EN BANC CALENDAR

Monday, June 2, 2025

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

Humana MarketPoint, Inc., Relator, vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A25-0058:  In 2016, relator Humana MarketPoint, Inc. (Humana), filed a combined Minnesota corporate franchise tax return on behalf of itself and other Humana subsidiaries.  In 2021, Humana requested a tax refund by amending its 2016 tax return.  Respondent Commissioner of Revenue denied the refund claim.

Under Minnesota Statutes § 290.02 (2024), corporations owe a franchise tax measured by net income.  Under Minnesota Statutes § 290.191 (2018), “net income from a trade or business carried on partly within and partly without this state must be apportioned to this state.”  Net income is calculated using a Sales Factor, which is essentially the value of sales, earnings, and receipts from the ordinary course of business in Minnesota divided by the value of all sales, earnings, and receipts:

          Minnesota Sales
                                       = Sales Factor
          Everywhere Sales

Humana’s request to amend its 2016 tax return concerns pharmacy benefits management (PBM) services.  One of Humana’s subsidiaries, Humana Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. (HPS), entered into a PBM agreement with another Humana subsidiary, Humana Insurance Company (HIC).  In its request to amend its 2016 tax return, Humana contended that the numerator of the Sales Factor should be zero because all of the relevant receipts were from services received in Wisconsin, where HIC is headquartered.  The Commissioner contended that the numerator of the Sales Factor should be $279,726,839, as stated in Humana’s 2016 tax return.  That figure was based on receipts sourced to Minnesota on a claim-by-claim basis for HIC plan members with a Minnesota address.

Humana appealed the Commissioner’s denial of the 2016 refund claim in Ramsey County District Court, which was transferred to the Minnesota Tax Court.  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the tax court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner.  The threshold issue before the tax court related to the interpretation and application of the apportionment-of-income provision in Minnesota Statutes § 290.191, subdivision 5(j).

On appeal to the supreme court, Humana presents the following issues: (1) Did the tax court err in concluding that there was a “complete lack of proof on an essential element” of Humana’s claim that the Commissioner’s tax order “was erroneous, unlawful, and contrary to Minnesota Statutes § 290.191, subdivision 5(j)”?  (2) For purposes of Minnesota Statutes § 290.191, subdivision 5(j), does receiving a service mean “taking possession of,” “acquiring,” or “directly experiencing” the service, or can services be “received” by an indirect beneficiary of the service that does not take possession of, acquire, or directly experience the service?  (3) Are PBM services provided by HPS received in Wisconsin at the location of the PBM services’ direct recipient, HIC, or in Minnesota at the location of the PBM services’ indirect beneficiaries, HIC’s customers?  (4) Alternatively, if it is not readily determinable where PBM services provided by HPS were received, must such PBM services be sourced to HIC’s ordering office in Wisconsin?  (Minnesota Tax Court)

Nonoral:  State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin, Appellant – Case No. A24-0859:  A grand jury indicted appellant Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin with several offenses, including first-degree felony murder.  The indictment alleged that Griffin was criminally liable either as a principle or as an aider and abettor.  Following a jury trial, Griffin was convicted of first-degree felony murder.  On direct appeal, Griffin argued the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he shot the victim with an intent to kill.  The supreme court affirmed his conviction, concluding that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove Griffin shot the victim with an intent to kill, including the presence of the victim’s blood on Griffin’s shorts and shoes and the absence of blood on the clothing of his accomplice. 

In September 2023, Griffin filed a preliminary application for relief under a 2023 session law that entitles persons convicted of first- or second-degree felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability, who are in state custody or under court supervision, to petition to have their convictions reviewed and vacated if they can establish certain facts, including that they “did not cause the death of a human being.”  Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864–68 (the Act).  In support of his preliminary application, Griffin argued the evidence the State presented at trial was insufficient to prove he shot the victim with an intent to kill, in part because the trial testimony of his accomplice was not credible.  The district court denied Griffin’s preliminary application, citing the analysis of the supreme court on direct appeal that concluded the State had presented sufficient evidence to prove Griffin shot the victim with an intent to kill.

