out otherwise, we'll raise that then.

On the two independent pathologists,

Forensic Pathologists Baden and Wilson, I've got some concerns about that information. First of all, I did not request it, I don't think it's relevant to the case at all. My concern however is that not having seen their reports, not knowing what's in there, I don't know if they came here to Minnesota and performed an

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independent autopsy. I will tell you that from what I read in the newspaper, that is what happened. And I shouldn't say newspaper anymore, I should say media generally. In -- is a medical procedure, Your Honor. I have checked with the Minnesota Board of Practices, neither of these people are licensed Minnesota physicians. don't know what's in there, maybe they didn't come here, but that would certainly be evidence It would also be a violation of the rules of practice for physicians. I just more than anything, Your Honor, I think that -- I'd hate to sit back and just file a complaint with the Medical Practices Board against their witnesses and these people without fair warning.

THE COURT: Well, let's go into this.

Doesn't sound like anybody is going to call these people as a witness. If they do, they're going to have to provide their reports. If they don't provide their reports, I'm not going to allow them to call them as witnesses. I'm not going to allow them to try and impeach anybody's opinion with their opinions. It's straightforward. If their names are mentioned in this case, it's only going to be after full disclosure of reports.

So I'm not mandating that the State get them. If they get them, they're going to provide them to you. And if they don't provide them to you, obviously that's a discovery violation, but it looks fairly straightforward to me. Any mention of their opinions has to be accompanied by full disclosure. And if it's -- it's not the State's fault because they wouldn't turn it over, well, the answer is they don't get to be mentioned in this trial, pure and simple.

So let's kind of defer that.

MR. PLUNKETT: Yes.

THE COURT: That basically, I think the State is kind of figuring out if they want to do it. They know what my order is. That if we're going to talk about that opinion in any way, shape or form, even through cross-examination that it has to be accompanied by full disclosure beforehand. Let's leave it at that.

MR. PLUNKETT: Fair enough.

THE COURT: Others.

MR. PLUNKETT: Moving forward then to the informant files. Mr. Frank focused on relevance as the standard for disclosure. I disagree with that. I think that it's not -- the

duty goes beyond relevant evidence, and I think everybody agrees with that.

I do take exception with the suggestion that we only requested, or maybe I only requested the informant files as a boilerplate or some other --

THE COURT: Don't worry about that.

MR. PLUNKETT: -- just to be mean.

Judge, the reason I think there might be an informant file is because we have a person found with a very large amount of drugs --

THE COURT: Let's stop you there.

MR. PLUNKETT: -- and they're not charged.

THE COURT: Let's assume that we have a file -- and I'm not saying he was, I'm just saying for sake of argument, let's say he was a gang member who was a regular informant to every law enforcement agency around. Where would that get us? That doesn't come into evidence on a case where he's being arrested for a counterfeit bill.

MR. PLUNKETT: But we're at the discovery state, not the relevance for trial stage.

1 THE COURT: But discovery has got to 2 have some showing that it would lead to 3 admissible evidence, and I'm not seeing it, Mr. Plunkett, to be perfectly honest. And if you can 4 come up with something, but I'm not seeing it so. 5 So other discovery issues? May 6th, I 6 7 think we've already dealt with. 8 MR. PLUNKETT: I think we have, I wasn't 9 going to bring it up. 10 THE COURT: They're going to bring the 11 Anything else you wanted to body worn camera. 12 address regarding this? 13 MR. PLUNKETT: I disagree with the idea that a document index is work product. 14 I don't 15 think that it shows anything to do with what the attorneys have thought or conclusions or anything 16 like that and I think it should be disclosed. 17 18 THE COURT: Well, I think summaries can 19 get into the realm of work product, but if they 20 have a table of contents, a pure index that say 21 this Bates stamp is this type of description, 22 they've, out of professional courtesy said they 23 will turn it over. 24 MR. PLUNKETT: Thank you, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: So if that exists to that

