Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
June 2013
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, June 3, 2013
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Toni Dykhoff, Respondent vs. Xcel Energy and CCMSI, Relators, and North Memorial Health Care, Intervenor – Case No. A12-2324: Respondent Toni Dykhoff injured her knee when she fell while walking down a hallway at the downtown Minneapolis general office of her employer, relator Xcel Energy. Dykhoff filed a claim seeking workers’ compensation benefits arising out of her fall. Under Minnesota workers’ compensation law, employers are liable to pay compensation “in every case of personal injury . . . of an employee arising out of and in the course of employment.” Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subd. 1 (2012). A workers’ compensation judge denied Dykhoff’s claim. The workers’ compensation court of appeals reversed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether an increased risk standard should be used in workers’ compensation cases to determine whether an unexplained injury arises out of employment. (Workers Compensation Court of Appeals)
Tuesday, June 4, 2013
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Terrance Sipe, Appellant vs. STS Manufacturing, Inc., et al., Respondents – Case No. A11-2082: Respondent Labor Ready/True Blue, which is a temporary employment agency, placed appellant Terrance Sipe with respondent STS Manufacturing. Sipe tore a rotator cuff while at work. On April 23, 2008, Labor Ready required Sipe to take a drug test. On April 26, 2008, Sipe’s employment was terminated for failing the drug test.
In March 2011, Sipe sued respondents, claiming they had wrongfully terminated him in violation of the Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 181.950-.957 (2012). Respondents moved to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds. They argued that Sipe’s claims were governed by the 2-year statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 541.07 (2012) for claims of “libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment resulting in personal injury.” Sipe argued that the 6-year default statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) (2012) applies. The district court applied the 2-year statute of limitations and dismissed Sipe’s claims. The court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a claim for wrongful termination under the Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act is governed by a 2-year or a 6-year statute of limitations. (Hennepin County)
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Jaimiah Lamar Irby, Appellant – Case No. A11-1852: Petitioner Jaimiah Lamar Irby was convicted of assault, burglary, and unlawful possession of a firearm after a jury trial. The court of appeals affirmed his convictions.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the judge who presided over Irby’s trial had forfeited her judicial office when she violated the statutory and constitutional requirements that she reside in her judicial district and therefore lacked authority to preside over the trial. (Hennepin County)
Wednesday, June 5, 2013
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Jose Santoya Juarez, Appellant – Case No. A11-2189: Following a court trial, appellant Jose Juarez was found guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping. Pursuant to the dangerous sex offender statute, the State sought a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release based on the heinous element of nonconsensual removal and unsafe release. After Juarez waived his right to a Blakely jury, the court found the State had proven the heinous element, incorporating by reference the removal and unsafe release findings it made as part of its kidnapping verdict. The court then sentenced Juarez to life imprisonment without the possibility of release based on the criminal sexual conduct conviction. The court did not impose a sentence for the kidnapping conviction. The court of appeals affirmed Juarez’s convictions and sentence.
On appeal to the supreme court, Juarez raises the following issues in his brief: (1) whether the State was required to resubmit evidence on the removal and unsafe release of the victim in order for Juarez to be sentenced pursuant to the dangerous sex offender statute when the district court found Juarez guilty of kidnapping based on the unsafe release of the victim; (2) whether the “incidental to the crime” doctrine, which precludes a person from being convicted of kidnapping when the confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, applies to enhancements under the dangerous sex offender statute; (3) whether the dangerous sex offender statute violates Minn. Const. art. I, § 5, which prohibits cruel or unusual punishment; and (4) whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Juarez’s convictions. (Kandiyohi County).
Nonoral: Ronald Lewis Greer, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A12-1464 and Ronald Lewis Greer, petitioner vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. 12-2346: These two appeals involve petitioner Ronald Lewis Greer, who was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial. On direct appeal, the supreme court rejected all of Greer’s claims except for his claim that the trial judge had improper contact with the jury during trial. The supreme court remanded to the chief judge of the Fourth Judicial District to consider this claim. On remand, the chief judge held a Schwartz hearing and then denied Greer’s motion for a new trial based on the trial judge’s improper contact with the jury. The supreme court affirmed this ruling.
In May 2012, Greer filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was his second petition for postconviction relief. In it, he claimed he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The district court summarily denied this petition.
On appeal to the supreme court in Case No. A12-1464, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Greer’s second petition for postconviction relief was time barred; and (2) whether Greer failed to show that he was entitled to any relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
In August 2012, Greer filed his third petition for postconviction relief. In it he claimed that he was entitled to a new trial because he testified falsely at trial. The district court summarily denied this petition.
