EN BANC CALENDAR

Wednesday, April 30, 2025

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Tracey Dee Keyes, Appellant – Case No. A23-1400:  The State charged Tracey Dee Keyes with several counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.  Keyes pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. At trial, the victim testified that Keyes sexually assaulted her in the bedroom and living room of her house.  Before closing arguments, Keyes requested a specific unanimity instruction, arguing that the jury needed to be instructed that their verdict would not be considered unanimous if six of them believed an act of penetration occurred in the bedroom and six of them believed an act of penetration occurred in the living room.  The district court denied Keyes’ request.  The jury found Keyes guilty as charged and the district court sentenced him to a prison term.  On appeal, Keyes argued the district court violated his right to a unanimous verdict when it denied his request for a specific-unanimity instruction.  The court of appeals affirmed Keyes’ conviction.

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether the district court reversibly erred and violated Keyes’ constitutional right to a unanimous verdict when it denied his motion to instruct the jury that it had to agree on which of two separate and distinct alleged acts constituted the “penetration” element of the criminal sexual conduct charges.  (Ramsey County)

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: B.D.D. and D.A.A., Parents – Case No. A24-1673:  Minnesota statutes provide that a district court may “terminate all rights of a parent to a child . . .with the written consent of a parent who for good cause desires to terminate parental rights.”  Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(a) (2024).  Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Protection Procedure 56.03 establishes a process by which a parent may admit to the allegations in a petition for termination of parental rights.  And in particular, Rule 56.03, subdivision 5, establishes the right to withdraw the admission, on motion, either “before a finding on the petition, for any fair and just reason,” or “at any time, upon a showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”  Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 56.03, subd. 5(a)-(b).
 
Appellant D.A.A. is the biological father of a child.  In February 2023, appellant filed in the Otter Tail County District Court an “affidavit of consent to voluntarily terminate parental rights.”  And in March 2023, the district court entered an order voluntarily terminating appellant’s parental rights to the child.  Appellant appealed that order, but the court of appeals affirmed, and the supreme court denied review.  In re Welfare of Child of B.D.D., No. A23-0489, 2024 WL 3934824 (Minn. App. Aug. 26, 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 4, 2024).
 
In October 2024, appellant submitted for filing in the district court a motion to withdraw his admission to the termination of parental rights.  The district court issued an order directing that the motion be removed from the file and returned to appellant, reasoning that appellant’s parental rights had been terminated and that he was no longer a party, and therefore he did not have the right to bring a motion in the matter.  Appellant appealed that order, and the court of appeals affirmed.  It reasoned that appellant’s request to withdraw his admission is “functionally a challenge to the order terminating parental rights,” and that notwithstanding the “at any time” language in Rule 56.03, subdivision 5(b), a party may not use that rule “as a vehicle to challenge an order terminating parental rights long after the time to file an appeal, posttrial motion, and motion for relief has expired.”  The court concluded that the termination of appellant’s parental rights deprived him of standing to appear at any further legal proceeding concerning the child, and it therefore dismissed the appeal.
 
The supreme court granted review of the following issues: (1) Does appellant have standing to file and should he have an opportunity to be heard for his Rule 56.03 Motion to Withdraw Admission which is guaranteed by the rules of this court “at any time upon a showing of manifest injustice”?  (2) Does Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 21 supersede the clear language of Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 56.03 which allows it to be filed at any time upon a showing of a manifest injustice?  (3) Should this issue be remanded to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to address the merits of the appellant’s claim that a manifest injustice has occurred?  (Otter Tail County)

Thursday, May 1, 2025

Highland Park High School – Saint Paul, Minnesota

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Anthony Blake Swope – Case No. A24-0128:  In September 2022, Scott County filed a petition seeking for Anthony Swope to be civilly committed as mentally ill and dangerous.  Under Chapter 253B, the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act, Swope was entitled to court-appointed counsel.  Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 2c (2024).  Accordingly, the district court appointed a law firm to represent Swope during the civil commitment proceedings.  This law firm had a contract with Scott County to provide court-appointed representation to individuals in civil commitment proceedings. 
Later in September 2022, the district court ordered that Swope be civilly committed.  The statute at that time required that Swope be placed in a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court’s commitment order.  Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1 (2022).  Swope was not placed in a treatment program within 48 hours, however, but instead remained in the Scott County jail.  One month later, Swope remained in jail.  His court-appointed attorney petitioned the district court for writs of mandamus or habeas corpus, attempting to secure Swope’s placement in a treatment program. 