On appeal to the supreme court, Griffin's brief presents the following issue: whether the district court committed reversible error when it denied Griffin’s preliminary application under the Act.  (Hennepin County)
 

Tuesday, June 3, 2025

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

In the Matter of the Minnesota Racing Commission’s Approval of Running Aces Casino, Hotel & Racetrack’s Request to Amend its Plan of Operation – Case No. A23-1738: In a certiorari appeal, appellant/cross-respondent Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community (Community) challenged the 2023 decision of respondent Minnesota Racing Commission (Commission) to approve an amended plan of operation for a card club operated by respondent/cross-appellant North Metro Harness Initiative, LLC, d/b/a Running Aces Casino, Hotel & Racetrack (Running Aces).  Running Aces sought to add an electronic dealer table to its card club, which would be linked to additional player stations.
The Community argued on appeal that the Commission’s decision unlawfully permits Running Aces to operate gambling devices and video games of chance.  See Minn Stat. § 299L.07 (2024) (regulating gambling devices); Minn. Stat. § 609.75, subds. 4, 8 (2024) (defining “gambling device” and “video game of chance”).  The Community also argued that the additional player stations exceed the statutory 80-table limit for card clubs.  See Minn. Stat. § 240.30, subd. 8(1) (2024).  The Commission and Running Aces asserted that the Community lacks standing to challenge the floor-plan approval of a competitor.  

The court of appeals affirmed.  As an initial matter, the court of appeals determined that the Community has standing to challenge the Commission’s decision.  On the merits, the court of appeals concluded that the Commission did not err by declining to treat the electronic table games (ETGs) as gambling devices or video games of chance, and the amended floor plan does not exceed the number of tables the Commission may approve.  The court of appeals also concluded that the Commission’s “approval was neither arbitrary and capricious nor unsupported by substantial evidence.”  Finally, the court of appeals rejected the Community’s argument that the Commission’s approval rested “on an unpromulgated and therefore unenforceable rule.”

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether ETGs are “gambling devices” or “video games of chance” that may not be operated at card clubs; (2) whether the court of appeals erred by allowing the Commission to expand the number of tables at the card club; (3) whether the Commission unlawfully approved ETGs through an unpromulgated rule; and (4) whether the Community has standing to bring a certiorari challenge to a competitor’s license.  (Minnesota Racing Commission)

Paula Kay Brunner, Respondent, vs. Post Consumer Brands and Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Relators – Case No. A25-0225:  Respondent Paula Brunner was an employee of Post Consumer Brands.  During the course of her employment, she developed a shoulder injury.  The employer and its insurer (relators), after first admitting the shoulder condition was work related, denied the claim.  Brunner’s health insurance provider, Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield (Anthem), then paid Brunner’s medical bills for her shoulder condition.
 
Brunner filed a workers’ compensation claim petition and also served potential intervenors, including Anthem, with notices of their right to intervene.  Anthem responded by letter but did not file a motion to intervene.  The compensation judge concluded that Anthem did not file a timely motion to intervene and further ordered that Brunner could not bring a direct claim for the medical bills Anthem paid.  The compensation judge also ordered Anthem’s interest extinguished and that Anthem may not collect or attempt to collect that extinguished interest from the employee, employer, insurer, or any government program.
 
Brunner appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA).  The WCCA concluded that notwithstanding the requirement for timely intervention under Minn. Stat. § 176.361, subd. 2 (2024), another statute—Minn. Stat. § 176.191, subd. 3 (2024)—requires that once compensability is determined, “the workers’ compensation insurer shall be ordered to reimburse the insurer” that made the payments.  Relying on section 176.191, subdivision 3, the WCCA reversed the decision of the compensation judge and ordered relators to reimburse Anthem for all payments made to cure and relieve the employee’s shoulder condition.
 
On appeal to the supreme court, relators’ brief presents the following issues: (1) Did the WCCA commit reversible error, exceeding its jurisdiction and authority, when it unilaterally interpreted Minn. Stat. § 176.191 as “prevailing over” and “overriding” the provisions and requirements of Minn. Stat. § 176.361, while failing to apply well-established case law and statutory authority regarding the rules and purpose of statutory interpretation, and utilizing their unsupported interpretation as a basis to reverse the compensation judge’s decision to extinguish the potential interest of Anthem?  (2) Did the WCCA commit reversible error by disregarding the mandatory and unambiguous requirements of Minn. Stat. § 176.361, subd. 2?  (3) Did the WCCA err in reversing the compensation judge’s order that the intervention interests of Anthem are extinguished for failure to timely intervene under Minn. Stat. § 176.361, and that Anthem cannot collect or attempt to collect from the employee, employer, insurer or any government program, when the undisputed evidence in the record established that Anthem did not intervene, attempt to intervene, and declined the opportunity to intervene in this claim?  (4) Whether the WCCA erred in reversing the compensation judge’s determination denying Brunner’s request to bring a direct claim for reimbursement of the payments made by Anthem?  (5) Did the WCCA commit reversible error in ordering relators to directly reimburse Anthem, in contradiction to the legislatively established provision in Minn. Stat. § 176.361, subd. 2, preventing an extinguished potential intervenor from collecting payment from any party or governmental agency?  (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
 

Wednesday, June 4, 2025

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

Lee Michael Scheurer, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, vs. Douglas Shrewsbury as Special Administrator for the Estate of Ann Maland, Deceased, Respondent/Cross-Appellant – Case No. A24-0106:  This appeal concerns a negligence action brought by appellant/cross-respondent Lee Scheurer against respondent/cross-appellant Douglas Shrewsbury as Special Administrator for the Estate of Ann Maland.  A jury awarded damages to Scheurer.  The issues here concern the accrual and calculation of preverdict interest under Minn. Stat. § 549.09 (2024).  The district court issued an order granting $53,320 in preverdict interest.  The district court determined that (1) preverdict interest began to accrue on the date the action was commenced, and (2) preverdict interest should be calculated on the amount of the judgment after applying collateral sources to the jury verdict.

