EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
June 2022
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, June 6, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
C. Jeremy Lagasse, Relator vs. Larry Horton, Respondent, Aspen Waste Systems, Inc. and EMC Insurance Company, Respondents – Case No. A21-1745: Relator C. Jeremy Lagasse, who represented an injured employee in a workers’ compensation matter, appeals from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA), which reversed an award of attorney fees. The attorney fees provision in Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(c) (2020) provides, in pertinent part, that contingent attorney fees for the recovery of benefits “shall be based solely upon genuinely disputed claims or portions of claims” and may not “be calculated on the basis of any undisputed portion of compensation awards.”
Lagasse premised his entitlement to attorney fees on the employer/insurer’s purported dispute of the employee’s partial permanent disability (PPD) rating. The compensation judge awarded Lagasse contingent attorney fees. The WCCA reversed, concluding that there was no genuine dispute over the payment of PPD benefits, and there were “no actions” taken by Lagasse, “which resulted in the employee being paid PPD benefits.”
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are (1) whether the WCCA erred in concluding that no evidence in the record supported the compensation judge’s determination that a genuine dispute existed over PPD benefits, which would support the award of contingent attorney fees; and (2) whether the WCCA erred in concluding that Lagasse did not take any actions that entitled him to contingent attorney fees, costs, and disbursements. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Joseph Daniel Roach, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0250843 – Case No. A21-0374: An attorney discipline matter that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.
Tuesday, June 7, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Douglas Juntunen, Respondent vs. Carlton County, Self-Insured, and Minnesota Counties Intergovernmental Trust, Relators – Case No. A22-0090: Relators Carlton County and Minnesota Counties Intergovernmental Trust (collectively, the County) appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA), which reversed the compensation judge’s determination that, after considering the opinions of competing experts, respondent Douglas Juntunen did not suffer from post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) arising from his work as a deputy sheriff for Carlton County. The WCCA ruled that the compensation judge erred by not applying the statutory presumption in Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15€ (2020), which provides that if a deputy sheriff or other specified first responder is diagnosed with PTSD as defined in section 176.011, subd. 15(d) (2020) and had not been diagnosed previously, then the PTSD is presumed to be an occupational disease and presumed to be due to the nature of employment. The WCCA concluded that the statutory presumption applies here “because there is no evidence disputing the employee’s PTSD diagnosis at the time of his disablement” and “because the employee otherwise met the remaining factors contained in the statutory presumption.” Therefore, the WCCA determined that “the employee has proven that he has a compensable work-related PTSD claim.” The WCCA remanded “for additional findings regarding the claimed benefits.”
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented include: (1) whether the WCCA erred in interpreting and applying the statutory language in Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(d) and (e); and (2) whether the WCCA erred in reversing the compensation judge’s findings regarding the respective expert opinions offered. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
Christopher Welters, Respondent vs. Minnesota Department of Corrections, et al., Appellants – Case No. A20-1481: Christopher Welters, an inmate at Minnesota Correctional Facility-Stillwater, filed a complaint that included civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two corrections officers. Welters alleges that he sustained personal injuries while handcuffed during his transport to a medical facility and during his medical treatment. The district court dismissed Welters’ claims on summary judgment. In a precedential opinion, the court of appeals reversed the dismissal of Welters’ Eighth Amendment claims under section 1983. The court of appeals concluded that “Welters produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that inappropriately restraining him during a medical transport and procedure could violate a clearly established right.”
The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether an inmate is required to satisfy the Eighth Amendment malicious and sadistic standard when restraints are used to maintain security before and during an inmate’s medical appointment; and (2) in the absence of factually similar case law, whether qualified immunity protects a corrections officer when the officer uses restraints on an inmate to maintain security during a medical appointment. (Washington County)
Wednesday, June 8, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
State of Minnesota, Appellant/Cross-Respondent vs. Jason James Loveless, Respondent/Cross-Appellant – Case No. A20-1254: In 2019, Jason Loveless was charged with fifth-degree possession of one or more mixtures containing marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols (THC) with intent to sell under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1) (2020), and fifth-degree possession of one or more mixtures containing a controlled substance classified in schedule I, II, III, or IV under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2020), after law enforcement officers executed a search warrant on a residence in Brainerd and discovered plastic bags filled with a dried green plant material and vaporizer cartridges filled with a green liquid. A jury found Loveless guilty, and he was sentenced to 21 months in prison.
In a precedential opinion, the court of appeals concluded that under the amelioration doctrine, recent amendments to Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 9, which changed the definition of “marijuana,” apply to Loveless’s convictions even though the alleged offenses occurred before the effective date of the amendments. The court of appeals determined that the 0.3-percent threshold in the amended statute applies to cannabis, and reversed Loveless’s conviction for fifth-degree possession of one or more mixtures containing a controlled substance classified in schedule I, II, III, or IV, because the State presented insufficient evidence to prove the THC concentration of the dried green plant material found in the Brainerd residence. The court of appeals also determined that the 0.3-percent threshold does not apply to a liquid mixture and therefore found the State’s evidence sufficient to support the conviction for fifth-degree possession of mixtures containing marijuana or THC with intent to sell.