1 extent that does not contain additional information about it. Because that may contain 2 conclusions or theories. Thank you. 3 Mr. Gray, anything you wanted to 4 address? I think we've addressed pretty much 5 everything. 6 7 MR. GRAY: No, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Nelson. 8 9 MR. NELSON: No, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Paule. 11 MR. PAULE: Yes, Your Honor. 12 Honor, if I may cite to my notice of motion and 13 motion to compel discovery filed August 28, 2020 at 4:16 just to give --14 THE COURT: Not 8/24. 15 I'm sorry. 8/28/2020 at 16 MR. PAULE: 17 4:16 p.m. 18 THE COURT: Got it. 19 MR. PAULE: With regard to number one, 20 the complete Minneapolis Police Department 21 disciplinary file on Mr. Chauvin, that may be 22 premature. But if the case is joined, then I 23 think that becomes potentially relevant and 24 material. So I would like to point that out. 25 With regard to the body camera videos,

again it's difficult for me to argue 404(b) evidence from the May 6th until I have that. I take Mr. Frank at his word that he will get that to us as soon as possible.

With regard to the potential informant information. The issue of relevance and material may come from a different perspective from a defense lawyer than a prosecutor.

THE COURT: I -- okay. Go ahead.

MR. PAULE: I think it's ultimately up to the Court. But in terms of what we view as what might be relevant or material to a various defense theory, may be something the State has not thought about. And as Mr. Plunkett stated, that's the issue, not admissibility.

And then with regard to the document index, Your Honor. I do take issue with the idea of professional courtesy. Because we're all professionals, we're trying to deal with this case which has a massive amount of discovery.

I've tried to be very professional. I've actually driven over to their office on a couple different occasions to pick up discovery because that's a quicker method of doing it.

Also, I received a phone call from

Mr. Frank one afternoon indicating that they provided some materials in discovery, or perhaps said that I wasn't entitled to. As an officer of the court, I told Mr. Frank I would not open it, I would go to my office. Once I would have it, I would drive it over. So I actually took the file, the letter, still sealed, brought it over to their office and waited while their paralegal went through it to make sure whatever may have been on there, that I wasn't entitled to; that's professional courtesy.

And I think the idea that they're not going to provide us a document index is very disrespectful to the Court and our time. And I would point out a couple of things. We've been provided multiple copies of the same documents as part of discovery. I'm loathe to throw stones at other people, but in about the fifth copy were the ten pages where there were the notes interviewing the medical examiners. It's either a heck of a coincidence or it's hay stacking.

I don't want to play games with discovery this way, I would appreciate the same courtesy from the State. This is going to be a long case and a potentially long trial, and I

think the Court has the authority to persuade them to provide us the discovery index. As Mr. Nelson -- I'll let Mr. Nelson talk about the way discovery -- because quite frankly, he's been archiving it and doing it in his own manner. But the idea is that we should -- if it's an open file, we should all get it and we shouldn't be playing games with discovery.

THE COURT: Well, I think I did encourage them to --

MR. PAULE: You encouraged him, but this --

THE COURT: I can't order them.

MR. PAULE: -- is not -- I would point this out, I'm a citizen of the State of Minnesota, this is not how I would want my Attorney General's office to be behaving in a case. This is the kind of case where we expect the best out of our profession, and I expect no less from them.

With regard to the medical examiner's file, Your Honor. I would again take Mr. Frank at his word that he's provided us everything. With regard to the other autopsies, specifically Mr. Baden -- excuse me, Dr. Baden and Dr. Wilson,

I would point out that those are discoverable under subdivision -- excuse me, Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.01 subdivision 1(a), which talks about the scope of the prosecutor's obligation.

THE COURT: But it refers to people under their control or regularly reporting to them.

MR. PAULE: I will quote the rule, and I don't mean to lecture the Court.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm fine with that.

MR. PAULE: The rule says: "The prosecutor's obligations under this rule extend to material and information in the possession or control of members of the prosecution's staff and any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case, and who either regularly report or with reference to the particular case have reported to the prosecutor's office."

I would note that I have two of three pages of a letter that was sent by Bhavani Raveendran, who is a senior associate with the firm of Romanucci & Blandin, who is the firm that is representing, I think on some level,

Mr. Floyd's family in the civil lawsuit. This -and I can show the Court what I have here if the
Court would like. But it references medical
examiner's findings. This was turned over to us
in discovery, which means they've reported to
either the county attorney or the attorney
general with regard to this case.

