Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
November 2014
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, November 3, 2014
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Christopher Thomas Wenthe, Respondent – Case No. A12-0263: The State charged Christopher Wenthe, a Catholic priest, with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(l)(i), (ii) (2012), based on his sexual relationship with a parishioner. The primary issue at trial was whether the sexual conduct occurred at a time when the parishioner was seeking religious or spiritual aid, advice, or comfort from Wenthe. The jury acquitted Wenthe of the count alleging sexual conduct “during a period of time” in which the parishioner was meeting with him on an ongoing basis to seek religious advice, but found Wenthe guilty of the count alleging that sexual conduct occurred “during the course of a meeting” at which the parishioner sought religious advice or comfort.
The court of appeals rejected Wenthe’s claim that the clergy-sexual-conduct statute was unconstitutional on its face, but agreed that the statute violated the Establishment Clause as applied to Wenthe, and reversed his conviction and ordered a new trial. The supreme court subsequently reversed the court of appeals’ decision, holding that the clergy-sexual-conduct statute does not violate the Establishment Clause on its face or as applied, and remanded to the court of appeals to consider the additional issues that Wenthe had raised on appeal. On remand, the court of appeals again reversed Wenthe’s conviction.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the district court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the single-meeting element of the clergy-sexual-conduct statute; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to instruct the jury that Wenthe must know that the parishioner sought or received spiritual or religious advice, aid, or comfort at the single meeting; and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the parishioner’s sexual history after the State had opened the door to this evidence. (Ramsey County)
Jason Donald Matakis, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A13-1040: Appellant Jason Matakis pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to prison on May 12, 2011. Matakis did not file a direct appeal from the conviction. On May 8, 2013, Matakis filed a petition for postconviction relief. The petition asserted in general terms that there was reason to question the accuracy and voluntariness of Matakis’ guilty plea, but did not allege any specific facts to support those claims. Matakis’ attorney indicated that she had been unable to meet with Matakis in prison or obtain necessary records because of scheduling conflicts. Approximately 1 month later, the district court issued an order denying relief without a hearing. The court explained that because it did not include a statement of the facts and grounds upon which relief was sought, the petition failed to “fulfill the basic content requirements” of a petition for postconviction relief. The court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the district court erred in dismissing the petition for postconviction relief for failure to state facts supporting the claims when Matakis had not had prior review of his conviction and would be procedurally barred from re-filing the petition due to the 2-year statute of limitations on postconviction claims. (Crow Wing County)
Tuesday, November 4, 2014
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Sysdyne Corporation, Appellant vs. Brian Rousslang, et al., Respondents – Case No. A13-0898: Respondent Xigent Solutions, LLC, hired respondent Brian Rousslang, notwithstanding Xigent’s knowledge that Rousslang had a noncompete agreement with appellant Sysdyne Corporation. Sysdyne sued Rousslang for breach of contract and Xigent for tortious interference with contract. Following a bench trial, the district court found that Rousslang had breached the noncompete agreement with respect to certain clients, but determined that Xigent was justified in interfering with the noncompete agreement based on the incorrect advice of counsel that the noncompete agreement was not enforceable. The court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the justification defense for a tortious interference with contract claim encompasses reliance on the incorrect advice of counsel. (Hennepin County)
Thomas V. Engfer, Respondent vs. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, Inc., Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development, Appellant – Case No. A13-0872: After respondent Thomas Engfer was laid off from his job with General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, Inc., he received state unemployment benefits, as well as supplemental unemployment benefits under a plan established by his employer. Appellant Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) subsequently determined that the employer’s plan did not fully comply with Minn. Stat. § 268.035, subd. 29(a)(12) (2012), which provides an exemption from “wages” for payments made under supplemental-unemployment-benefit plans that meet certain requirements. Because the employer’s plan did not meet the requirement of “provid[ing] supplemental payments only for those weeks the applicant has been paid regular, extended, or additional unemployment benefits,” Minn. Stat. § 268.035, subd. 29(a)(12), DEED treated the supplemental unemployment benefits as “wages” and determined that Engfer had been overpaid state unemployment benefits.
SeeMinn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 3(a)(2) (2012) (providing that applicants are not eligible to receive unemployment benefits for any week that they receive payments that are considered “wages” equal to or in excess of their weekly unemployment benefit amounts).
An unemployment law judge affirmed the overpayment determination. The court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals concluded that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012), preempts the provision of Minn. Stat. § 268.035, subd. 29(a)(12), which “purports to mandate the terms of the ERISA-governed . . . supplemental-unemployment-benefit plan in order for the plan to provide the intended benefits.”
