EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
March 2012
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

            State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Denon Anthony Rhoads, Appellant – Case No. A10-1568:  Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Denon Rhoads with second-degree burglary.  A public defender was appointed to represent Rhoads.  At his second-court appearance, Rhoads waived his right to counsel and began representing himself.  Several months later, the State filed an amended complaint and added a charge of first-degree burglary.  After a court trial, Rhoads was convicted of first-degree burglary.  The court of appeals affirmed Rhoads’ conviction.

            On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Rhoads’ conviction must be reversed because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel on the charge of first-degree burglary, which was added after Rhoads had waived his right to counsel.  (Ramsey County)
 

            Bruce Nelson, Relator vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A11-2015:  Respondent the Commissioner of Revenue assessed relator Bruce Nelson with personal liability pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 270C.56 (2010), for the unpaid petroleum and sales taxes owned by Twin Cities Avanti Stores, LLC (Avanti).  Nelson filed a tax court action challenging the Commissioner’s personal liability assessments against him, contending, in part, that the Commissioner was equitably estopped from pursuing him personally for Avanti’s unpaid taxes.  The Commissioner filed a motion for summary judgment, and Nelson filed a motion to compel the depositions of certain Department of Revenue officials in support of his equitable estoppel defense.    The tax court denied Nelson’s motion to compel, and it granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.

            On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the Minnesota Tax Court erroneously entered summary judgment for the Commissioner despite Nelson’s request for additional discovery to develop an estoppel defense.  (Minnesota Tax Court)

            Scott L. Stevens, Relator vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A11-2020:  Respondent the Commissioner of Revenue assessed relator Scott Stevens with personal liability pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 270C.56 (2010), for the unpaid petroleum and sales taxes owned by Twin Cities Avanti Stores, LLC (Avanti).  Nelson filed a tax court action challenging the Commissioner’s personal liability assessments against him.  The tax court granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.

            Three issues are before the supreme court on appeal:  (1) whether the Commissioner can be equitably estopped from assessing personal liability for unpaid petroleum taxes against a responsible person under Minn. Stat. § 270C.56 when the Commissioner’s actions made payment of the taxes through a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization impossible; (2) whether causation is an element in a finding of personal liability as a responsible person under Minn. Stat. § 270C.56; and (3) whether the tax court erroneously granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether Stevens is a responsible person who is liable for the unpaid taxes under Minn. Stat. § 270C.56.  (Minnesota Tax Court)

            Gordon Helmer Anderson, Respondent, Maxine Anderson, Plaintiff vs. Neil Raymond Christopherson, Respondent, Dennis Christopherson, Appellant – Case No. A11-0191:  While respondent Neil Christopherson was staying for a week at a home owned by his father, appellant Dennis Christopherson, Neil’s dog attacked a dog owned by respondent Gordon Anderson and his wife Maxine.  In his attempt to break up the fight and protect his dog, Gordon Anderson fell and broke his hip.  The Andersons sued the Christophersons under Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (2010), which makes the owner of a dog which attacks or injures someone liable for damages.  Under section 347.22, an “owner” includes any person “harboring or keeping” the dog.  The district court dismissed the complaint against Neil Christopherson, concluding that he could not be liable because his dog attacked the Andersons’ dog, not Gordon Anderson himself.  The court also dismissed the complaint against Dennis Christopherson, concluding that to “harbor” a dog requires that a person do so for more than a limited period of time.  The court of appeals reversed and reinstated the claims against both defendants. 

            Three questions are before the supreme court on Dennis Christopherson’s appeal:  (1) whether Minn. Stat. § 347.22 creates absolute liability for a dog’s conduct that is not focused on the injured party; (2) whether an individual’s voluntary intervention and attempt to separate two fighting dogs precludes absolute liability; and (3) whether the definition of “harborer” under the statute requires that an individual afford the dog shelter or give the dog refuge for more than a limited period of time.  (Anoka County)
 

            RAM Mutual Insurance Company, Appellant vs. Rusty Rhode d/b/a Studio 71 Salon, Respondent – Case No. A10-2146:  Appellant RAM Mutual Insurance Company insured commercial property in Sauk Centre, Minnesota.  Respondent Rusty Rohde rented one of the units and operated Studio 71 Salon there.  During his tenancy, Rohde installed a new water line to a pedicure chair, allegedly without the landlord’s permission.  Shortly after that, the water line burst and caused damage to the property.