Also, as Mr. Plunkett points out, both Dr. Wilson and Dr. Baden apparently performed autopsies, which is part of the investigation of this case. For them to now say we don't have it is simply not sufficient.

think what -- I filed the motion requesting discovery specifically of the complete medical examiner's file, although that's something that should have been turned over in the regular course of discovery. When I called Mr. Frank to inquire before I filed that motion, his response was, we've requested it but we don't have it. And this is approximately three months or so after this incident, and they've been meeting with them. The Department of Defense had no problem getting a copy of that file. I think it's hard pressed that the Attorney General's

Office couldn't get a copy of that file quicker than that if they wanted to.

Now, again, I'm not trying to tell

Mr. Frank how to do his job, but the idea that we
don't have that, and we don't have any mechanism,
sure they do. They have subpoena power. They
have grand jury. They can do all kinds of things
if they wanted to. The Court is very familiar
with this.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Paule, you have subpoena power, too.

MR. PAULE: I do.

THE COURT: I guess let me just stop you there. Because I know what you're saying, that they come under the rubric of Rule 9.01 because they're now part of the investigation because they did investigatory work.

MR. PAULE: With the --

THE COURT: I understand. I disagree, though, because they are independent medical examiners hired like any other physician by the family for a civil investigation; it is not a part of the criminal investigation. To the extent that it becomes a part of this case by someone trying to call them as a witness, I kind

of made it clear that that's not going to happen without full disclose in a timely manner. So I'm going to leave it at that. I'm not going to -- I'm going to -- I'm not going to hold that 9.01 requires that they obtain it and disclosure it at this time.

MR. PAULE: May I make one other point at least for the record?

THE COURT: For the record.

MR. PAULE: I know, because of a newspaper article -- again, whether it's newspaper or media I don't know, but that both Mr. Ellison and Eric MacDonald, U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, traveled down to Houston to meet with the Floyd family accompanied by representatives of his civil team. So the idea that they're not regularly reporting or participating in the investigation I think strains credulity at least on my part.

THE COURT: I think traveling together to a family meeting does not convert it into working together on a criminal case. As a former prosecutor in one of my lives, regularly you meet with families, sometimes they bring a lawyer along with them, and you never keep -- cross the

boarder and say I'm representing you as a victim, I'm representing you as a family. It was always represent the State of Minnesota, your lawyer is here, we'll talk, it's more convenient that we have one meeting. I'm not agreeing with you on that, Mr. Paule, so the ruling stands as is, but I acknowledge your right to make that record.

MR. PAULE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else regarding discovery, otherwise I think we're ready to move on. We are getting close to noon. The motions we have left, there's some administrative matters I'm just going to talk about briefly, and then we'll get back to Blakely and see whether we want to power through that.

But let me make clear what -- let me go through the discovery orders that I made. With regard to the Hennepin County Medical Examiner's file, disclosure is complete. Any further reports will be disclosed as soon as possible.

With regard to the independent medical examiners Dr. Baden and Wilson, the State has requested reports from them. They will provide them, anything they receive from those doctors.

And unless and until they provide the reports and

all the necessary components of an expert witness's testimony, including a CV, they will not be called as witnesses by any party, nor will their names or their findings be mentioned in cross-examination. Unless and until the Court gives permission finding that the disclosure was made.

The Armed Forces medical file, it's my understanding that it's being requested. I don't find that they're under control of the State or the State obtains that, they'll provide it to counsel as soon as possible. They're under the same restriction. If they don't provide their reports, they're not testifying. Their findings are not going to be brought out on cross-examination.

Body worn camera footage. Sounds like the State is willing to provide everything from the May 6, 2019 incident that they can get.

As far as informant files and gang files, the request by the defense is denied in its entirety.

Training video links. I trust the State to continue to work on getting the videos. I think the State has as much of an interest in

seeing those videos as does the defense.

The document index. Again, professional courtesy, I hope the State would provide an index if it exists. But I understand that their current index, if we can call it that, is much more than that. So I'm not going to require the State. I don't think that the discovery -- in fact, I'm ruling that the discovery rules do not require that. But certainly anything you can do to assist in organizing the documents that you feel would not prejudice you in any way,

Mr. Frank, I would appreciate the disclosure.

Again, I cannot order it under the rules.

Mr. Chauvin's personnel records. The State is required to disclose anything that falls under 13.43(5), disciplinary matters that actually resulted in discipline including the full factual basis of it.

I think that pretty much goes through most of the discovery issues. Now, just a few things to clean up before we get to *Blakely*, I've not forgotten.

