EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

January 2015

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Monday, January 5, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Webb Golden Valley, LLC, Respondent, Evelyn Thomson, Plaintiff vs. State of Minnesota, et al., Appellants, Global One Golden Valley, LLC, Appellant, Golden Valley Housing and Redevelopment Authority, Appellant – Case No. A13-2044:  The Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) has determined that it no longer needs three parcels of land in Golden Valley, which were acquired for the construction of Interstate 394.  MnDOT intends to transfer the parcels to Golden Valley Housing and Redevelopment Authority.  Pursuant to a development agreement, the Authority intends to convey the parcels to Global One Golden Valley, LLC, a private developer, which plans to construct a senior and multi-family housing complex on the parcels.

Webb Golden Valley, LLC, owns property located west of the parcels and sought a declaratory judgment that MnDOT’s proposed transfer of the parcels violates Minn. Stat. § 161.44 (2012), which governs the relinquishment of lands that are no longer needed for trunk highway purposes.  The district court dismissed Webb’s action with respect to two of the parcels based on lack of standing.  The district court also required a $3.2 million surety bond under Minn. Stat. §§ 469.044–.045 (2012).  When the surety bond was not posted, the district court dismissed Webb’s action in its entirety.  The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether Webb has standing to challenge MnDOT’s conveyance under Minn. Stat. § 161.44; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering Webb to post a surety bond.  (Hennepin County)

Minnesota Joint Underwriting Association, Respondent vs. Star Tribune Media Company, LLC, Appellant – Case No. A13-2112:  This appeal arises from requests submitted by a reporter for appellant Star Tribune Media Company, LLC, to respondent Minnesota Joint Underwriting Association under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01–.99 (2012).  The Legislature created the Association “to provide insurance coverage to any person or entity unable to obtain insurance through ordinary methods if the insurance is required by statute, ordinance, or otherwise required by law, or is necessary to earn a livelihood or conduct a business and serves a public purpose, including, but not limited to, liquor liability.”  Minn. Stat. § 62I.02 (2012).

After receiving the requests, the Association sought a declaratory judgment that it is not a “government entity” subject to the Data Practices Act and that the requested data is not subject to disclosure.  See Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 7a (defining “government entity” as “a state agency, statewide system, or political subdivision”).  The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to Star Tribune, concluding that the Association is an “agency of the state” that performs functions for the public benefit and is therefore subject to the Data Practices Act.  See Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 17 (defining “state agency” to include an “agency of the state”).  The court of appeals held that the Association is not a “government entity” subject to the Data Practices Act. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the Association is an “agency of the state” for purposes of the Data Practices Act.  (Ramsey County)

 

Tuesday, January 6, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

In the Matter of Reichmann Land and Cattle, LLP – Case No. A13-1461:  Reichmann Land and Cattle, LLP, operates a farm in Pope County, which includes two registered feedlots and 4,000 acres of cropland.  In 2010, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency notified Reichmann that its winter feeding operation requires a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit and a State Disposal System (SDS) permit.  Reichmann disputed the necessity of the permits, and a contested case hearing was held.  An administrative law judge concluded that both permits are required because the Reichmann winter feeding fields are an “animal feeding operation” as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1) (2013), and the winter feeding fields do not qualify for the state “pasture” exemption in Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subd. 7d (2012).  The court of appeals reversed the order requiring an NPDES permit, but affirmed the order requiring an SDS permit.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Reichmann is required to obtain an NPDES permit for its winter feeding fields; and (2) whether the winter feeding fields are “pasture” under Minnesota law.  (Minnesota Pollution Control Agency)

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Frank Arend Schulte, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 244934 – Case No. A14-1311:  An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.

