EN BANC CALENDAR
Before
the
October 2011
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, October 3, 2011
Supreme Court
Courtroom, State Capitol
State of Minnesota, Respondent v. Chaun Dubae Carridine, Appellant – Case No. A09-1412: Appellant Chaun Carridine was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder. On appeal from that conviction, five issues are presented: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion when it rejected Carridine’s Batson challenges to the State’s exercise of peremptory strikes to remove two potential jurors; (2) whether Carridine is entitled to a new trial because the district court allowed the prosecutor to impeach Carridine’s trial testimony with a letter he had written to the district court; (3) whether Carridine is entitled to a new trial because the district court erroneously instructed the jury on self-defense; (4) whether Carridine is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor committed misconduct; and (5) whether Carridine is entitled to a new trial because the district court judge who presided over his trial is married to an attorney employed by the county attorney’s office that prosecuted Carridine. (Hennepin County)
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Joseph Anthony Rymanowski, Jr., a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 240606 – Case No. A11-0340: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based upon the facts of the matter.
Tuesday, October 4, 2011
Supreme Court
Courtroom, State Capitol
State of Minnesota, Respondent v. Jabaris Curt Boldman, Appellant – Case No. A10-1235: A jury found appellant Jabaris Boldman guilty of first-degree felony murder and second-degree intentional murder. The district court convicted Boldman of first-degree murder. In an appeal from that conviction, Boldman raised several arguments regarding his first-degree murder conviction, and the State conceded that Boldman should not have been convicted of first-degree murder. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented concerning the second-degree intentional murder charge is whether there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was intentional. (Ramsey County)
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Christopher Thomas Kalla, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 325818 – Case No. A10-1906: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based upon the facts of the matter.
Wednesday, October 5, 2011
William Mitchell
College of Law
State of Minnesota, Respondent v. Herman Tanksley, Jr., Appellant – Case No. A10-0392: Appellant Herman Tanksley, Jr. was charged with two counts of fourth-degree driving while impaired. The charges were based, in part, on the results of a urine test indicating that Tanksley’s alcohol concentration was .08 or higher within two hours of driving. Tanksley filed a motion to suppress the results of this urine test and requested a Frye-Mack hearing on the admissibility of first-void urine-alcohol test results. The district court denied these motions. The district court convicted Tanksley of fourth-degree driving while impaired, based on an alcohol concentration of .08 or higher, after a stipulated-facts trial. The court of appeals affirmed petitioner’s conviction.
On appeal to the supreme court, two issues are presented: (1) whether Tanksley was entitled to a Frye-Mack hearing on the admissibility of first-void urine-alcohol test results; and (2) if so, whether the denial of a Frye-Mack hearing was harmful. (Hennepin County)
Thursday, October
6, 2011
Supreme Court
Courtroom, State Capitol
James Luther Carlton, petitioner, Appellant v. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A10-2061: In 1995, appellant James Carlton was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder. Carlton filed a direct appeal, but this appeal was dismissed by the supreme court. In August 2010, Carlton filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant and that the trial court erred in admitting Spreigl evidence. The district court summarily denied Carlton’s petition for postconviction relief.
On appeal to the supreme court, four issues are presented: (1) whether Carlton’s petition for postconviction relief is qualifies for an exception to the statutory time bar because it is not frivolous and it is in the interests of justice; (2) whether the Minnesota Constitution guarantees the right to one review, either by direct appeal or a postconviction proceeding, of a felony conviction; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying Carlton’s motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his body because the warrant authorizing the search was not supported by probable cause; and (4) whether Carlton is entitled to a new trial because the district court improperly admitted Spreigl evidence. (Hennepin County)
Alexander Jerome Miller, Appellant v. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A09-2047 and Jorge Alberto Sanchez, a/k/a Jorge Alberto Sanchez-Reyes, Appellant v. State of Minnesota, Respondent, Case No. A09-2195: In March 2005, appellant Alexander Miller entered a guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to a charge of second-degree murder. Later that month, Miller moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court denied this motion and sentenced Miller. Miller filed a direct appeal, but the court of appeals granted Miller’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the direct appeal.
On May 11, 2009, Miller filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, claiming that his guilty plea was inaccurate. On August 11, 2009, the State Public Defender filed a supplemental postconviction petition, alleging further grounds why Miller’s guilty plea was inaccurate. The district court concluded that the pro se and supplemental petitions for postconviction relief were time barred by the statute of limitations contained in the Postconviction Remedy Act. Nevertheless, the district court considered, and rejected, petitioner’s postconviction claims on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed the district court.
In November 2003 following a stipulated-facts trial, appellant Jorge Sanchez-Reyes was convicted of first-degree controlled-substance crime and sentenced to 98 months in prison. Pursuant to Sanchez-Reyes’s request, the district court stayed its sentencing order pending appeal. Sanchez-Reyes filed a direct appeal, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeal after Sanchez-Reyes failed to make financial arrangements for the transcript. After a July 2004 hearing at which he learned that he would need to begin serving his 98-month sentence because his appeal had not been perfected, Sanchez-Reyes fled to Mexico. In January 2008, Sanchez-Reyes returned to Minnesota and began serving his 98-month sentence.