In November 2022, Swope was placed in a treatment program.  The law firm billed Scott County for their work in Swope’s case under their contract with the county to provide court-appointed representation.  Scott County refused to pay for the law firm’s work on the petitions for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus related to his untimely transfer to a treatment program.  The law firm then filed a motion to compel payment in district court.  Scott County opposed the motion, arguing that the petitions for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus were outside the scope of Chapter 253B, under which Swope had a statutory right to court-appointed counsel and the county had an obligation to pay for Swope’s court-appointed counsel.  The district court granted the law firm’s motion and ordered Scott County to pay the law firm. 

Scott County appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  The court of appeals concluded that a petition for a writ of mandamus or habeas corpus is not a civil commitment proceeding under Chapter 253B, accordingly the district court did not have authority to order Scott County to pay for attorney fees related to those actions.  The law firm petitioned for review. 

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: Does the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act provide a person found to be mentally ill and civilly committed the right to court-appointed counsel, and for that counsel to be compensated, in extraordinary writ proceedings to enforce their right to transfer from jail to treatment within 48 hours and/or receive treatment under the Act?  (Scott County)
 

Monday, May 5, 2025

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Benda for Common-sense, a Minnesota Non-Profit Corporation, et al., Appellants, vs. Denise Anderson, Director of Rice County Property and Tax Elections, Respondent, Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon, Respondent – Case No. A23-0302:  Appellants Benda for Common-sense and Kathleen Hagen initiated an action against respondent Denise Anderson, the Director of Rice County Property Tax and Elections, by a three-count complaint and petition in August 2022.  Count III petitioned to correct alleged errors and omissions under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44 (2024), related to the electronic voting system used by Rice County in the November 2022 general election.  Appellants did not serve the petition on any candidate listed on the ballot in Rice County for the November 2022 general election.  Respondent Secretary of State Steve Simon filed a notice of intervention related to count III. 

Respondents filed motions to dismiss.  On January 17, 2023, the district court issued an order dismissing appellants’ complaint and petition.  As for count III, the court found it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. 

The court of appeals affirmed.  It concluded that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide count III because appellants did not serve a copy of the petition on all candidates running for offices in the November 2022 election, as required by Minn. Stat. § 204B.44(b). 

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether a petitioner under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44(a)(4) must serve all candidates running for office at the commencement of the action.  (Rice County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Erick Dewaun Haynes, Appellant – Case Nos. A24-1039, A24-1604:  Appellant Erick Dewaun Haynes pleaded guilty to first-degree felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability.  The district court sentenced Haynes to life in prison with the possibility of release and ordered $7,500 in restitution.  The State later filed a motion to amend the restitution order to include losses for travel and funeral expenses claimed by the victim’s relatives.  Haynes did not object to the State’s motion.  The district court granted the State’s motion.

On appeal to the supreme court, Haynes’ brief presents the following issue: whether the district court abused its discretion and violated Minnesota's restitution statute by ordering Haynes to pay restitution to parties for travel and funeral expenses without finding that the parties were all “family members” under the statutory definition, and without finding that their travel to preliminary hearings was a covered loss under the statute.  (Hennepin County)
 

Tuesday, May 6, 2025

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Dennis Walsh, Appellant, vs. City of Orono, Minnesota, et al., Respondents – Case No. A25-0354:  On November 12, 2024, Matt Johnson resigned from the Orono City Council, effective immediately.  Johnson’s term would have expired on December 31, 2026.  Later in November 2024, appellant Dennis Walsh, who was then the Orono mayor, appointed someone to fill Johnson’s seat on the City Council. 

On February 10, 2025, the Orono City Council adopted Ordinance No. 307.  It states that “after a vacancy is declared on the City Council and a person appointed to fill the vacancy, a special election shall be held pursuant to Minnesota Statues Section 412.02, subd. 2a if there are more than 365 days remaining until the next general election,” and it authorizes the City Council to determine the date for such special elections.  The City Council also adopted another ordinance calling for a special election to be held on May 13, 2025, for Johnson’s seat on the City Council. 

On February 15, 2025, Walsh filed a petition under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44 (2024), against respondents City of Orono and Christine Luisiana, the Orono City Clerk.  The petition sought an order cancelling the May 13, 2025 special election.  The district court denied the petition.

The supreme court granted accelerated review on the following issues:  (1) whether, under Minn. Stat. § 412.02, subd. 2a (2024), and Minn. Const. art. VIII, § 5, the City of Orono wrongfully and erroneously ordered a special election for a city council seat already filled by mayoral appointment by retroactively applying a special-election ordinance enacted months after the appointment; and (2) whether the district court erred by denying appellant’s petition under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44 to quash the City of Orono’s special-election resolution and cancel the planned May 13, 2025 special election.  (Hennepin County)

State of Minnesota Office of the Attorney General, Appellant, vs. Madison Equities, Inc., Respondent – Case No. A24-0107:  Appellant State of Minnesota Office of the Attorney General (AGO) brought a lawsuit against respondent Madison Equities, Inc.  The complaint included a claim for violation of the overtime provisions of the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act (MFLSA), Minn. Stat. §§ 177.21–.35 (2022).  The district court dismissed the MFLSA claim as time-barred under the 2-year statute of limitations for wage-hour violations in Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5) (2024). 

