EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

June 2016

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Monday, June 6, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, ex rel. Demetris L. Duncan, Appellant vs. Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent – Case No. A15-1349: Appellant Demetris Duncan was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for an offense committed in July 2000. The district court sentenced Duncan to 196 months in prison, plus 5 years of conditional release, as mandated by Minn. Stat. § 609.109, subd. 7(a) (1998). Duncan was released from custody on supervised release on August 18, 2011, but he was returned to custody and his release was revoked when he could not find an approved residence in the community that satisfied the conditions of his supervised release. The Department of Corrections subsequently notified Duncan that his conditional-release date was extended from August 18, 2016, to December 30, 2021.

In 2015, the district court denied Duncan’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court rejected Duncan’s argument that the Commissioner of Corrections had miscalculated his conditional-release term by failing to reduce it by the entire supervised-release term, whether he served that term in prison or in the community. The court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court misinterpreted the conditional-release statute to require the Commissioner of Corrections to reduce Duncan’s conditional-release term by only the time served on supervised release in the community. (Chisago County)

Storms, Inc., Respondent vs. Mathy Construction Company, Appellant – Case No. A15-0484: The Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) contracted with appellant Mathy Construction Company for highway repairs in Houston County. Mathy subcontracted with respondent Storms, Inc., to excavate and supply fill for the projects. Storms calculated its bid based on MnDOT’s statement of estimated quantities. However, MnDOT had miscalculated the amounts of materials needed. After Storms completed its work, MnDOT issued a change order, which reduced the contract price by $327,064.

Storms brought a breach-of-contract action against Mathy. Applying MnDOT’s Standard Specifications for Construction, the district court ruled that Mathy had breached the subcontract agreement. The district court also concluded that Storms is entitled to damages in the form of fixed costs, but that Storms “failed to present any evidence regarding fixed costs” and thus “failed to meet the burden of proving damages.” On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling that Mathy had breached the subcontract agreement, but concluded that Storms is entitled to “contract damages” and remanded for a determination of the amount due under the subcontract agreement.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Mathy breached the subcontract agreement by adjusting the subcontract sum based on the MnDOT change order; (2) whether the court of appeals erred by reversing the dismissal of the damages claim based on Storms’ failure to prove its entitlement to fixed-cost damages; and (3) whether any damages awarded on remand are limited to Storms’ lost profits. (Houston County)

Tuesday, June 7, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Kristyn Nicole Schouweiler, Appellant – Case No. A15-1461: Appellant Kristyn Schouweiler wrote a check for approximately $2,000 to Wabasha County for past due property taxes, penalties, and interest. The check was returned for insufficient funds. Appellant was charged with one felony count of issuing a dishonored check in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.535, subd. 2 (2014). The district court dismissed the charge for lack of probable cause, reasoning that the dishonored check statute does not apply because the check fell within the statutory exception for “a check given for a past consideration” in Minn. Stat. § 609.535, subd. 5 (2014). The district court reasoned that a check is given for a past consideration unless there is a contemporaneous exchange of goods or services for the check.

The court of appeals reversed and remanded. Interpreting “the phrase ‘a check given for a past consideration’ according to the special meaning of past consideration under contract law,” the court of appeals held that “the phrase refers to a promise to pay that is unenforceable for lack of adequate consideration.” The court of appeals reasoned that because the obligation to pay taxes arises under statute rather than contract law, the exception does not apply to appellant’s case.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is the meaning of the term “a check given for a past consideration” under section 609.535, subdivision 5. (Wabasha County)

In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct in Panel File No. 39302 – Case No. A15-2078: The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility issued a private admonition against respondent, who is licensed to practice law in Colorado, for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in Minnesota, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a). Respondent appealed the admonition to a panel of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board. The panel affirmed the admonition.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the panel clearly erred in finding that respondent practiced law in Minnesota, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(a); and (2) if respondent practiced law in Minnesota, whether the panel clearly erred in concluding that his conduct was not a permissible, temporary practice authorized by Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(c).

