EN BANC CALENDAR

 

Monday, March 3, 2025

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Jennifer Lynn Nagle, Appellant – Case No. A23-0927:  The State charged appellant Jennifer Lynn Nagle with several offenses including third-degree possession of methamphetamine in a school zone.  Nagle filed a pretrial motion to suppress the State’s evidence arguing the warrant application failed to establish probable cause to search her home.  The district court denied the motion.  Following a jury trial, the district court convicted Nagle of the charged offense. On appeal, Nagle argued the district court committed reversible error when it denied her pretrial suppression motion. The court of appeals affirmed her conviction.

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: When police did not corroborate a confidential reliable informant’s tip to any extent, is the lack of corroboration irrelevant to the probable-cause analysis, or is the lack of corroboration instead part of the totality of the circumstances relevant to whether probable cause is established?  (Swift County)

Christopher Thigpen, Appellant, vs. Best Home Care LLC, Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent – Case No. A23-1544:  After appellant Christopher Thigpen separated from his retail job in March 2020, he applied for and received unemployment benefits between March 2020 and March 2022.  During this time, he also maintained other employment.  For each week during the two-year period, he was asked whether he worked during the reporting period, and whether he had received income from any other source.  He responded in the negative to both questions.  

Respondent Department of Employment and Economic Development conducted an audit and determined that Thigpen’s earnings from his other employment made him ineligible for unemployment benefits, and that he was therefore overpaid unemployment benefits because of misrepresentation.  Following an administrative appeal, an unemployment law judge made a final determination that Thigpen, through misrepresentation, received an overpayment of benefits.  The unemployment law judge further determined that Thigpen is required to return all overpaid benefits along with a 40 percent penalty, and that he is not eligible for unemployment benefits until that entire amount, including the penalty, is repaid.  See Minn. Stat. § 268.18, subd. 2(a) (2024).  

Thigpen took a certiorari appeal, arguing in relevant part that the 40 percent penalty violates his constitutional right against excessive fines.  The court of appeals affirmed, concluding among other things that the 40 percent penalty is not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.  See Wilson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 656 N.W.2d 547, 554–55 (Minn. 2003).

The supreme court granted review of the following issue: Does Minnesota’s misrepresentation overpayment penalty violate the Minnesota and United States Constitutions’ prohibition against excessive fines?    (Department of Employment and Economic Development)

Tuesday, March 4, 2025

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Melvin Bilbro, Appellant – Case No. A24-0861:  A grand jury indicted appellant MelvinBilbro for first-degree domestic abuse murder, second-degree murder, and first-degree arson.  After a court trial, Bilbro was found guilty on all counts.  The district court sentenced Bilbro to life in prison without the possibility of release on the first-degree murder conviction, as required by statute, and a consecutive 57-month sentence for the first-degree arson conviction.  

On appeal to the supreme court, Bilbro raises the following issues: (1) whether the court must reverseBilbro’s first-degree murder conviction because the State did not prove that he engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse or that the murder was an act of domestic abuse; and (2) whether the district court violated Bilbro’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when it made factual findings purportedly authorizing the imposition of a sentence for arson.  (Ramsey County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Atravius Joseph Weeks, Appellant – Case Nos. A22-1623, A24-1497:  Following a jury trial, the district court convicted appellant Atravius Joseph Weeks of three counts of murder.  Weeks filed a direct appeal, which was stayed to allow him to pursue postconviction relief.  In his postconviction petition, he alleged that he was entitled to a new trial because he was deprived of a grand jury and a petit jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.  The district court denied his postconviction petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.

On appeal to the supreme court, Weeks raises the following issues: (1) Did the district court err by denying Weeks’ petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing where Weeks provided sufficient information to establish that he was deprived of a grand jury and a petit jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, and the lack of Black jurors in the grand jury pool and venire was the result of systemic exclusion? and (2) Did the district court err by entering convictions for three murder counts that arose out of a single behavioral incident?    (Dakota County)

Wednesday, March 5, 2025

University of Minnesota Law School

Doug Hoskin, Appellant, vs. Josh Krsnak, et al., Respondents – Case No. A23-1275:  Appellant Doug Hoskin brought a lawsuit that arose from his sale of various business interests to respondents Josh Krsnak and JT Manager, LLC.  The complaint alleged that Hoskin signed agreements that transferred his interests under duress.  The complaint also included claims for fraud.  Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Respondents relied, in part, on releases in the transfer agreements.  The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.  The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err by enforcing the releases in the transfer agreements.  