Both Loveless and the State filed petitions seeking further review, and the supreme court granted review of both petitions, which raise issues related to the amelioration doctrine, the interpretation of language in the statutory amendments, and whether the evidence presented by the State is sufficient to support Loveless’s convictions. (Crow Wing County)
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Kevin Herman Larson, Appellant – Case No. A21-0220: Appellant Kevin Larson is required to register as a predatory offender based on a 1993 conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. In 2019, while in prison for his seventh conviction of failing to register, Larson refused to register on two separate dates. Based on those refusals, respondent State of Minnesota filed a criminal complaint, charging him with two counts of failing to register in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a)(1) (2020). Larson filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that because he has never registered, the two offenses alleged in the complaint actually began to run in the mid-1990s and still continue today. Based on that assertion, Larson argued that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the current prosecution because he was previously convicted of his ongoing failure to register. The district court denied Larson’s motion. Following a jury trial, Larson was convicted and sentenced on both counts of failing to register. On appeal, Larson renewed his double jeopardy arguments. The court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether the district court erred by not dismissing both or at least one of the two charges on double jeopardy grounds. (Carlton County)
Thursday, June 9, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Cathy Spann, et al., Appellants vs. Minneapolis City Council, et al., Respondents – Case No. A21-0931: In August 2020, a group of north Minneapolis residents, including Cathy Spann (appellants), claimed that they were suffering increased violence in their community due to the inadequately funded and staffed police force of the City of Minneapolis. Appellants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, asserting that the Mayor and the City Council (respondents) had failed to perform their duties to fund and employ an adequate number of police officers as required by the Minneapolis City Charter. Section 7.3(a) of the City Charter states that “[t]he Mayor has complete power over the establishment, maintenance, and command of the police department.” Section 7.3(c) states that “[t]he City Council must fund a police force of at least 0.0017 employees per resident, and provide for those employees’ compensation.” And section 1.3(d)(5), in turn, defines references to “population or other enumeration” as “the latest decennial federal census.” The district court granted a writ of mandamus in a July 1, 2021 order, finding that respondents had failed to fund a police force of at least 0.0017 employees per resident as the City Charter required because the projected number of sworn officers fell below the number of employees the ratio required. The district court ordered respondents to take any and all necessary action to ensure that they fund a police force of at least 0.0017 employees per resident, requiring compliance by a return date of June 30, 2022.
The court of appeals reversed in a precedential opinion. The court concluded that the City Charter “clearly imposes a duty on the city council to continuously fund a police force with a minimum number of sworn police officers,” but noted that the record reflects that the City Council has “maintained funding that meets the minimum-funding requirement” at all relevant times. As to the Mayor, the court held that the City Charter “does not clearly impose a duty on the mayor to continuously employ that same minimum number of sworn police officers.” The Mayor’s duty is instead discretionary, and because the “the record reflects that the mayor is actively exercising his discretion to address the shortage of sworn officers,” the court found “no need for mandamus to set that discretion in motion.”
The supreme court granted review of the following issues: (1) whether, under City Charter section 7.3, the Mayor has a clear legal duty to establish and maintain a police force of at least 0.0017 sworn officers per resident using funding from the City Council; (2) whether the City Council is satisfying its clear legal duty in the City Charter to “fund a police force of at least 0.0017 employees per resident, and provide for those employees’ compensation”; and (3) whether the district court properly issued a writ of mandamus. (Hennepin County)
Monday, June 13, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
In re the Estate of: Joseph Rocco Figliuzzi, aka Joseph Figliuzzi, aka Joe Figliuzzi, Deceased – Case No. A21-1035: In 1987, Joseph Figliuzzi created the Figliuzzi family trust. He died testate on April 19, 2020. Appellant Gina Bicknell became one of the co-trustees of the trust, and respondent Linda Gray became the personal representative of Figliuzzi’s probate estate. Before his death, Figliuzzi had taken a number of actions in an effort to transfer certain wetland credits, which had been held by the trust, to himself in his personal capacity. The parties disagree about whether those efforts met the regulatory requirements to successfully effect the transfer.
Bicknell petitioned the probate court under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-505 (2020) for a declaration that the wetland credits are non-probate assets that remained the property of the trust, rather than the property of Figliuzzi’s probate estate. She also requested that the court impose a constructive trust to preserve the wetland credits during the dispute regarding their proper characterization. The court denied the petition, stating in a brief order that the credits “were transferred and are no longer assets of the Trust.”
Bicknell appealed the probate court’s order. The court of appeals questioned its jurisdiction, and the parties submitted informal memoranda. Bicknell argued that the court of appeals had jurisdiction under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g), which allows an appeal from a final order “in an administrative or other special proceeding,” and under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b), which allows an appeal from certain orders regarding injunctions. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal. The court of appeals concluded that the probate court’s order was not appealable under Rule 103.03(g) because the question of whether the credits are part of the estate affected the merits of the underlying probate action, and therefore it was not a “special proceeding.” With respect to Rule 103.03(b), Bicknell argued that the denial of her request for a constructive trust was analogous to the denial of an injunction. But because the probate court had determined that the wetland credits are part of the probate estate, the court of appeals concluded that the dispute was over, and Bicknell’s request for a constructive trust was moot.
The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether a determination that a decedent’s estate owns disputed assets is appealable as a final order in a special proceeding; and (2) whether a contested district court order deciding ownership of disputed property moots a request for a constructive trust over the property for the pendency of litigation (including an appeal). (Beltrami County)