EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
November 2024
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, November 4, 2024
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Appellant Anthony Richard Smeby was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Paramedics responded to the accident. While the paramedics transported him to North Memorial Hospital, Smeby made several statements. The State later charged Smeby with driving while impaired. Before trial, Smeby moved to suppress his medical records and any evidence obtained through his medical records, arguing the physician-patient evidentiary privilege, Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(d) (2022), applied to the statements he made to the paramedics. The district court denied the suppression motion. Following a jury trial, Smeby was convicted of the charged offense. On appeal, Smeby argued the district court erred by admitting evidence of his statements to the paramedics. The court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether the district court prejudicially erred by ordering North Memorial Hospital to surrender Smeby’s medical records to police where no statutory exception pierced the privilege; and (2) whether the district court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of statements Smeby allegedly made about the cause of his condition to paramedics who were gathering information to provide to doctors to aid in Smeby’s examination and treatment. (Hennepin County)
The State charged appellant Kyaw Be Bee with carrying a BB gun in a public place, Minn. Stat. § 624.7181 (2022). The complaint alleged that a police officer found a BB gun under the driver’s seat of a motor vehicle that Bee was driving on a public roadway. The district court issued a pretrial order dismissing the charge for lack of probable cause, concluding that the interior of a private car is not a public place. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether the court of appeals erred in finding that the interior of a private motor vehicle on a public road is a “public place” as defined by Minnesota Statutes § 624.7181. (Ramsey County)
Tuesday, November 5, 2024 Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Bobby Lykins, by George Duranske, conservator, Respondent, vs. Anderson Contracting, Inc., and SFM Mutual Insurance Co., Relators. Bobby Lykins, by John Hoscheid, conservator, Relator, vs. Anderson Contracting, Inc., and SFM Mutual Insurance Co., Respondents – Case Nos. A24-0548, A24-0549:
In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Bobby Lykins, suffered serious, life-changing injuries due to an explosion at work, affecting both his physical abilities and cognition. In 2017 and 2018, Lykins and his employer, Anderson Contracting, Inc., as well as the insurer, SFM Mutual Insurance Co., reached workers’ compensation settlements which were approved by a compensation judge. Five years later, a conservator was appointed to represent Lykins, who then filed a petition to vacate the 2017 and 2018 awards. The petition alleged that the settlement stipulations should be invalid as based on fraud because when they were sent to the compensation judge for approval in 2017, the “attorneys deliberately withheld” doctor reports and other documents that, if read, would have led the judge to refer the matter for consideration of appointment of a conservator before approving the stipulations.
In addressing the petition, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) relied upon Minn. Stat. § 176.521, subd. 1(a) (2022), which provides that “[a]n agreement to settle any claim is not valid if . . . a conservator is required under section 176.092 and an employee . . . has no . . . conservator.” The WCCA concluded that “[t]he issue presented by the petition to vacate cannot be addressed without a determination of whether the employee appeared to be incapacitated, or was incapacitated,
at the time of the stipulations for settlement.” The WCCA invoked Minn. Stat. § 176.092, subd. 3 (2022), as providing that “the compensation judge has jurisdiction to refer the matter to district court for a determination of whether the employee was incapacitated and in need of a conservator at the time of the settlements.” Based on this, the WCCA “refer[red] this matter to the chief judge of OAH [Office of Administrative Hearings] for assignment to a compensation judge to make findings on whether the evidence shows that the employee appeared to be incapacitated as defined under Minn. Stat. § 524.5-102, subd. 6, at the time of the stipulations.” The WCCA stated that “[i]f the compensation judge finds that the employee did not appear to be incapacitated at the time of the settlements, the judge will return that finding to the court.” But the WCCA explained that if, on the other hand, “the compensation judge finds the employee appeared to be incapacitated at those times, the judge shall refer the matter to district court in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 524.5-108, for a determination of whether the employee was in fact incapacitated at the time of the stipulations. The compensation judge shall return the findings to the WCCA, including those of the district court.” The WCCA closed by explaining that, “[a]fter the findings are returned, the WCCA will consider the petition to vacate.”
Both parties separately appealed. On appeal to the supreme court, the employer and insurer present the following issues: (1) whether the WCCA has authority to seek district court involvement to evaluate the potential need for a guardian or conservator under Minn. Stat. § 176.092, where the employee already has a conservator; (2) whether a retroactive fact inquiry regarding how a person “appeared” to a hypothetical judge in 2017 and 2018 is a justiciable controversy; (3) whether the WCCA erred by failing to distinguish between the rule applicable to parties under Minn. Stat. § 176.092, subd. 2 and the rule applicable to courts under subd. 3, and whether the Order is impermissibly vague and contrary to law; (4) whether, if Minn. Stat. § 176.092 is to be applied, either to a compensation judge or to a party, the WCCA applied the correct statutory provision and whether a narrow reading is essential; and (5) whether, based on the record, only one outcome can be sustained, and whether the employee has established grounds to vacate or void the workers’ compensation settlements.
