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October 18, 2001

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
Mr. Frederick K. Grittner  
Clerk of Appellate Courts  
305 Minnesota Judicial Center  
25 Constitution Avenue  
St. Paul, MN 55155-6102

Re: Susan B. Zachman, et al. v. Mary Kiffmeyer, et al.  
Minn. Special Redistricting Panel, No. C0-01-160  
Our File No. 6088.01

Dear Mr. Grittner:

Pursuant to the Special Redistricting Panel's Order of October 29, 2001, enclosed for filing is the Original and (9) nine copies of the Zachman Plaintiffs' Statement of Unresolved Issues Regarding Criteria.

Very truly yours,



Timothy D. Kelly

TDK:dme

Enclosures

cc: All Counsel of Record (*via facsimile and U.S. Mail*)  
Elizabeth M Brama (*via facsimile*)

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**FILED**

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STATE OF MINNESOTA  
SPECIAL REDISTRICTING PANEL

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C0-01-160

Susan M. Zachman, Maryland Lucky R.  
Rosenbloom, Victor L.M. Gomez, Gregory G.  
Edeen, Jeffrey E. Karlson, Diana V. Bratlie, Brian  
J. LeClair and Gregory J. Ravenhorst, individually  
and on behalf of all citizens and voting residents of  
Minnesota similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

and

Patricia Cotlow, Thomas L. Weisbecker, Theresa  
Silka, Geri Boice, William English, Benjamin  
Gross, Thomas R. Dietz and John Raplinger,  
individually and on behalf of all citizens and voting  
residents of Minnesota similarly situated,

Applicants for Intervention,

and

Jesse Ventura,

Applicant for Intervention,

and

Roger D. Moe, Thomas W. Pugh, Betty  
McCollum, Martin Olav Sabo, Bill Luther, Collin  
C. Peterson and James L. Oberstar,

Applicants for Intervention,

vs.

Mary Kiffmeyer, Secretary of State of Minnesota,  
and Doug Gruber, Wright County Auditor,  
individually and on behalf of all Minnesota county  
chief election officers,

Defendants.

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**ZACHMAN PLAINTIFFS'  
STATEMENT OF  
UNRESOLVED ISSUES  
REGARDING CRITERIA**

**I. THE ZACHMAN PLAINTIFFS URGE THIS PANEL TO ADOPT A POPULATION DEVIATION OF PLUS OR MINUS 0.75% FOR LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS.**

The Zachman plaintiffs urge adoption of the following language relative to legislative district deviation<sup>1</sup>:

Legislative districts must be substantially equal in population. The population of a legislative district must not deviate from the ideal by more than point seventy-five percent (0.75%), plus or minus.

This contention is based on the following three points:

(i) court precedent requires a lower population deviation when a judicial body draws a redistricting map in the first instance than when a legislature draws a map;

(ii) modern technology makes it easier to draw maps with a lower deviation while preserving political subdivisions, which point was empirically demonstrated during the 2001 Minnesota Legislative session; and

(iii) Minnesota's State Constitution requires a lower population deviation than permitted by U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution.

**A. Court precedent requires a lower population deviation when a judicial body draws a redistricting map.**

We urge this Panel to adopt a comparatively low deviation to promote the U.S. and Minnesota constitutional requirements that legislative districts be equal in population. Other parties to this action have proposed a deviation of two percent (2%), plus or minus, arguing that 2% was the standard adopted in prior redistricting cycles and was also passed by the Minnesota Senate during the 2001 legislative session.

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<sup>1</sup>"Deviation" means the total of the percentage the largest and smallest districts deviate from the "ideal" population. Therefore, if the largest district is one-half percent (0.5%) larger than the ideal population size and the smallest district is one-half percent (0.5%) smaller than the ideal population size, the overall deviation is one percent (1.0%).

Federal caselaw indicates that plans drafted by a judicial body must be closer to strict equality in population than plans drafted a legislature. *See Chapman v. Meier*, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); *Abrams v. Johnson*, 521 U.S. 74 (1977). As the *Emison* court stated,

The Supreme Court has observed that any court-ordered reapportionment plan will be held to stricter standards and must strive to achieve ‘the goal of population equality with little more than *de minimis* variation. . . A court-ordered plan. . . must be held to higher standards than a State’s own plan. With a court plan, any deviation from approximate population equality must be supported by enunciation of historically significant state policy or unique features (citations omitted).

