EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

October 2014

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Monday, September 29, 2014

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Joseph Haywood Campbell, Appellant – Case No. A13-1713: A grand jury indicted appellant Joseph Campbell with first-degree premeditated murder for the benefit of a gang. Campbell pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. At trial, the court admitted a taped statement made to police by an eyewitness who testified at trial. The trial court also admitted evidence that Campbell previously shot a gun in the same neighborhood as the murder. The jury found Campbell guilty of first-degree premeditated murder for the benefit of a gang and the court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of release.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether the trial court erred when it admitted the eyewitness’ taped statement, and (2) whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence that Campbell previously shot a gun in the same neighborhood as the murder. (Hennepin County).

Dennis E. Kinworthy, Appellant vs. Soo Line Railroad Company d/b/a CP Rail System, Respondent – Case No. A13-0915: Appellant Dennis Kinworthy brought an action against respondent Soo Line Railroad Company in Hennepin County District Court, seeking recovery under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006). On September 28, 2012, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Kinworthy. After judgment was entered on December 27, 2012, Kinworthy moved to amend the judgment under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1 (2012), to include interest from the date the verdict was returned until the date judgment was entered. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a FELA litigant is “not entitled to recover postverdict, prejudgment interest” as a matter of federal substantive law.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Kinworthy has a state statutory right to receive interest on the money judgment from the date the verdict was returned until the date judgment was entered. (Hennepin County).

Tuesday, September 30, 2014

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Yer Sumner, Respondent vs. Jim Lupient Infiniti and SFM Risk Solutions, Respondents, and North Memorial Health Care and Mercy Hospital, intervenors/cross-appellants, Realtors, and Minnesota Department of Labor & Industry/VRU, Medical Advanced Pain Specialists, McMarron Lake Chiropractic. M.A.I. Spine Center, HealthEast Physician Services, Fairview Health Services, CIGNA Healthcare, and Rehab Results, Intervenors – Case No. A14-0726: Employee Yer Sumner suffered an injury while at work. In 2013, she filed a claim petition for temporary total disability benefits and payment of medical expenses. Eleven intervenors–Sumner’s medical payers and providers—filed motions to intervene, attaching to their motions documentation of their intervention interest. The employer objected to all but two of the intervention interests, asserting that the treatment charges were unreasonable, unnecessary, and not causally related to Sumner’s claimed injury. A workers compensation hearing was held in September 2013; none of the intervenors attended, though all received notice of it. The compensation judge denied all of the intervenors’ reimbursement claims due to their failure to attend the hearing.

The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed in part and reversed in part. The WCCA concluded that the un-objected to claims of two intervenors should have been allowed, notwithstanding their absence from the hearing.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the WCCA erred when it affirmed the compensation judge’s order denying the remaining intervenors their claims for reimbursement due to nonattendance at the worker’s compensation hearing. (Workers Compensation Court of Appeals).

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Dakari Michael Coles, Petitioner – Case No. A13-0789: In 2003, respondent State of Minnesota filed a delinquency petition against appellant Dakari Coles. The parties entered into a plea agreement in which Coles agreed to plead guilty to first-degree aggravated robbery and an amended charge of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, and the State agreed to dismiss a charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The parties further agreed that Coles would be designated an extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) and would receive a stayed adult sentence of 96 months, which was based on 48-month consecutive sentences for each offense. The agreed-to sentence was an upward durational departure. The juvenile court accepted Coles’ guilty plea, designated him an EJJ, and imposed the agreed-to adult sentence. In 2005, Coles’ EJJ status was revoked and his 96–month sentence was executed.

In 2012, Coles filed a petition for postconviction relief and a motion pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, in which he argued his sentence should be reduced because no valid aggravating factors supported the upward departure. The district court denied Coles’ request for relief, concluding Coles’ petition directly challenged his 2003 plea, and therefore, it was subject to the 2-year statute of limitations for postconviction petitions. The court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the time bars in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2012), apply to a motion to correct a sentence in which an offender attempts to challenge an upward sentencing departure that was imposed pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement. (Hennepin County).

Wednesday, October 1, 2014

Worthington High School

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Roger Benedict Schmid, Appellant – Case No. A13-0337: Appellant Roger Schmid was convicted of violating Minn. Stat. § 97B.301, subd. 1 (2012), which provides that “[a] person may not take a deer without a license.” The court of appeals affirmed Schmid’s conviction, concluding there was sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a person must acquire possession or control over a deer in order to “take a deer,” in violation of Minn. Stat. § 97B.301, subd. 1. (Stearns County).

Thursday, October 2, 2014

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Patrick William Benton, Appellant – Case No. A13-1605: A grand jury indicted appellant Patrick Benton with first-degree domestic abuse murder. Benton pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. On two occasions during the trial, the court granted defense counsel’s request to close the courtroom. The trial court also admitted evidence that Benton had previously assaulted his sister and ex-girlfriend. The jury found Benton guilty of first-degree domestic abuse murder and the court imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of release.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether the trial court erred when it closed the courtroom, and (2) whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence that Benton had previously assaulted his sister and ex-girlfriend. (Anoka County).

