EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
October 2022
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, October 3, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Drake Snell, et al. Appellants, vs. Tim Walz, Governor of Minnesota, in his official capacity, et al., Respondents – Case No. A21-0626: On March 13, 2020, acting pursuant to the Minnesota Emergency Management Act of 1996, Minn. Stat. §§ 12.01–.61 (2020), respondent Governor Walz issued Emergency Executive Order 20-01, declaring a peacetime emergency in Minnesota relating to COVID-19. The Governor extended the peacetime emergency multiple times. On July 22, 2020, the Governor issued Emergency Executive Order 20-81 (the “mask mandate”), which required most Minnesotans to wear face coverings in certain places. In August of 2020, appellants—a group of Minnesota residents, businesses, and churches—filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto in the district court against the Governor and the Attorney General, challenging the mask mandate as unlawful for various reasons, and seeking to enjoin its enforcement. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In March 2021, the district court granted the motion and dismissed appellants’ claims on the merits.
On May 6, 2021, the Governor announced an intention to begin lifting COVID-19 restrictions. On May 13, 2021, appellants appealed the district court’s decision dismissing their claims. On May 14, 2021, the Governor issued an executive order lifting the mask mandate “in most settings.” And on June 30, 2021, the Governor signed a bill that the Legislature had passed earlier that same day, terminating the peacetime emergency as of July 1, 2021.
The court of appeals dismissed appellants’ appeal. It concluded that the lifting of the mask mandate and the subsequent end of the peacetime emergency had rendered the appeal moot, and that no exception to mootness applies. In particular, it first reasoned that the mask mandate dispute does not fall within the exception to mootness for disputes that are capable of repetition while evading review. Second, although the court concluded that the lawfulness of the mask mandate is functionally justiciable, it declined to apply the exception to mootness for such matters because the issue involved constitutional questions about the separation of powers. And third, the court of appeals declined to apply an exception to mootness for cases involving voluntary cessation by the defendant of the challenged activity, noting that the supreme court has never adopted that exception.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether the Governor’s rescission of Executive Order 20-81 renders this case moot. (Ramsey County)
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Peter James Nickitas, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0212313 – Case No. A20-1529: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.
Tuesday, October 4, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Almir Puce, Respondent, vs. City of Burnsville, MN, Appellant – Case No. A21-0895: Minnesota Statutes section 462.358 (2020) allows municipal ordinances to require that a reasonable portion of the buildable land of proposed subdivisions be dedicated to the public for uses such as parks. The statute also allows the municipality to accept a cash fee in lieu of a portion of the land, subject to certain restrictions. Appellant the City of Burnsville has enacted such an ordinance, requiring certain lands to be dedicated to the public for uses including parks, “or to contribute an equivalent amount of cash.”
Respondent Almir Puce owns land in the City that he sought to redevelop for commercial use. He submitted an application to the City seeking, among other things, approval of a preliminary and final plat of the property. The City’s planning commission recommended approval subject to conditions, including the payment of a park-dedication fee of $37,804. Puce objected to the City’s imposition of the park-dedication fee, arguing that his proposed development would not result in a need for more parkland or park services. The City approved the plat, retaining the park-dedication fee but reducing it to $11,700. Puce challenged the City’s decision in the district court under Minn. Stat. § 462.361, subd. 1 (2020). The district court held a court trial and concluded that the imposition of the park-dedication fee was lawful.
The court of appeals reversed in a precedential opinion. It reasoned that the City did not make an individualized assessment of what, if any, new park need was created by granting Puce’s development application. See Minn. Stat. § 462.358, subd. 2b(e). And it reasoned that although there was an “essential nexus” between the park-dedication fee and the purpose served by the fee, the City did not demonstrate a “rough proportionality” between the fee and any need for new or improved parkland resulting from approval of Puce’s development application. See id., subd. 2c(a). Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded, the City’s action was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.
