EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
November 2013
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

In the Matter of the Welfare of: B.A.H., Child – Case No. A12-1347:   Fourteen-year-old B.A.H. was adjudicated delinquent for committing first-degree criminal sexual conduct after he and his 13-year-old cousin engaged in mutually consensual sexual penetration.  Under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g) (2012), sexual penetration is elevated to a first-degree offense if the defendant has a significant relationship to the complainant and the complainant was under 16 years old; consent is not a defense.  The court of appeals reversed B.A.H.’s conviction on the ground that section 609.342, subdivision 1(g), is unconstitutional. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether section 609.342, subdivision 1(g), as applied to B.A.H., violates his rights to due process and equal protection of the law because both B.A.H. and the complainant were under age 16 and had a significant relationship to one another, yet only petitioner was prosecuted.    (Chisago County) 

            In re Petition for Reinstatement of William G. Mose, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 125659 – Case No. A12-0380:  An attorney reinstatement matter that presents the issue of whether suspended attorney William Mose should be reinstated to the practice of law.

State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Guillermo Garcia-Gutierrez, Respondent, Armando NMN Araiza, Respondent, Aidan James Heine Mellgren, Respondent, Terry Darnell Gilliam, Jr., Respondent, Jamie David Pintor-Velo, Respondent – Case No. A12-2012:  Respondents allegedly broke into a residence and stole a locked safe.  They removed the safe from the premises, and when they broke it open, they discovered a handgun inside.  Appellant the State of Minnesota charged the respondents with multiple offenses, including first-degree burglary based on the State’s theory that they possessed a dangerous weapon while in the residence.  The district court granted the respondents’ pretrial motion to dismiss the first-degree burglary charge for lack of probable cause on the ground that there was no evidence the respondents knowingly possessed the weapon.  The court of appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the crime of first-degree burglary based on the defendant’s possession of a dangerous weapon while inside the burgled premises requires proof the defendant knowingly possessed the weapon.  (Scott County)

Scott B. Schuette, Relator vs. City of Hutchinson, Self-Insured/Berkley Risk Administrators Company, LLC, Respondent, and HealthPartners, MeritCare Health System, Hutchinson Area Health Care, Medica Health Plans, Intervenors – Case No. A13-0840:    Relator Scott Schuette was a police officer for respondent the City of Hutchinson in June 2005 when he responded to an emergency call involving an injury to a child that fell out of a truck.  Schuette recognized the child, who later died from a head injury, and accompanied her to the hospital.  Schuette realized soon afterward that the incident had an effect on him, but he did not notify his employer until 2008 that he believed he had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) related to the 2005 incident.  Schuette was then diagnosed with PTSD. 

Schuette filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits.  The compensation judge denied Schuette’s petition after concluding that his PTSD is not a compensable personal injury.  The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the findings of the compensation judge are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) whether the court should reconsider its decision in Lockwood v. Independent School District No. 877, 312 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. 1981), and allow compensation for work-related mental injuries that do not result in a physical injury.  (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)

Nonoral:       Sharon A. Soyka, Relator vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A13-0434:  On May 30, 2012, respondent Commissioner of Revenue issued an order assessing relator Sharon Soyka individual income taxes, penalties, and interest owed for the 2008 tax year.  Soyka appealed the May 30 order to the Minnesota Tax Court.  The tax court determined that Soyka’s appeal was untimely because it was filed more than 60 days after the Commissioner’s decision being appealed.  The tax court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Soyka’s appeal and dismissed it.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the tax court erred when it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Soyka’s appeal.  (Minnesota Tax Court)      

            Nonoral:       Elaine Huebbe, Respondent vs. Dairy Farmers of American and Zurich American Insurance Company, Relators, Taher, Inc. and Indiana Insurance Company, Respondents, Fairview Redwing Clinic, Intervenor – Case No. A13-0810:  Respondent Elaine Huebbe suffered a back injury in 2009 while working for relator Dairy Farmers of America.  Work restrictions, including weight and lifting/bending limitations, were imposed.  In August 2010, Huebbe began working for respondent Taher Inc.  Her job at Taher required limited lifting.  In February 2011, Huebbe was diagnosed with a  chronic back condition.  She has not worked since that time. 

Huebbe filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits.  Based, in part, on an independent medical exam (IME) report, the compensation judge concluded that liability should be assessed 50/50 between Dairy Farmers and Taher.  The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed. 

On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the WCCA applied the correct standard of review when it reviewed the compensation judge’s decision; (2) whether the compensation judge’s findings were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) whether the WCCA erroneously ruled that the opinions of the IME expert regarding apportionment of causation lacked foundation.  (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)

Alice Ann Staab, Respondent vs. Diocese of St. Cloud, Appellant – Case Nos. A12-1575, A12-1972:  Respondent Alice Staab was injured after she fell out of a wheelchair that was being pushed by her husband Richard while they were visiting a school that is a part of appellant the Diocese of St. Cloud.  Alice sued the Diocese.  After a trial, the jury found that both the Diocese and Richard were negligent; the jury attributed 50% of the fault to each of them; and the jury awarded Alice a total of $224,200 in damages. 