On appeal, the AGO argued that the running of the statute of limitations was tolled while Madison Equities sought to quash the AGO’s civil investigative demand (CID) relating to potential wage-hour violations.  The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the MFLSA claim as time barred, citing “a lack of Minnesota caselaw that has applied tolling in this type of circumstance.”  The court of appeals also rejected the AGO’s reliance on equitable tolling and the 6-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 541.05 (2024).

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether the limitations period applicable to the AGO’s MFLSA claim was tolled during the pendency of the CID litigation; and (2) whether recovery of remedies uniquely available to the AGO for wage-theft violations are subject to a 6-year limitations period.  (Ramsey County)
 

Wednesday, May 7, 2025

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, vs. Seneca Warrior Steeprock, Respondent/Cross-Appellant – Case No. A23-0875: During the afternoon of December 29, 2020, a man was shot inside an apartment in Duluth.  The police investigation indicated there was more than one shooter.  On December 31, 2020, law enforcement located what they believed was the victim’s car in a parking lot.  Law enforcement saw respondent/cross-appellant Seneca Steeprock and Alexia Cutbank walk toward the car.  Law enforcement arrested Cutbank.  Steeprock ran down a snowy hill and was arrested at the bottom of the hill. 

On January 2, 2021, using a canine that specialized in looking for firearms, an officer found a firearm buried in the snow near where Steeprock was arrested.  Testing determined that this gun fired eight of the 15 cartridge cases found in the bedroom where the man was shot and that there was DNA on the gun.

The State charged Steeprock with attempted first-degree premediated murder and felon in possession of a firearm.  Cutbank was also charged in connection with the shooting. 
During pretrial proceedings, the State moved for an order under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02, subd. 2(1)(f), requiring Steeprock to permit the taking of saliva for the purposes of comparative DNA analysis.  The district court granted the State’s motion and issued an order directing Steeprock to provide a saliva sample under Rule 9.02, subdivision 2(1)(f).  Using DNA from Steeprock’s saliva, a forensic analysis determined that Steeprock’s DNA was on the gun.

A jury trial was held.  At the trial, Cutbank did not testify, but the district court allowed the State to admit into evidence recordings of telephone conversations Cutbank had with her brother and text messages she sent a friend as statements against her interest under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).  The jury found Steeprock guilty of both counts. 

The court of appeals reversed Steeprock’s convictions. 

The supreme court granted review on the following issues in the State’s petition for review: When seeking a DNA sample from a charged defendant, can an order for a saliva sample be issued under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02, or is a search warrant necessary?  And if there was error in not obtaining a warrant here, is a new trial required?  The supreme court also granted review on the following issues in Steeprock’s request for cross-review: (1) whether the district court prejudicially erred by denying Steeprock’s motion for an accomplice-corroboration instruction because Cutbank’s out-of-court statements were the testimony of an accomplice that Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2024) required to be corroborated in order to convict Steeprock; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting Cutbank’s out-of-court statements under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) because each of her statements was not sufficiently against her interest that a reasonable person would not have made the statement unless they believed it was true.  (St. Louis County)

Cindy Ludwig, Respondent, vs. Dakota County, Self-Insured by SFM Risk Solutions, Relator – Case No. A24-1989:  Respondent Cindy Ludwig worked for respondent Dakota County, performing clerical, computer, and customer service work on site from 8:00 a.m. – 4:30 p.m.  Due to COVID-19, she began working at home in 2020 and took all her office equipment and her office chair home.  Ludwig was directed to return to work in the office on September 8, 2021.  To prepare for her return, the night before she was scheduled to return to work in the office, she placed the work equipment she had brought home in a bin.  The next morning, she planned to leave home earlier than usual to have all her equipment at the office set up by the start of her workday at 8:00 a.m.  At 7:15 a.m., Ludwig opened the door of her vehicle, pushed the loaded bin into the driver’s side back seat, and fell backward onto the lawn, injuring her back. 

The compensation judge concluded that Ludwig’s injuries were not covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act.  As relevant here, the compensation judge recognized that employee injuries that occur while commuting to and from work are generally not compensable and concluded that the special errand exception recognized under the law was inapplicable here.  The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed in part, concluding that Ludwig’s injury occurred during a special errand while she was in the process of returning office equipment to the employer by request before her regular shift, and therefore arose out of and in the course of her employment. 

On appeal to the supreme court, relator’s brief presents the following issue:  whether the WCCA erred in applying the special-errand exception to the employee’s September 8, 2021 injury.  (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)