Jury selection, it's going to be sequestered selection, that is one by one on the witness stand. I do anticipate we will do

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questionnaires ahead of time. Number of peremptories generally in a single trial is five and three. And if we have individual trials that's what it will be. If there's a joint trial, we will adjust accordingly. And I think it's fairly discretionary with the Court on the number of peremptories in a joint trial, but we'll get to that -- we'll cross that bridge if and when we come to it.

In court presence. I appreciate that we've made this courtroom work. It may not be our courtroom for trial, we'll have to see -we'll have to essentially as a court figure out did this work for the purposes of trial as well. So we're going to go through that analysis. it any case, we are planning, and I would ask counsel to plan with the understanding this is likely still going to have COVID-19 restrictions, as far as spacing on juries and everything else, and all the Plexiglass that we have will probably be in place. We will also have overflow rooms at a minimum for family members of all parties, and that includes the Floyd family obviously. will be separate family rooms. There will be a media room for overflow audio and video.

One request I would ask you to all think about, and actually this would include the media. If anyone is planning on ordering overnight transcripts, number one, think carefully about it, but if you're going to do that we need to know ahead of time because that determines how we staff our court reporter. Ms. Carmichael is not superwoman, she's close, but she's not superwoman, and she cannot do a full day of trial testimony and then overnight transcripts. So I'm not asking you to give me an answer now, but you better tell me by October 1st if you're planning on having -- putting in requests for overnight transcripts.

Trial length. I'd also like -- and I know you're still plowing through discovery.

I've just, by guess more than anything else, said two weeks for jury selections, four weeks for trial. And if anybody thinks that that's wrong, for example, if the State has kind of an idea at some point closer to trial how many weeks it will take for their case, and then defense can kind of give me an idea of their case, and I know things are still in flux so I'm not even going to ask you for an estimate at this point. But just so

you know what I'm doing for planning purposes,
I'm planning six weeks. So -- but obviously that
can change.

Now, it is noon. If the parties would like to break for lunch and come back, I'd prefer we simply plow through and talk about *Blakely* a little bit. Let's plow through.

Mr. Frank, if you would take the podium, please. All right. We have notices in each of the defendant's case, notices of intent to seek an aggravated sentence pursuant to *Blakely* versus Washington, and there are five grounds that are stated. And are they identical for all four defendants?

MR. FRANK: The grounds are; the descriptions vary a little by defendant.

THE COURT: All right. Well, it kind of is a good segue into what I'm going to start by asking. Let's start with the first proposed factor was that George Floyd was particularly vulnerable because, and then you have your factual basis. Essentially, are those the questions you would want submitted to the jury? For example, one, did the officers have him handcuffed behind his back and he -- and then was

placed down on the pavement. And, two, did he clearly and repeatedly tell the officers he could not breathe? Are you anticipating that those are the questions that would support that factor?

MR. FRANK: So, Your Honor, I don't know that we have clear case law requiring that level of special interrogatory to the verdict -- or to the jury as we do with particular cruelty under Rourke.

THE COURT: Well, I was going to say, I think Rourke says otherwise because Rourke -- because the jury does not have the collegial experience of the court which was when the guidelines were first passed and judges made all these decisions.

MR. FRANK: Right.

THE COURT: I could tell you if something was significantly more serious than the typical homicide because I've done a few, jurors haven't. So to ask them was this particularly vulnerable, or was this person particularly vulnerable, that is more vulnerable than a typical victim. Was it particularly cruel because it involved, you know, torture or conduct above and beyond a typical -- and the jurors,

what do they know from typical? I think you see the emotional reaction to something, but that doesn't give you the answer. So you're anticipating my question by citing Rourke, so what do you think?

MR. FRANK: If we're going to impose Rourke's reasoning on the particularly vulnerable...

THE COURT: And I am.

MR. FRANK: And if that's a decision the Court has made, I don't know that I would commit to saying those would be the only questions we would ask. We might want to refine those.

Again, this is a notice and --

THE COURT: Well, it does require that you have notice so that I can make the finding.

MR. FRANK: It's a finding that it's an appropriate basis, aggravating factor or sentence -- sentencing factor to go forward on, but when it comes to writing the actual interrogatories or verdict forms to the jury, I'm not sure I want to be held to just how it's stated in this notice.

