EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
December 2022
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, November 28, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Kolten Krantz, et al., Appellants, vs. City of Bloomington, Minnesota, et al., Respondents, Daniel Rogan, in his official capacity as Hennepin County Auditor, Respondent, Steven Simon, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, Respondent – Case No. A22-1190: Respondent the City of Bloomington amended its city charter in 2020 to use ranked-choice voting in municipal elections. In June 2022, a petition to amend the city charter to repeal ranked-choice voting was presented to the Bloomington City Clerk. The proposed amendment contained four sections, the last of which, § 4.08, required a super-majority of voters at a regular municipal election to approve the use of ranked-choice voting for municipal offices. The Bloomington City Council voted unanimously to reject the proposed amendment because § 4.08 was inconsistent and in conflict with a Minnesota statute.
Appellants, residents of Bloomington, filed a petition in district court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 204B.44 (2020), arguing respondents erred by refusing to place the charter amendment on the November 8, 2022 ballot, and seeking an order for the charter amendment to be added to the ballot. The district court denied the petition. It found that § 4.08 was preempted by a Minnesota statute. The district court also concluded that the preempted language in § 4.08 was not severable from the rest of the proposed amendment.
The supreme court granted a petition for accelerated review on the following issue: whether the district court erred by failing to order the City of Bloomington to place on the November 8, 2022 municipal ballot a question seeking to amend the Bloomington City Charter to repeal ranked-choice voting because it could not be severed from a provision governing the method of the proposed amendment’s repeal. (Hennepin County)
Kera Quinn, Respondent, vs. LMC NE Minneapolis Holdings, LLC, et al., Appellants – Case No. A21-1062: Appellants LMC NE Minneapolis Holdings, LLC and LMC Living, LLC (collectively LMC) own and operate an apartment building in Minneapolis. Respondent Kera Quinn was in a long-term relationship with a tenant of LMC’s. In 2018, Quinn moved into the tenant’s apartment, despite a provision in the lease forbidding anyone other than the tenant from occupying the apartment. Quinn paid an amount each month to the tenant under an oral agreement between the two of them, but she never paid any money or signed any documents with LMC. Eventually Quinn’s relationship with the tenant ended, but Quinn continued to live in the apartment. The tenant moved out and gave notice of her intent to vacate when the lease expired. The lease terminated according to its terms on April 7, 2021, and shortly thereafter LMC discovered Quinn living in the apartment. LMC then deactivated the electronic key fob that allowed Quinn access to the building.
In order to avoid being locked out, Quinn stayed in the apartment until she initiated this lawsuit on April 19, 2021, petitioning for emergency relief under Minn. Stat. § 504B.375 (2020), which allows a “residential tenant” to whom it applies to “recover possession of the premises.” “Residential tenant” is defined in Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 12 (2020) to include “a person who is occupying a dwelling in a residential building under a lease or contract, whether oral or written, that requires the payment of money or exchange of services,” as well as “all other regular occupants of that dwelling unit.” A housing-court referee concluded that Quinn was an “other regular occupant” entitled to relief under the statute and ordered LMC to enable the key fob and to allow Quinn to move freely in and out of the premises. The district court confirmed the referee’s order.
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the question of who may qualify as an “other regular occupant” is a question of fact to be ascertained in each case by a consideration of all the circumstances, and that the district court’s determination that Quinn was an “other regular occupant” was not erroneous. In July 2022, Quinn vacated the premises.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the appeal is moot because Quinn has vacated the premises; (2) whether the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the district court order recognizing Quinn’s status as a “residential tenant” based on her status as an “other regular occupant”; and (3) whether the court of appeals erred when it decided “whether a person qualifies as an ‘other regular occupant’ is a question of fact in each case to be ascertained by consideration of a totality of the relevant circumstances and that no single factor is necessarily dispositive.” (Hennepin County)
Tuesday, November 29, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Non-Oral: Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC, Respondent, vs. County of Hennepin, Relator – Case No. A22-1024: Respondent Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC (Avis) operates rental car facilities at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport on premises leased from the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC). The tax court held a trial on the value of the leased property for property tax purposes. A major issue was whether a “concession fee” was to factor into the taxable value of the property under the income approach to valuation. Under agreements between Avis and the MAC, Avis pays the MAC a “concession fee” for its “use of the facilities and access to the Airport market” that is 10% of Avis’s gross revenues, but not less than a minimum annual guarantee. As the tax court recognized, under the income approach, “only amounts paid to a property owner for the use of real property should be capitalized.”
This is not the first time this particular concession fee was before this court. A few years ago, this court held that Avis’s concession “fees were rent or, at least, income that needed to be disclosed under the [mandatory disclosure] statute, whether in the required financial statements, as rent information, or as anticipated income.” Avis Budget Car Rental LLC v. County of Hennepin, 937 N.W.2d 446, 450 (Minn. 2020); see also Enterprise Leasing Co. of Minnesota v. County of Hennepin, 937 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 2020). Citing this prior decision, the tax court here reasoned that “the concession fee is cognizable as consideration for both ‘use of the facilities and access to the Airport market.’ ” The tax court then looked to whether the “fee payments for these combined purposes can be reliably allocated,” and concluded “that the concession fee is consideration for access to the airport car rental market, rather than rent paid for use of the ‘Leased Premises,’ ” and thus was “not capitalized under the income approach.” But out of recognition for the fact “that under the plain meaning of the agreement, some portion of the fee payments may be for use of the ‘Leased Premises,’ ” the tax court decided to accord the income approach only 10% weight in its final reconciliation. The tax court instead placed 90% reliance on the cost approach to valuation, which is unchallenged on appeal. The tax court’s final reconciliation resulted in an assessed value of the property lower than Hennepin County’s initial assessment.
