EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the
September
2012
SUMMARY OF
ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Tuesday, September 4,
2012
Supreme
Court Courtroom, State Capitol
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Rosalyn McDonald-Richards, Appellant – A11-1449: Appellant Rosalyn McDonald-Richards was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether McDonald-Richard’s first statement to police should have been suppressed because it was the direct product of her unlawful arrest. (Hennepin County)
David
McKee, M.D., Respondent vs. Dennis K. Laurion, Appellant –
A11-1154: Respondent David McKee is a medical doctor
who practices neurology at St. Luke’s Hospital in Duluth. Dr. McKee examined the father of
appellant Dennis Laurion. Shortly
thereafter, Laurion posted negative reviews of Dr. McKee on three
rate-your-doctor websites. Laurion
also sent letters to St. Luke’s Hospital and numerous medical associations and
organizations, which contained substantially similar statements about Dr.
McKee.
Dr. McKee brought a complaint against Laurion, asserting claims for
defamation and interference with business based on 11 statements Laurion had
made about him. The district court
granted Laurion’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals reversed, in part,
with respect to Dr. McKee’s defamation claim and remanded.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether six statements Laurion made are factual assertions that are capable of being proven true or false; (2) whether Laurion’s statements made on the rate-your-doctor websites are opinions; and (3) whether Laurion’s letter to St. Luke’s Hospital is subject to a qualified privilege. (St. Louis County)
Wednesday, September 5,
2012
Supreme
Court Courtroom, State Capitol
Tessa M. Washek, Relator vs. New Dimensions Home Health and State Fund Mutual Insurance Company, Respondents – A12-0395: Employee-relator Tessa Washek was paralyzed in a 2002 work-related motor vehicle accident. In 2008, an expert recommended the installation of a ceiling-mounted lift system in Washek’s home to minimize skin breakdowns and repetitive trauma to Washek’s upper extremities during transfers to and from her wheelchair. Washek’s employer, New Dimensions Home Health, and its insurer agreed to pay for the lift system itself as a medical expense under Minn. Stat. § 176.135 (2010). However, installation of the lift system will require structural modifications to Washek’s home. Minnesota Statutes § 176.137, subd. 4 (2008), requires the employer to furnish a permanently disabled employee “such alteration or remodeling of the employee’s principal residence as is reasonably required to enable the employee to move freely into and throughout the residence and to otherwise adequately accommodate the disability.” However, the employer’s liability for alteration or remodeling of the employee’s residence is capped at $60,000. New Dimensions has already paid about $58,100 to make Washek’s home accessible.
A compensation judge found the cost of the necessary modifications to Washek’s home to be a compensable medical expense because installation of the track is necessary in order for the employer to “furnish” the lift device. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the structural changes to the residence necessary to permit installation of the ceiling track constitute “alteration or remodeling” of the residence under Minn. Stat. § 176.137.
The issue before the supreme court is whether the compensation judge’s
finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Workers’ Compensation Court of
Appeals)
Non-Oral: John K. Beck, Relator, and Carrie L. Beck, Petitioner Below vs. County of Todd, Respondent – Case No. A12-0252: Relator John Beck and his wife Carrie own property on Pine Island Lake in Todd County. The County assessed the property as of January 2, 2009 (for taxes payable in 2010), at a value of $397,400. The Becks appealed the assessed value to the Minnesota Tax Court, which found the value of the property as of January 2, 2009, to be $395,000.