*Emison v. Growe*, 782 F.Supp. 428 (D.Minn. 1992). Therefore, while a two percent (2%) deviation may be an appropriate criterion for a plan drafted by the Legislature, this Panel should keep in mind that a plan drafted by a judicial body should be closer to strict equality in population.

If the Court was to adopt a 2% deviation it would be required to enunciate “historically significant state policy or unique features” to justify the ruling, an unusual and perhaps challenging step. In our view, adoption of the 2% criterion also makes it less likely the Legislature will adopt its own plan before the Court rules, i.e., why bother to fight a political battle if the Court will ultimately adopt a plan using the same general deviation used by the Legislative plans introduced in 2001.

While the deviation proposed during the last three (3) redistricting cycles has been two percent (2%), plus or minus, we urge this Panel not to rely on this experience because: (1) the 1991 Cotlow case involved a plan drafted by the Legislature; and (2) as shown in Section B, *infra*, current technology enables drafting of plans with a lower deviation that still preserve “traditional redistricting criteria.” A population deviation of 0.75%, plus or minus, should be adopted.

**B. Modern technology enables drawing of redistricting maps with lower deviation while preserving political subdivisions.**

One rationale for permitting higher population deviation among legislative districts in previous federal court cases is due to a desire to promote the (non-constitutional) traditional redistricting criteria of preservation of political subdivision lines (*i.e.*, cities and counties) and identifiable communities of interest. *See, e.g. Brown v. Thompson*, 1462 U.S. 835 (1983) (“we recognize that some deviations from population equality may be necessary to permit states to pursue other legitimate objectives such as ‘maintaining the integrity of various political subdivisions.’”)

Today’s sophisticated computer technology enables a plan drafter to preserve “traditional redistricting criteria” at a lower deviation. In his testimony before the Minnesota Legislature, Minnesota State Demographer Tom Gillaspay stated that in recent years the “census geography” of the entire state has become uniform, versus the system in the 1980s where the metropolitan areas had one geography and the non-metropolitan areas had another. Now the State Demographic has block level information in the non-metropolitan areas as well as the metropolitan areas. *See* Affidavit of Timothy D. Kelly, Exhibit A. (“Kelly Affid.”)

Additionally, an article entitled “Drawing Better Boundaries” in the September, 2001 issue of *Government Technology* magazine, pp. 68-69, reported:

[Peter Wattson, chief counsel of the Minnesota Senate], said the software does make a difference. ‘*The technology made it easier to get districts of equal population. It’s made it possible to reduce population deviations.*’ (emphasis added.)

A copy of the article is attached to the Timothy D. Kelly Affid. as Exhibit B.

Actual redistricting experience this year also shows that lower population deviations can be attained in Minnesota while still preserving political subdivisions. During the 2001 legislative session, the plan passed by the Minnesota House had a lower deviation than the plan passed by the

Minnesota Senate, yet the Minnesota House plan split fewer cities and counties. A comparison of the plans is as follows:

<u>Plan</u>	<u>Population Deviation</u>	<u>Splits</u>
Plan L0002-0 (House) Author: Sen. Belanger	Deviation: 1.45% overall (0.74 to - 0.71)	60 counties 44 cities
Plan L0001-3 (House) Author: Sen. Pogemiller	Deviation: 3.52% overall (1.86 to - 1.67)	64 counties 84 cities
Plan S0002-0 (Senate) Author: Sen. Belanger	Deviation: 1.23% overall (0.64 to - 0.60)	52 counties 31 cities
Plan S0001-3 (Senate) Author: Sen. Pogemiller	Deviation: 2.49% overall (1.37 to - 1.12)	49 counties 51 cities

See Kelly Affid., Exhibit C.

Additionally, during the 1991 redistricting cycle, the federal court in *Emison v. Growe* drafted a legislative plan with a lower deviation than the plans proposed by the parties (including the plan passed by the Minnesota Legislature), yet the federal court's plan preserved traditional redistricting criteria better than the other plans. As the court concluded:

The court's plan is more compact, splits fewer cities and townships, better protects minority voting rights and *still contains substantially lower population deviation* (emphasis added).

*Emison v. Growe*, 782 F.Supp 427, 443, 444 (D.Minn 1992)<sup>2</sup>.

Based on the foregoing, arguments in favor of a lower deviation that express a desire to preserve cities, counties and communities of interest (or other "traditional redistricting criteria") should be rejected by this Panel. That is really another way of saying "ignore the demographic shifts" of recent years. Plaintiffs urge this Panel to adopt a population deviation of 0.75%, plus or

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<sup>2</sup>The *Emison* court plan had an overall deviation for senate districts of -0.74% to 0.58%, a range of 769 persons or 1.20%. The average senate deviation was 0.15% per district. See 782 F.Supp. at 444.

minus, to protect the rights of voters in currently overpopulated legislative districts throughout the state from vote dilution.

