EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
February 2013
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Val Derick Diggins, Appellant – Case No. A08-1143:  Following a jury trial, appellant Val Diggins was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and three counts of aggravated robbery.  On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Diggins’s Batson challenge to the State’s use of a preemptory strike on an African-American venire member; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to present evidence that Diggins had assaulted a witness shortly before trial.  (Hennepin County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Jonathan Nicholas Turner, Appellant – Case Nos. A10-1522, A12-0979:  Following a jury trial, appellant Jonathan Turner was convicted of first-degree murder and crime committed for the benefit of a gang.  Turner’s direct appeal was stayed in order that he could pursue postconviction relief.  After the district court summarily denied his petition for postconviction relief, the supreme court consolidated Turner’s direct and postconviction appeals.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether the district court erroneously denied Turner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim; (2) whether Turner is entitled to a new trial because the district court improperly instructed the jury on aiding and abetting liability; (3) whether Turner is entitled to a new trial because of two evidentiary errors; (4) whether Turner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claim of recanted trial testimony; and (5) whether the district erroneously sentenced Turner on his conviction for crime committed for the benefit of a gang.  (Hennepin County) 

Robert McCaughtry, et al., Appellants vs. City of Red Wing, Respondent – Case No. A10-0332:  Appellants are a group of landlords and tenants who have challenged the constitutionality of a rental property inspection ordinance enacted by respondent City of Red Wing.  The district court granted summary judgment to the City and dismissed appellants’ declaratory judgment claims.  After this court concluded that appellants presented a justiciable controversy, McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 808 N.W.2d 331, 341 (Minn. 2011), the court of appeals concluded that appellants have not established that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face under the Minnesota Constitution on the ground that it permits the issuance of an administrative warrant without an individualized showing of suspicion that particular code violations exist in the rental property to be inspected.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution provides any greater privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).  (Goodhue County)

500, LLC, Appellant vs. City of Minneapolis, Respondent – Case No. A11-1705:  Appellant 500, LLC owns a four-story brick building constructed in 1908, which is located in respondent City of Minneapolis.  Appellant sought zoning approvals to develop the property into an office building.  After the Minneapolis Heritage Preservation Commission denied appellant’s application for a certificate of appropriateness, appellant brought a lawsuit against the City.  Appellant asserted various claims, including a claim that the City violated Minn. Stat. § 15.99 (2012) by failing to timely approve or deny the application for a certificate of appropriateness.  The district court granted summary judgment to the City.  Among other conclusions, the district court determined that the application for a certificate of appropriateness was not a “request relating to zoning” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2.  The court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Minn. Stat. § 15.99 applies to a property owner’s application for a certificate of appropriateness.  (Hennepin County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Tracy Alan Zornes, Appellant – Case No. A12-0463:  Following a jury trial, appellant Tracy Zornes was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count each of first-degree arson and theft of a motor vehicle.  On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether Zornes is entitled to a new trial because the district court violated his right to a public trial; (2) whether Zornes is entitled to a new trial because the district court denied his motion to suppress a statement he made to police as fruit of the poisonous tree; (3) whether Zornes is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to admit into evidence items that were found at Zornes’s campsite; and (4) whether Zornes is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused its discretion by ruling that Zornes could be impeached with his prior convictions if he chose to testify.  (Clay County)

            In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Susanne Marie Glasser, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 272978 – Case No. A11-2126:  An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based upon the facts of the matter.

Metropolitan Sheet Metal Journeyman and Apprentice Training Trust Fund, Relator vs. County of Ramsey, Respondent – Case No. A12-0323:  In 2006, relator Metropolitan Sheet Metal Journeyman and Apprentice Training Trust Fund filed a petition challenging the taxability of its Ramsey County property for the 2005 tax year.  The Fund argued that it was exempt from paying property taxes as a “seminary of learning.”  In 2009, the Fund filed a petition challenging the taxability of the same property for the 2008 tax year.  In 2011, the Fund brought a motion to amend the petitions to include challenges to respondent Ramsey County’s assessments for tax years 2006 and 2007, or alternatively, to allow the Fund to file new petitions with respect to taxes assessed in 2006 and 2007.  The Minnesota Tax Court denied the motion.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether the supreme court has jurisdiction over this appeal because the tax court order denying the Fund’s motion to amend was a final order; (2) whether the supreme court should assert jurisdiction over this appeal in the interests of justice pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 105.01; and (3) whether the tax court erred in dismissing the Fund’s 2006 and 2007 claims for lack of jurisdiction because the timely filing of a tax exemption petition is not jurisdictional.  (Minnesota Tax Court).