THE COURT: Well, let me just -- I'll just briefly going to Rule 11. I don't have it handy. Sorry for the delay.

MR. FRANK: So, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Do you have the rule? Could you cite the rule for me and what the standard is? Or, I'm sorry, 703, not 11. The notice --

MR. FRANK: I have that, too, I believe.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FRANK: So 703 must give written notice at least seven days before the OH of an intent to seek an aggravated sentence. Notice must include the grounds or statutes relied upon in a summary statement of the factual basis supporting the aggravated sentence.

essentially assert enough facts for this Court to say, yes, there's a basis to go forward on this.

I think the reason -- well, there may be several reasons why this was put in the omnibus hearing rule at this stage so going forward parties know that there are -- these issues are out there.

Not to commit to the exact verdict form as how it's going to look, I --

THE COURT: Well, the only reason I bring it up is, to be perfectly honest, your factual basis doesn't support particular vulnerability.

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MR. FRANK: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Just being honest.

MR. FRANK: -- I think a man who is handcuffed, has been pulled out of his car at gunpoint and handcuffed and despite claiming various physical conditions -- I'm trying not to be too descriptive, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, and I get what you're But the problem is the factor is not saying. just particular vulnerability. It's particular vulnerability due to a physical or mental infirmity, and I know of no case where that vulnerability is developed mid crime. anything, I think there are a few cases that say otherwise. It appears at Gardner, for example, a woman was being raped and said I thought I was --I essentially became vulnerable because she thought she was having an epileptic seizure. Some parallels here that Mr. Floyd may have been in medical distress. The Court said that's not particular vulnerability because it was not a substantial factor exploited by the defendant.

MR. FRANK: These defendants had Mr. Floyd --

THE COURT: I'm aware of the facts.

Tell me why they make him vulnerable.

MR. FRANK: Because he can't save his own life. Because he can't fight back. There's three officers, police officers sitting on him, handcuffed, holding his arms back.

THE COURT: Well, aren't we conflating --

MR. FRANK: While another officer is holding back people who are trying to help him. He can't help himself.

THE COURT: The problem I have, I think you're conflating particular cruelty, position of authority, and three or more persons involved in a crime. You just said, well, he was vulnerable because they had three people on him. Well, that's the whole reason behind three or more parties participating in a crime, it makes the victim more vulnerable because they have more people that are -- I'm not saying you don't have --

MR. FRANK: With all due respect.

THE COURT: -- Blakely factors here.

MR. FRANK: I think the Court may be conflating the question of whether it's an appropriate question to submit to the jury, and

what the Court uses to decide how much to aggravate a sentence. Because that's ultimately the Court's choice. If the Court feels there's some overlap, then the Court takes that into consideration. But what we're dealing with here is whether to submit this to the jury to decide under Blakely. Because we have to have those facts in order to argue later. How you decide as a judge, you know, how a judge decides how much is the Court's ultimate decision. That's what I think you're talking about in terms of overlap if that's what you mean.

THE COURT: Well, what I'm talking about here is I'm doing an analysis under 11.04 subdivision 2(a) says that it is the duty of the court — the court must determine whether the law and proffered evidence support an aggravated sentence. The court must also determine to conduct a unitary or bifurcated trial. It doesn't say anything about — what I'm saying is even accepting your proffered facts, that does not support particular vulnerability. It may support particular cruelty. It may support three or more persons involved in a crime. It may support position of trust and authority. I'm

just saying for this one to characterize it as particular vulnerability is conflating the facts with different factors.

And I note the *Gardner* case because I've talked about someone who essentially became vulnerable in the midst of a rape, and they said that's not -- the whole idea of particular vulnerability, at least from my experience has been that it's to punish those who prey on the weaker, people who are clearly weak, either due to physical or mental infirmity, and they take advantage and exploit that vulnerability, and it becomes then, as the case law calls it, a substantial factor. That's my analysis that I'd like you to respond to.

MR. FRANK: And what happened here is they took this man out of his car, you know -- hardly being -- well, they handcuffed him behind his back. And they used three individuals, first of all, try to stuff him into the car, they get him out and they hold him to the ground. And all three of them hold him on the ground while Mr. Thao holds them away. That is vulnerability because he's handcuffed and he's thrown on the ground with three people on top of him. And

that's where the crime is. That's where they caused his death. At that point he's completely vulnerable, there's nothing he can do. In fact, he isn't even physically trying to fight back. He doesn't want to get in the squad car, but he's not fighting. He's held down by three people who are sitting on top of him, wrenching his arms back which are handcuffed behind him. He's completely vulnerable; he can't move to breathe.