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether ERISA governs the supplemental-unemployment-benefit plan; and (2) whether ERISA preempts the operation of the provision in Minn. Stat. § 268.035, subd. 29(a)(12), which specifies that a plan providing supplemental unemployment benefits “must provide supplemental payments only for those weeks the applicant has been paid regular, extended, or additional unemployment benefits.” (Department of Employment and Economic Development).
Wednesday, November 5, 2014
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Jason William McGee – Case No. A14-0211: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.
Nonoral: Edbert Neal Williams, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A14-0475: Appellant Edbert Neal Williams was convicted in 1996 of first-degree murder following a jury trial. Williams appealed the conviction to the supreme court, which affirmed. In 2003, Williams filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking a new trial based on a witness’ recantation of his trial testimony and other new evidence. The district court denied relief, and the supreme court affirmed. In 2013, Williams filed a second postconviction petition in which he alleged, for the first time, that he received ineffective assistance from both his trial and appellate attorneys. The district court held that the petition was untimely and its claims barred because Williams knew or should have known of them at the time of his previous postconviction petition, and denied relief without a hearing.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Williams was denied effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; (2) whether the postconviction court abused its discretion in holding that Williams’ claims were procedurally barred without conducting an evidentiary hearing to address Williams’ claim that he was prevented from filing this petition by a mental disease; and (3) whether the postconviction court erred in denying Williams’ request for a new trial in the interests of justice. (Ramsey County)
Thursday, November 6, 2014
Hamline Law School
Ethan Dean, et al., Appellants vs. City of Winona, Respondent – Case No. A13-1028: Appellants Ethan Dean, et al., brought an action challenging an ordinance adopted by respondent City of Winona. The challenged ordinance, referred to as the 30 percent rule, limits in certain areas of the City the number of lots on a block that are eligible to obtain certification as a rental property. Appellants asserted that the 30 percent rule is a zoning law that is illegal under Minnesota’s Zoning Enabling Act, Minn. Stat. § 462.357 (2012). Appellants also asserted that the 30 percent rule violates their rights to equal protection, substantive due process, and procedural due process under the Minnesota Constitution. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to the City. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the adoption of the ordinance was a valid exercise of the City’s police power and that appellants have not met their burden of showing that the ordinance is unconstitutional.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the 30 percent rule is a zoning law, and if so, whether the 30 percent rule is illegal under the Zoning Enabling Act; and (2) whether depriving homeowners of the right to rent out their homes under the 30 percent rule violates Article I, Sections 2 or 7 of the Minnesota Constitution. (Winona County)
Monday, November 10, 2014
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Great River Energy, et al., Appellants vs. David D. Swedzinski, et al., Respondents, Redwood Electric Cooperative, et al., Respondents Below – Case No. A13-1474: Appellants Great River Energy, et al., are members of a joint initiative of utilities involved in a project to construct and operate high-voltage transmission lines. As part of the project, the utilities filed a condemnation petition to obtain a 150-foot-wide easement across agricultural land owned by respondents Dale and Janet Tauer. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 216E.12 (2012), the Tauers elected to require the utilities to acquire fee title to their entire 218.85-acre parcel, instead of taking only the 8.86-acre easement needed for the project. Among other arguments, the utilities asserted that condemning all of the Tauers’ land was not reasonable because the total amount of land was so much greater than the actual amount of land needed for the easement. The district court approved the Tauers’ election, concluding that the election is reasonable and that the statute does not require consideration of the ratio between the easement and the election. The court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the district court erred by refusing to consider the relationship between the size of the easement necessary for the project and the size of the elected property, and by limiting the reasonableness requirement of Minn. Stat. § 216E.12 to an inquiry regarding the commercial viability of the land included in the election. (Redwood County)
State of Minnesota by its Attorney General, Lori Swanson, Respondent, vs. Integrity Advance, LLC, Appellant – Case No. A13-1388: Appellant Integrity Advance, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability company that offered short-term consumer loans via the Internet to Minnesota residents. Respondent State of Minnesota by its Attorney General, Lori Swanson, brought a regulatory action against Integrity, asserting that Integrity’s loans to Minnesota residents exceeded the interest rate limits and other requirements of Minnesota laws pertaining to consumer small and short-term loans, Minn. Stat. §§ 47.60 and 47.601 (2012). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. Among other conclusions, the district court determined that the application of Minnesota law to Integrity’s loans to Minnesota residents does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the dormant Commerce Clause precludes the State from regulating the loans made by Integrity to Minnesota residents. (Ramsey County)
Wednesday, November 12, 2014
