State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin, Appellant – Case No. A24-0859:  In July 2013, the State charged appellant Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin with several offenses, including first-degree felony murder, alleging aiding-and-abetting criminal liability.  Following a jury trial, Griffin was convicted of first-degree felony murder.  Griffin’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.  In 2023, the Legislature created a process for challenging a felony murder conviction that is based on aiding-and-abetting criminal liability.  Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68.  The first step of that process is the submission of a preliminary application.  Griffin submitted a preliminary application, which was denied.  When Griffin filed a notice of appeal, the supreme court questioned its jurisdiction to hear the appeal and ordered supplemental briefing on the issues of whether the denial of a preliminary application is an appealable order, and if so, what rules or statutes govern such appeals.  
 
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the denial of a preliminary application is an appealable order; and (2) if so, what rules or statutes govern the appeal.  (Hennepin County) 
   
Dawn M. Simonson, Respondent, vs. Douglas County, and Minnesota Counties Intergovernmental Trust, Relators – Case No. A24-1309:  Respondent Dawn Simonson began working at the Douglas County Hospital in 1991 when she was 35.  In 1996, she suffered a severe back injury at work, and she has not worked for any employer since.  She was paid permanent total disability (PTD) benefits until March 2023, when she reached age 67.  Under the workers’ compensation law in effect when she suffered her injury, permanent total disability ceased at age 67 “because the employee is presumed retired,” but the “presumption is rebuttable by the employee.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4 (2016).  Without the PTD benefits, Simonson’s only income was social security retirement benefits which did not cover her expenses.  Simonson, going into debt, filed a claim that she had rebutted the retirement presumption under Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4. 
 
The compensation judge observed that the “Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals [WCCA] has recognized several factors that may be relevant to whether an employee has retired from the labor market,” found here that “each party has an equal number of factors in their favor,” and on that basis determined that he “cannot conclude that the employee has rebutted the presumption that she retired from the labor market.”
 
The WCCA reversed.  It found the full list of factors relied upon by the compensation judge to be “problematic in PTD cases” and instead held that “the primary factor in determining whether the retirement presumption has been rebutted in a PTD case should be an employer’s financial predicament.”  The WCCA then determined that “[t]he compensation judge’s determination that the employee has not rebutted the presumption is manifestly contrary to the evidence,” and thus reversed that finding.  In doing so, the WCCA also held that the burden of proof to overcome the presumption was a preponderance of the evidence, rather than a higher standard of “substantial proof to the contrary,” as the employer/insurer argued.
 
On appeal to the supreme court, relators’ brief presents the issues as follows:  (1) whether the WCCA erred in determining that an employee’s financial need alone constitutes sufficient evidence for an employee to rebut the statutory presumption of retirement found in Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4; and (2) whether the WCCA erred in applying the incorrect burden of proof in reversing the compensation judge’s finding that the employee did not meet her burden to rebut the retirement presumption.  (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
   
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Respondent, vs. True Gravity Ventures, LLC, et al., Respondents, Astra Genstar Partnership, LLP, Appellant – Case No. A24-0787:  The court of appeals dismissed the appeal of appellant Astra Genstar Partnership, LLP, after concluding that the appeal was untimely.  The court of appeals declined to accept the appeal in the interests of justice on the basis that the district court administrator failed to serve notice of entry of the judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 77.04 until after the time to appeal had expired.  The court of appeals also declined to extend the time to appeal under Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 14.01(c)(2). 
 
The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) Is it in the interest of justice for an appeal to proceed on the merits when the district court administrator’s office failed to serve notice of the judgment or entry of the judgment on the parties until weeks after the time to appeal had expired, contrary to Minn. R. Civ. P. 77.04?  (2) Did the court of appeals have authority to extend the time to appeal under Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 14.01(c)(2), which allows extensions to respond to e-filed documents not received?  (Dakota County)
 
In re the Estate of Roger Abrahamson, Deceased – Case No. A23-1127:  Roger Abrahamson died in 2021.  His will, apparently executed in 2013, provides nothing to his heir-at-law, appellant Michelle Stark.  Instead, it leaves his entire estate to three charities, two of whom are respondents Union Gospel Mission Twin Cities and Homeward Bound.  Stark petitioned for an adjudication of intestacy, arguing among other things that the will was not validly executed and witnessed.  Under Minnesota’s version of the Uniform Probate Code, a will must be “signed by at least two individuals, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after witnessing either the signing of the will” by the testator “or the testator’s acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will.”  Minn. Stat. § 524.2-502 (2022).  Abrahamson’s will contained lines for two witness signatures.  One was dated December 3, 2013, and signed by an identified witness to the execution, Reinhard Clausen; the other was dated the next day and was an undecipherable scrawl. 
 