Lykins, by his conservator, in his appeal to the supreme court, presents the following issues: (1) whether the WCCA in its order has misstated the law in effect at the specific time periods of 5/23/17 and 1/25/18; (2) whether OAH does not have the authority to request from the district court its opinion on what decision it would have made relative to the entitlement of the employee to a conservator per Minn. Stat. § 176.092, subd. 4 on 5/23/17 or 1/25/18; (3) whether the WCCA has committed an error of law by not concluding and instructing OAH that the threshold for referral of a potentially incapacitated employee to the district court under Minn. Stat. § 176.092, subd. 3 is at least equal to the threshold for referral described in Minn. Stat. § 176.092, subd. 2, which is “knows or has reason to believe”; (4) whether the record as a whole that was before the WCCA that led to its order compels the conclusion that the award of 1/25/18 only played a de minimis role in determining the issue of whether or not OAH should have referred the employee to the district court for appointment of a conservator per Minn. Stat. § 176.092, subd. 3 and subd. 4 and that therefore the focus of OAH’s fact finding process on remand by the WCCA should be on facts that are material and relevant to the employee’s need for a referral to the district court under Minn. Stat. § 176.092, subd. 3 prior to 5/23/17, and in the alternative, whether the WCCA should be directed to specifically address that issue upon return of the OAH findings to the WCCA; and (5) whether the order of the WCCA requires substantial clarification. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
Tescil Romalis Mason-Kimmons, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A23-0914:
A grand jury indicted appellant Tescil Mason-Kimmons and his then-girlfriend on charges of first-degree premeditated murder and Mason-Kimmons on a charge of unlawful possession of ammunition. The charges related to a fatal shooting in a Minneapolis park on the morning of September 15, 2017. Mason-Kimmons retained private counsel (trial counsel), who filed a substitution of counsel dated February 15, 2018.
Trial was scheduled for August 13, 2018. Before beginning jury selection, the parties announced that they had reached an agreement. Mason-Kimmons would plead guilty to an amended charge of second-degree intentional murder and receive a sentence of 366 months; the State would dismiss other charges against Mason-Kimmons, including charges pending in two separate cases; and the girlfriend would receive a probationary sentence. Mason-Kimmons pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. The district court accepted his guilty plea and sentenced him to 366 months in prison.
After filing a direct appeal, Mason-Kimmons obtained a stay to pursue postconviction relief. His postconviction petition asserted, in part, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during plea negotiations. The district court denied the petition. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court rejected Mason-Kimmons’ ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Mason-Kimmons appealed a second time, and the court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals concluded that trial counsel’s advice to Mason-Kimmons to plead guilty because he was not prepared for trial fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. It also concluded that the district court applied the incorrect prejudice standard by failing to consider whether Mason-Kimmons would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on a trial but for trial counsel’s unreasonable advice. The court of appeals again remanded to the district court to apply the correct prejudice standard and make specific findings regarding prejudice.
On the second remand, the district court held another evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the district court found Mason-Kimmons was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s objectively unreasonable advice and denied the postconviction petition. The court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court granted review of the following issues: (1) whether there is a reasonable probability that Mason-Kimmons would not have pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder but for trial counsel’s deficient advice that Mason-Kimmons plead guilty because trial counsel was unprepared for trial; (2) when a district court’s order denying a postconviction petition rests on clear factual errors, whether the reviewing court can affirm the district court based on independent factual findings that allegedly do not appear in the district court order or anywhere else in the postconviction record; and (3) when an attorney instructs a defendant to plead guilty because the attorney is unprepared to represent the defendant at trial, whether it is a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment-secured autonomy that is structural error and not subject to harmless-error review. (Hennepin County)
Wednesday, November 6, 2024
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Appellant Paul Seeman was convicted of 29 offenses involving charges of racketeering, theft, receiving stolen property, and falsifying information in applications for motor-vehicle titles. The district court ordered Seeman to pay restitution to 13 victims in the total amount of $124,018.65.
An offender may challenge a restitution order in district court. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2022). As part of an offender’s “burden to produce evidence” when “challeng[ing] the amount of restitution or specific items of restitution or their dollar amounts,” the offender must file “a detailed sworn affidavit of the offender setting forth all challenges to the restitution or items of restitution, and specifying all reasons justifying dollar amounts of restitution which differ from the amounts requested by the victim or victims.”
Id., subd. 3(a) (2022). The State has “[t]he burden of demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense and the appropriateness of a particular type of restitution.”
Id.
Seeman filed a timely pro se affidavit challenging restitution. In the affidavit, Seeman made a specific challenge to each of the 13 restitution awards. With the assistance of counsel, Seeman later filed a supplemental affidavit in which he detailed his limited financial resources and requested that the district court consider his inability to pay restitution.
The district court held a hearing on the restitution challenge. Respondent the State of Minnesota did not call any witnesses, claiming that Seeman had not made a challenge to the amount of loss for any victim in his affidavits and instead had only made legal arguments about the court’s authority to order restitution.
Following the hearing, the district court granted Seeman’s restitution challenge in part and denied it in part in a second restitution order. The district court reduced the restitution award to one victim and eliminated the restitution awards to six victims because the State failed to produce evidence proving the amount of loss for those awards.