The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether the City’s decision to impose a statutorily permitted fee under Minn. Stat. § 462.358, subd. 2b was per se arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable when applying a formula based on the City’s specific needs as provided in their comprehensive plan and park plan; (2) whether the City had a rational basis for its decision to impose a statutorily permitted dedication fee; and (3) whether the court of appeals erred in analyzing the City’s decision under Minn. Stat. § 462.358, subd. 2c. Appellant also argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction of Puce’s original challenge due to untimely service, and that the case has become moot. (Dakota County)
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Marcelino Santiago Lopez, Appellant – Case No. A21-1585: A grand jury indicted appellant Marcelino Santiago Lopez with several offenses, including first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder. Lopez waived his right to a jury trial and submitted his case to the district court. Before closing arguments, defense counsel asked the district court to add the offense of second-degree unintentional felony murder to the charges it would consider during deliberation. The district court denied the request. The district court found Lopez guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. As part of its factual findings, the district court wrote, “Defendant’s testimony the gun had been in the car since April 1, 2020, when he and his brother were going target shooting at a gun range in Blaine lacks credibility. April 1, 2020, was the beginning of the pandemic, and most places were closed.”
On appeal to the supreme court, Lopez raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court, in the factual finding above, considered evidence not introduced at trial, and if so, whether the court’s actions deprived him of his right to an impartial fact-finder; and (2) whether the district court had a rational basis to acquit Lopez of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder but find him guilty of second-degree unintentional felony murder. (Dakota County)
Wednesday, October 5, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Herbert Azubuike Igbanugo, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0191139 – Case No. A21-0338: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.
State of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Stafon Edward Thompson, Respondent – Case No. A22-0192: In 2009, respondent Stafon Thompson was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without the possibility of release. At the time he was convicted and sentenced, Thompson was 17 years old. The supreme court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal.
In 2013, Thompson filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, arguing that his two consecutive life terms without the possibility of release were unconstitutional based on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). While Thompson’s petition was initially denied, the United States Supreme Court eventually remanded the case to the federal district court based on its decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). The federal district court then remanded the case to the state district court for resentencing. The state district court resentenced Thompson to two consecutive life sentences with the possibility of release. The supreme court affirmed Thompson’s new sentences.
In 2021, Thompson filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that the imposition of his two consecutive life sentences was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted Thompson’s request for postconviction relief, concluding that imposing two consecutive life sentences with the possibility of release for crimes committed by a juvenile without an evidentiary hearing violated Thompson’s rights to due process and equal protection. The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing for resentencing.
On appeal to the supreme court, appellant the State of Minnesota raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by finding Thompson’s constitutional rights were violated; and (2) whether the district court erred as a matter of law by concluding that due process requires a full contested evidentiary hearing in order to impose consecutive sentences. (Hennepin County)
Non-oral: In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct in Panel File No. 43372 – Case No. A22-0413: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter. (Panel of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board)
Thursday, October 6, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Deangelo Profit, Relator, vs. HRT Holdings, d/b/a DoubleTree Suites, and CNA Claim Plus, Respondents – Case No. A22-0656: Relator Deangelo Profit, while in the course of his employment at the DoubleTree Suites hotel, was violently attacked by someone Profit had worked with for a different employer. Unbeknownst to Profit, the assailant had been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder and had developed the false belief that Profit had murdered his uncle, who had instead died of heart disease. The assailant was determined incompetent to stand trial on the related criminal charges and was civilly committed as a dangerous person. After receiving treatment, the assailant was later deemed competent to stand trial and pleaded guilty to two counts of felony assault for his conduct.
Profit filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking medical and wage loss benefits for injuries sustained in the attack. At the hearing, the sole issue was whether the intentional act exclusion in Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 16 (2020) barred Profit’s claims. The compensation judge analyzed the claim through the three-tier framework set forth in Hanson v. Robitshek-Schneider Co., 297 N.W. 19, 22 (Minn. 1941), and determined that the assault fell in the category of “non-compensable cases where the assailant was motivated by personal animosity toward his victim, arising from circumstances wholly unconnected with the employment.” The compensation judge concluded that the assailant’s “motivation—however misguided due to his mental illness—was self-evident.” The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed, applying the same three-tier framework in Hanson in the same way.
On appeal to the supreme court, relator raises the following issues: (1) whether an assault by a mentally ill person is not “intentional,” such that the personal injury exclusion in Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 16, for injuries “intended to injure the employee because of personal reasons,” is inapplicable; (2) whether an assault caused by mental illness should be analyzed outside the Hanson framework; and (3) whether the personal injury exclusion is inapplicable even under the Hanson framework. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Ignatius Chukwuemeka Udeani, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0300615 – Case No. A21-0754: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.