The district court held a hearing at which Stark, Clausen, and a handwriting expert each testified.  None of the testifying witnesses claimed any direct knowledge about the identity of the person who made the marks on the second signature line or the circumstances under which they were made.  But the district court concluded that the second signature was, in fact, a signature, and that it was made within a reasonable time after Clausen’s signature.  The district court concluded that respondents had met their burden of proof to show that the will was properly executed and witnessed, and the court admitted it to probate. 
 
Stark appealed, citing Carlson v. Stover, 126 N.W.2d 784, 785 (Minn. 1964), for the proposition that where “there is neither extrinsic evidence that the purported will was properly attested nor any recitation to that effect in the instrument, its execution is deemed fatally defective.”  Notwithstanding Minn. Stat. § 524.3-406 (2022), which requires only the testimony of “at least one of the attesting witnesses,” she relied on In re Larson’s Estate, 73 N.W. 966, 967 (Minn. 1898), for the proposition that the testimony of a single subscribing witness is insufficient to justify probating a will if that witness’s testimony is silent as to a second witness to the will.  The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that both Carlson and Larson’s Estate were decided prior to Minnesota’s adoption of the Uniform Probate Code and were inapposite, and concluding that the district court’s findings are supported by the record.
 
The supreme court granted review of the following issues, as stated in the petition for review: (1) Did the court of appeals err when it upheld the district court’s order to probate a will, holding that the will was duly executed in front of two witnesses after making specific findings that it received no evidence of a second witness to a will, no evidence relating to the will’s execution in front of a separate witness, and ignored two separate precedential opinions of the supreme court?  (2) Did the court of appeals err when it upheld the district court’s order to probate a will, after refusing to follow two precedential decisions by the supreme court by finding that the intervening passage of the UPC made the cases inapposite despite: a) the court of appeals not having jurisdiction over the decisions of the supreme court; b) the long established rule that the court of appeals is bound by the decisions of the supreme court and may neither reverse nor ignore such precedent; c) ignoring the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 524.1-103; and 4) without attempting to harmonize the precedents with the statute.  (3) Was it reversible error to deny a motion for judgment as a matter of law when the party with both the prima facie burden and the burden of persuasion failed to enter evidence of: a) a second witness to a will; b) evidence relating to the will’s execution in front of a second witness; and c) evidence of a second witness’s competency.  (Anoka County)
   
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Samuel Alejondro Torrez, Appellant – Case No. A23-0902:  Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Samuel Torrez with first-degree test refusal, Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2), 169A.24 (2022), for refusing to provide a blood or urine sample after being presented with a search warrant authorizing law enforcement to obtain such a sample.  A jury found Torrez guilty.  The court of appeals affirmed.
 
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: at a trial for refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), must the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that law enforcement had probable cause to believe the defendant was driving while impaired if there was a valid search warrant for a blood or urine test supported by probable cause.  (Polk County) 
 
Nonoral:  Burnsville Medical Building, LLC, Relator, vs. County of Dakota, Respondent – Case No. A24-0847:  This property tax dispute concerns the market value of the Burnsville Medical Building as of its January 2, 2020, assessment date, for taxes payable in 2021.  The property was assessed at $8,007,800.  The tax court concluded that the market value of the property was $9,300,000.  In applying the income approach to valuation, the tax court identified that “[t]he principal dispute between the parties is whether the additional reductions from potential gross income to effective net rent are proper.”  In answer to that question, the tax court concluded that “Burnsville Medical has not presented the court with a sufficient reason to support further reducing potential gross income by a TI [tenant improvement] allowance or free rent to arrive at an effective net rent.”  The tax court also discounted Burnsville Medical’s occupancy adjustment in the tax court’s sales comparison approach.
 
On appeal to the supreme court, the brief of relator Burnsville Medical Building, LLC, presents the following issues:  (1) When performing a property tax appraisal, may the tax court include the value of improvements that do not exist on the assessment date in its market value conclusion, specifically, may the court include non-existent tenant improvements?  (2) When performing a property tax appraisal, may the tax court ignore the near-term risk of future destabilizing vacancy when estimating an occupancy adjustment based upon the premise that changes in occupancy relate to the leased fee characteristics of the property?  (Minnesota Tax Court)