Wednesday, January 7, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Abshir Abtidon Barrow, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A13-1520:  Appellant Abshir Abtidon Barrow was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his wife when they were stopped by police.  Barrow had just bought a small amount of cocaine for personal use. He handed the cocaine to his wife and told her to hide it.  The police found the cocaine, and Barrow was charged with several drug-related offenses, including the unlawful “sale” of cocaine, a third-degree controlled substance crime.  Barrow pled guilty to this offense in return for dismissal of the other charges and a favorable sentencing recommendation by the State.  He testified at the plea hearing that he possessed the cocaine and that just before the traffic stop he gave the cocaine to his wife to hide for him.  He also testified that he understood that the statutory definition of “sale” includes giving drugs to someone, even though no payment is received in return.

Barrow subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty plea.  He contended that the plea was invalid because the conduct he admitted did not meet the legal definition of a “sale.”  He asserted there had been no sale because he had never relinquished constructive possession of the cocaine after giving it to his wife; and under State v. Carithers, 490 N.W.2d 620 (Minn. 1992), spouses who jointly acquire a controlled substance each have constructive possession of the substance and cannot be convicted of selling that substance to one another.  The district court denied postconviction relief.  The court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a person commits a “sale” of a controlled substance by handing the substance to another person, while maintaining constructive possession of the controlled substance, for the other person to hold and eventually return.  (Rice County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Derek Lawrence Stavish, Appellant – Case No. A14-0771:  At about 10:30 p.m. on June 18, 2012, appellant Derek Stavish was driving a car that was involved in a single-car accident in which his passenger was killed.  The accident occurred near Courtland, Minnesota in Nicollet County.  Stavish was also injured in the accident.  He was taken by ambulance to a hospital 10 miles away in New Ulm, Minnesota, which is in Brown County. 

            Several law enforcement officers responded to the accident.  One of them went to the hospital in New Ulm.  This officer asked a nurse to take a blood sample from Stavish.  A blood sample was taken at about 11:18 p.m.  Testing of Stavish’s blood sample revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.20. 

            Respondent State of Minnesota filed multiple criminal charges against Stavish, including three counts of criminal vehicular homicide and two counts of fourth-degree driving while impaired.  Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), Stavish filed a motion to suppress his blood sample and alcohol-concentration test results.  The district court granted Stavish’s motion to suppress.  The State filed a pretrial appeal, and the court of appeals reversed the district court.

            On appeal to the supreme court, the parties raise the following issues in their briefs: (1) whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of Stavish’s blood; and (2) whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule articulated in Davis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011), should be applied to the warrantless search of Stavish’s blood.  (Nicollet County)

Monday, January 12, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Jerry Expose, Jr., Respondent – Case No. A13-1285:  During a counseling session with a therapist, respondent Jerry Expose, Jr., threatened to harm a child protection worker if a future court date did not go his way.  The therapist contacted the child protection worker and the police to alert them to the threats pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 148.975 (2012), which provides that a licensed psychologist has a duty to warn of violent behavior when a client has communicated “a specific, serious threat of physical violence against a specific, clearly identified or identifiable potential victim.”  Appellant State of Minnesota subsequently charged Expose with one count of terroristic threats.

At trial, Expose objected to the testimony of the therapist, contending that the therapist should be precluded from testifying against him under the psychologist-client privilege, Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(g) (2012).  The district court ruled that the therapist’s testimony about the threats was admissible as an exception to the privilege.  The therapist testified at trial regarding the threats.  The child protection worker also provided testimony about the threats.  A jury convicted Expose of making terroristic threats.  The court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that Minnesota does not recognize a “threats exception” to the psychologist-client privilege.  The court of appeals also concluded that “the admission of Expose’s statements through any witness was erroneous.”     