The State appealed the second restitution order. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The supreme court granted review of the following issue: how “detailed” does a defendant’s affidavit have to be to meet the requirements in Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045, subdivision 3(a)? (Rice County)
An attorney reinstatement matter that presents the issue of whether suspended attorney Scott Selmer should be reinstated to the practice of law.
Thursday, November 7, 2024
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Henry Lee Brown pleaded guilty to criminal vehicular homicide (driver who causes collision leaves scene), Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(7) (2022). On appeal, Brown argued his guilty plea was inaccurate because he never admitted his operation of the motor vehicle was volitional when it struck and killed the decedent. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the statute does not require that the person’s operation of the vehicle include a volitional act.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether Minnesota Statutes § 609.2112, subdivision 1(a)(7), requires that a person acted volitionally to operate the motor vehicle at the time it caused a collision. (Hennepin County)
Tuesday, November 12, 2024
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
An attorney discipline matter that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.
Nonoral: Andrew Thompson, Relator, vs. Minnesota Trial Courts - District 4 and State of Minnesota Department of Administration, Respondents – Case No. A24-0310:
In this workers’ compensation case, relator Andrew Thompson, who was employed by the Minnesota Fourth District Trial Courts, was injured when walking to work in December. On the day he fell, the skyway entrance to the Hennepin County Government Center was closed for security reasons, and he slipped on a patch of ice on a sidewalk as he was walking towards the north public entrance to the building. That day, Thompson was returning to work in the office for the first time after having been told days earlier to work offsite due to heightened security surrounding a high-profile jury verdict being issued. When Thompson fell, he was carrying items he had brought home with him for work, although he testified that carrying the items did not contribute to his fall or worsen its effects.
The compensation judge denied Thompson’s worker’s compensation claim, finding that Thompson’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed, acknowledging that an injury sustained during an employee’s commute is generally not compensable, and concluding that none of the recognized exceptions to that general rule invoked by Thompson applied.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether the WCCA erred when it held that the dual-purpose doctrine negates the street risk exception; (2) whether the WCCA erred when it held that the special hazard exception did not apply even where the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated the employee would not have encountered ice but for a trial that was being conducted by respondent; and (3) whether the WCCA erred when it failed to analyze the
Youngberg factors and instead applied the dual-purpose doctrine. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
Wednesday, November 13, 2024
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Appellant Alex Lancaster filed a certiorari appeal, challenging a correction order relating to his adult foster care facility. The correction order was issued by an Olmsted County licensor on behalf of the Commissioner of Human Services pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 245A.06 (2022 & Supp. 2023). The correction order provided notice of violations of adult foster care licensing regulations and directed Lancaster to either correct the violations or request reconsideration with the Commissioner. He did not correct the alleged violations or request reconsideration.
The court of appeals dismissed the appeal and discharged the writ of certiorari. The court of appeals concluded that “the correction order does not have a binding effect on Lancaster’s legal rights” and therefore is not a quasi-judicial decision appealable by writ of certiorari under Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (2022).
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether the court of appeals erred by holding that correction orders issued under Minn. Stat. § 245A.06 are not appealable by writ of certiorari under Minn. Stat. § 606.01. (Minnesota Department of Human Services)
Nonoral: Rodney Dean Bjornson, Relator, vs. McNeilus Companies, Inc. and Travelers Indemnity Company of America and Property & Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford with claims administered by Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Respondents – Case No. A24-0454:
In this workers’ compensation case, relator Rodney Bjornson sustained two work-related injuries, and the parties entered into a settlement agreement, for which Bjornson’s attorney received a contingency fee. Bjornson’s attorney also sought additional fees up to the statutory maximum permitted on each injury, based on Minn. Stat § 176.081, subd. 1(a)(1) (2022), which permits attorney fees to be assessed beyond the contingency fee amount when that amount is inadequate, and provides that the additionally-assessed fees should be based on applying the contingency fee formula to “the dollar value of the medical or rehabilitation benefit awarded, where ascertainable.” The compensation judge granted Bjornson’s attorney’s request, finding the contingent fee paid through the settlement inadequate, and based the additional fee award on what the court found was the ascertainable “intervention interest of United Healthcare,” which the attorney had “resolved on behalf of the employee.
The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed in part, concluding that “substantial evidence does not support the judge’s findings that [the attorney] recovered medical benefits on behalf of his client totaling” the amount relied upon by the compensation judge. Instead, the WCCA relied upon Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(a)(2), in which, if the dollar value of medical benefits is not readily ascertainable, any additional attorney fee beyond the contingency fee “is the amount charged in hourly fees for the representation or $500, whichever is less.” The WCCA thus awarded Bjornson’s attorney $500 in fees.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether Bjornson’s attorney recovered genuinely disputed medical expenses based on what respondents stipulated and agreed to as part of the settlement; (2) whether the contingency fee withheld from the settlement was alone inadequate to reasonably compensate Bjornson’s attorney; (3) what the ascertainable dollar value of the medical expense benefits is; and (4) whether the WCCA was correct in vacating the compensation judge’s finding as to the ascertainable dollar value. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)