EN BANC CALENDAR

Monday, March 31, 2025

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Lisa Dawn Oliver, Respondent – Case No. A23-1062:  After a trial, a jury found respondent Lisa Oliver guilty of attempted first-degree assault-harm and second-degree assault.  The district court convicted Oliver of attempted first-degree assault-harm and imposed a sentence for that conviction.
A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed Oliver’s conviction for attempted first-degree assault-harm and remanded to the district court to enter a judgment of conviction for second-degree assault and impose a sentence for that offense. 
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether attempted first-degree assault-harm is a crime under Minnesota law.  (Dakota County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Buay David Duol, Appellant – Case Nos. A22-0748, A24-1754:  Following a jury trial, the district court convicted appellant Buay David Duol of first-degree premeditated murder.  Duol filed a direct appeal, which was stayed to allow him to pursue postconviction relief.  In his postconviction petition, he alleged that he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that purportedly showed that one of the State’s trial witnesses falsely testified that Duol confessed to the murder.  After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the postconviction petition.  Duol appealed the district court’s denial of his postconviction petition, and his appeals were consolidated.

On appeal to the supreme court, Duol’s brief presents the following issues: (1) whether Duol is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that establishes one of the State’s key witnesses falsely testified that Duol confessed to the murder; and (2) whether Duol is entitled to a new evidentiary hearing on his postconviction petition where the court deprived Duol of his right to an impartial factfinder when it independently investigated one of the postconviction witness’s criminal history and used what it learned to make credibility determinations that impacted its decision to deny Duol’s petition for relief.  (Hennepin County)
 

Tuesday, April 1, 2025

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: L.K. and A.S., Parents – Case No. A24-1296:  Respondent L.K. is the mother of twins, who were adjudicated children in need of protective services (CHIPS) and removed from her care shortly after their birth.  The twins are “Indian children”—a statutory term used in the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA).  They are eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe, namely respondent the Miskwaagamiiwi-Zaaga’iganing tribe—known in English as the Red Lake Nation.  Upon being adjudicated CHIPS, the twins were placed in foster care with appellants K.R. and N.R.  More than a year later, respondent Faribault and Martin County Human Services informed the K.R. and N.R. that the Red Lake Nation supported permanent placement of the children with their aunt, a tribal member. 

K.R. and N.R., who seek to have the twins permanently placed with them, filed an emergency motion seeking: permissive intervention; party status for the purpose of filing a custody petition; a finding that “good cause” exists to deviate from statutory placement preferences; and a declaration that ICWA and MIFPA violate the equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution by discriminating on the basis of race in, among other things, preferences for the placement of children like the twins.  K.R. and N.R. later filed a petition to establish third-party custody of the children, alleging that it is in the best interests of the children for them to be granted sole legal and physical custody.  Other parties, including respondent the children’s guardian ad litem, disputed that there was good cause to place the children with K.R. and N.R. 

The court ordered that the twins be placed with their aunt; it later denied K.R. and N.R.’s request for permissive intervention and dismissed their custody petition, concluding that the children’s present placement was in their best interests.  It did not express an opinion on the constitutional questions.  K.R. and N.R. appealed, raising multiple issues, including whether ICWA and MIFPA are unconstitutional.

The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in a divided decision.  Among other things, the court of appeals concluded that the district court had applied the wrong standard in assessing K.R. and N.R.’s intervention request and that the district court misinterpreted the law regarding third-party custody petitions.  The court of appeals also ruled that the placement preferences of MIFPA do not violate federal equal protection principles.  Instead, it concluded that those preferences are based on membership in an Indian tribe, not race, and that MIFPA satisfies the rational basis test. 

The supreme court granted review—and the case proceeded to briefing—on the constitutionality of ICWA and MIFPA.  Oral argument was held on October 1, 2024, and that appeal currently remains pending before the supreme court. 

Meanwhile, on remand from the court of appeals, the district court again considered K.R. and N.R.’s petition for third-party custody and their motion for permissive intervention.  The district court again denied the request for permissive intervention, concluding that the disadvantages of making K.R. and N.R. parties to the CHIPS proceeding would outweigh the advantages.  And it again dismissed K.R. and N.R.’s petition for third-party custody, concluding that the petition was both procedurally improper and that it failed on the merits because K.R. and N.R. were unable to prove that it is in the best interests of the children to be in their custody.  K.R. and N.R. appealed the district court’s order on remand, and the court of appeals stayed proceedings pending the supreme court’s decision in the first appeal.  K.R. and N.R. then filed a petition for accelerated review in the supreme court of the district court’s order on remand.