**C. Minnesota's State Constitution requires lower population deviations than U.S. Supreme Court precedent applying the U.S. Constitution.**

Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides:

The House of Representatives. . . shall be apportioned among the several States. .  
. . according to their respective Numbers. . . .

Article IV, Section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution provides:

The number of members who compose the senate and house of representatives shall be prescribed by law. The representation in both houses shall be apportioned equally throughout the different sections of the state in proportion to the population thereof (emphasis added).

Since *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the standard for determining constitutional population size for congressional districts is strict equality. In interpreting the “one person, one vote” doctrine and the provisions of Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution (set forth above), the U.S. Supreme Court stated in *Wesberry* that congressional districts must be “as nearly equal in population as practicable.” *Id.* at 8. “Practicable” means districts that are physically possible; thus, congressional districts must be of exactly equal size if that is physically possible.<sup>3</sup>

As to state legislative districts, while the federal courts applying the Equal Protection clause have consistently permitted greater population deviation than that permitted for congressional districts, *See Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964), these courts have held that a legislative district plan will *prima facie* violate the 14th Amendment if the deviation from the “ideal” population size exceeds ten percent (10%). *See Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735, (1973); *Chapman v. Meier*; *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); *Voinovich v. Quilter*, 507 U.S. 146

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<sup>3</sup>This standard has been universally recognized by all parties in this litigation by the Stipulation signed October 17, 2001 by all parties' counsel.

(1993). The chief rationale for permitting greater deviation is the lack of a specific federal constitutional provision governing legislative districts like Article I, Section 2 governing congressional plans. Therefore, under the U.S. Constitution, legislative district plans are scrutinized under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

Because *Sims* and its progeny rely on an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution extrapolated from the Equal Protection Claim and not from a specific State provision relating to legislative district equality, we respectfully submit that these authorities need not be read strictly in this case.<sup>4</sup>

The Minnesota Constitution specifically addresses legislative redistricting plans. As cited above, Article IV, Section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution explicitly states that, “[t]he representation in both houses shall be apportioned equally [emphasis added].” By essentially using the words “shall be equal,” the Minnesota Constitution appears to require greater population equality than Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which only uses the words “among the States according to their respective numbers.”

Plaintiffs submit that this is a question of first impression before this Panel; no federal or Minnesota redistricting panel or court has considered or interpreted the Minnesota Constitution provision requiring “equal” districts<sup>5</sup>, although Article IV, Section 2 was cited in *Cotlow* in a string citation along with *Wesberry v. Sanders*. Therefore, the question of whether the Minnesota

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<sup>4</sup>Obviously, Plaintiffs do not contend that the Minnesota Constitution applies to congressional plans; only legislative plans.

<sup>5</sup>The 1991 Federal District Court in *Emison v. Growe* cited the Minnesota Constitution in adopting legislative districts with deviation *less than* the 2% deviation proposed by the Minnesota Legislature, 782 F.Supp. at 443. However, the decision relied on U.S. Supreme Court cases applying the Equal Protection clause and did not expressly interpret or otherwise discuss the Minnesota Constitution provisions.



Constitution requires the Legislature to approach stricter equality than that required under federal Equal Protection analysis is still an open question.

The Zachman Plaintiffs could find no U.S. Supreme Court decision evaluating state constitutional provisions related to legislative district population deviations that considered state constitutional language comparable to the Minnesota Constitution. Many state constitutions require that towns or counties not be divided; others only require legislative districts to be “substantially equal” in population<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, Minnesota’s Constitution appears unique in its requirement that the houses “shall be apportioned equally.” This unique, specific language is a compelling reason to adopt a deviation as low as possible that will still enable political subdivisions and communities of interest to remain intact.

As a final note, *Reynolds v. Sims* and its progeny were decided long before the above-described computer technology existed to easily draw strictly equal legislative districts. This technology calls into question the continuing validity of judicial references in those decisions regarding the difficulty of drawing mathematically equal legislative districts. As such, a practical

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<sup>6</sup>The Supreme Court cases cited above permitting legislative district population deviation at 10% and below and the relevant state constitutional provisions at issue in those cases are set forth below:

<u>CASE</u>	<u>STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION</u>
<i>Reynolds v. Sims</i> (1964)	– “apportionment districts according to their numbers”
<i>Gaffney v. Cummings</i> (1973)	– “apportionment shall be consistent with federal standards”
<i>Brown v. Thomson</i> , 462 U.S. 835 (1983)	– “apportionment as nearly as may be according to the number of inhabitants, except each county shall have at least one representative
<i>Voinovich v. Quilter</i> (1993)	– “apportionment shall be substantially equal in ratio to population with up to 95% deviation among districts”

reason for rejecting strict equality no longer exists, and court references to such argument are no longer persuasive.