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Josue Robles Fraga, Appellant – Case No. A13-2381: Appellant Josue Robles Fraga was indicted for one count of first-degree murder and two counts of second-degree murder in connection with the death of his two-year-old niece. A jury found Fraga guilty of all charges. Fraga brought a postconviction petition based on newly discovered evidence. The district court granted a new trial, after which the State obtained an amended indictment charging Fraga with three counts of first-degree murder and two counts of second-degree murder. Following a second jury trial, Fraga was again found guilty and the district court sentenced him to life in prison without possibility of release.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether Fraga was deprived of a fair trial by the district court’s refusal to strike for implied bias jurors who knew that Fraga had previously been convicted of the same offense; (2) whether Fraga was deprived of a fair trial by the district court’s refusal to strike for actual bias a juror who knew of Fraga’s prior conviction and who had prejudged the credibility of the State’s witnesses; (3) whether the district court prejudicially erred by denying Fraga’s motion for a change of venue; (4) whether the district court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence a news article from which jurors could easily surmise that Fraga had previously been convicted of the offense for which he was being tried and which summarized and highlighted testimony at a prior court hearing; (5) whether the district court committed reversible error by precluding testimony by a defense expert about the typicality of delayed reporting by sexual abuse victims; (6) whether the district court committed reversible error by admitting evidence that Fraga sodomized a relative 20 years earlier; and (7) whether the district court erroneously adjudicated Fraga guilty of all five counts of murder. (Nobles County)
Nonoral: LaMonte Rydell Martin, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A14-0084: Appellant LaMonte Rydell Martin was indicted in 2006 for first-degree murder for the shooting death of Christopher Lynch. Martin was 17 years old at the time of the shooting and was automatically certified to stand trial as an adult. At trial, the jury heard testimony from two eyewitnesses, Jermaine Mack-Lynch and Charles Pettis, both of whom implicated Martin in Lynch’s death. The jury found Martin guilty, and he was sentenced to a mandatory term of life with no possibility of release. The supreme court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal.
In 2011, Martin filed a petition for postconviction relief in which he sought a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The petition included affidavits by Mack-Lynch and Pettis in which both men recanted their trial testimony. The district court denied the petition without a hearing. On appeal, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for a hearing at which the district court could assess the recanting witnesses’ credibility. On remand, Martin filed a second postconviction petition claiming the Supreme Court’s decision in
Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), should be applied retroactively to invalidate his sentence under the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied both petitions.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion and failed to comply with the supreme court’s directive on remand to assess the credibility of recanting witnesses; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion when it did not find that the evidence at the postconviction hearing was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the recanting witness was credible and that the witness’ trial testimony was false; and (3) whether the supreme court should reconsider its decisions in
Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013), and
Roman Nose v. State, 845 N.W.2d 193 (Minn. 2014), that the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), does not apply retroactively to a juvenile whose sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release became final before the
Miller rule was announced. (Hennepin County)
Thursday, November 13, 2014
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Robert Meeker, et al., Respondents vs. IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company, Appellant – Case No. A13-1302: Respondents Robert and Jacqueline Meeker sought to bring an action against appellant IDS Property Casualty Company after the insurer denied their claim for property damage. The Meekers sought to commence the action by service of process on the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce. Under Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2 (2012), service of process is “not effective unless,” among other requirements, the plaintiff files an affidavit of compliance “on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within further time as the court allows.” The Meekers satisfied all of the requirements for service of process under the statute; however, they did not file the affidavit of compliance until after the 2-year limitations period on the claim had expired. The district court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that the action was untimely. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that “under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 45.028, subd. 2, the affidavit of compliance may be filed after the end of the limitations period, so long as it is filed on or before the return day of the process.”
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the Meekers’ suit against the insurer is time-barred based on their failure to file the affidavit of compliance before the expiration of the limitations period. (Wright County)
Nonoral: Jack Willis Nissalke, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A14-0458: Appellant pro se Jack Willis Nissalke was indicted for four counts of first-degree murder. In 2009, a jury found him guilty of all charges and he was sentenced to life in prison. On direct appeal, the supreme court affirmed the conviction. Nissalke brought a postconviction proceeding in 2013 in which he raised nine claims for relief, including the existence of newly discovered evidence, ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and juror misconduct. The district court denied the petition without a hearing.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issue is presented: whether the district court abused its discretion in summarily denying Nissalke’s petition for postconviction relief where none of the issues raised in the petition was either procedurally barred under
Knaffla v. State, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976), or susceptible of decision without an evidentiary hearing. (Winona County)