On appeal to the supreme court in Case No. A12-2346, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Greer’s third petition for postconviction relief is time barred; (2) whether Greer’s claim of false trial testimony is Knaffla barred; (3) whether the district court abused its discretion by concluding Greer was not entitled to a new trial based on his false trial testimony; and (4) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Greer’s third petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. (Hennepin County)
Thursday, June 6, 2013
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Christopher Thomas Wenthe, Respondent/Cross-Appellant – Case No. A12-0263: Christopher Wenthe is a Catholic priest. He had a sexual relationship with a member of his parish. Appellant State of Minnesota charged Wenthe with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. A jury found Wenthe guilty of one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(l)(i) (2012), which prohibits a member of the clergy from engaging in sexual penetration with a person to whom he or she is not married when the sexual penetration occurred during a meeting in which the complainant sought or received religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort from the actor in private. The court of appeals reversed Wenthe’s conviction.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the clergy sexual conduct statute violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to Wenthe; and (2) whether the clergy sexual conduct statute violates the Establishment Clause on its face. (Ramsey County)
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Larry Allen Nelson, Appellant – Case No. 12-0071: The State charged appellant Larry Nelson with failure to comply with his obligation to provide care and support for his children, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.375 (2012). Nelson moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause. More specifically, he claimed the plain language of section 609.375 required the State to prove that he knowingly failed to provide care and support for his children, and that the complaint only alleged a knowing failure to provide monetary support. After the district court denied the motion to dismiss, Nelson submitted his case to the court on stipulated facts. The court found him guilty as charged and stayed imposition of sentence. The court of appeals affirmed Nelson’s conviction.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Minn. Stat. § 609.375 requires the State to prove that the defendant knowingly failed to provide both care and support for his or her children. (Olmsted County).
Monday, June 10, 2013
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Jill Eleanor Clark, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 196988 – Case No. A12-0326: An attorney disciplinary case that presents the issue of whether the attorney should be transferred to disability inactive status.
Lorraine White, Trustee for the Lorraine M. White Trust, et al., Appellants vs. City of Elk River, Respondent – Case No. A12-0681: Appellants Lorraine White and Wapiti Park Campground have operated a campground on property in respondent City of Elk River since 1973. After the City revoked a 1984 conditional-use permit (CUP) for the campground, appellants brought an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded that the campground was a legal nonconforming use and that the City could not eliminate this use by revoking the 1984 CUP. The court of appeals reversed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the City can terminate a legal nonconforming use by revoking a CUP; and (2) whether appellants had the right to rebuild an accessory structure to a legal nonconforming use, when the value of the structure was less than 50% of the value of the entire legal nonconforming use. (Sherburne County)
Wednesday, June 26, 2013
Nonoral: Brian Keith Hooper, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A12-1833: In 1998, appellant Brian Hooper was convicted of first-degree murder following a jury trial. Hooper’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
Hooper filed his third petition for postconviction relief in 2011. In it, he claimed that newly discovered evidence showed that a state’s witness had confessed to the crime, that three trial witnesses, C.K., C.B., and L.J., had recanted their trial testimony, a Brady violation, and that the trial judge’s law clerk had interfered with a defense witness’s testimony. Hooper also filed a motion to recuse every Hennepin County district court judge, which was denied.
The district court summarily denied some of petitioner’s claims. It held an evidentiary hearing regarding Hooper’s claims that L.J. had recanted his trial testimony and of newly discovered evidence. The district court then ruled that Hooper was not entitled to a new trial based on these claims.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Hooper’s claims that C.K and C.B. recanted their trial testimony and his claim of a Brady violation are Knaffla barred; (2) whether Hooper was denied due process because the trial judge’s law clerk interfered with a potential defense witness’s testimony; (3) whether the district court abused its discretion when it ruled that Hooper was not entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; (4) whether the district court abused its discretion when it ruled that Hooper was not entitled to a new trial based on L.J.’s recanted trial testimony; and (5) whether Hooper’s petition for postconviction relief should have been assigned to a judge from a different judicial district because Hooper claimed misconduct by a Hennepin County district court judicial law clerk. (Hennepin County)
Nonoral: Michael Jon Staunton, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A12-1971: Following a jury trial, Staunton was convicted of first-degree murder in 2001. In a postconviction petition that was Staunton’s first appellate review, the supreme court affirmed his conviction.
Staunton filed a petition for postconviction relief in September 2012, alleging newly discovered evidence related to the testimony of the medical examiner, prosecutorial misconduct, and Brady violations. The district court summarily denied the petition.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Staunton’s petition for postconviction relief was time barred; and (2) whether Staunton’s claims are Knaffla barred. (St. Louis County)