## II. PLAINTIFFS URGE THIS PANEL TO REJECT “POLITICAL COMPETITIVENESS” AS A REDISTRICTING CRITERIA.

Certain Plaintiffs urge adoption of the following criterion

Political Competitiveness. Previous or projected electorate voting behavior by party shall not be used in the development or evaluation of any apportionment plan.

We agree, as do all parties to this litigation, that constitutional questions of population deviation are not the only valid redistricting criteria. The courts have repeatedly permitted non-constitutional criteria known as “traditional redistricting principles.” However, “political competitiveness” has never been recognized by the courts as a “traditional redistricting principle,” and Plaintiffs believe that political considerations should have no part of this Panel’s decision, which should be based on the facts and the law.

Federal and state courts have routinely held that political considerations such as “political competitiveness” and “political fairness” are improper considerations for redistricting plans drawn by the courts, even though such considerations may be proper (although not required) in the legislative realm<sup>7</sup>. In *Fletcher v. Golder*, 959 F.2d 106 (8th. Cir. 1992), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the district court to exclude all evidence of political considerations when drawing redistricting plans. The *Fletcher* court quoted the district court as follows:

**While legislatures may legitimately compromise on partisan considerations, *a court, where no legislative body has adopted a plan, should base its decision on the Constitution and the laws rather than become embroiled in partisan political***

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<sup>7</sup>In *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 93 S.Ct. 2321 (1973) and *Davis v. Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court held otherwise constitutional redistricting plans were not otherwise invalid because their purpose was political in nature. However, neither of these cases involved plans drawn by the judiciary.

**questions.** Therefore, this court declined to consider evidence concerning political competitiveness and evidence concerning the protection of incumbents (emphasis added).

959 F.2d at 108; see also *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973)(while legislature is best situated to identify and reconcile traditional state policies, “courts . . . possess no distinctive mandate to compromise sometimes conflicting state apportionment policies in the people’s name”); *Connor v. Finch*, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1834-1835 (“legislature is by far institution best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies” and “courts possess no distinctive mandate to compromise sometimes conflicting state apportionment policies in the people’s name”); *Skolnick v. State Electoral Bd. of Ill.*, 336 F.Supp. 839, 844 (“Given the vagaries of electoral politics, and given the imperfect data available for predicting the outcome of elections, it would be unwise for the court to establish as a criterion. . . establishment of politically-balanced districts.”).

The last three times the Minnesota courts have considered redistricting, either by drafting a redistricting plan or analyzing a legislatively-enacted plan, the panels refused to include political considerations as a criterion. In 1972, the court specifically decided that no consideration was to be given to “the voting pattern of electors.” *Beens v. Erdahl*, 336 F.Supp. 715, 719 (D.Minn. 1972). Similarly, ten years later, the three-judge panel again refused to permit political considerations to guide the plan drawn up by a Special Master appointed by the panel:

In consideration of the adoption of criteria, some of the parties suggested that a final test be given to any plan proposed to make certain that it be ‘politically fair. . .’ However, here again this court in its criteria order of December 29, 1981 **consciously chose not to adopt such a standard in this case** (emphasis added).

*LaComb v. Growe*, 541 F.Supp. 160, 168 (D.Minn. 1982)(concurring opinion). Finally, the *Emison v. Growe* panel ordered in its criteria determination that “previous electorate voting behavior. . . shall not be used in the development of any apportionment plan.” *Emison v. Growe*, No. 4-91-202, Order dated October 21, 1991, pp 4-5 (D.Minn. 1991).

In practical terms, the major problem with a criteria of “political competitiveness” is the lack of an objective standard by which to measure such competitiveness. It is so broad as to encompass any notion that suits any party’s current interest. To date, no party to this litigation has proposed a standard or test to be used to judge political competitiveness, and, if asked, each party to this litigation could very well offer its own test of competitiveness<sup>8</sup>.

