Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
May 2015
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, May 4, 2015
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Respondent Lori Peterson Law Firm (respondent) assumed representation of the client. Attorney Lori Peterson negotiated a settlement of $200,000, which included 40% for attorney fees. The attorney fees were kept in trust while the parties attempted to resolve a dispute over the proceeds.
Appellant filed a petition for distribution of the contingent attorney fees with the district court. Following a bifurcated court trial, the district court ruled that appellant had failed to establish a “good cause” basis for withdrawal from representation to support recovery, under a theory of quantum meruit, of a portion of the contingent attorney fees received by respondent. The court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented in the parties’ briefs: (1) whether a lawyer who voluntarily withdraws from representing a client on a contingent-fee basis must establish good cause for the withdrawal in order to recover attorney fees on the basis of quantum meruit; (2) whether appellant had good cause for withdrawing from representing the client after she refused a settlement offer; and (3) whether the district court improperly reversed rulings it had made in a pretrial order when it made its findings of fact and conclusions of law following the court trial. (Otter Tail County)
Todd C. Allan, Respondent vs. RD Offutt Co., Self-Insured/Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Relators – Case No. A14-1555: After respondent Todd Allan sustained a work-related injury to his low back while employed by Relator RD Offutt Company, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition alleging he was entitled to permanent total disability benefits pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5(2) (2014). To qualify for permanent total disability under that subdivision, respondent was required to demonstrate that he had suffered an “injury which totally and permanently incapacitates the employee from working at an occupation which brings the employee an income,” and also that he had “at least a 17 percent permanent partial disability rating of the whole body.”
Following a hearing, a compensation judge found that respondent’s work-related injury was permanent but concluded that respondent had no more than 10 percent permanent partial disability from the low back injury. Respondent claimed additional permanent partial disability of 10 percent according to applicable regulations for complete loss of his teeth, which had been replaced by dentures, and argued that the 10 percent permanent partial disability for his work-related injury, combined with the 10 percent permanent partial disability for loss of teeth, exceeded the 17 percent requirement. Relator argued that because respondent’s loss of teeth was not work related, it could not be considered under the statute. The compensation judge agreed. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, relying on its decisions in
Frankhauser v. Fabcon, Inc., 57 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 239 (WCCA),
aff’d without opinion, 569 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1997), and
Metzger v. Turck, Inc., 59 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 229 (WCCA 1999).
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether a permanent partial disability rating for an employee’s corrected, non-vocationally disabling condition may be included in meeting the threshold for permanent total disability benefits under Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5(2). (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
Tuesday, May 5, 2015
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Timothy Guzick, Respondent vs. Larry Alan Kimball, et al., Appellants, Colleen Bennett, Defendant – Case No. A14-0429: Respondent Timothy Guzick, as Personal Representative of the Estate of George J. Nyberg and Trustee of the George Nyberg Trust, brought a legal malpractice action against appellants Larry Alan Kimball, et al., arising out of a power-of-attorney form that Nyberg signed shortly before his death, which had been prepared by Kimball’s secretary and was used to misappropriate $226,524 from Nyberg’s personal and trust accounts. Guzick claimed that appellants failed to advise Nyberg on the scope of authorization provided by the power-of-attorney form. The district court granted summary judgment to appellants, concluding that Guzick failed to comply with the expert disclosure requirements for professional malpractice claims under Minn. Stat. § 544.42 (2012). A divided court of appeals reversed and remanded.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subds. 2(2) and 4, required Guzick to provide an expert witness disclosure and testimony to establish an attorney-client relationship; (2) whether Minn. Stat. § 544.42, subds. 2(2) and 4, required Guzick to provide an expert witness disclosure and testimony to establish but-for causation; and (3) whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that Guzick’s affidavit of expert review and interrogatory answers satisfied the minimum expert disclosure requirements. (Cass County)
Nonoral: KCP Hastings, LLC, Relator vs. County of Dakota, Respondent – Case No. A15-0018: Relator KCP Hastings, LLC, owns a multi-tenant retail shopping center located within the boundaries of respondent Dakota County. The parties disputed the property value of the shopping center for tax purposes. The matter was tried to the tax court, which issued a determination of value.
On petition for certiorari to the supreme court, the issues presented include: (1) whether the tax court abused its discretion when it rejected, as inadequately supported at trial, relator’s valuation of the property under an income approach using a discounted cash flow, and instead valuing the property using the sales comparison approach; and (2) whether the tax court erred in calculating the property value based on gross building area instead of gross leasable area. (Minnesota Tax Court)
Wednesday, May 6, 2015
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Kimberlee Ann Nelson, Appellant vs. Lynette Nelson, et al., Respondents – Case No. A14-0200: At the time of his death, decedent Michael Nelson was married to appellant Kimberlee Ann Nelson, but their marriage dissolution proceedings were underway. Following his death, the dissolution proceedings were dismissed. After the spouses had separated but before the dissolution proceedings had begun, decedent designated a new beneficiary on a $1 million term life insurance policy on his life, changing it from appellant to respondents, his parents and sister. In the probate proceedings related to decedent’s estate, appellant claimed an elective share under Minn. Stat. §§ 524.2-202 to -208 (2014).