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) Was the court of appeals’ conclusion that threats to deliberately ruin another’s livelihood are “economic duress,” and categorically excluded as a foundation of duress incorrect? (2) Was the court of appeals’ determination that “economic duress” was not a defense to a contract, but was a factor to be considered in terms of whether appellant intended to release his claims, erroneous? (3) Must a litigant separately plead fraud as to each individual term of an agreement, rather than as to the agreement as a whole, in order to plead fraud and duress, as the court of appeals ruled? (4) Is the court of appeals’ holding that an appellant must address both the holdings of the district court as well as the potential arguments of its opponent in its opening brief a direct contradiction of appellate rules? (5) Does Great Plains Educational Foundation, Inc. v. Student Loan Finance Corp., 954 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. App. 2020) require the Rule 12 dismissal of fraud claims if the involved party discovered the fraudulent scheme? (6) Does a claim that a party lied, stating that he would sabotage needed financing when in fact he had no intent to do so, made to induce execution of a contract, set forth an actionable claim of fraudulent inducement?  In addition, the supreme court requested supplemental briefing from the parties on issues related to the legal standards that apply when a motion to dismiss is based on an affirmative defense.  (Hennepin County)

Thursday, March 6, 2025

Nonoral:  Nantambu Noah Kambon, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A24-1211:  Following a jury trial, appellant Nantambu Noah Kambon was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.  In February 2024, Kambon filed his second petition for postconviction relief, which alleged that the district court engaged in ex parte, unrecorded communication with the jury and that one of the jurors was subject to coercion and intimidation.  The district court denied the postconviction petition.

On appeal to the supreme court, Kambon raises the following issues: (1) Is a criminal defendant entitled to a new trial where the record establishes that the district court’s ex parte, unrecorded communication with the jury may have coerced the complaining juror into reaching a guilty verdict? and (2) Is a criminal defendant entitled to a new trial where the record establishes that one of the jurors who decided the case was subject to serious juror misconduct during deliberations and where the record establishes that the juror’s misconduct created an atmosphere of coercion and intimidation that may have influenced the lone holdout for acquittal to change her mind and vote to convict?  (Hennepin County)

Nonoral:  Milton K. Sanders, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A24-1757:  In May 1998, after a jury trial, appellant Milton K. Sanders was found guilty of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder.  He was convicted of all three charges.  He was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder and a 180-month sentence for each count of attempted murder.  Each attempted murder sentence was executed consecutively to Sanders’s life sentence for first-degree murder.  

Sanders filed a direct appeal.  In 1999, Sanders’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.  In 2000, Sanders filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied without a hearing.  In 2001, the supreme court affirmed.  In 2010, Sanders filed a second petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied without a hearing.  The supreme court affirmed.  In 2020, Sanders filed a motion for correction of his sentence.  The district court denied the motion.  Sanders did not appeal the denial of his motion.  In 2024, Sanders filed a second motion for correction of his sentence.  The district court denied the motion.  Sanders now appeals.  

On appeal to the supreme court, Sanders challenges the denial of his motion to correct his sentence.  The issues Sanders raises include: (1) whether the district court erred by denying relief; and (2) whether the doctrine of stare decisis precludes relief in this case.  (Hennepin County)

Monday, March 10, 2025

Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Nicholas Lee Hill, Respondent – Case No. A23-0560:  Respondent Nicholas Lee Hill was convicted of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct following a court trial.  The district court sentenced Hill to 180 months in prison.  

On appeal in the court of appeals, one of Hill’s claims was that his conviction must be reversed because the State failed to present any evidence on the issue of intent to corroborate his confession as required by Minn. Stat. § 634.03 (2024).  That statute provides that, “A confession of the defendant shall not be sufficient to warrant conviction without evidence that the offense charged has been committed.”  In a divided opinion, the court of appeals reversed Hill’s conviction on this ground.  Appellant State of Minnesota petitioned for discretionary review.

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) What is the State’s burden of proof under Minn. Stat. § 634.03 (2024) to sufficiently corroborate the corpus delicti of an attempt crime? and (2) When the State charges a defendant with an attempt crime, and the defendant confesses to having the intent to commit the attempted crime, has the State met its burden of proving the corpus delicti of the attempted crime under Minn. Stat. § 634.03 when it produces independent evidence showing the defendant committed multiple elements of the underlying attempted crime?  (Hennepin County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Ryan Charles Rooney, Appellant – Case No. A24-0344:  Appellant Ryan Rooney was indicted for first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder for the murder of his wife.  Prior to trial Rooney moved to suppress his statement to police.  The district court denied his motion, in part.  Rooney also sought to introduce evidence of an alleged alternative perpetrator, which the district court precluded.  After a jury trial, Rooney was found guilty of both charges.  The district court sentenced Rooney to life in prison without the possibility of release for first-degree murder, as required by statute.  