Wednesday, June 8, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Todd Eugene Trahan, Respondent – Case No. A13-0931: Minnesota law makes it a crime for a person to refuse a test of the person’s breath, blood, or urine for the presence of alcohol if certain conditions are met. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2014). Respondent Todd Trahan pleaded guilty to first-degree test refusal based on his refusal of a blood test for the presence of alcohol. Trahan’s direct appeal was stayed pending postconviction proceedings. In a postconviction petition, Trahan argued, in part, that the test-refusal statute is unconstitutional under Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), because it violates substantive due process and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The district court denied the postconviction petition.

In a combined direct and postconviction appeal, a divided panel of the court of appeals reversed and remanded for withdrawal of Trahan’s guilty plea. The court of appeals held that the test-refusal statute, as applied to Trahan, violated his right to substantive due process.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether it violates Trahan’s Fourth Amendment or substantive due process rights to convict him of violating Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2, based on his refusal to submit to a warrantless search of his blood; (2) whether exigent circumstances were present that would have justified a warrantless search of Trahan’s blood for the presence of alcohol; and (3) whether Trahan’s conviction should be upheld because the police officer acted in good-faith reliance on binding appellate precedent when the officer asked Trahan to submit to a blood test without first obtaining a warrant. (Ramsey County)

State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Ryan Mark Thompson, Respondent – Case No. A15-0076: Minnesota law makes it a crime for a person to refuse a test of the person’s breath, blood, or urine for the presence of alcohol if certain conditions are met. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2014). Appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent Ryan Thompson with several offenses, including third-degree driving while impaired and second-degree test refusal based on his refusal of a blood or urine test for the presence of alcohol. Thompson agreed to a stipulated-facts trial on the test-refusal count, and the other charges were dismissed. The district court found Thompson guilty of second-degree test refusal. The court of appeals reversed Thompson’s conviction for second-degree test refusal, concluding that the test-refusal statute, as applied to Thompson, violated his right to substantive due process.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether it violates Thompson’s Fourth Amendment or substantive due process rights to convict him of violating Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2, based on his refusal to submit to a warrantless search of his blood or urine; and (2) whether Thompson’s conviction should be upheld because the police officer acted in good-faith reliance on binding appellate precedent when the officer asked Thompson to submit to a blood or urine test without first obtaining a warrant. (Steele County)

Thursday, June 9, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

In re Petition for Reinstatement of Clark Calvin Griffith, II, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0175638 – Case No. A15-1186: An attorney reinstatement matter that presents the issue of whether suspended attorney Clark Griffith should be reinstated to the practice of law.

Nonoral: Aaron Joseph Morrow, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A16-0117: Appellant Aaron Morrow was convicted of one count of first-degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first-degree premeditated murder in connection with an incident in which Morrow repeatedly fired a semiautomatic AK–47 rifle at Joseph Rivera and two of Rivera’s friends. The supreme court affirmed the convictions in 2013. State v. Morrow, 834 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 2013). In 2015, Morrow petitioned for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The district court concluded that Morrow failed to establish that the performance of his appellate counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Therefore, the district court concluded that Morrow is not entitled to postconviction relief.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues include whether the district court committed numerous errors when it denied postconviction relief. (Ramsey County)

Monday, June 13, 2016

 

Nonoral: Derrick Delmar Brocks, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-2096: Appellant Derrick Brocks was convicted of first-degree murder for the killing of James Nunn. The supreme court affirmed the conviction in 1998, concluding, in part, that “there is no evidence that defense counsel provided Brocks with ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 44 (Minn. 1998). Subsequently, Brocks filed two petitions for postconviction relief, both of which asserted unsuccessfully, among other arguments, that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2015, Brocks filed a third petition for postconviction relief, again asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition in its entirety.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the third petition for postconviction relief is untimely or procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976). (Hennepin County)

Nonoral: Kim Thul Ouk, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-2056: In 1992, a jury found appellant Kim Thul Ouk guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder in connection with an armed robbery that involved four separate victims. At the time of the robbery, Ouk was 15 years old. Ouk waived his right to a certification hearing and indicated that he wished to be certified to adult court. Following a jury trial, the district court imposed two life sentences with the possibility of release and two 15-year sentences, with the sentences to be served consecutively. The supreme court affirmed the convictions and the district court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. State v. Ouk, 516 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1994). In 2015, Ouk filed a motion seeking to correct his aggregated sentence, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because a juvenile defendant cannot waive the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Determining that the motion was in substance a petition for postconviction relief, the postconviction court concluded that Ouk’s challenge to his sentence is untimely and procedurally barred.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Ouk’s challenge to his sentence is untimely or procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976). (Ramsey County)