The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s determination that preverdict interest accrues from the time of the notice of claim only if the action was commenced within two years of the notice of claim, “regardless of whether there was a settlement offer.”  But the court of appeals reversed the district court’s calculation of preverdict interest, holding that “a district court must calculate preverdict interest on jury verdicts for past medical expenses and past wage loss before reducing the jury award by collateral-source payments.”

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether the offer-counteroffer provision of Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1, requires a prevailing party whose offer was closer to the judgment or award to also commence the action within two years of the notice of claim for preverdict interest to begin on the date of the notice; and (2) whether a trial court must grant preverdict, prejudgment interest on the full amount of the jury’s verdict under Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1, when a substantial part of the jury’s verdict constitutes collateral sources that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.  (Blue Earth County)

Erin Lindsay, Respondent, vs. Minneapolis Public School District (SSD1), Self-Insured, Relator – Case No. A25-0193:  Respondent Erin Lindsay was employed by relator Minneapolis Public School District as a math teacher.  On February 9, 2023, she sustained an injury to her left knee while participating in an after-school student basketball practice at the request of five students.

The parties dispute whether the injury is compensable—specifically, whether the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, and whether the injury is barred by Minnesota Statutes § 176.021, subdivision 9 (2024), which provides that “[i]njuries incurred while participating in voluntary recreational programs sponsored by the employer, including health promotion programs, athletic events, parties, and picnics, do not arise out of and in the course of the employment even though the employer pays some or all of the cost of the program.”  This exclusion does not apply if the employee was ordered or assigned to participate in the program by the employer.  Id.
 
The compensation judge concluded that the preponderance of the evidence established that respondent’s injury arose out of and in the course of her employment as a teacher.  The compensation judge also concluded that the preponderance of the evidence established that the injury is not barred by Minnesota Statutes § 176.021, subdivision 9.  The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed the compensation judge’s award in favor of respondent.
 
On appeal to the supreme court, relator’s brief presents the following issues: (1) Did the compensation judge err as a matter of law when determining that respondent’s claimed personal injury of February 9, 2023, was not barred by operation of Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subd. 9?  (2) Did the compensation judge err as a matter of fact and law in determining that respondent’s claimed personal injury of February 9, 2023, occurred in the course and scope of her employment, and were the factual findings clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted?  (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
 

Thursday, June 5, 2025

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Deshon Israel Bonnell, Appellant– Case No. A24-1463:  A grand jury indicted appellant Deshon Israel Bonnell with several offenses, including first-degree premeditated murder.  At a contested omnibus hearing, the district court considered Bonnell’s motion to suppress Facebook records and his squad-car statement, as well as respondent State of Minnesota’s motion to admit immediate episode and Spreigl evidence.  The district court denied Bonnell’s motion and granted the State’s motion.  Following a jury trial, Bonnell was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder.
On appeal to the supreme court, Bonnell’s brief presents the following issues: (1) whether it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to admit Facebook records where the search warrant did not satisfy the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment; (2) whether it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to admit Bonnell’s squad‑car statement when his will was overborne by coercion and trickery, and to admit the derivative evidence; (3) whether it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to admit immediate episode and Spreigl evidence when they had no relation to the charged offense and were unfairly prejudicial; and (4) whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict, based on two untrustworthy accomplices, no confession from Bonnell, and circumstantial DNA evidence permitting a reasonable inference other than guilt.  (Saint Louis County)

Nonoral:  Ricky Darnell Waiters, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A25-0182:  In 2018, a jury found Ricky Waiters guilty of several offenses, including first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree felony murder, and drive-by shooting.  In 2019, the supreme court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. In 2020 and 2021, Waiters sought postconviction relief in numerous filings, and the district court denied relief.

In November 2023, Waiters filed the current petition for postconviction relief, seeking a new trial.  His claims included ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and insufficient evidence.  In January 2025, the district court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing.  The district court concluded that the claims were either procedurally barred or time barred. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented include: (1) whether Waiters received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; (2) whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (3) whether the district court abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings; and (4) whether the evidence is sufficient to support Waiters’ convictions.  (Winona County)