EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

December 2015

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Monday, November 30, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Melrose Gates, LLC, Respondent vs. Chor Moua, et al., Appellants – Case No. A14-1131: Appellant tenants leased an apartment from respondent Melrose Gates. A fire that started in appellants’ apartment damaged the apartment building in which it was located, causing significant damage to appellants’ apartment and another apartment. Respondent’s insurer, State Farm, paid for the damage to both units, and then brought a subrogation claim against appellants, seeking to recover the amounts it had expended. The district court applied the test set out in RAM Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rohde, 820 N.W.2d 1 (2012), which directs the court to consider whether based on the lease as a whole, along with any other relevant and admissible evidence, the landlord and tenant reasonably anticipated that the tenant would be liable to a subrogation claim. The district court found that Melrose Gates and appellants did not reasonably anticipate such liability and dismissed the subrogation claim. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that it was able to determine from the lease alone that the parties expected that appellants would be liable to a subrogation claim, and that the same result would be required after consideration of other relevant evidence.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the parties to this case reasonably anticipated that appellants would be liable to a subrogation claim. (Hennepin County)

Nonoral: Keith Richard Rossberg, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-1205: Appellant Keith Rossberg was convicted of first degree murder, and the supreme court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2014). In June of 2015, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming he was entitled to a new trial. The petition acknowledged it was filed without factual support. Appellant also moved to stay the petition. After assignment of the case to a district judge, appellant made a motion for the assigned judge to recuse. The court denied the motions for a stay and to recuse and dismissed the petition for postconviction relief.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether appellant’s claims for postconviction relief are barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976); (2) whether appellant’s postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was properly dismissed when appellant did not make any factual allegations to support it; (3) whether the district court judge should have recused; and (4) whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion for a stay. (Wright County)

Tuesday, December 1, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Mark R. Zweber, Appellant vs. Credit River Township, et al., Respondents – Case No. A14-0893: In September of 2012, appellant Mark Zweber sued respondents Credit River Township and Scott County, alleging that conditions imposed by respondents in 2006 on the approval of a preliminary plat application amounted to an unconstitutional taking of his property without proper compensation, in violation of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Respondents moved for summary judgment. The district court denied respondents’ motion, but the court of appeals reversed, ruling that Zweber’s claims related to quasi-judicial decision-making and should have been asserted by writ of certiorari to the court of appeals within 60 days of the challenged action, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (2014). Therefore, the court of appeals concluded, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Zweber’s claims.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues include: (1) whether respondents’ decision was a quasi-judicial one reviewable under Minnesota law only by writ of certiorari; and (2) whether federal law preempts the 60-day period in Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (2014) for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Scott County)

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Steven L. Handevidt, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 004307X – Case No. A15-0740: An attorney discipline matter that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.

Monday, December 7, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

In the Matter of the Welfare of: C.J.H., Child – Case No. A14-1810: The State filed a delinquency petition against C.J.H. The State later agreed to continue the matter for dismissal under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 14.01. As part of the continuance for dismissal, C.J.H. stipulated to facts that would be submitted to the court if he was not successful on probation. When C.J.H. violated his probation 9 months later, the juvenile court adjudicated him delinquent. The court of appeals vacated the juvenile court’s order, explaining that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over C.J.H. expired 3 months before the juvenile court issued its delinquency order because C.J.H.’s stipulation transformed the continuance for dismissal into a continuance without adjudication under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether C.J.H.’s stipulation to the existence of facts that established the elements of the charged offense transformed the continuance for dismissal into a continuance without adjudication. (Itasca County)

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Jeffrey H. Olson, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 82004 – Case No. A15-0223: An attorney discipline matter that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.