RAM paid the landlord’s insurance claim and brought a subrogation action against Rohde.  The district court granted Rohde’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the subrogation claim is barred under the court of appeals’ decision in United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bruggeman, 505 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993).  The court of appeals affirmed. 

            On appeal to the supreme court, the general issue presented is whether a landlord’s insurer can pursue a subrogation claim against a negligent tenant.  (Stearns County)

Non-Oral:  Jeremy Jackson, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A11-2045:  In 2008 appellant Jeremy Jackson was convicted following a jury trial of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder.  Jackson’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.  In July 2011, Jackson filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  The district court summarily denied the postconviction petition.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court erred when it concluded that Jackson failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  (Hennepin County)

Mitchell Sawh, Respondent/Cross-Appellant vs. City of Lino Lakes, Appellant/Cross-Respondent – Case No. A10-2143:  Respondent Mitchell Sawh is a resident of appellant City of Lino Lakes.  In April 2010, Sawh’s dog bit or scratched a pedestrian.  After this incident, the City declared the dog “potentially dangerous,” without providing an opportunity to challenge the declaration.  After a second incident in October 2010, a hearing took place, and the City declared the dog a “dangerous animal.”  In November 2010, after a third incident, the City seized the dog.  Following a hearing, the City ordered the dog destroyed.

The court of appeals reversed the dangerous animal declaration and the order to destroy the dog.  The court of appeals held that “when a city relies on the potentially dangerous declaration as a predicate for a dangerous-animal declaration, as it did in this case, the dog owner must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to challenge the potentially dangerous declaration in order for the city to satisfy the dog owner’s right to procedural due process.”

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are:  (1) whether the City violated Sawh’s procedural due process rights by failing to provide a hearing before declaring the dog “potentially dangerous;” and (2) whether the City erroneously interpreted its animal control ordinance to require that the dog be destroyed.  (Lino Lakes City Council)

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. William Grigsby, Appellant – Case No. A10-1686:  Respondent the State of Minnesota filed a juvenile delinquency petition against 15-year-old appellant William Grigsby, alleging a single count of second-degree intentional murder.  The juvenile court issued an order certifying the proceedings against Grigsby for action under the law and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations.  In the adult criminal proceedings, the State initially filed a complaint that alleged a single count of second-degree intentional murder, but the State later amended the complaint to allege an additional count of felony second-degree murder. 

A jury trial was held.  The jury acquitted Grigsby of second-degree intentional murder but found him guilty of second-degree felony murder.  At the sentencing hearing, Grigsby argued the district court should reconsider the adult certification because the jury acquitted him of the charge listed in the certification order.  Rejecting Grigsby’s argument, the district court imposed a presumptive 180-month sentence.  The court of appeals affirmed. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a juvenile court’s certification of the proceedings for action under the law and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations is limited to the offense listed in the certification order. (Ramsey County). 

Non-Oral:  Adrian Dominic Riley, a/k/a Amiri Abdul Rasheed-El, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A11-1809:  In 1996 appellant Adrian Riley was convicted following a jury trial of three counts of first-degree murder.  Riley’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.  Riley has filed two previous petitions for postconviction relief.  In July 2011, Riley filed his third petition for postconviction relief, in which he claimed he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  Riley also filed a motion seeking DNA testing on several pieces of evidence and to allow an examination of all latent fingerprint evidence.  The district court summarily denied the third postconviction petition.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether Riley’s claims are barred by the 2-year statute of limitations period of Minn. Stat.             § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2010); (2) whether any exceptions to the 2-year statute of limitations apply; and (3) whether Riley’s motion for  DNA and fingerprint testing is time-barred pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2) (2010).   (Carver County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Javaris Eugene Milton, Appellant – Case No. A11-0809:  Appellant Javaris Milton was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder.  On appeal from those convictions, three issues are presented:  (1)  whether the district court erred in ruling that shell casings seized from the back stairs of Milton’s residence were lawfully seized without a warrant because they were in plain view; (2)  whether Milton is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to inadmissible evidence during opening statements; and (3) whether Milton is entitled to a new trial because the district court failed to give an accomplice liability instruction in its original instructions or in response to the jury’s question.  (Hennepin County)