The supreme court granted K.R. and N.R.’s petition for accelerated review, which presents the following issues: (1) Do ICWA/MIFPA unconstitutionally deny equal protection to children they classify as “Indian” and to non-“Indian” persons seeking custody of them? (2) Does the district court violate a person’s constitutional right to petition the government and access the courts by prohibiting the person from intervening into a proceeding based on the person’s good-faith legal challenge to a governing law? (3) Did the district court err by denying petitioners’ motion for permissive intervention under Juvenile Protection Rule 34.02 based on petitioners challenging ICWA/MIFPA’s constitutionality, disagreement with a tribe on the twins’ best interests, seeking custody of the twins, bringing the twins to visit their biological mother and seeking her support, and having limited ability to see the twins after their removal? (4) May the district court dismiss an interested third party’s valid custody petition under Minn. Stat. § 257C.03 without an evidentiary hearing, by denying the party’s petition for permissive intervention under Juvenile Protection Rule 34.02? (5) Did the district court err by dismissing petitioners’ custody petition under Minn. Stat. § 257C.03 by, without an evidentiary hearing, notwithstanding Lewis-Miller v. Ross, 710 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 2006), weighing the petition’s and affidavit’s allegations against evidence apparently from other sources?  (Martin County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. James Nyonteh, Appellant – Case No. A24-0532: 
A grand jury indicted appellant James Nyonteh for first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree domestic abuse murder, second-degree intentional murder, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct for the murder of his wife and the sexual assault of his stepdaughter.  After a jury trial, Nyonteh was found guilty of all charges.  He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for first-degree premeditated murder with a consecutive 144-month sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct.

On direct appeal to the supreme court, Nyonteh raises the following issues: (1) whether Nyonteh’s convictions must be reversed because the district court erred by granting—over Nyonteh’s objection—the State’s motion to dismiss an impaneled juror who the State alleged committed misconduct by periodically falling asleep during trial; (2) whether the State’s circumstantial evidence failed to establish the victim experienced a reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm at the time of the sexual assaults; and (3) whether the district court erred by entering convictions for first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder because both constitute lesser included offenses of first-degree premeditated murder.  Additional issues raised include whether the district court erred by denying Nyonteh’s constitutional right to represent himself and whether Nyonteh had ineffective assistance of counsel.  (Hennepin County)
 

Wednesday, April 2, 2025

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

Thaleaha McBee, Appellant, vs. Team Industries, Inc, Respondent – Case No. A23-1879:  Appellant Thaleaha McBee brought a disability-discrimination claim against her former employer, Team Industries, Inc.  The case proceeded to a bench trial.  The district court ruled that information the employer submitted to the Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) for the purpose of evaluating McBee’s unemployment-benefits application was inadmissible at trial under Minn. Stat. § 268.19, subd. 2 (2024).  The district court granted judgment in favor of the employer.

The court of appeals affirmed.  The court of appeals held that “information submitted to DEED for processing an unemployment-benefits claim is absolutely privileged and thus inadmissible in another civil, administrative, or judicial proceeding.”

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: As a matter of first impression, are written records submitted in connection with an application for unemployment benefits admissible evidence?  (Becker County)

Ashcel Companies, Inc., a Minnesota Corporation, Appellant, vs. County of Dodge, Respondent – Case No. A24-0056:  In 2017, the Dodge County Board of Commissioners authorized the auction of a tax-forfeited parcel of real property located in Kasson, Minnesota.  The board’s authorization conditioned the sale on the purchaser’s demolition of an existing mobile home and septic system on the property, and that condition was published in the notices of sale listing the property.  Appellant Ashcel Companies, Inc. submitted the winning bid for the parcel, which the county then conveyed to Ashcel via a written Conveyance of Forfeited Lands that did not list any conditions of sale.  Ashcel never demolished the mobile home.  Instead, it requested that the board permit its president to occupy the home, but the board denied the request. 

Ashcel then petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus directing the county to issue a permit for construction of an onsite sewage treatment system (later amended to clarify that what it sought was a septic site evaluation, not issuance of a permit) on the property.  The county filed an answer and counterclaim, requesting that the district court compel Ashcel to comply with the condition of conveyance and to demolish the home.  Ashcel argued, among other things, that the county lacked the authority to impose the demolition condition as part of the sale. 

On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court, in relevant part, denied the county’s request to compel Ashcel to demolish the house.  The district court concluded that Minn. Stat. § 282.03 (2024), upon which the county relied for authority to impose the demolition condition, did not allow the county to place the burden of demolition on the purchaser.  On the parties’ request, the district court then certified as important and doubtful the following question: “Whether counties have the authority to impose a condition requiring demolition of pre-existing structures as a part of a tax-forfeiture sale.”  The court of appeals issued a unanimous, precedential opinion (1) agreeing that the certified question is important and doubtful, and (2) answering it in the affirmative.

