Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
May 2011
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, May 2, 2011
Judicial Center, Courtroom 300
Paula Savela, Appellant v. City of Duluth, Respondent – Case No. A09-2093: Appellant Paula Savela sued respondent the City of Duluth, individually and as a representative of a class, alleging that the City had breached its contractual obligations for health and medical benefits owed to former city employees who had retired under certain collective bargaining agreements between January 1, 1983 and December 31, 2006. The district court certified the case as a class action pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 23.02. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. It ruled the relevant contractual language was not ambiguous and that the City could change the class members’ health and insurance benefits to a level that is consistent with benefits provided under collective bargaining agreements that apply to current city employees. The court sua sponte dismissed appellant’s claim for promissory estoppel. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the City on the breach of contract claim, but reversed the dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim because the issue was not properly before the district court.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether, as a matter of law, the relevant contractual language (1) allows the City to modify the class members’ health insurance benefits to a level that is consistent with benefits provided to current city employees, or (2) fixes class members’ health insurance benefits at the level specified in the contracts in effect on the date of the each employee’s retirement. (St. Louis County)
State of Minnesota, Respondent v. Elizabeth Mary Hawes, Appellant – Case No. A10-1225: Appellant Elizabeth Hawes was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. Hawes filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, which the district court denied. On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to support Hawes’ conviction for first-degree murder; (2) whether Hawes is entitled to a new trial because the district court excluded testimony regarding out-of-court statements Hawes’ brother made to her; and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Hawes’ motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. (Anoka County)
Tuesday, May 3, 2011
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol
State of Minnesota, Appellant v. Gerald Alan Hanson, Respondent – Case No. A09-2124: A jury found respondent Gerald Hanson guilty of several offenses. The court of appeals reversed Hanson’s conviction for first-degree possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether there was sufficient evidence to support Hanson’s conviction for first-degree possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell. (Lyon County)
Robert McCaughtry, et al., Appellants v. City of Red Wing, Respondent – Case No. A10-332: In February 2005, respondent City of Red Wing adopted a rental inspection and licensing ordinance as part of its revised Housing Maintenance Code (“HMC”) and Rental Dwelling Licensing Code (“RDLC”). The RDLC requires rental property owners to have their properties inspected for compliance with the HMC. Under the current version of the ordinance, an administrative warrant is required before the City may inspect a nonconsenting tenant’s unit or the common areas of a nonconsenting landlord’s property.
Appellants are landlords and tenants who have objected to the City’s request to inspect their rental properties. Two previous applications for an administrative warrant were challenged by appellants, and the district court denied the applications.
Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action against the City, challenging the constitutionality of the City’s rental inspection ordinance. Appellants also argued that the City’s third application for an administrative warrant failed to satisfy minimum federal constitutional standards for housing inspections. The district court denied the City’s third application for an administrative warrant and dismissed appellants’ declaratory judgment claims after concluding that appellants lacked standing under Minnesota law to challenge the constitutionality of the rental inspection ordinance. The court of appeals affirmed the district court.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether appellants’ claims are justiciable under the Minnesota Declaratory Judgment Act because the ripening seeds of a justiciable controversy are present; and (2) whether appellants have standing to challenge respondent’s Rental Dwelling Licensing Code. (Goodhue County)
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Lawrence Walter Ulanowski, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0316015 – Case No. A10-819: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based upon the facts of the matter.
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Jo M. Fairbairn, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 28137 – Case No. A10-977: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based upon the facts of the matter.
Thursday, May 5, 2011
Eden Prairie High School
State of Minnesota, Appellant v. Melissa Jean Crawley, Respondent– Case No. A09-1795: Appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent Melissa Crawley with falsely reporting police misconduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2(a)(2) (2010), and falsely reporting a crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 1 (2010). Crawley filed a motion to dismiss the charge of falsely reporting police misconduct because the statute violates the First Amendment’s prohibition against viewpoint discrimination. The district court denied the motion, and a jury found Crawley guilty of both counts. A divided court of appeals reversed Crawley’s conviction for falsely reporting police misconduct after concluding Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2, violates the First Amendment.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2(a)(2), is a constitutional content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction of defamation of a public figure; (2) whether Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2(a)(2), is a constitutional content-based restriction on speech because it satisfies the exceptions for content-based restrictions on speech articulated in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1991); and (3) whether the Minnesota Court of Appeals erred in addressing the constitutionality of all of Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2, rather than the narrow issue raised in the district court of whether Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2(a)(2), is an unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction on speech. (Winona County)
Monday, May 9, 2011
Judicial Center, Courtroom 300
Marlow Timberland, LLC, Relator v. County of Lake, Respondent – Case No. A11-138: In 2008, relator Marlow Timberland, LLC, purchased over 39,000 acres of real estate located in respondent Lake County. This property includes 744 separate tax parcels located throughout the County. In 2008, Marlow Timberland filed a property tax petition that included all 744 tax parcels located in four townships and two unorganized territories. In 2009, Marlow Timberland filed four tax petitions for taxes payable in 2009. Marlow Timberland paid only the first-half installment of the payable 2009 taxes on the parcels. In 2010, Marlow Timberland filed four tax petitions for taxes payable in 2010. Marlow Timberland has paid no taxes for the payable year 2010.