Appellant brought a declaratory judgment, claiming that she was entitled to the proceeds of the term life insurance policy pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (2014), which precludes a spouse “in contemplation of commencing, or during the pendency of” dissolution proceedings from transferring or disposing of marital assets without the consent of the other spouse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents, and the court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented in the parties’ briefs: (1) whether a term life insurance policy is an asset for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a, or a mere expectancy; (2) whether the only remedy provided for a violation of subdivision 1a is in the context of a divorce proceeding, such that when the proceeding ends with no distribution of property, an injured spouse is deprived of any remedy; and (3) whether decedent in fact violated subdivision 1a. (Pennington County)
Thursday, May 7, 2015
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Harvey Ray Dupey, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A13-2317: In 2008, appellant Harvey Dupey pleaded guilty to one count of fifth-degree controlled-substance crime. The district court stayed adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on probation for 5 years. On May 24, 2011, the district court revoked the stay of adjudication, convicted appellant of fifth-degree controlled-substance crime, and sentenced him to 13 months in prison. On May 23, 2013, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief in which he asked to withdraw his guilty plea.
The district court denied appellant’s postconviction petition, concluding in part that the petition was time barred under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2014). The court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the 2-year time limit for filing a petition for postconviction relief in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, begins to run when a defendant receives a stay of adjudication of guilt. (Ramsey County)
Monday, May 11, 2015
Thomas Edison Senior High School
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. True Thao, Appellant – Case No. A14-1182: Appellant True Thao was charged with multiple counts of attempted and completed first- and second-degree murder relating to an alleged gang-related shooting. Over Thao’s objections, the trial court admitted evidence that Thao was convicted of attempted murder 13 years prior to the date of the shooting, as well as expert testimony about the nature of gang activity. A jury found Thao guilty of all charges. The district court sentenced Thao to life in prison without the possibility of release on one count of first-degree murder for the benefit of a gang, with additional sentences imposed for the other counts.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Thao’s prior crime as
Spreigl evidence; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the State’s expert testimony regarding the nature of gang activity; (3) whether the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the State’s burden of proof; and (4) whether the trial court erred by imposing sentences of life without the possibility of release on the attempted murder charges. (Ramsey County)
Tuesday, May 12, 2015
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Martin David Hutchins, Jr., Appellant – Case No. A14-0750: Appellant Martin David Hutchins, Jr., was found guilty of burglary and criminal sexual conduct. The district court imposed concurrent sentences of 130 months and 105 months. Hutchins appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the 130-month sentence because the departure grounds given by the district court were invalid and remanded to the lower court for resentencing.
On remand, the district court left the 105-month sentence undisturbed, but reduced the 130-month sentence to 41 months, and made it consecutive, resulting in a total sentence of 146 months. Hutchins again appealed, and the court of appeals again reversed and remanded for imposition of a sentence of no more than 130 months.
On remand for a second time, the district court reduced the 105-month sentence to 89 months, and reinstated a consecutive term of 41 months, thereby achieving a total sentence of 130 months.
On appeal to the court of appeals, Hutchins argued that the district court was without authority to modify the 105-month sentence because he had not challenged that sentence in either of his prior appeals. The court of appeals applied the federal “sentencing-package” doctrine, which had not previously been adopted in Minnesota, to conclude that Hutchins’ two sentences were essentially part of a “package,” and that by challenging one of those two interdependent sentences, he effectively challenged the entire package.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the court of appeals erred when it adopted and applied the federal “sentencing-package” doctrine to allow the modification of a sentence that Hutchins did not challenge on appeal. (Hennepin County)
Nonoral: Chaun Dubae Carridine, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A14-1198: A jury found appellant Chaun Dubae Carridine guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. The supreme court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Carridine filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting multiple grounds for relief. The district court denied the petition after holding an evidentiary hearing relating to some of Carridine’s stated grounds for relief and ruling others were barred by the rule announced in
State v. Knaffla, 303 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).
On appeal to the supreme court, Carridine presents the following issues: (1) whether his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective; (2) whether he was subject to prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct; (3) whether the trial court committed prejudicial error in allowing him to be impeached by a prior statement; (4) whether the postconviction court abused its discretion in denying him a new trial based on certain allegedly newly-discovered evidence; and (5) whether the postconviction court abused its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing based on other allegedly newly-discovered evidence. (Hennepin County)
Wednesday, May 13, 2015
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against William Bernard Butler, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 227912 – Case No. A14-0834: An attorney discipline matter that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.
Nonoral: State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Michael Wayne, petitioner, Appellant – Case No. A14-1730: A jury found appellant Michael Wayne guilty of murder in the first and second degrees in 1987. The trial court sentenced Wayne to a mandatory term of life in prison for first-degree murder. The supreme court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. Wayne subsequently filed six petitions for postconviction relief. The postconviction court denied each petition, and the supreme court affirmed each denial.
Wayne then filed his seventh postconviction petition, asserting that his petition was timely under the exception to the 2-year time limit for claims based on a new interpretation of constitutional law retroactively applicable to the claims, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(3) (2014), and relying on
McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013). The postconviction court denied the petition as untimely and Wayne’s claims as barred by the rule announced in
State v. Knaffla, 303 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues include: (1) whether Wayne’s petition is
Knaffla-barred; and (2) whether Wayne’s petition is untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2014). (Waseca County)