Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
April 2015
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, March 30, 2015
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Nonoral: Christopher C. Roskos, by Mark Roskos, Relator, vs. Bauer Electric, Inc. and Federated Mutual Group, Respondents -- Case No. A14-1831: Relator Christopher Roskos suffered a work-related injury resulting in a 99% permanent partial disability. The employer, respondent Bauer Electric, accepted liability and agreed Roskos was permanently and totally disabled. Roskos requested a lump sum payment of his benefits, as allowed by Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 2a(b). Bauer applied a 5% discount rate to the total value of Roskos’s benefits. Roskos argued that the correct discount rate is the 10-year Treasury bill rate, or 1.59%. The compensation judge found that the evidence supported Bauer’s 5% discount rate because it was “reasonable and appropriate.” The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (“WCCA”) affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the WCCA erred in affirming the compensation judge’s determination of the discount rate applicable to Roskos’s lump-sum payment for permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 2a(b). (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
Nonoral: Kristopher J. Ouellette, Relator, vs. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Claims Management, Inc., Respondents, Minnesota Department of Human Services/BRS, Intervenor -- Case No. A14-2000: Relator Kristopher Ouellette suffered a work-related injury to his foot that led to pain, swelling, and hypersensitivity, for which he received treatment. Ouellette was later assigned a 75% permanent partial disability rating. After observing Ouellette for a period of time and securing a second examination, employer Wal-Mart Stores filed a petition to discontinue benefits, which was granted by a compensation judge.
Ouellette appealed, and the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed, finding Ouellette waived his challenge to the denial of his disability rating by failing to raise the issue in his brief; that Wal-Mart followed the correct statutory procedure to discontinue benefits; and that benefits do not “vest” once payment begins such that an employer waives the right to dispute entitlement to benefits at a later time.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the compensation judge’s order conformed with statutes and administrative rules for the payment of permanent partial disability benefits and the discontinuance of periodic weekly permanent partial disability benefits; (2) whether the compensation judge’s Findings of Fact and Order were clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record; and (3) whether Ouellette waived the issue of the compensation judge’s denial of his claim for permanent partial disability because it was not briefed pursuant to Minn. R. 5800.0900, subp. 1. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
Tuesday, March 31, 2015
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Guardian Energy, LLC, Relator, vs. County of Waseca, Respondent -- Case No. A14-1883, A14-2168: These consolidated appeals challenge the Tax Court’s fair-market valuation for an ethanol production facility in Janesville, Minnesota. The tax court resolved disputes over expert appraisal opinions and the specific items of property included or excluded from the County’s assessment, and found valuation determinations higher than those offered by the parties or the experts.
On petition for certiorari to the supreme court by the property owner, Guardian Energy, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the tax court erred when it found that Guardian presented sufficient credible evidence to rebut the prima facie validity of the assessments, despite rejecting the testimony of those same witnesses with respect to other issues of fact; (2) whether the tax court erred in its analysis of external obsolescence; and (3) whether the tax court erred when it determined that certain process tanks and distillation columns at the subject property are taxable real property under Minn. Stat. § 272.03, subd. 1. (Minnesota Tax Court)
Wells Concrete Products Co. and CCMSI, Relators, vs. David J. Mach, Jr., Respondent, and Blue Cross Blue Shield and Operating Engineers Local 49 Health & Welfare Fund, Intervenors -- Case No. A14-2065: Employee David Mach’s request for medical benefits for a spinal cord stimulator, recommended for treatment of a 2008 work-related injury, was denied in June 2011. The compensation judge found that Mach, who relied on the opinion of his treating physician, did not show the device was “reasonable medical treatment” for the injury. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (“WCCA”) affirmed.
In 2013, Mach filed a petition for medical benefits for payment for the removal and replacement of the spinal cord simulator. Mach relied on a 2012 letter from a different physician, who stated that the treatment using the spinal cord stimulator was reasonable and necessary. The compensation judge granted employer Wells Concrete Products’ motion to dismiss Mach’s claim as barred by
res judicata and collateral estoppel.
The WCCA found that the 2011 order covered only claims for expenses prior to January 2011. Because the current claim was for medical expenses after January 2012, the WCCA reversed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the WCCA erred as a matter of law in reversing the compensation judge’s determination that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Mach’s claim for medical expenses. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
Wednesday, April 1, 2015
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Monday, April 6, 2015
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Commerce Bank, Respondent, vs. West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, Appellant -- Case No. A14-0247: Appellant West Bend Mutual Insurance Company insured a building that was vandalized after the owner left the property vacant. Respondent Commerce Bank, the mortgage-holder of the property, was listed as an additional insured under the insurance policy and submitted a claim for the loss. West Bend denied the claim, relying on a vacancy provision in the policy, which provided that the insurer will not pay for any loss or damage caused by vandalism if the building “has been vacant for more than 60 consecutive days before that loss or damage occurs.” Commerce Bank asserted that it was entitled to coverage under the standard mortgage clause in the policy, which provided that if the insurer denies a claim because of the owner’s “acts” or because the owner “failed to comply with the terms of this policy, the mortgage-holder will still have the right to receive loss payment.”
Commerce Bank commenced suit against West Bend, claiming breach of contract and seeking declaratory relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to West Bend. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that “West Bend’s denial of coverage for loss, which was sustained as a result of the owner causing the property to remain vacant for more than 60 days, does not apply to Commerce” under the standard mortgage clause.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the vacancy provision in the insurance policy applies to the claim of a mortgage-holder. (Dakota County District Court)
Tuesday, April 7, 2015
University of St. Thomas Law School
Wednesday, April 8, 2015
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Kemen Lavatos Taylor, II, Appellant -- Case No. A14-0942: A Hennepin County grand jury indicted appellant Kemen Lavatos Taylor, II, with one count of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder; one count of aiding and abetting first-degree felony murder; two counts of aiding and abetting attempted first-degree premeditated murder; and two counts of aiding and abetting attempted first-degree felony murder. A jury found Taylor guilty of all counts. The district court sentenced Taylor to life in prison without the possibility of parole and two concurrent terms of 180 months in prison sentences.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether the district court denied Taylor his federal and state constitutional rights to a public trial by
sua sponte excluding from the trial all members of the public who did not have photo identification; (2) whether the district court deprived Taylor of his constitutional right to due process by not allowing Taylor to present evidence that the shooters had their own personal motives to commit the charged crimes, which was relevant to disprove the State’s theory that Taylor intentionally aided and abetted the shooters; (3) whether the district court deprived Taylor of his right to a fair trial by admitting irrelevant, unhelpful, and highly prejudicial rebuttal testimony by a gang expert, to impeach Taylor’s testimony regarding the collateral issue of whether Taylor was a member of a gang; (4) whether the district court committed reversible error by materially misstating the law on aiding-and-abetting liability and expansive liability within its instructions to the jury; (5) whether the district court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that prior-conviction evidence could only be used to impeach Taylor’s credibility; and (6) whether the cumulative effect of the errors in this case deprived Taylor of a fair trial. (Hennepin County District Court)