Moreover, relying on past voting behavior from one or two isolated races in a district is unreliable, because different factors affect each race: whether or not an incumbent is running; whether a candidate is unopposed; whether voter turnout/interest is high or low, etc. Additionally, demographic changes that occur over a ten (10)-year period make predicting whether a district will be “competitive” in the year 2008 nearly impossible. These factors make measuring “competitiveness” as an objective standard nearly impossible even if everyone agreed what the phrase means.

As such, political competitiveness is an extremely unreliable barometer to be used by this Panel, given the judiciary’s duty to render decisions based on the intersection of objective facts and law. This Panel should not act as a crystal ball to attempt to divine the will of the voters in each legislative district over the next 10 years; rather, the Panel should adopt criteria that are constitutionally and legally sound and reliable.

Without an objective, reliable standard for this Panel to follow, the value of political competitiveness becomes a guessing game about votes to be taken over the next decade. The very vagueness of the criterion distracts the Panel from the approved legal criteria which seek to

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<sup>8</sup>For example, should the presidential or U.S. Senate votes in 2000 be used? Or the vote for governor in 1998? These questions make defining political competitiveness difficult if not impossible.


implement "one-man, one-vote." Plaintiffs urge this Panel to follow the precedent of *Fletcher*, et al. cited above and reject political competitiveness as a criteria.

**CONCLUSION**

Plaintiffs urge this Panel to adopt a deviation of 0.75%, plus or minus. Article 4, Section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution is clear (even more clear than Article 1, Section 2 of the United States Constitution): legislative districts "shall be apportioned equally." Minnesota's unique constitutional provision, along with existing technological advances, provide persuasive reasons why even a 2% deviation is undesirable and subject to legal challenge. True equality should mean what it says, to the best extent of the currently available technology. Mathematically equal legislative district populations (a feat easily achievable given today's technology) comply with the Minnesota Constitution and provide the fairest possible representation for Minnesota's voters.

Dated: November 13, 2001

**KELLY & BERENS, P.A.**

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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***Attorney for Plaintiffs***

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STATE OF MINNESOTA  
SPECIAL REDISTRICTING PANEL

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C0-01-160

Susan M. Zachman, Maryland Lucky R.  
Rosenbloom, Victor L.M. Gomez, Gregory  
G. Edeen, Jeffrey E. Karlson, Diana V.  
Bratlie, Brian J. LeClair and Gregory J.  
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Applicants for  
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vs.

Mary Kiffmeyer, Secretary of State of  
Minnesota, and Doug Gruber, Wright  
County Auditor, individually and on behalf  
of all Minnesota county chief election  
officers,

Defendants.

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***AFFIDAVIT OF  
TIMOTHY D. KELLY***

STATE OF MINNESOTA )  
                                  ) ss.  
COUNTY OF HENNEPIN )

TIMOTHY D. KELLY, first being duly sworn and upon oath, deposes and states as follows:

1. I am an attorney representing Plaintiffs Susan M. Zachman, Maryland Lucky R. Rosenbloom, Victor L.M. Gomez, Gregory G. Edeen, Jeffrey E. Karlson, Diana V. Bratlie, Brian J. LeClair and Gregory J. Ravenhorst in this matter.

2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the testimony of Minnesota State Demographer Tom Gillaspay before the Minnesota House of Representatives Redistricting Committee on 2/10, 2001.

3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of an article entitled "Drawing Better Boundaries."


4. Attached here and made a part of as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of a Summary Report from the Minnesota Geographic Information Systems Office showing the deviation and political subdivision splits from the legislative plans passed by the Minnesota House and Senate.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

Timothy D. Kelly  
TIMOTHY D. KELLY

Subscribed and sworn to before me  
this 13<sup>th</sup> day of November, 2001.

Darcy M. Ernst  
Notary Public





## Exhibit A

The following was transcribed from the 2/6/01 Minnesota House Redistricting Committee tape.

Paulsen: "...does the technology allow us to do that, to have a narrower deviation than we've had historically with the plus or minus two percent...uh... in Minnesota?"

Gillaspy: "Mr. Chairman, uh, members of the committee. Uh, uh, certainly with the advent of computers it is a great deal easier, uh, there has also been a change in census geography uh, uh, that began in the 1990 census that uh, that all areas have the same geography. Uh, in the '80 census and before uh, the uh the metropolitan areas had one geography, the nonmetropolitan areas had another geography system and it was extremely confusing and uh, we did not have block level information for example in uh, in nonmetropolitan areas so we now have a great deal more information in uh outside of the metropolitan areas and uh, that uh, allows for much greater, much closer analysis than uh, ever before."