Tuesday, June 14, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Timothy John Bakken, Appellant – Case No. A14-2057: Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Timothy Bakken with seven counts of possession of a pornographic work involving a minor in violation of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a) (2014), which prohibits a person from possessing “a pornographic work or . . . computer . . . containing a pornographic work.” Bakken pleaded guilty to all seven counts. At the sentencing hearing, Bakken argued the court could only impose one sentence because all of the pornographic works were contained on a single computer. The district court imposed seven separate sentences. The court of appeals affirmed, explaining that under the plain language of the statute the State was free to charge Bakken with either multiple counts for distinct pornographic works stored on a single computer or a single count of possession of a computer containing distinct pornographic works.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the language of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a), allows the State to file separate possession charges for each pornographic work stored on a single computer. (Polk County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. David Ernest Osorio, Appellant – Case No. A15-0921: On May 1, 2013, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant David Osorio with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. At this time, Osorio was living in California. The district court issued a summons and complaint, which described the charges against Osorio and his obligation to appear at all hearings regarding the charges. The district court mailed the summons and complaint to Osorio’s California address. On June 6, 2013, the district court issued a warrant for Osorio’s arrest after he failed to appear at the first hearing on the charges.

In February 2015, law enforcement officials in California arrested Osorio for an unrelated matter. Osorio was extradited to Minnesota and made his first appearance in district court on March 2, 2015. On April 3, 2015, Osorio moved to dismiss the charges, alleging a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The district court dismissed the charges, ruling that Osorio’s right to a speedy trial was violated. The court of appeals reversed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Osorio’s right to a speedy trial was denied when there was a 21-month delay between the charging of Osorio and his arrest. (Hennepin County)

Wednesday, June 15, 2016

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Debra Lee Fawcett, Appellant – Case No. A15-0938: Appellant Debra Fawcett was involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in personal injury. Police suspected she was under the influence of alcohol, so they obtained a search warrant that authorized the taking of a blood sample for “testing,” but did not specify the type of testing. One month later, the lab notified police that Fawcett’s blood sample contained no alcohol and that additional tests would be conducted. Two and a half months after that, the lab reported that Fawcett’s blood sample tested positive for controlled substances.

Fawcett was charged with criminal vehicular operation. Before trial she moved to suppress the blood test results, arguing that the testing for controlled substances exceeded the scope of the search warrant, which established probable cause for, and authorized, testing only for alcohol. The district court agreed and suppressed the blood test results. The court ruled that the warrant permitted only a blood search for alcohol and not for drugs, and that the testing for drugs was not authorized under any exception to the warrant requirement.

The State appealed the suppression order to the court of appeals, which reversed the district court. The appeals court held that it did not matter whether the drug testing was authorized by the warrant, because once a blood sample has been lawfully removed from a person’s body, the person loses any reasonable expectation of privacy in the blood sample and its contents. As a result, subsequent chemical analysis of the blood sample does not violate the person’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is when a person’s blood is drawn by law enforcement under the authority of a warrant that permits a search for one or more substances, does the person retain a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the contents of her blood with respect to anything that is not specifically authorized in the warrant. (Anoka County)

Nonoral: Derrick Trevor Griffin­, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A16-0323: Appellant Derrick Griffin was convicted of first-degree murder by drive-by shooting and first-degree premeditated murder in connection with the shooting death of Kristopher Miller. The supreme court affirmed the convictions. State v. Griffin, 834 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. 2013). In 2015, Griffin filed a petition for postconviction relief, citing prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court denied postconviction relief.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Griffin was improperly convicted of multiple offenses against the same victim arising out of the same behavioral incident; (2) whether Griffin received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) whether the district court and appellate court applied an incorrect harmless error standard in denying relief on Griffin’s claim regarding the erroneous admission of an out-of-court statement. (Hennepin County)