Monday, October 10, 2022
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Wilmington Trust, National Association, Respondent vs. 700 Hennepin Holdings, LLC, Respondent, Gregg Williams, as receiver for 700 Hennepin Holdings, LLC, Appellant, Anytime Restoration, Inc., Defendant, Seven Acquisition, LLC, Respondent – Case No. A21-0963: Respondent Seven Acquisition, LLC (Seven) is a restaurant tenant in a commercial building in Minneapolis. In connection with a foreclosure action, the district court appointed a limited receiver, appellant Gregg Williams, with the power to collect rent from Seven, among other powers. A dispute arose over the payment of rent. Seven argued that the terms of its lease with the building owner requires arbitration of the rent dispute.
The district court granted the receiver’s motion to direct the payment of rent, reasoning that the receiver is not subject to the arbitration provision in the lease. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the receiver is subject to the arbitration provision “to the same extent that the party subject to the receivership would have been bound but for the receivership.”
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether a court’s “exclusive authority” over a receiver under Minn. Stat. § 576.23 (2020), allows an arbitrator to exercise authority over the receiver. (Hennepin County)
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Larry John Laver, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0317731 – Case No. A21-1532: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.
Tuesday, October 11, 2022
Shakopee High School
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Michael Phillip Cloutier, Appellant – Case No. A21-1270: Appellant Michael Cloutier pleaded guilty to second-degree unintentional felony murder. The probation officer who conducted the presentence investigation collected information about Cloutier’s education, work history, financial status, and physical abilities. At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to order Cloutier to pay restitution for $7,500 in funeral expenses. Cloutier filed a motion to relieve or reduce his restitution obligation, arguing he was unable to pay $7,500 in restitution. The district court denied Cloutier’s motion, concluding petitioner had the ability to pay restitution someday.
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the burden of proof imposed on the State by Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3 (2020), does not extend to disputes involving a defendant’s ability to pay.
The supreme court granted review on the following question: Who has the burden of proving defendant’s ability to pay restitution? (Hennepin County)
Wednesday, October 12, 2022
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
In the Matter of the Application of Timothy D. Moratzka, Trustee of the Nancy L. Mayen Residual Trust – Case Nos. A21-0829 and A21-0832: These consolidated appeals arise from a Torrens action. The dispute involves a 30-foot-wide strip of undeveloped road abutting Trout Lake in Itasca County. In 1911, the property owner platted parcels of land containing the road. The plat, which was recorded in the Itasca County Recorder’s Office in 1912, states that the property owner did “hereby dedicate to the public use forever the public roads” contained within the plat.
At issue is the status of the platted road. Appellants Itasca County and Minnesota Department of Natural Resources argue that the road can be used by the public because it was dedicated to the public long ago. Respondent Timothy Moratzka, who represents the trust that purchased the disputed land, argues that any public interest in the road was abandoned under Minnesota law. The district court granted the trustee’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed appellants’ objections.
The court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that the Marketable Title Act (MTA), Minn. Stat. § 541.023 (2020), “creates a conclusive presumption of abandonment where, as here, the public’s interest in a parcel of land created by plat is not validly recorded by the relevant public authority within 40 years of the dedication of any such interest.” According to the court of appeals, “[w]hen the public is given an interest in land, a public entity must affirmatively accept the interest by following the requirements of the MTA.”
The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether a public road noted on a plat is deemed abandoned if no MTA preservation notice is filed to preserve the road; (2) whether the procedural and substantive requirements of the vacation statute, Minn. Stat. § 505.14 (2020), apply; and (3) whether common-law estoppel bars a property owner from denying the legal existence of a platted public road when the plat is referenced in the property owner’s deed. (Itasca County)
Non-oral: Joel Marvin Munt, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A22-0300: Following a jury trial, appellant Joel Marvin Munt was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Between 2013 and 2017, Munt sought various forms of postconviction relief. In 2021, Munt filed another petition for postconviction relief along with several motions, including a discovery motion. The district court denied the petition and motions.
On appeal to the supreme court, Munt raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court abdicated its authority by adopting the State’s arguments without discussion; (2) whether the court erred by rejecting arguments the State did not address; (3) whether the court erred when it denied his petition for postconviction relief; and (4) whether the court erred when it denied his motions. (Blue Earth County)