B

0178

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# DRAWING BETTER BOUNDARIES

*Minnesota is using new software to make redistricting easier and more transparent.*

Ten years ago, the mechanics of congressional and legislative redistricting in most states was largely a manual process. The software of the period was cumbersome, difficult, expensive and carried a steep learning curve.

Today's redistricting tools are something entirely different. Designed primarily by makers of geographic information systems, they allow users to quickly analyze an enormous range of demographic information, voting records and other aggregate data. Incumbents can watch as a boundary line is moved this


way or that and immediately see the changes in population, the ethnic and racial mix of a particular

block, whether a precinct or neighborhood is being split, where minority/majority blocks can be created and which party is likely to gain or lose seats in Congress or in the state assembly. In fact, today's redistricting tools can spit out plans, maps and boundary options faster than anyone is capable of absorbing.

The new technology may make redistricting a faster, more open process. Tools that can quickly and accurately analyze and map the Census Bureau's TIGER 2000 files and P.L. 94-171 demographic fields may help produce plans that not only stand up in court, but reduce the number of legal challenges that dogged 41 of the 50 states after redistricting plans were enacted in 1992.

## First-Mover

What influence the new technology will have on the actual political process of redrawing congressional and legislative boundaries depends as much on the legislature's approach as on the incumbents involved in the process. Minnesota's Hennipin County Commissioner Randy Johnson described redistricting as an almost life-and-death issue to many politicians. How congressional and legislative lines are redrawn can determine who will get elected or not elected over an entire decade. "In the scramble for political survival, everybody is looking to rely on somebody else to make sure they don't get shafted in the process," Johnson



said. Under these circumstances, partisan infighting and incumbency protection can quickly overshadow demographic concerns and community interests.

Minnesota is one of the most progressive states when it comes to utilizing software in redistricting efforts. In Minnesota, Republicans control the House, the Democratic-Farm-Labor (DFL) Party has a majority in the Senate and the governor is a member of the Independence Party. Although the Minnesota Legislature has yet to agree on principles for redrawing congressional and legislative boundaries, the new technology reportedly has several advantages

and very little downside. In addition to speed and convenience, advantages include openness, increased accuracy of demographic analysis, and the ability to support redistricting standards that are more likely to stand up in court.

So far, the technology appears to have had little effect on the partisan nature of the redistricting process. Republican and DFL caucuses in both the Senate and the House each draw up a redistricting plan, four in all, along with the principles and guidelines used in drafting them. Each caucus has a team of hired GIS/redistricting technicians. Each has the

Geo Info: State

By Bill McGarigle

Contributing Editor



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## Population Summary Report

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Overall Range:		1.45	Percent	532	Persons	
Largest District:	36,984	Deviation:	0.74	Percent	271	Persons
Smallest District:	36,452	Deviation:	-0.71	Percent	-261	Persons
		Mean Deviation:	0.37	Percent	135.04	Persons
		Standard Deviation:			156.48	Persons
Ideal District:	36,713					

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District	Population	Deviation	% Devn.
01A	36,569	-144	-0.39
01B	36,563	-150	-0.41
02A	36,519	-194	-0.53
02B	36,840	127	0.35
03A	36,808	95	0.26
03B	36,873	160	0.44
04A	36,536	-177	-0.48
04B	36,579	-134	-0.36
05A	36,475	-238	-0.65
05B	36,950	237	0.65
06A	36,456	-257	-0.70
06B	36,750	37	0.10
07A	36,781	68	0.19
07B	36,725	12	0.03
08A	36,635	-78	-0.21
08B	36,521	-192	-0.52
09A	36,669	-44	-0.12
09B	36,561	-152	-0.41
10A	36,649	-64	-0.17
10B	36,767	54	0.15
11A	36,967	254	0.69
11B	36,476	-237	-0.65
12A	36,812	99	0.27
12B	36,568	-145	-0.39
13A	36,590	-123	-0.34
13B	36,453	-260	-0.71
14A	36,491	-222	-0.60
14B	36,694	-19	-0.05
15A	36,456	-257	-0.70
15B	36,949	236	0.64
16A	36,596	-117	-0.32
16B	36,729	16	0.04

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## Political Subdivisions Split Between Districts

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Number of subdivisions split into more than one district:

County	52
MCD	31
VTD	125

Number of times a subdivision is split into more than one district:

County	122
MCD	41
VTD	131

Number of splits involving no population:

County	4
MCD	2
VTD	12

County	MCD	VTD	District	Population
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*Split Counties:*

