EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
December 2013
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

            Connie L. Gretsch, Appellant vs. Vantium Capital, Inc., d/b/a Acqura Loan Services, Respondent – Case No. A12-2270:  Appellant Connie Gretsch sued her mortgage loan servicer, respondent Vantium Capital, Inc., alleging that respondent violated Minn. Stat. § 58.13, subd. 1(a)(5) (2012), by violating the terms of its Servicer Participation Agreement with the Federal National Mortgage Association.  The district court granted summary judgment to respondent, ruling that Gretsch lacked standing to pursue her claim.  The court of appeals affirmed.

            On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a mortgagor has standing under Minn. Stat. § 58.18 (2012) to sue a mortgage loan servicer for a violation of Minn. Stat. § 58.13, subd. 1(a)(5), that results from the servicer’s failure to conform to a written agreement with a third party.  (Hennepin County)

            Darrel Schmitz, Respondent vs. United States Steel Corporation, Appellant – Case No. A12-0709:  Respondent Darrel Schmitz allegedly injured his back while working as a maintenance mechanic at appellant United States Steel Corporation.  Schmitz later brought an action against U.S. Steel, which included claims that U.S. Steel had violated Minn. Stat. § 176.82 (2012) by threatening to discharge him for seeking workers’ compensation benefits and by discharging him for seeking workers’ compensation benefits.  The claims went to trial, and the district court granted U.S. Steel’s motion to quash Schmitz’s demand for a jury trial.  Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Schmitz on his threat-to-discharge claim, but rejected his retaliatory-discharge claim.  The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for Schmitz on his threat-to-discharge claim, but concluded that Schmitz is entitled to a jury trial on his retaliatory-discharge claim. 

            On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Schmitz has a constitutional right to a jury trial on his retaliatory-discharge claim under section 176.82; and (2) whether an employer may assert an affirmative defense to liability under section 176.82 for supervisors’ threats of discharge when no tangible employment action has been taken.  (St. Louis County)

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Don Antoine Jones, Appellant – A12-1189:  A jury found appellant Don Jones guilty of stalking and violating an order for protection based on an incident in which appellant sent multiple text messages to his ex-wife over the course of an evening.  The district court entered judgment on both convictions and sentenced appellant to consecutive sentences of 18 months, and a year and a day.  The court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the district court erred in imposing multiple convictions and multiple, consecutive sentences because the two offenses stemmed from a single behavioral incident. (Scott County)

            Lawrence Leiendecker, et al., Respondents vs. Asian Women United of Minnesota, Appellant, Greenstein, Mabley & Wall, L.L.C., et al., Defendants – Case Nos. A12-1978, A12-2015:  Respondents Lawrence and Sinuon Leiendecker brought an action asserting multiple claims against appellants Asian Women United of Minnesota, et al., including claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process.  The district court denied appellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statutes, Minn. Stat. §§ 554.01-.05 (2012).  After reviewing the allegations in the complaint, the district court concluded that the Leiendeckers had met their statutory burden of “clearly and convincingly demonstrating” that appellants’ actions were tortious and therefore not immunized by the anti-SLAPP statutes.  The court of appeals affirmed. 

            On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether appellants are entitled to dismissal of the complaint under Minn. Stat. § 554.02 when the Leiendeckers produced no evidence in response to the motion to dismiss, but relied solely on the allegations of their complaint.  (Hennepin County)

            John Doe 169, Respondent vs. Paul Alan Brandon, et al., Defendants, Minnesota District Council of the Assemblies of God, Appellant – Case No. A12-1721:    Respondent John Doe 169 was sexually abused by a volunteer in the youth ministry program at his church.  Respondent later commenced a civil action alleging, among other claims, that appellant Minnesota District Council of the Assemblies of God was negligent in credentialing the volunteer as a minister.  The district court granted appellant’s motion for summary judgment.  The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that “no showing of a special relationship is required and there is sufficient evidence to permit a jury to conclude that [appellant] had knowledge of the minister’s history of inappropriate relationships with youth while employed as a youth minister” at a different church. 

            On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether a general duty of care can exist under common law negligence where there is no special relationship and no misfeasance; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in creating a new cause of action for negligent pastoral credentialing.  (Hennepin County)
Chad Jamie Gulbertson, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A13-0901:  In April 2010, appellant Chad Gulbertson was convicted of first-degree domestic-abuse murder following a jury trial.  Gulbertson did not file a direct appeal of his conviction.  In March 2012, Gulbertson filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence that Gulbertson engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse; (2) whether Gulbertson is entitled to a new trial because the district court improperly instructed the jury on the definition of domestic abuse; and (3) whether Gulbertson is entitled to a new trial because the district court admitted into evidence testimony regarding the victim’s applications for and testimony at hearings on orders for protection, in violation of his right to confrontation. (Freeborn County)     

            Citizens State Bank Norwood Young America, Respondent vs. Gordon Brown, et al., Appellants – Case No. A12-1257:  Respondent Citizens State Bank Norwood Young America sued appellants Gordon and Judy Brown, alleging that the appellants’ transfers of property defrauded it as a judgment creditor under the Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 513.41-.51 (2012).  The district court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment, rejecting appellants’ argument that the transfers were not fraudulent because they were pursuant to a divorce decree.  The court of appeals affirmed.