Tuesday, December 8, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Patrick M. Figgins, Appellant vs. Noah Wilcox, et al., Respondents – Case No. A14-1358: In a dispute arising from a lender-borrower relationship, appellant Patrick Figgins initiated an action against respondents Grand Rapids State Bank and chief executive officer Noah Wilcox. The complaint alleged that Wilcox orally informed Figgins that he did not need to make a scheduled balloon payment on one of his loans while the parties were negotiating a refinance of the loan, that Figgins relied on this statement and did not make the balloon payment, and that Figgins’ application for a loan from a different bank was subsequently denied because of Wilcox’s false statement to the other bank that Figgins had a poor payment history and was seriously delinquent on his loans. As a result of these actions, Figgins asserted that he was forced to refinance with Grand Rapids State Bank at above-market interest rates.

The district court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that Wilcox’s oral statement that Figgins would not have to make the scheduled balloon payment “constitutes an unwritten credit agreement on which any action by a debtor is barred” by the statute of frauds in Minn. Stat. § 513.33 (2014). The court of appeals also rejected Figgins’ argument that his promissory estoppel claim stands outside the statute of frauds in section 513.33.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Figgins sued to enforce a “credit agreement” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 513.33, subd. 1(1); and (2) whether a claim of promissory estoppel and other claims are barred by Minn. Stat. § 513.33. (Itasca County)

Michael Harlow, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota Department of Human Services, et al., Respondents – Cases Nos. A14-1342, A14-1343: Appellant Michael Harlow is a former employee of the Minnesota Security Hospital in St. Peter where he worked as a psychiatrist. In November of 2011 he was involved in an incident with a patient who was acting violently. Respondent Department of Human Services, which operates the Security Hospital, conducted an employment investigation, which concluded in December of 2011. Shortly thereafter, appellant’s employment was terminated. Meanwhile DHS’s Division of Licensing conducted a separate investigation, which did not conclude until the end of May 2012. In the interim, individual respondents made statements to the press and by e-mail to DHS employees about the November incident and appellant’s role in it. Appellant sued, claiming respondents’ statements both (1) communicated private data in violation of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA) and (2) were defamatory.

Respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) their statements were based only on information included in the employment investigation, which became public when the report was released, not the ongoing, private licensing investigation, and (2) they were entitled to absolute or in the alternative, qualified privilege for their statements. The district court denied the motion, finding that issues of material fact prevented summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. It ruled that there were no genuine issues of material fact that respondents’ comments were based only on public data from the employment investigation, which did not lose its public character even if the same information was also classified as private in the context of the licensing investigation. And it ruled that the individual respondents were sufficiently high-ranking officials to qualify for absolute privilege, that their statements were made in the scope of their job duties, and that their statements touched on a matter of public concern.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are whether issues of material fact exist as to (1) the MGDPA claim, and (2) individual respondents’ absolute immunity. (Ramsey County)

Wednesday, December 9, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Curtis G. and Stacy S. Marks, Respondents vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Relator – Case No. A15-1145: Minnesota law provides that a “resident” is “any individual domiciled in Minnesota” and that resident “also means any individual domiciled outside the state who maintains a place of abode in the state and spends in the aggregate more than one-half of the tax year in Minnesota.” Minn. Stat. § 290.01, subd. 7(a), (b) (2014). Respondents Curtis and Stacy Marks moved from Minnesota to Florida in 1999, but continued to maintain a home in Minnesota and spend significant time in Minnesota. Respondents re-established domicile in Minnesota on August 1, 2007, and they were physically present in Minnesota for the remaining 153 days of 2007. Prior to August 1, respondents were physically present in Minnesota for 104 days in 2007, for a total of 257 days. When respondents filed their 2007 tax return, they claimed they were part-year Minnesota residents. The Commissioner of Revenue audited respondents’ return and determined they were full-year Minnesota residents in 2007, assessing them back taxes, interest, and penalties.