THE COURT: But the case law does say not based on position or not based on restraint during the crime, it says because of a physical or mental infirmity.

MR. FRANK: His physical infirmity is he can't move.

THE COURT: Okay. As far as the others, I don't have any questions. It appears that you have made a showing on particular cruelty position of trust and authority, but I'll also hear from defense on that because I do have a question on that.

Position of trust and authority is the way the case law, in fact, it developed first out of position of trust. Then it started to be talked about in Lee and Carpenter and some other

cases as trust "and" authority, and now you're basically saying authority.

MR. FRANK: Correct.

THE COURT: Is there any case law that providers that simply authority -- because I think we can all agree that based on Mr. Floyd's statement when Mr. Lane came up to the window is that he did not trust the police. So I don't think you can say they were in possession of trust vis-à-vis each other.

MR. FRANK: Well, I don't know that I would -- well, maybe I would agree with that. We don't know if George Floyd trusted the police.

What we do know is he followed his commands, he followed the officers' commands.

THE COURT: Let's do this. Position of authority. Let's talk about position of authority.

MR. FRANK: He's following commands. In fact --

THE COURT: I'm not disagreeing with you that you don't have a factual basis for position of authority. I'm asking you purely a legal question. Is solely being in a position of authority ever recognized in any case law as an

independent aggravating factor?

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MR. FRANK: From trust, I can't cite that to you right now, Your Honor. I'm happy to

THE COURT: Yeah, because --

MR. FRANK: -- I don't see why that would be dispositive. It's a position of -- it's a position of authority. It's the same thing, it's taking advantage of your position given to you as authority, as an authority figure. when they tell him to get out of the car, certainly they're going to characterize all that conduct differently, I understand that. But he follows commands, he walks over there, he sits on the sidewalk, he walks across the street. when he starts expressing frustration or his claustrophobia at being put in the back of a -never been in the back of a squad car, but they are tiny, you can see that -- that this whole --I mean, the thing started out going bad, but he's following commands.

THE COURT: And I guess I'm just following the trajectory of the initial case law which, for example, *State versus Campbell*, that's 367 N.W.2d 454. That was back in the mid '80s

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when they were talking strictly about a position of trust and someone you trust violates that trust, allows you to get into their life, make you a victim because you trusted them. It then started to develop with other cases, Lee and Carpenter, using the phrase trust and authority, which I don't know where it came from, it seemed to just kind of evolve and maybe we're just getting sloppy with our terminology. So my question is, and I'm not saying you don't have a valid point, I'm just saying is there any case law, do I have any authority for the proposition that position of authority alone can be an aggravating factor?

MR. FRANK: I can't cite that right now, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to give you time to maybe get a little more on these, so that's fine.

MR. FRANK: And, of course, our juris prudence on aggravating sentences has changed considerably since the '80s, as we all grew up with departures and what these reasons should be. And I see no reason why position of authority isn't any more legitimate than...

1 THE COURT: We have enough gray hair to 2 remember when they were called the new sentencing guidelines -- and Mr. Gray before guidelines. 3 MR. GRAY: Thank you. 4 THE COURT: Anything else on aggravating 5 factors? I'd like to hear from the defense on 6 7 some of these as well. 8 Anybody wish to speak to the aggravating factors? 9 10 Mr. Paule. Because I will allow you to 11 brief it as well. And I don't think we need a 12 tight time frame on this since we're talking 13 about aggravating factors, which would be at the end of a trial, and much of the evidence would be 14 15 in a trial anyway. And if not, it would be part of a bifurcated trial. 16 17 Mr. Paule. I totally understand that, 18 MR. PAULE: 19 I'm just talking as a threshold matter. 20 Court issued a scheduling order ordering them to 21 make --22 THE COURT: Correct. 23 MR. PAULE: -- notices. They're way 24 beyond that. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think they

