EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

November 2015

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

 

Monday, November 2, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Maureen Ndidiamaka Onyelobi, Appellant – Case No. A15-0267: Appellant Maureen Onyelobi was indicted for first- and second-degree murder in connection with the March 2014 shooting death of Anthony Fairbanks. The evidence at trial established that Onyelobi helped Maurice Wilson and David Johnson plan and carry out the killing. Onyelobi was found guilty following a jury trial and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the district court’s aiding-and-abetting instruction plainly and materially misstated the law; (2) whether the police had probable cause to arrest Onyelobi; and (3) whether the State’s reasons for exercising peremptory strikes of three of four potential African-American jurors were pretextual. (Hennepin County District Court)

Ali M. Shire, Respondent, vs. Rosemount Inc., Self-Insured/Berkley Risk Administrators Company, LLC, Relator, Twin Cities Orthopedics, P.A., Crosstown Surgery Center, and Minnesota Department of Human Services/BRS, Intervenors – Case No. A15-0856: Relator Rosemount Inc. held an employee-appreciation event during respondent Ali Shire’s normal work hours. Rosemount considered attendance at the event “voluntary.” Because the event was during his work hours, Shire was given the option of attending, taking vacation leave and not attending, or taking leave without pay and not attending. Shire attended, injured his ankle while participating in a laser-tag activity during the event, and sought workers’ compensation benefits.

Rosemount contended that Shire’s injury was not compensable because the injury was incurred while participating in an employer-sponsored, but voluntary recreational program. The compensation judge granted Shire’s petition for benefits, and the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (“WCCA”) affirmed, both concluding that Shire’s participation in the event was “involuntary” because attendance was the only means available to avoid “a forfeiture of pay or benefits.” The WCCA declined to consider whether Shire’s participation in laser tag was “voluntary,” noting that the statute does not require an individual activity assessment.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Shire’s injury is excluded from coverage because his participation in the employer-sponsored employee-recognition event was voluntary within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9 (2014); and (2) whether Shire’s injury is excluded from coverage because his participation in laser tag at the employee-recognition event, during which he sustained an injury, was “voluntary” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)

 

Tuesday, November 3, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

Jamy Hegseth f/k/a Jamy Jager, Appellant, vs. American Family Insurance Group, Respondent – Case No. A14-1189: Appellant Jamy Hegseth was injured in a motor-vehicle accident that occurred in March 2007 when a truck turned in front of the vehicle in which she was a passenger. Hegseth sought uninsured motorist (“UM”) benefits from the insurer of the occupied vehicle. After reaching a settlement with that insurer, Hegseth sought excess UM benefits from her own insurer, respondent American Family Mutual Insurance Group. American Family denied Hegseth’s claim in September 2012, and Hegseth brought an action against American Family in July 2013. The district court granted American Family’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the action is time-barred because Hegseth commenced the action more than 6 years after the accident occurred. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Hegseth’s argument that her claim for primary UM benefits had to be resolved before her claim for excess UM benefits became ripe.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the pursuit and resolution of Hegseth’s claim for primary UM benefits was a condition precedent to bringing a claim for excess UM benefits, and (2) whether the claim for excess UM benefits accrued when the accident occurred or when the contract was allegedly breached. (Hennepin County District Court)

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Joshua Lee Myhre, Appellant – Case No. A14-0670: Appellant Joshua Myhre was charged with first-degree refusal to submit to a chemical test. Myhre moved to dismiss the charge, arguing the test-refusal statute is unconstitutional, and the district court denied the motion. To preserve that issue for appeal, Myhre agreed to a trial by stipulated facts. But rather than enter a plea of not guilty, as required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4 (2014), Myhre entered a plea of guilty, while acknowledging on the record that he could still appeal the court’s finding of guilt.