Respondents filed an administrative appeal, and the Commissioner upheld the assessment. Respondents then appealed to the Tax Court, which ruled that respondents were not full-year residents in 2007 because they were not domiciled in the state for the entire year, and during the time they were not domiciled in the state, they did not spend 183 days or more in the state. The Tax Court ruled that to the extent Minn. R. 8001.0300, subp. 8 provided otherwise, it was contrary to Minn. Stat. § 290.01, subd. 7.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether respondents were full-year residents of Minnesota in 2007. (Minnesota Tax Court)

Nonoral: Robert Marlyn Taylor, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-0398: Appellant Robert Taylor’s first trial ended in a hung jury, and he was tried a second time and found guilty of premeditated first-degree murder in January of 2001. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison. The supreme court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190 (Minn. 2002). Appellant filed a first petition for postconviction relief in 2003; that petition was denied, and the supreme court affirmed. Taylor v. State, 691 N.W.2d 78 (Minn. 2005). In 2004, the supreme court removed and retired the judge who presided over appellant’s second trial. Appellant filed his second petition for postconviction relief in October of 2014, arguing he was entitled to a new trial based on the removal and retirement of the judge who presided over his second trial and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether appellant’s claims for postconviction relief are barred by Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2014); and (2) whether appellant’s claims for postconviction relief are barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976). (Hennepin County)

Thursday, December 10, 2015

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Jimmy Dawayne Lester, Respondent – Case No. A14-0431: On October 26, 2011, a Minneapolis police officer received a call from a confidential reliable informant (CRI), who stated that a man, nicknamed “J.,” would be delivering heroin in approximately 10 minutes to a specific location in Minneapolis. Within minutes of receiving the tip, the police went to that location and saw a parked car with a passenger who matched J.’s description. The police drove the CRI past this car, and he confirmed the passenger was J. Respondent Jimmy Lester was the driver of this car. Lester drove to a nearby gas station, and he and J. went inside. When the men emerged from the gas station, J., while talking on his cell phone, crossed the street and walked around a parking lot. A car pulled into that parking lot, and J. got in and drove away. Meanwhile, Lester parked his car in a location of the gas station parking lot where he could see J. and remained in the car. The police then arrested Lester and during a search of his car, found heroin hidden behind a panel in the car’s center console.

Appellant State of Minnesota charged Lester with second- and third-degree controlled-substance crime. Lester filed a motion to suppress the drugs found in the car. At a contested omnibus hearing, the Minneapolis police officer testified that based on his training, experience, and observations of J. and Lester, he believed that both J. and Lester and were involved in drug dealing. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding there was probable cause to believe Lester was assisting J. in a heroin sale and to search his car under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Lester was later convicted of third-degree controlled-substance crime.

The court of appeals reversed Lester’s conviction. It concluded that the police did not have probable cause to arrest Lester and that it was not reasonable to believe evidence of drug dealing would be found in Lester’s car.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the warrantless search of Lester’s car was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement because, based on the totality of circumstances, there was probable cause to believe that Lester’s car contained evidence of drug dealing. (Hennepin County).

Nonoral: Toby Earl Johnson, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A15-0698: Appellant Toby Johnson pleaded guilty to both aiding and abetting premeditated intentional murder, and to second-degree intentional murder, under a plea agreement that provided he would only be convicted on one count or the other. The district court convicted him of aiding and abetting premeditated intentional murder and sentenced him to a mandatory life sentence. Johnson petitioned for postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that the plea agreement violated the separation of powers. The postconviction court denied the petition, and the supreme court affirmed. Johnson v. State, 641 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. 2002). In April 2010, Johnson filed a motion to correct or reduce his sentence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. The district court granted Johnson’s motion in part, but treated the remainder of it as a petition for postconviction relief and denied it as untimely and barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976). The supreme court affirmed. Johnson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. 2011).

In February of 2015, Johnson filed a second motion to correct or reduce his sentence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, arguing that his sentence was contrary to law because its length violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court treated the motion as a petition for postconviction relief and denied it as untimely and Knaffla-barred.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Johnson’s motion was properly brought under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9; and (2) whether Johnson’s motion escapes the Knaffla bar because it is a novel claim. (McLeod County)