Several issues are before the supreme court on John Beck’s appeal: (1) whether the tax court erred by accepting the County’s appraisal; (2) whether the tax court erred by rejecting Beck’s appraiser’s testimony because he was not a licensed appraiser; (3) whether the tax court erred by concluding that the County Assessor and the County’s appraiser were unable to access the subject property; (4) whether the tax court erred by accepting the County’s expert’s appraisal; (5) whether the tax court erred by rejecting the Becks’ testimony regarding comparable properties and market values; and (6) whether the tax court erred in accepting the County’s expert’s value for the Becks’ land. (Minnesota Tax Court)
Thursday, September 6,
2012
Supreme
Court Courtroom, State Capitol
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Andrew Anthony Craig, Appellant – Case No. A10-1938: A jury found appellant Andrew Craig guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2010). To establish the element of a prior crime-of-violence conviction, respondent the State of Minnesota relied on Craig’s 2008 conviction for fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. After his trial, Craig moved to dismiss the case, citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). Craig argued that the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because under a strict scrutiny standard his nonviolent drug conviction did not warrant the denial of his fundamental right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment. The district court denied Craig’s motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed the district court.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), violates the Second Amendment, as applied to Craig. (Ramsey County)
Monday, September 10,
2012
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Christopher James Hayes, Appellant – Case No. A11-1314: Appellant Christopher Hayes was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder. On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Hayes intentionally shot the victim while committing a drive-by shooting; and (2) whether Hayes is entitled to a new trial because a witness for the State testified that he had been attacked in prison for being a snitch. (Hennepin County)
Non-Oral: Candy S. Bradison, Relator vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A12-0428: Relator Candy S. Bradison is the personal representative of the estate of her daughter, Katelyn S. Janson, who died in April 2006 while undergoing medical treatment in Minnesota. Katelyn was the beneficiary of certain annuities established for her benefit after a 1997 motor vehicle accident in which she was seriously and permanently disabled. This case presents two issues for the supreme court’s consideration: (1) whether the annuities are properly included in Katelyn’s estate; and (2) whether Katelyn was a resident of Minnesota at the time of her death. (Minnesota Tax Court)
Tuesday, September 11,
2012
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. David Gustave Hawkinson, Respondent – Case Nos. A11-1565, A11-1819: Respondent David Hawkinson was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI). A blood sample was taken from him, testing of which revealed an alcohol concentration of .11. Appellant State of Minnesota charged Hawkinson with several misdemeanors, including fourth-degree DWI based on having an alcohol concentration of .08 or higher within two hours of driving.
Respondent was provided with a copy of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension’s (BCA) toxicology report, dated April 8, 2010, which stated that
Hawkinson’s blood sample had been tested using an approved gas chromatographic
procedure. It also stated that
“[t]his evidence will be destroyed by the laboratory twelve months following the
date of this report.” Afterwards,
Hawkinson’s counsel served the State with a demand for disclosure and discovery
and demand for preservation of all evidence. This demand requested that the State
preserve all evidence about Hawkinson, including blood tests.
Four days before trial, Hawkinson’s counsel called the BCA to ask if it
still had Hawkinson’s blood sample.
The BCA indicated the sample had been destroyed. Hawkinson filed a motion to suppress the
blood test evidence and to dismiss the DWI charge based on his alcohol
concentration. The district court
granted Hawkinson’s motion to suppress the blood test results and dismissed the
DWI charged based on his alcohol concentration. The court of appeals
affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the State presents three issues in its briefs: (1) whether Hawkinson was denied due process of law by the destruction of his blood sample; (2) whether destruction of the blood sample violated Hawkinson’s right to confrontation; and (3) whether destruction of the blood sample violated Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding discovery. (Hennepin County)
Non-Oral: William D. Larson, Relator vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A12-0378: For tax years 1999 through 2006, relator William D. Larson filed Minnesota individual income tax returns and paid Minnesota income taxes as a nonresident. The Commissioner of Revenue determined that Larson was domiciled in Minnesota for tax years 2002 through 2006; the Minnesota Tax Court affirmed, applying the factors listed in Minn. R. 8001.0300, subp. 3 (2011). On Larson’s appeal, the issue before the supreme court is whether Larson was a Minnesota resident during the tax years at issue. (Minnesota Tax Court)
Wednesday, September 12,
2012
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Donald Warren Hayes, Appellant – Case No. A11-1665: Appellant Donald Warren Hayes was convicted following a jury trial of first-degree murder. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Hayes assaulted the victim and caused his death; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to prove Hayes engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse; (3) whether Hayes is entitled to a new trial because the district court erroneously instructed the jury on the burden of proof on the element of a past pattern of domestic abuse; and (4) whether Hayes is entitled to a new trial because the district court did not instruct the jury that it had to unanimously agree on which two or more acts of domestic abuse Hayes committed. (Hennepin County)
Non-Oral: LaMonte Rydell Martin, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – A12-0089: In 2007, appellant LaMonte Martin was convicted of first-degree murder committed for the benefit of a gang. The supreme court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. In July 2011, Martin filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Martin’s request for a new trial based on witness recantations; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Martin’s petition for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing on his claim for a new trial based on witness recantations; and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Martin’s remaining claims in his postconviction petition were Knaffla-barred. (Hennepin County).