            On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether and under what circumstances asset transfers made pursuant to a dissolution judgment and decree may be deemed fraudulent transfers; (2) whether ex-spouses are considered insiders under the Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act; and (3) whether appellants are precluded from relitigating whether they fraudulently transferred assets by their divorce decree when respondents did not raise this issue below.  (Carver County)

            Graphic Communications Local 1B Health & Welfare Fund "A", et al., Respondents/Cross-Appellants vs. CVS Caremark Corporation, et al., Appellants, Coborn’s Incorporated, Appellant, Kmart Holding Corporation, et al., Appellants, Snyder’s Drug Stores (2009), Inc., et al., Appellants, Target Corporation, Appellant, Walgreen Co., Appellant, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Appellant – Case No. A12-1555:  Two employee health and welfare benefit plans brought a putative class action complaint against CVS Caremark Corporation and other operators of pharmacies.  The plaintiffs alleged that the pharmacies had violated a Minnesota statute that regulates the pricing of generic prescription drugs, Minn. Stat. § 151.21, subd. 4 (2012), as well as the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), Minn. Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1 (2012).  The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that no private right of action exists under Minn. Stat. § 151.21, subd. 4, and the plaintiffs did not plead an actionable CFA claim.  The court of appeals affirmed on the issue of a private right of action, but reversed and remanded on the CFA claim. 

            On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the plaintiffs may base a CFA claim on alleged violations of a regulatory statute; (2) whether the plaintiffs were required to allege a duty to disclose the allegedly material information; (3) whether the plaintiffs failed to plead facts showing a causal nexus between the allegedly actionable omission and the alleged injury; and (4) whether there is an implied right of action under Minn. Stat. § 151.21, subd. 4.  (Hennepin County)

Nonoral:       Matthew Klennert, Respondent vs. SNG Construction and Western National Insurance Company, Relators – Case No. 13-1155:  Respondent Matthew Klennert injured his back in late 2001 when he was carrying siding for his employer, SNG Construction.  Klennert had surgery in September 2002 for disc herniation.  By February 2003 he was released to work with restrictions, received a 13% permanent partial disability rating, and was deemed at maximum medical improvement in September 2003.  In March 2004, Klennert and SNG entered into a settlement, with SNG paying $35,000 for a “full, final, and complete waiver” of all claims other than non-chiropractic medical expenses.  In May 2004, Klennert’s application for social security disability benefits was granted. 

Klennert continued to experience back pain and leg problems.  In September 2004, he had a second surgery.  When the employer’s doctor evaluated Klennert and his medical records in May 2005, the doctor concluded that the second surgery was “reasonable and necessary” in part because the first surgery was not successful.  In April 2012, his doctor assessed a 20% permanent partial disability based in part on a “change in diagnosis” for his low back condition. 

Klennert then filed a petition to vacate the March 2004 stipulation based on a change in condition or mutual mistake of fact. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) granted the petition, finding that there was a mutual mistake of fact as to Klennert’s medical condition at the time of the stipulation because his diagnosis was not what the parties assumed it to be.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue is whether the WCCA abused its discretion when it set aside the award in stipulation based on a mutual mistake of fact.  (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)

            Jennifer Marie Axelberg, Appellant vs. Commissioner of Public Safety, Respondent – Case No. A12-1341:  Appellant Jennifer Axelberg and her husband Jason were staying at a family cabin when they got into an argument.  Before the argument, the couple had consumed alcohol.  Jason took away appellant’s cell phone and assaulted her.  Appellant got into their car and locked the doors.  Jason climbed onto the car and hit the windshield, causing it to crack.  Fearing for her safety, appellant drove about nine-tenths of a mile to a resort.  Jason followed her there.  A bystander called the police and intervened to stop Jason from acting aggressively toward appellant.             The police arrived and arrested Jason.  They also arrested appellant on suspicion of driving while impaired. 

            Respondent Commissioner of Public Safety revoked appellant’s driver’s license pursuant to the implied-consent law, Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.50-.53 (2012), after a test revealed her alcohol concentration was above the legal limit.  Appellant sought judicial review of the license revocation and attempted to assert the affirmative defense of necessity.  The district court concluded that the necessity defense is not a recognized defense in an implied-consent proceeding and sustained the revocation of appellant’s driver’s license.  The court of appeals affirmed.

            On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a petitioner may assert the affirmative defense of necessity in a judicial review hearing of a license revocation under the implied-consent law.  (Kanabec County)