Nonoral:       Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc., Relator vs. County of Washington, Respondent – Case No. A12-1507:  This is a property tax appeal involving a retail department store.  Relator Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. filed a petition challenging the fair market value that respondent Washington County had assessed for the property for the tax years 2007, 2008, and 2009.  Following a trial, the tax court determined the fair market value for the property for the tax years 2007, 2008, and 2009.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether the tax court clearly erred in determining the market capitalization rate for the relevant tax years; and (2) whether the tax court improperly determined the market rent for the property.  (Minnesota Tax Court)                     

            State of Minnesota, Appellant/Cross-Respondent vs. Taylor James Pass, Respondent/Cross-Appellant – Case No. A12-0635:  On the same evening, victim 1 and victim 2 were stabbed in a house they shared.  The State of Minnesota charged Taylor Pass with second-degree murder of victim 1 and with attempted murder and second-degree assault of victim 2.  A jury acquitted Pass of the murder charge but deadlocked on the other charges.  The district court declared a mistrial and scheduled a retrial of the attempted-murder and assault charges. 

            The parties disputed what, if any, evidence could be offered related to victim 1’s murder at Pass’s second trial.  The State argued that it should be allowed to offer testimony as immediate episode evidence that on the evening in question, Pass stabbed victim 2 shortly after victim 2 encountered Pass and victim 1 in the garage.  Pass argued that because he would need to offer evidence that victim 1 was murdered to support his alternative-perpetrator defense, the charges should be dismissed because it would violate his right to a fair trial if evidence about a crime for which he was acquitted was introduced at his second trial. 

            The district court ruled that the State’s proffered evidence was not admissible as immediate-episode evidence.  The court also dismissed the complaint after concluding that Pass had a constitutional right to present evidence of victim 1’s murder as an alternative-perpetrator defense, and that the admission of such evidence would deny Pass’s right to a fair trial.  The court of appeals affirmed the district court.

            On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar the State from appealing the district court’s order dismissing the complaint; and (2) did the district court clearly err by dismissing the complaint on the grounds that admission of Pass’s proffered evidence related to an offense for which he was previously acquitted would be unduly prejudicial, thus denying Pass’s right to a fair trial.  (Dakota County) 

            In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against William John Morris, Jr., a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 230637 – Case No. 12-0943:  An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based upon the facts of the matter.  

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Aaron Joseph Morrow, Appellant – Case No. A12-0079: Following a jury trial, appellant Aaron Morrow was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder.  On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the district court erroneously denied Morrow’s motion to dismiss the indictment because the prosecutor did not allow Morrow to testify before the grand jury and did not present exculpatory evidence; (2)  whether the district court erroneously determined that Morrow’s custodial statements to police were voluntary; (3) whether Morrow is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to admit into evidence a photograph of the victims as children; (4) whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Morrow’s motion for a mistrial after a police officer testified about Morrow’s behavior while in high school; and (5) whether Morrow is entitled to a new trial because the district court denied his request for a rebuttal closing argument.  (Ramsey County)

            A.A.A., Appellant vs. Minnesota Department of Human Services, Respondent – Case No. A11-1831:  In 2009, the Legislature amended the statutory framework for calculating personal care assistance, using the individual’s “home care rating,” which is, in turn, determined by the individual’s need for assistance in completing activities of daily living (ADLs), complex health needs, and the presence of “Level 1” behaviors.  Minn. Stat. § 256B.0652, subd. 6 (2010).  A base level of hours is assigned to the individual’s home care rating, and the individual is allotted 30 additional minutes of personal care assistance per day for “a dependency in each critical activity of daily living,” each “complex health-related function,” and each “behavior issue.”  Id., subd. 6(b).

            Appellant A.A.A. is a severely autistic child who also experiences grand mal seizures on a daily basis, has sleep disturbances, and a myriad of behavior difficulties.  In 2010, A.A.A. was reassessed for personal care assistance and found dependent in five ADLs:  dressing, grooming, bathing, eating, and toileting.  The child was not assessed as dependent in mobility.  A.A.A. appealed within respondent the Department of Human Services (DHS).  The Commissioner of DHS eventually determined that A.A.A. did not have a dependency in mobility and was entitled to 390 minutes per day of personal care assistance.

            A.A.A. appealed the DHS’s decision to the district court.  The district court reversed, concluding that A.A.A. had a dependency in mobility and was entitled to 450 minutes per day of personal care assistance.  The court of appeals reversed.

            On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether A.A.A. is entitled to additional minutes of personal case assistance due to a dependency in mobility.  (Minnesota Department of Human Services).