In March 2009, Sanchez-Reyes filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his suppression motion and that his appellate counsel was ineffective. Sanchez-Reyes invoked the interests-of-justice exception to the two-year statute of limitations in the Postconviction Remedy Act and asserted that his interests-of-justice claim arose in 2008 when he learned that he had never had an appeal. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the postconviction petition. The court of appeals affirmed.
These cases have been consolidated before the supreme court for the purposes of oral argument. On appeal to the supreme court, these appeals present the following issues: (1) whether the requirement in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) (2010), that any postconviction petition invoking an exception to the statute of limitation in the Postconviction Remedy Act must be “filed within two years of the day the claim arises,” bars review of appellants’ petitions for postconviction relief; (2) whether the Minnesota Constitution guarantees the right to one review, whether by direct appeal or postconviction proceeding, of a criminal conviction; and (3) whether the supreme court should invoke its inherent authority to review convictions and invalidate Sanchez-Reyes’ conviction. (Ramsey County)
Monday, October 10, 2011
Judicial
Center, Courtroom 300
State
of Minnesota, Respondent v. Adrian Lamont Patterson, Appellant – Case No. A10-0563: A grand jury indicted appellant Adrian Patterson
of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree
murder. Prior to trial, respondent State
of Minnesota moved to disqualify Patterson’s retained counsel, based on a conflict of interest resulting from counsel’s
representation of three of the State’s witnesses and Patterson’s co-defendant. The district court disqualified Patterson’s
counsel, concluding that based on the facts and circumstances of this case,
“the prejudice to [Patterson] as a result of disqualifying his attorney of
choice is outweighed by the State’s interest in the finality of any judgment of
conviction, the court’s interest in preserving the ethical standards of the
legal profession and the public interest in having a criminal justice system
that is perceived as fair.” A jury
subsequently found Patterson guilty of second-degree murder and
drive-by-shooting. The court of appeals
affirmed Patterson’s convictions.
On appeal to the supreme
court, the issue presented is whether the district court deprived Patterson of
his constitutional right to counsel of choice by disqualifying the attorney
Patterson had retained for trial. (Hennepin County)
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Stanley H. Nathanson, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 144046 – Case No. A10-0684: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based upon the facts of the matter.
Tuesday, October 11, 2011
Judicial
Center, Courtroom 300
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Peter Gerald Lonergan and In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Robert Archie Kunshier – Case Nos. A10-1269, A10-1270: Appellant Peter Lonergan was indeterminately civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person. In May 2010, Lonergan filed a motion for relief from his judgment of commitment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, in which he sought relief because he was not mentally ill, the treatment at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program was inadequate and punitive, and the district court was misled during the commitment hearings about the treatment that would be provided during his civil commitment. The district court denied Lonergan’s motion.
Appellant Robert Kunshier was indeterminately civilly committed as a sexual psychopathic personality. In December 2009, Kunshier filed a motion for relief from his judgment of commitment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, in which he sought relief because his commitment violated his constitutional rights, he was denied release from commitment despite completing treatment, and he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his commitment hearings. The district court denied Kunshier’s motion.
Lonergan and Kunshier both appealed the denial of their Rule 60.02 motions. In separate decisions, the court of appeals affirmed the district courts’ orders denying their Rule 60.02 motions. The appeals were consolidated before the supreme court for the purpose of briefing and oral arguments.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a person indeterminately civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person or as a sexual psychopathic personality may petition the committing court for relief from judgment of commitment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. (Dakota County)
Nonoral: Darryl Colbert, petitioner, Appellant v. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A11-0717: In 2005, appellant Darryl Colbert was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder. The supreme court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Colbert filed three previous petitions for postconviction relief, all of which were denied by the district court. In January 2011, Colbert filed his fourth petition for postconviction relief, in which he alleged that the prosecutor used false evidence to convict him, an expert witness based an opinion on illegally seized evidence, the prosecutor committed misconduct, and the police used unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures. The district court summarily denied Colbert’s fourth postconviction petition.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether Colbert’s fourth petition for postconviction relief is time barred by Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2010); and (2) whether the claims Colbert raises in his fourth petition for postconviction relief are procedurally barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).
Wednesday, October 12, 2011
Tornstrom
Auditorium, Brainerd
Christopher John Daly, Respondent v. Zachary John McFarland, Appellant – Case No. A10-1184: Respondent Christopher Daly and appellant Zachary McFarland were among a group of four young men snowmobiling in January 2007 when Daly was injured. Daly sued McFarland for negligence, and the case went to a jury. McFarland’s request for a jury instruction on the “emergency rule” was denied. The jury found McFarland negligent in the operation of his snowmobile. The jury found Daly also negligent but found that Daly’s negligence was not a direct cause of the accident. However, when asked to apportion negligence between the parties, the jury attributed 30% of the direct cause of the accident to Daly. The jury awarded Daly more than $442,000 in damages. The district court determined that no fault comparison was required and no fault reduction was appropriate. McFarland moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that he was not negligent as a matter of law based on the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. McFarland’s post-trial motion was denied. A divided court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, three issues are presented: (1) whether primary assumption of risk applies to snowmobile-operation cases and negates McFarland’s negligence; (2) whether McFarland is entitled to a new trial because of the jury’s inconsistent answers on the special verdict form regarding Daly’s negligence; and (3) whether McFarland is entitled to a new trial because the district court refused to instruct the jury on the emergency rule. (Nobles County)