On appeal to the court of appeals, Myhre argued he was entitled to a new trial because the lack of strict compliance with the procedure in Rule 26.01 rendered the district court proceeding invalid. The court of appeals affirmed Myhre’s conviction, stating the district court and the parties clearly intended to follow, and thought they were following, the procedure for a valid trial by stipulated facts to obtain review of a pretrial ruling. It also found that Myhre’s waiver of his trial-related rights was valid. The court concluded that the procedural defects were not substantial enough to invalidate the district court proceedings altogether. The court treated the guilty plea as a not-guilty plea with stipulated facts, reviewed the district court’s pretrial ruling, and denied relief.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether Myhre’s conviction must be reversed and the case remanded because the parties did not comply with the procedure required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain review of a dispositive pretrial ruling and instead entered an invalid conditional guilty plea. (Houston County District Court)

 

Wednesday, November 4, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation, Relator, vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent, Commissioner of Revenue, Relator, vs. Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation, Respondent – Case Nos. A15-0422, A15-0438: Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation (“MERC”) objected to the Commissioner of Revenue’s 2008-2012 valuations of its natural gas pipeline network and related facilities. Following a trial, the tax court concluded that MERC had rebutted the prima facie validity of the commissioner’s valuations and assessments. The tax court decreased the commissioner’s assessed values for each year except 2012, for which it increased the valuation.

MERC and the commissioner each separately appealed, and the appeals have been consolidated. On appeal to the supreme court, MERC presents the following issues: (1) whether, in calculating the capitalization rate under the income approach, the tax court erred by failing, inter alia, to account for additional company-specific risk, explain its beta determination, and incorporate the build-up method in determining the cost of equity; and (2) whether, in calculating the market valuation under the cost approach, the tax court erred in failing to recognize a deduction for economic obsolescence. The commissioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the tax court erred in deducting, from the income indicator of value, arbitrary amounts the court attributed to income purportedly contributed to MERC’s income stream by unidentified intangible property and working capital, when MERC produced no objective evidence any intangible property or working capital contributed an identifiable amount to MERC’s income streams; and (2) whether the tax court erred by failing to consider a recent sale of the subject property and annual valuations of the subject property by MERC. (Minnesota Tax Court)

Nonoral: Craig Matthew Hohenwald, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-0487: Appellant Craig Hohenwald was convicted of first-degree murder for the February 2009 stabbing deaths of Larry and Lois Steenerson. The district court sentenced Hohenwald to two consecutive terms of life in prison without possibility of release. On direct appeal to the supreme court, Hohenwald argued that the indictment was invalid because it was obtained while proceedings were suspended pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01; the evidence was legally insufficient to find him guilty of premediated murder instead of heat-of-passion manslaughter; the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct; and the district court erred in admitting a witness’s out-of-court statement. The court affirmed Hohenwald’s conviction in July 2012.

In August 2014 Hohenwald filed a petition for postconviction relief in which he asserted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and newly discovered evidence. The district court denied Hohenwald’s claim of newly discovered evidence on the merits, holding that the evidence was not newly discovered and/or was unlikely to produce an acquittal or another more favorable result. It held that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was procedurally barred because Hohenwald knew or should have known about all the grounds for the claim at the time of his direct appeal.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Hohenwald’s petition for postconviction relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Hohenwald’s petition for postconviction relief based upon newly discovered evidence. In addition, the State has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal which presents the following issues: (1) whether Hohenwald’s appeal is untimely because he did not file his notice of appeal within 60 days of entry of a final order denying postconviction relief; and (2) whether Hohenwald seeks to appeal from a nonappealable order. (Kanabec County District Court)

 

Thursday, November 5, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Paul Roland Rambow, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 169389 – Case No. A14-0804: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.

Nonoral: Daniel J. Berglund, Relator, vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A15-0957: This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Minnesota Tax Court.  The Commissioner of Revenue made and filed returns on behalf of relator Daniel Berglund, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 270C.33, subd. 3 (2014), for tax years in which Berglund had not filed returns.  The commissioner then notified Berglund of the tax liability reflected in those returns.  Berglund filed an appeal with the tax court, relying on Minn. R. 8160.0620 (2013) to assert that the returns cannot be considered “filed” because they lack a manual signature.  The tax court granted the commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: did the tax court correctly determine that the commissioner-filed returns were valid. (Minnesota Tax Court)

 

 

 