The supreme court granted review of the following issue: Did the County of Dodge have the authority pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 282.03 to attach a condition to the sale of tax forfeited property requiring the buyer to demolish a building or structure on the property?  (Dodge County)
 

Thursday, April 3, 2025
University of St. Thomas Law School – Minneapolis, Minnesota

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Raenard Romalle Douglas, Appellant – Case No. A24-0385:  The State charged appellant Raenard Romalle Douglas with possession of ammunition by an ineligible person.  Douglas filed a pretrial motion to suppress the ammunition that the arresting officer found during a vehicle search.  At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified that he searched the vehicle for only one reason: the odor of burnt marijuana.  The district court issued an order suppressing the ammunition.  On appeal, the State argued the district court committed reversible error.  A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed the district court’s suppression order, citing the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to an unconstitutional warrantless search of a vehicle where law enforcement’s suspicion is based only on the smell of marijuana.  (Scott County)
 

Monday, April 7, 2025

Minnesota Judicial Center

Inquiry into the Conduct of the Honorable John P. Dehen – Case No. A24-0694: The Board on Judicial Standards filed a complaint for disciplinary action against the Honorable John P. Dehen, a district court judge for the Tenth Judicial District.  After an evidentiary hearing, a three-member panel appointed under the Rules of the Board on Judicial Standards found that Judge Dehen violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by issuing two writs of mandamus compelling court administration to increase his court reporter’s compensation despite having a conflict of interest and without giving the district court administrator a meaningful opportunity to respond.  The panel also found that Judge Dehen violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by, in five cases where he was requested as a judge to appoint guardians for at-risk juveniles, failing to follow the statutory requirements for guardianship and showing prejudice against non-citizen juveniles seeking special immigration status.  And the panel found that Judge Dehen violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by presiding over a remote juvenile court calendar while riding in a moving vehicle.  The panel recommended to the supreme court discipline including public censure and suspension from office without pay for six months.

Judge Dehen appealed to the supreme court.  The issues before the supreme court include: whether Judge Dehen committed sanctionable judicial misconduct; what judicial discipline, if any, is appropriate; whether Judge Dehen committed attorney misconduct; and what attorney discipline, if any, is appropriate.

In the Matter of the Trust Created Under Agreement by and Between Janet E. Johnson, Settlor, and Paul Johnson, Successor Trustee, dated July 15, 1998; In the Matter of the Trust Created Under Agreement by and Between Carroll A. Johnson, Settlor, and Paul Johnson, successor Trustee, dated July 15, 1998; Nancy Patock and Susan Gerhardt, Beneficiaries, Respondents, and Paul Johnson, Successor Trustee, Appellant – Case No. A24-1189:  Appellant Paul Johnson filed an interlocutory appeal in a complicated trust matter, which involved his siblings, respondents Nancy Patock and Susan Gerhardt.  Appellant challenged a district court order that removed him as trustee; appointed a successor trustee; directed him to take all necessary actions within 14 days to return real property deeded to him from the trusts; and required him to “immediately turn over all other trust assets in his possession.”  The order also directed respondents to submit reimbursement requests to the district court for approval.  The district court stated that it “retains in rem jurisdiction in a supervised administration until the trust is terminated.”

The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as premature.  The court of appeals rejected appellant’s argument that the order is immediately appealable under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b), which provides that an appeal may be taken “from an order which grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve, an injunction.”  The court of appeals determined that the “order granted requests for permanent relief in respondents’ petition.”  According to the court of appeals, respondents had not requested a temporary or permanent injunction, and the district court “did not grant such relief.”  The court of appeals therefore concluded that the order is not an order granting or denying an injunction under Rule 103.03(b).

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) Is an order removing a trustee and ordering the immediate transfer of property to a trust immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b) as characteristic of a mandatory injunction, even if not named an injunction in the order?  (2) Does an order that is characteristic of a mandatory injunction fall outside of Rule 103.03(b) if it grants permanent rather than temporary relief?  (Renville County)

E. I. duPont de Nemours and Company & Subsidiaries, Relator, vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent– Case No. A24-1601:  This tax dispute concerns relator E. I. duPont de Nemours and Company & Subsidiaries’ (DuPont) apportionment of multistate income to Minnesota related to foreign exchange contracts (FECs) in tax years 2013, 2014, and 2015.  The tax court concluded that the commissioner of revenue presented sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the general apportionment method—which relied on gross FEC receipts—is correct for those years.  The tax court further concluded that the commissioner of revenue presented sufficient evidence to require the use of his alternative apportionment method, which includes the net income from DuPont’s FECs, and not gross receipts, when calculating the apportionment factor.

On appeal to the supreme court, relator DuPont’s brief presents the following issues: (1) Did the tax court err in finding that the commissioner of revenue met his burden to establish that the standard apportionment method does not fairly reflect DuPont’s taxable net income allocable to Minnesota for the tax years in issue?  (2) Did the tax court err in finding that the commissioner of revenue met his burden to establish that his alternative apportionment method fairly reflects DuPont’s net income in Minnesota for the years in issue?  (Minnesota Tax Court)
 

Wednesday, April 9, 2025

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Ana L. Pena, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0386459 – Case No. A24-1737:  An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.

(Virtual) In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Samuel A. McCloud, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0069693 – Case No. A24-0509:  An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.