The 2009 and 2010 petitions were automatically dismissed for failure to pay the taxes due for those years, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 278.03 (2010). The County filed a motion to dismiss the 2008 petition, arguing that the petition violated Minn. Stat. § 278.02 (2010) because it contained multiple parcels that were not in the same town. Marlow Timberland then filed a motion to reinstate the 2009 and 2010 petitions. The Minnesota Tax Court granted the County’s motion to dismiss the 2008 petition and denied Marlow Timberland’s motion to reinstate the 2009 and 2010 petitions.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the tax court erred in failing to permit Marlow Timberland to amend its 2008 petition to comply with Minn. Stat. § 278.02; (2) whether the tax court erred in concluding that the 2009 and 2010 petitions should not be reinstated because Marlow Timberland established it was entitled to relief pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02; and (3) whether Minn. Stat. § 278.03 provides the excusive remedy for automatically dismissed property tax petitions. (Tax Court)
NONORAL: Toby Earl Johnson, petitioner, Appellant v. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A10-1540: Based on a guilty plea, appellant Toby Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison in 2000. In 2001, Johnson filed a petition for postconviction relief, asking to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. The supreme court affirmed the district court’s denial of Johnson’s postconviction petition. Johnson v. State, 641 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. 2002).
In 2010, Johnson filed a motion to correct or reduce his sentence. Johnson argued his sentence was invalid because his guilty plea was not accurate or intelligent and because the district court referred to the second-degree murder statute when sentencing him to life in prison. He also argued that his sentence should be reduced because it was disproportionately long. The district court granted Johnson’s motion to correct his sentence in part, concluding that it made a clerical mistake by referring to the wrong statute when it pronounced sentence, and it ordered that the record should be corrected to reflect that Johnson was sentenced under the first-degree murder statute. The district court denied Johnson’s motion to correct his sentence with respect to his remaining requests for relief.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are raised: (1) whether Johnson’s claims are procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976); (2) whether the interests of justice require a reduction of Johnson’s sentence and conviction to second-degree murder; and (3) whether the supreme court should resentence Johnson because he received a disproportionately long sentence. (McLeod County)
Tuesday, May 10, 2011
Judicial Center, Courtroom 300
State of Minnesota, Respondent v. Thomas Allen Zais, Appellant – Case No. A10-1020: Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Thomas Zais with second- and third-degree DWI, obstruction of legal process, and disorderly conduct. Prior to trial, the State indicated that it would call Zais’ wife as a witness, and Zais objected to her testifying against him. The district court ruled that the marital-privilege statute, Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(a) (2010), precluded the State from calling Zais’ wife as a witness. The State filed a pretrial appeal of the district court’s order, and the court of appeals reversed the district court. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the crime exception in the martial-privilege statute applies to a prosecution for disorderly conduct. (Hennepin County)
NONORAL: John Miles, petitioner, Appellant v. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A10-2168: Appellant John Miles was convicted of first-degree murder in 1997. The supreme court affirmed Miles’ conviction on direct appeal. State v. Miles, 585 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1998). In 2010, Miles filed a petition for postconviction relief based on a claim of newly discovered evidence. The district court summarily denied the petition for postconviction relief. On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Miles’ petition for postconviction relief when Miles presented the testimony of a previously unknown witness to the crime for which Miles was convicted who states Miles was not the killer; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Miles’ petition for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing on his claim of newly discovered evidence. (Hennepin County)
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
Judicial Center, Courtroom 300
George E. Frandsen, Respondent v. Ford Motor Company, Self-Insured, Relator – Case No. A11-126: Respondent George Frandsen sustained an injury while working for relator Ford Motor Company in November 2004 and filed a workers’ compensation claim. The parties stipulated that Frandsen was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his work injury. A stipulation for settlement was approved by a compensation judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings in April 2007. In September 2010, relator filed a petition with the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals to allow discontinuance of Frandsen’s permanent total disability benefits. Relator argued the benefits should be discontinued on the grounds that Frandsen was 67 years old and no longer entitled to benefits, because he was presumed retired under to Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4 (2010). The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals denied relator’s request. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals erred by concluding that relator had waived the right to stop paying permanent total disability benefits, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4, by not expressly reserving that right in the stipulation for settlement. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)