Aitkin			07	2,601
Aitkin			11	7,967
Aitkin			13	4,733
Anoka			30	36,586
Anoka			31	19,014
Anoka			33	171,501
Anoka			34	73,130
Anoka			35	85,799
Anoka			36	26,089
Becker			05	2,065
Becker			06	27,935
Beltrami			01	269
Beltrami			02	39,381
Benton			10	2,194
Benton			12	25,637
Benton			16	8,185
Blue Earth			21	271
Blue Earth			22	56,261
Brown			17	3,939
Brown			20	1,339
Brown			21	21,633
Carlton			08	5,352
Carlton			13	26,319
Carver			42	43,964
Carver			50	32,685
Carver			51	35,743
Cass			02	4,610
Cass			07	22,538
Cass			10	2
Chippewa			14	2,398

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## Population Summary Report

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Overall Range:		1.23	Percent	905	Persons	
Largest District:	73,892	Deviation:	0.64	Percent	467	Persons
Smallest District:	72,987	Deviation:	-0.60	Percent	-438	Persons
		Mean Deviation:	0.25	Percent	184.51	Persons
		Standard Deviation:			230.00	Persons
Ideal District:	73,425					

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District	Population	Deviation	% Devn.
01	73,132	-293	-0.40
02	73,359	-66	-0.09
03	73,681	256	0.35
04	73,115	-310	-0.42
05	73,425	0	0.00
06	73,206	-219	-0.30
07	73,506	81	0.11
08	73,156	-269	-0.37
09	73,230	-195	-0.27
10	73,416	-9	-0.01
11	73,443	18	0.02
12	73,380	-45	-0.06
13	73,043	-382	-0.52
14	73,185	-240	-0.33
15	73,405	-20	-0.03
16	73,325	-100	-0.14
17	73,270	-155	-0.21
18	73,124	-301	-0.41
19	73,892	467	0.64
20	73,419	-6	-0.01
21	73,476	51	0.07
22	73,592	167	0.23
23	73,268	-157	-0.21
24	73,316	-109	-0.15
25	73,361	-64	-0.09
26	73,395	-30	-0.04
27	73,369	-56	-0.08
28	73,253	-172	-0.23
29	73,711	286	0.39
30	73,267	-158	-0.22
31	73,742	317	0.43
32	73,643	218	0.30

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## Political Subdivisions Split Between Districts

Number of subdivisions split into more than one district:

County	60
MCD	44
VTD	206

Number of times a subdivision is split into more than one district:

County	193
MCD	75
VTD	221

Number of splits involving no population:

County	4
MCD	5
VTD	30

County	MCD	VTD	District	Population
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*Split Counties:*

Aitkin			07A	2,601
Aitkin			11B	7,967
Aitkin			13A	4,733
Anoka			30B	36,586
Anoka			31A	11,384
Anoka			31B	7,630
Anoka			33A	36,833
Anoka			33B	186,781
Anoka			34A	36,597
Anoka			34B	36,533
Anoka			35A	68,019
Anoka			35B	47,545
Anoka			36A	20,988
Anoka			36B	5,101
Becker			05A	2,065
Becker			06A	8,452
Becker			06B	19,483
Beltrami			01A	269
Beltrami			02A	8,048
Beltrami			02B	31,333
Benton			10B	2,194
Benton			12A	2,548
Benton			12B	23,089
Benton			16A	8,185
Blue Earth			21B	271
Blue Earth			22A	36,826
Blue Earth			22B	21,268
Brown			17B	3,939
Brown			20B	1,339
Brown			21B	21,633

## Population Summary Report

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Overall Range:		3.52	Percent	1,294	Persons	
Largest District:	37,395	Deviation:	1.86	Percent	682	Persons
Smallest District:	36,101	Deviation:	-1.67	Percent	-612	Persons
		Mean Deviation:	0.62	Percent	227.17	Persons
		Standard Deviation:			283.76	Persons
Ideal District:	36,713					