1 said the rules require omnibus. So if my 2 scheduling order is tighter than that, it's a violation of the scheduling order, not the 3 omnibus hearing rule; would you agree with that? 4 I would agree. 5 MR. PAULE: scheduling order specifically said shall be 6 7 completed. Failure to make timely disclosure will presumptively develop into the preclusion of 8 any matter not disclosed. I would assume that 9 10 goes to notices as well. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. PAULE: I think the Court can view 13 that any way it wants. THE COURT: Well, it say "may 14 presumptively," but given the amount of discovery 15 in this case, I think I would be hard pressed to 16 17 hold the State to that, to be honest. 18 The only thing I will say, MR. PAULE: 19 and, again, I mean no disrespect. The rules 20 apply to both sides. 21 THE COURT: And I think I've given 22 enough leeway to both sides, so we'll go with 23 And if not, you need to tell me that. MR. PAULE: 24 I will. 25 Mr. Gray, anything you'd THE COURT:

like to say?

MR. GRAY: Well, Your Honor, I'd like to correct the record. My client did not pull out Mr. Floyd at gunpoint. As the Court has seen the video --

THE COURT: He holstered --

MR. GRAY: He put the gun back in his holster.

THE COURT: Yeah, I understood that.

All right. Anything else for the good of the order?

MR. NELSON: Briefing schedule.

THE COURT: On Blakely, I would like the State to take a month. And if possible, I would actually encourage the State to think of interrogatory questions because I think it does inform. I will not give the jury -- Mr. Ellison, could I talk to Mr. Frank for a little bit first. Thank you.

I would appreciate that we have questions because that could guide the decision.

I'm not going to give the jury, was this particularly cruel. Rourke says that's not the way we do things. And in my experience since Rourke it is not the way we've done things. But

I would appreciate if as early as possible we can start talking about this in case it comes to that. I don't want to be doing last-minute thoughts on what we submit to a jury.

Okay. Anything else? Otherwise, we have a trial date set, we may be setting up a hearing for motions in limine closer to the trial date.

MR. NELSON: Our responsive time to that?

THE COURT: One month. Like I say, I don't think this requires a tight timeframe in response. So a month for the State; a month in response for the defendants. And if you wish, you may submit a joint response. But since I think -- well, you did say the facts were different -- alleged, Mr. Frank, so however you want to do it, you have a month.

MR. GRAY: How much time, Your Honor?

How much time after we receive the body camera on the May 2019 issue do we have to submit a brief on the Spreigl?

THE COURT: If the State can give you notice of when that happens, I'll give you a month.

MR. GRAY: Okay.

THE COURT: A month from the date of

3 receipt.

MR. GRAY: Thank you.

THE COURT: Any other motions that we can resolve today, otherwise we'll stand adjourned for now until March 8th.

(Clerk confers with the Court.)

THE COURT: Mr. Schaefer, who keeps
track of all things better than I do. With
regard to the Spreigl notice, if defense feels it
does have any effect on your joint trial
analysis, I'll give you two weeks to -- and it
can be letter brief if you wish. You don't have
to file a formal response. If you think that
somehow that affects the calculus on a joint
trial, I'll give you two weeks to submit a letter
brief. Nothing further.

And, everybody, please remember the scheduling order does have how you're supposed to serve the Court. Mr. Gray's office has been doing it, the State's been doing it. Everybody else, you're supposed to CC me and staff in the CC line of the e-filing system itself. Okay.

We've been getting everything, but it's not easy.

1	Mr. Frank.
2	MR. FRANK: Just one issue. The County
3	Attorney's Office would like the Court to revisit
4	the disqualifying of all of those individuals.
5	I'm assuming the Court
6	THE COURT: I'll entertain a motion for
7	them, and they show up for it. They can schedule
8	it with my office.
9	All right. Thank you. We're adjourned.
LO	(Proceedings concluded at 12:17 p.m.)
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2	CERTIFICATE
3	STATE OF MINNESOTA)
4	COUNTY OF HENNEPIN)
5	I, Dana M. Carmichael, an Official Court
6	Reporter for the District Court of Hennepin County,
7	Fourth Judicial District of Minnesota, reported in
8	machine shorthand the proceedings had on the hearing in
9	the above-entitled cause and transcribed the same by
10	Computer Aided Transcription, which I hereby certify to
11	be a true and accurate transcript of the proceedings had
12	before District Court Judge Peter A. Cahill.
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16 17	Dated: October 9, 2020. Dawa M. Carmichael
18	Dana M. Carmichael
19	Official Court Reporter
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