On appeal to the supreme court, Rooney raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court erroneously denied Rooney his constitutional right to present a complete defense when it precluded him from presenting evidence of an alternative perpetrator; and (2) whether the district court erroneously denied Rooney’s motion to suppress his statements to police because his statements were involuntary.  (Hennepin County)

Tuesday, March 11, 2025

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Alvin Glay, trustee for the next of kin of Unity McGill, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, vs. R.C. of St. Cloud, Inc., Appellant/Cross-Respondent – Case No. A23-1464:  Alvin Glay, as trustee for the next of kin of Unity McGill, brought a wrongful death action against R.C. of St. Cloud, Inc. (R.C.), which was the owner of Red Carpet Nightclub.  McGill died after he was attacked by other patrons at the nightclub.  The trustee claimed that R.C. was liable for McGill’s death under a theory of innkeeper negligence.  R.C. served a third-party complaint on the patrons that attacked McGill (third-party defendants), alleging that their conduct constituted an intervening and superseding cause.  The trustee amended his complaint to add direct claims for civil battery against the third-party defendants.  The case proceeded to a jury trial.  The jury found that R.C. was negligent but that its negligence was not a direct cause of McGill’s death.  The district court denied the trustee’s motion for a new trial, ruling that there was no reversible error in the jury instructions.

On appeal, the trustee raised issues relating to the jury instructions.  A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed and remanded.  The majority concluded that the district court abused its discretion by providing a jury instruction on superseding cause, which warrants a new trial.  The majority did not reach a comparative fault issue that the trustee had raised.  The dissent concluded that the district court did not err when it instructed the jury on comparative fault and superseding cause.

 

R.C. raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the court of appeals erred by failing to first consider the prerequisite issue of determining whether the jury’s verdict was supported by facts in evidence; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in substituting foreseeability in an amended innkeeper’s duty instruction and preventing the application of foreseeability in the superseding cause instruction.  The supreme court also granted review on the following issue raised in the trustee’s request for conditional cross-review: whether the liability of a negligent party may be reduced based on the fault of a party that committed an intentional tort.  (Stearns County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Clifford Robert Letourneau, III, Appellant – Case No. A24-0182:  In an amended complaint, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Clifford Letourneau in count I with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d) (2024), for a November 18, 2022 offense involving K.L.  Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(d) makes it a crime for a person to engage in sexual penetration with another person “if any of the following circumstances exists: . . .  the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1).”

Letourneau moved to dismiss count I for lack of probable cause.  The district court granted the motion, concluding that section 609.342, subdivision 1(d) requires the defendant to use force to accomplish the act of penetration and that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts that would allow a jury to determine that Letourneau used force to accomplish the act of penetration.  The court of appeals reversed.  

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether to establish that a defendant committed the crime of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), the State must prove that the defendant caused bodily harm independent of the act of sexual penetration and then “use[d] the infliction of bodily harm” to “engage in sexual penetration.”  (Crow Wing County)

Wednesday, March 12, 2025

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Hook & Ladder Apartments, L.P., Respondent, vs. Nichole Nalewaja, Appellant, John Doe, et al., Defendants – Case No. A23-1048:  Appellant Nichole Nalewaja rents an apartment from Hook & Ladder Apartments, L.P., with the assistance of a program funded by the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority (MPHA) that pays most of her rent on her behalf.  In March of 2023, Hook & Ladder filed an eviction complaint againstNalewaja, alleging that she materially breached the lease on several occasions between July and October 2022.  Nalewaja argued, as a defense to eviction, that Hook & Ladder waived its right to terminate the lease when it accepted rent payments for three months with knowledge of the alleged breaches.  Hook & Ladder argued in response that waiver does not apply when the rent is paid by a public housing agency.  

The district court rejected Nalewaja’s waiver defense and, after trial, entered judgment in favor of Hook & Ladder.  The court of appeals affirmed in relevant part.  Nalewaja petitioned for review.

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: Should Minnesota families who rely on rent subsidies receive fewer protections from eviction than those who do not?  (Hennepin County)

Nonoral:  Adrian Dominic Riley, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A24-1702:  In 1996, appellant Adrian Dominic Riley was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder. The district court imposed three consecutive life sentences.  In July 2024, Riley filed a motion to correct his sentence.  The district court awarded Riley 351 days of jail credit but denied his remaining requests for relief.  

On appeal to the supreme court, Riley raises the following issues: (1) Did the district court waive jurisdiction in this matter when it stated in its order from October 7, 2024 that, “The Carver County District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear defendant’s claims?” and (2) Did the district court commit fraud and/or plain error on behalf of State by arresting, charging, convicting and adjudicating claimant when standing and status was erroneous and based on a record from 1990 when in fact claimant had never been to prison prior to his arrest and when he was arrested on or about May 23,1995 and convicted April 25, 1996? (Carver County)