Nonoral: Deaunteze Lavion Bobo, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A14-0117: In 2007, appellant Deaunteze Bobo was convicted of first-degree murder while committing a drive-by-shooting. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Bobo subsequently filed several requests for postconviction relief. In August 2012, the supreme court reversed the district court’s summary denial of Bobo’s third petition for postconviction relief and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Bobo’s third postconviction petition.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether the district court applied the wrong standard of proof when analyzing Bobo’s newly discovered evidence claim, (2) whether the district court properly excluded Bobo’s alternative perpetrator evidence, and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Bobo’s request for postconviction relief. (Hennepin County).

Monday, October 6, 2014

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Thomas James Fox, Appellant – Case No. A13-1624: A grand jury indicted appellant Thomas Fox with first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree intentional murder while committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery. Fox moved to suppress his statements to police asserting a Miranda violation. The district court denied the motion to suppress and scheduled a jury trial. At trial, Fox requested a circumstantial-evidence instruction that informed the jurors that the circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. The district court denied the request and instead used the pattern jury instruction on circumstantial evidence. The jury found Fox guilty as charged.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether Fox validly waived his Miranda rights, (2) whether the trial court erred when instructing the jury on circumstantial evidence, and (3) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Fox’s convictions. (Washington County).

Chad Nelson, Respondent Below vs. Troy Schlener, Realtor, Carla Brown, et al., Respondents Below, Minnesota Department of Human Services, Appellant – Case No. A13-0936: Appellant Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) employed respondent Troy Schlener in its Licensing Division. After he was sued by Chad Nelson for violations of data privacy laws and other claims, Schlener requested defense and indemnification by DHS. DHS denied the request for defense and indemnification after concluding that the actions of Schlener that were at issue in Nelson’s suit were outside the scope of Schlener’s employment. Schlener sought review of DHS’s decision, by certiorari, in the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed DHS’s decision and remanded to the agency with directions to grant Schlener’s request for defense and indemnification.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether the Minnesota Tort Claims Act, Minn. Stat. § 3.736 (2012), permits review by certiorari of DHS’s decision on defense and indemnification; (2) whether, if the court of appeals properly exercised jurisdiction by certiorari review, it nonetheless erred in ordering DHS to defend and indemnify Schlener; and (3) whether a remand for reconsideration was the appropriate remedy. (Department of Human Services).

Tuesday, October 7, 2014

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Ge Her, Appellant – Case No. A13-1586: In 2008, a jury found appellant Ge Her guilty of failing to register as a predatory offender. A district court is required to impose a 10-year period of conditional release on a person convicted of failing to register as a predatory offender if that person was assigned a predatory offender risk level III at the time of the violation. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a (2012). The district court sentenced Her to 16 months in prison and to 10 years of conditional release.

In 2013, Her filed a motion to correct his sentence, asking the district court to vacate his conditional-release term because a jury had not found that he was a risk level III predatory offender at the time he failed to register. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was assigned a risk level III at the time he or she failed to register as a predatory offender in order for the district court to include a 10-year period of conditional release as part of his or her sentence. (Redwood County).

Nonoral: In Re: Guardianship and Conservatorship of Helen Louise Durand, Ward/Protected Person – Case No. A13-1415: Appellant Alternate Decision Makers, Inc., the court-appointed guardian and conservator for Helen Durand, sought to file on Durand’s behalf for an elective share of the estate of her late husband. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 542.2-212 (2012), a person under conservatorship may only exercise her right of election by court order after the court makes certain findings. The case was scheduled for an evidentiary hearing to address whether the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 542.2-212 were met, but the district court held that the statute was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Minnesota Constitution because it unreasonably treated spouses acting through conservators differently from spouses acting on their own behalf. The court of appeals reversed, finding that spouses acting through conservators are not similarly situated to spouses acting on their own.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Minn. Stat. § 542.2-212 violates the Equal Protection Clause. (Hennepin County).

Wednesday, October 8, 2014

William Mitchell College of Law

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Brandon Wayne Riggs, Appellant – Case No. A13-1189: The State charged appellant Brandon Riggs with second-degree assault. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Riggs pleaded guilty to an amended charge of terroristic threats. As part of his factual basis, Riggs admitted that he stabbed the victim, that the stabbing caused terror, and that he was “waiving [his] right to self-defense.” At a subsequent restitution hearing, Riggs argued the court should reduce the victim’s losses because the victim was the initial aggressor. The State objected arguing the court could only consider the set of factors listed in the restitution statute, which does not include victim aggression. The court reduced the victim’s documented expenses based on the victim’s role as the aggressor. The court of appeals reversed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the restitution statute sets forth an exclusive list of factors to be considered when ordering restitution. (Winona County).