Monday, November 9, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

Steven J. Jaeger, Respondent, vs. Palladium Holdings, LLC, Appellant, Franklin Financial, LLC, et al., Defendants – Case No. A14-0803: Respondent Steven Jaeger owned a townhouse in St. Louis Park, but he worked in Wisconsin. After Jaeger became delinquent on association dues, the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale. Appellant Palladium Holdings, LLC, ultimately acquired the property. In this action, Jaeger claims that the sheriff’s sale is void due to the failure to provide lawful notice of the sale under Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a) (2014), which provides that notice may be left “at the individual’s usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.” The district court found that notice of the foreclosure sale was left at Jaeger’s townhouse with Jaeger’s 25-year-old son, who was living at a separate address, and that Jaeger did not have actual notice of the sale. The district court declared the sheriff’s sale void on the ground that Jaeger’s son was not a person “then residing” at the townhouse for purposes of substitute service under Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a). The court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the served individual must live at the property for substitute service to be effective pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(a). (Hennepin County District Court)

Nonoral: Jason Lee Bolstad, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-0564: Appellant Jason Bolstad was convicted in April 2003 of first-degree murder for the shooting death of his half-brother Gary Bolstad in April 1996. The district court sentenced him to life in prison. On direct appeal to the supreme court, Bolstad argued there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, the district court abused its discretion when it refused to allow him to recall a witness, and the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct. The court affirmed Bolstad’s conviction in September 2004. Bolstad filed a petition for postconviction relief in July 2007, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence, which the district court denied following an evidentiary hearing.

Bolstad filed a second petition for postconviction relief in October 2014, in which he maintained that the district court’s supplemental jury instructions on first-degree felony murder had the effect of directing a guilty verdict. The district court denied relief without a hearing, holding that Bolstad’s petition was time-barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.03, subd. 4(a), (b) (2014); his claims were procedurally barred because they were known at the time of Bolstad’s direct appeal; and Bolstad failed to demonstrate his actual innocence.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Bolstad’s petition for a new trial based on an erroneous jury instruction; and (2) whether Bolstad should be granted a new trial in the interests of justice. (Kanabec County District Court)

 

Tuesday, November 10, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

 

Yvette Ford, Respondent, vs. Minneapolis Public Schools, Appellant – Case No. A13-1072: Respondent Yvette Ford was employed by appellant Minneapolis Public Schools (“MPS”). After MPS eliminated Ford’s position, she brought an action that included a claim for violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, alleging that MPS had retaliated against her for reporting illegal conduct. The district court granted summary judgment to MPS and dismissed the whistleblower claim as untimely under the 2-year statute of limitations “for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort resulting in personal injury,” Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) (2014). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the whistleblower claim is timely under the 6-year statute of limitations for an action “upon a liability created by statute,” Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) (2014).

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether a statutory whistleblower claim alleging retaliation for reporting illegal conduct is subject to the 2-year statute of limitations under Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) or the 6-year statute of limitations under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2). (Hennepin County District Court)

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Timothy J. Oliver, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0121393 – Case No. A15-1285: An attorney discipline case in which the issue presently before the court is whether respondent Timothy Oliver should be temporarily suspended pending final determination of the disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Rule 16, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility.

Nonoral: Harry Jerome Evans, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-0792: Appellant Harry Evans was convicted in January 2006 of first-degree murder of a peace officer for the shooting death of St. Paul Police Sergeant Gerald Vick. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release. The sentence included a requirement that Evans pay restitution in the amount $7,500.00 to the Crime Victims’ Reparations Board. On direct appeal, Evans challenged the conviction on numerous grounds, but he did not challenge the sentence. The supreme court affirmed the conviction in October 2008.

Evans filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief in August 2009 in which he asserted claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, newly discovered evidence, and recanted witness testimony. The district court denied relief and the supreme court affirmed in a decision issued in August 2015. Meanwhile, in April 2015, Evans filed a pro se petition for correction of sentence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 (2014), in which he asserted that the restitution order was unlawful. The district court treated the claim as a petition for postconviction relief and denied relief. The court held that Evans’ claim was untimely because Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2014), requires that a challenge to an order for restitution must be made within 30 days of receiving notice of the amount of restitution, or within 30 days of sentencing, whichever is later.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Evan’s restitution challenge as untimely. (Ramsey County District Court)