The district court initially concluded that the Diocese was required to pay the entire damages award because Richard was not a party to the litigation.  The court of appeals reversed.  The supreme court affirmed, concluding that Minn. Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1 (2012), “applies when a jury apportions fault between a defendant and a nonparty tortfeasor and limits the amount the defendant must pay to the share of fault assigned to the defendant by the jury.”  Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 80 (Minn. 2012).  The supreme court remanded to the district court for entry of judgment consistent with the court’s opinion.  Id.

On remand, the district court granted Alice’s motion for reallocation under Minn. Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2 (2012), after finding that Richard’s share of the obligation was uncollectible.  The district court entered a judgment against the Diocese for the entire jury award, plus costs and interest, less amounts already paid.  A divided court of appeals affirmed the district court’s reallocation order.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a severally liable defendant, whose responsibility is limited by Minn. Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1, to his or her equitable share of the award, can be required to pay more than that equitable share pursuant to the reallocation of damages provision in Minn. Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2.  (Stearns County)

            State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Jerry Vang, Appellant – Case Nos. A12-0956, A13-0922:  In 2001, respondent State of Minnesota filed a delinquency petition charging appellant Jerry Vang with first-degree drive-by-shooting murder, second-degree drive-by-shooting murder, and attempted first-degree drive-by-shooting murder.  Vang was 14-years-old at the time of the shooting.  A grand jury subsequently indicted Vang on the three charges alleged in the delinquency petition.  After the State filed a motion to certify Vang for prosecution as an adult, Vang pleaded guilty to first-degree drive-by-shooting murder and attempted first-degree drive-by-shooting murder.  The district court convicted Vang as an adult and imposed an adult sentence on him.  In 2010, the supreme court reversed Vang’s convictions and sentences after concluding the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict and sentence him as an adult.  Vang v. State, 788 N.W.2d 111, 117-18 (2010). The supreme court remanded the case to the district court.  Id.

            On remand, Vang filed a motion seeking to have his case removed to juvenile court.  The district court denied the motion.  A jury found Vang guilty of all counts.  The district court sentenced Vang to life in prison for first-degree drive-by-shooting murder and to a consecutive 90-month sentence for attempted first-degree drive-by-shooting murder.

            Vang appealed his convictions.  The supreme court stayed Vang’s direct appeal so that he could pursue postconviction relief.  Vang filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing he was denied effective assistance of counsel.  The district court denied Vang’s postconviction petition.  The supreme court vacated the stay and consolidated Vang’s direct and postconviction appeals.

            On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented:  (1) whether on remand, the district court had jurisdiction over Vang’s case; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Vang’s convictions; (3) whether Vang is entitled to a new trial because the district court did not instruct the jury that for drive-by-shooting, the State was required to prove Vang shot at or toward a building or a motor vehicle; (4) whether Vang’s life sentence for an offense he committed while he was a juvenile resulted in cruel or unusual punishment; (5) whether the district court erred when it imposed a sentence on Vang following his trial upon remand that was longer than the sentence he received after pleading guilty; and (6) whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Vang’s petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.  (Ramsey County)

            In re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Thomas G. Harrigan, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 132378 – Case No. A13-0542:  An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.

            State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Artiase Dvon Williams, Respondent – Case No. A12-1719:  In September 2012, appellant State of Minnesota filed a state’s pretrial appeal of a district court order suppressing evidence in respondent Artiase Williams’s criminal case.  In April 2013, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

            While the State’s appeal was pending, the Chief Judge of Hennepin County District Court issued a standing order, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 611.27, subd. 16 (2012), establishing a reimbursement rate of $50 per hour for the attorney fees a responsible governmental unit is required to pay to the defendant in a state’s pretrial appeal.  The standing order applied to services performed on or after November 17, 2012.    

            After the court of appeals filed its decision in this appeal, Williams’s counsel filed a motion for attorney fees in which she sought $3,636 in attorney fees.  Williams’s counsel asked to be reimbursed at a rate of $120 per hour for all work she performed in the appeal, including the work she performed after November 17, 2012.  The court of appeals granted Williams’s counsel’s motion for attorney fees in its entirety.

            On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the court of appeals erred in awarding Williams’s counsel attorney fees when it rejected the reimbursement rate for attorney fees established by the Chief Judge of Hennepin County District Court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 611.27, subd. 16.  (Minnesota Court of Appeals)

            City of Duluth, Respondent vs. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, Appellant – Case No. A12-1324:  Respondent City of Duluth filed an action alleging that appellant Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa had breached a 1986 agreement by submitting an application to the Bureau of Indian Affairs to have a parcel of land placed into trust without the City’s consent.  The Band argued that the state court did not have jurisdiction over the dispute based on 1994 amendments to the 1986 agreement.  The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to interpret the 1994 amendments and dismissed the action.  The court of appeals reversed. 

            On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Minnesota state courts have jurisdiction over the dispute.  (St. Louis County)