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether the defense motion to preclude testimony from the therapist was untimely under Minn. R. Crim. P. 10.01, subd. 2, because the motion was made after the therapist’s testimony was discussed in opening statements; (2) whether the psychologist-client privilege precludes testimony from third parties who were advised of the threats pursuant to the statutory duty to warn; and (3) whether the court should recognize a threats exception to the psychologist-client privilege.  (Ramsey County)

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Brian James Engel, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 299790 – Case No. A13-1497:  An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Cody Devereaux Sleiter, et al., Appellants vs. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, Respondent – Case No. A13-1596:  Appellant Cody Sleiter was injured in a school bus accident near Cottonwood, Minnesota.  Four children were killed, and fifteen individuals were injured in the accident; the total damages exceeded $5 million.  After recovering a pro-rata share of his damages from the liability and primary underinsured motorist (UIM) insurers, Sleiter sought excess UIM benefits under his family’s insurance policy with respondent American Family Mutual Insurance Company.  American Family denied the claim based on the language of the policy and the relevant statutory language, which states that “excess insurance protection . . . is available only to the extent by which the limit of liability for like coverage applicable to any one motor vehicle listed on the automobile insurance policy of which the injured person is an insured exceeds the limit of liability of the coverage available to the injured person from the occupied motor vehicle.”  Minn. Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (2012).  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to American Family, concluding that Sleiter is not entitled to excess UIM benefits because the UIM limit under the American Family policy ($100,000) does not exceed the UIM limit under the policy covering the school bus ($1 million).  The court of appeals affirmed. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented concerns the interpretation and application of the phrase “the limit of liability of the coverage available to the injured person” in Minn. Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5).  (Lyon County) 

Nonoral: State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Jason Ryan Williams, petitioner, Appellant – Case No. A14-1640:  A jury found appellant Jason Williams guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree attempted murder, and first-degree burglary in connection with the murder of a woman and her 3-year-old daughter and the attempted murder of her 4-year-old son.  Williams was 16 years old at the time of the offense.  The district court imposed four consecutive sentences, consisting of two life sentences on two counts of first-degree murder, 240 months on one count of attempted first-degree murder, and 18 months on one count of first-degree burglary. 

In May 2014, Williams filed a pro se motion to correct and reduce his sentences, arguing that the sentences violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.  Williams relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which held that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of release are unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.  The district court denied the motion.  The district court found Miller inapposite because “none of Williams’s four consecutive sentences mandate life without the possibility of release.”  The district court also concluded that the sentences do not otherwise violate the Eighth Amendment. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the consecutive sentences for two counts of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and first-degree burglary are prohibited by the Eighth Amendment and the holding in Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  (Hennepin County)

Wednesday, January 14, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Carl Lee Nodes, Respondent – Case No. A13-1772:  Respondent Carl Lee Nodes was charged in a single complaint with three counts of criminal sexual conduct.  He subsequently pleaded guilty to two of those charges, Counts I and III, which were based on two incidents, involving separate children, which occurred approximately 1 month apart.  Nodes was sentenced for both crimes at a single hearing.  The district court imposed two concurrent prison sentences, each of which included a mandatory 10-year conditional release term.  Appellant State of Minnesota argued that because the court had pronounced the sentence for Count I before it pronounced the sentence for Count III, Count I was a “prior sex offense conviction” under Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 1 (2012), with respect to Count III and was therefore subject to mandatory imposition of a lifetime conditional release term.  See Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 7(b) (2012).  The district court denied the request, explaining that because Nodes was being sentenced for both offenses at the same time, Count I was not a “prior sex offense conviction.”

The State appealed the sentence to the court of appeals, which affirmed the district court.  The court of appeals reasoned that a judgment of conviction entered into the record at the same time as another conviction is “not ‘prior,’ it is simultaneous.”  Nodes did not have a “prior sex offense conviction,” the court of appeals concluded, because his conviction for Count I had been “announced, but not yet recorded in a judgment of conviction” before he was sentenced for Count III. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented:  when a district court imposes multiple sentences during the same hearing for multiple convictions of criminal sexual conduct arising from separate behavioral incidents, do the earlier-sentenced convictions constitute “prior sex offense convictions” for purposes of imposing conditional release for each subsequent conviction?  (Itasca County)

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Mark Alan Greenman, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 228990 – Case No. A13-1963:  An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.