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District	Population	Deviation	% Devn.
01A	36,920	207	0.56
01B	36,546	-167	-0.45
02A	36,433	-280	-0.76
02B	36,655	-58	-0.16
03A	36,693	-20	-0.05
03B	37,114	401	1.09
04A	37,127	414	1.13
04B	36,135	-578	-1.57
05A	36,402	-311	-0.85
05B	36,351	-362	-0.99
06A	36,461	-252	-0.69
06B	36,584	-129	-0.35
07A	36,375	-338	-0.92
07B	36,492	-221	-0.60
08A	36,376	-337	-0.92
08B	36,738	25	0.07
09A	36,431	-282	-0.77
09B	36,488	-225	-0.61
10A	36,715	2	0.01
10B	36,794	81	0.22
11A	37,370	657	1.79
11B	36,947	234	0.64
12A	36,335	-378	-1.03
12B	37,347	634	1.73
13A	36,602	-111	-0.30
13B	36,728	15	0.04
14A	37,022	309	0.84
14B	37,079	366	1.00
15A	37,163	450	1.23
15B	36,936	223	0.61
16A	36,707	-6	-0.02
16B	36,718	5	0.01

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## Political Subdivisions Split Between Districts

Number of subdivisions split into more than one district:

County	64
MCD	84
VTD	248

Number of times a subdivision is split into more than one district:

County	192
MCD	126
VTD	263

Number of splits involving no population:

County	0
MCD	10
VTD	38

County	MCD	VTD	District	Population
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*Split Counties:*

Aitkin			04B	4,445
Aitkin			12A	10,856
Anoka			18B	27,865
Anoka			32B	22,067
Anoka			33A	37,782
Anoka			33B	8,557
Anoka			34A	36,527
Anoka			34B	15,113
Anoka			37A	36,662
Anoka			37B	103,365
Anoka			38B	51,322
Anoka			40A	77,569
Anoka			40B	9,497
Anoka			41A	62,939
Becker			02B	8,115
Becker			08B	21,885
Beltrami			02B	16,669
Beltrami			03B	22,981
Benton			11B	685
Benton			16B	7,122
Benton			17A	21,626
Benton			17B	8,736
Blue Earth			20B	1,244
Blue Earth			22A	4,098
Blue Earth			22B	37,395
Blue Earth			27A	717
Blue Earth			27B	14,911
Brown			20A	515
Brown			20B	26,721
Carlton			05B	11,201

## Population Summary Report

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Overall Range:		2.49	Percent	1,828	Persons	
Largest District:	74,432	Deviation:	1.37	Percent	1,007	Persons
Smallest District:	72,604	Deviation:	-1.12	Percent	-821	Persons
		Mean Deviation:	0.48	Percent	354.57	Persons
		Standard Deviation:			447.59	Persons
Ideal District:	73,425					

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District	Population	Deviation	% Devn.
01	73,466	41	0.06
02	73,088	-337	-0.46
03	73,807	382	0.52
04	73,262	-163	-0.22
05	72,753	-672	-0.92
06	73,045	-380	-0.52
07	72,867	-558	-0.76
08	73,114	-311	-0.42
09	72,919	-506	-0.69
10	73,509	84	0.11
11	74,317	892	1.21
12	73,682	257	0.35
13	73,330	-95	-0.13
14	74,101	676	0.92
15	74,099	674	0.92
16	73,425	0	0.00
17	73,735	310	0.42
18	74,432	1,007	1.37
19	72,766	-659	-0.90
20	73,318	-107	-0.15
21	72,801	-624	-0.85
22	74,085	660	0.90
23	72,929	-496	-0.68
24	73,564	139	0.19
25	73,507	82	0.11
26	72,610	-815	-1.11
27	73,833	408	0.56
28	73,030	-395	-0.54
29	73,599	174	0.24
30	73,435	10	0.01
31	73,434	9	0.01
32	73,746	321	0.44

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## Political Subdivisions Split Between Districts

Number of subdivisions split into more than one district:

County	49
MCD	51
VTD	139

Number of times a subdivision is split into more than one district:

County	110
MCD	64
VTD	144

Number of splits involving no population:

County	0
MCD	4
VTD	21

County	MCD	VTD	District	Population
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*Split Counties:*

Aitkin			04	4,445
Aitkin			12	10,856
Anoka			18	27,865
Anoka			32	22,067
Anoka			33	43,255
Anoka			34	50,917
Anoka			37	73,474
Anoka			38	43,330
Anoka			40	166,944
Anoka			41	71,414
Becker			02	8,115
Becker			08	21,885
Beltrami			02	16,669
Beltrami			03	22,981
Benton			11	685
Benton			16	7,122
Benton			17	30,362
Blue Earth			20	1,244
Blue Earth			22	41,493
Blue Earth			27	13,795
Carlton			05	11,201
Carlton			12	20,470
Carver			35	24,649
Carver			42	45,556
Chippewa			13	11,821
Chippewa			19	1,267
Chisago			18	15,503
Chisago			33	24,470
Chisago			34	1,128
Cottonwood			20	438