On appeal to the supreme court, relator’s brief presents the following issue: whether the concession fee, which is paid by respondent to the MAC under the lease agreement, is income attributable to the subject property that must be included in the income approach to value. (Minnesota Tax Court)
Non-Oral: Enterprise Leasing Co of MN, Respondent, vs. County of Hennepin, Relator – Case No. A22-1022: This case raises the same issue as Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC v. County of Hennepin, No. A22-1024, and arises from substantially similar facts and a materially identical order by the tax court. (Minnesota Tax Court)
Wednesday, November 30, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Danna Rochelle Back, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant – Case No. A20-1098: Danna Back was convicted of second-degree manslaughter for the shooting death of her ex-boyfriend. Back was not the shooter, but she asked the shooter to drive her to the place where the shooting occurred. Back received an executed prison sentence. The Supreme Court reversed Back’s conviction, concluding the State had presented insufficient evidence to support Back’s conviction. State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 2009).
Back filed a petition for an order determining her eligible for compensation based on exoneration pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (2020) (the statute). The State opposed the petition. The district court held a hearing. Four of the victim’s family members provided live statements at the hearing indicating they did not believe Back was entitled to compensation because of her role in the victim’s death.
The district court granted the petition. The court found that “the actual wording of the statute . . . requires a finding [Back] is eligible for compensation under subdivision 3” because she had proven she was exonerated and she had established her innocence. It also stated that if it was allowed to consider evidentiary factors referenced in subdivision 4 of the statute and balance those against her showing of innocence, it would determine Back was not entitled to compensation.
The court of appeals reversed. It concluded that Back was exonerated, as that term is defined in the statute. The court of appeals also concluded that the district court erroneously determined it could not consider evidentiary factors referenced in subdivision 4 of the statute in making its decision. Instead, it held “that the legislature unambiguously granted the district court discretion to consider the evidence as described in subdivision 4 to conclude” whether an exonerated person is eligible for compensation.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether a district court may deny a petition under Minn. Stat. § 590.11, after the petitioner proves her factual innocence, based on evidence unrelated to the petitioner’s innocence; and (2) whether Back is not exonerated because she does not have clean hands. (Hennepin County)
In the Matter of the Denial of Contested Case Hearing Requests and Issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System / State Disposal System Permit No. MN0071013 for the Proposed NorthMet Project St Louis County Hoyt Lakes and Babbitt Minnesota – Case Nos. A19-0112, A19-0118, A19-0124, A20-1271, A20‑1380, A20-1385: Respondent Poly Met Mining, Inc., intends to build and operate a mine and associated facilities to extract and process copper, nickel, and platinum group metals from the NorthMet Deposit in northeastern Minnesota. At issue is the decision of the respondent Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) to issue a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System and State Disposal System (NPDES/SDS) permit for the NorthMet project.
Appellants are environmental nonprofit organizations and one tribal band that filed three certiorari petitions in the court of appeals: (1) WaterLegacy, (2) Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, and (3) Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy, Center for Biological Diversity, and Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness. Appellants challenged the MPCA’s decision to issue the NPDES/SDS permit, as well as other decisions related to the permit, including decisions to not impose more restrictive conditions and to deny a contested case hearing.
While the certiorari petitions were pending, the court of appeals issued an order transferring the matter to Ramsey County District Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding “alleged irregularities in the procedure.” The district court authorized limited discovery, conducted an evidentiary hearing, and issued a decision. Appellants separately appealed the district court order, and the MPCA filed a notice of related appeal.
After consolidating all the appeals, the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court of appeals concluded that the MPCA “erred by not properly considering whether the federal Clean Water Act applies to any future discharges from Poly Met’s facility to groundwater.” But the court of appeals determined that “there is no reversible error with respect to all other issues that have been raised by the parties.” The court of appeals remanded to the MPCA “for a determination as to whether any discharges by Poly Met to groundwater are governed by the Clean Water Act.”
The supreme court granted review on three primary issues: (1) whether any procedural irregularities in the MPCA’s consideration of the permit application may have prejudiced appellants’ substantial rights; (2) whether the MPCA erred by issuing a permit that does not include water-quality-based effluent limits; and (3) whether the permit complies with a Minnesota rule addressing discharges to groundwater, Minn. R. 7060.0600 (2021). (Minnesota Pollution Control Agency)
Thursday, December 1, 2022
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Non-oral: Kawaskii Antonio Blanche, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A22-1020: In 1999, appellant Kawaskii Blanche was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of a child. The district court sentenced Blanche to life in prison without the possibility of release. Blanche did not file a direct appeal.
In 2002, Blanche filed a petition for postconviction relief asserting multiple claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and evidentiary errors. The district court denied the petition and the supreme court affirmed on appeal. State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. 2005).
In 2022, Blanche filed another petition for postconviction relief asserting newly discovered evidence. The district court summarily denied the petition.
On appeal to the supreme court, the appellant argues the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying his second petition for postconviction relief. (Hennepin County)
Monday, December 5, 2022
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Xavier Demond Gilleylen, Appellant – Case No. A22-0303: A grand jury indicted appellant Xavier Demond Gilleylen with several offenses, including first-degree premediated murder. Gilleylen pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. During the trial, the district court limited defense counsel’s cross-examination of a witness. The final jury instructions included instructions on accomplice testimony and the use of evidence related to the thoroughness of the police investigation. The jury found Gilleylen guilty as charged.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the State presented insufficient evidence; (2) whether the district court improperly limited Gilleylen’s cross-examination about a key witness’s plea deal; (3) whether the district court erroneously instructed the jury on accomplice testimony; and (4) whether the district court provided the jury a confusing and misleading instruction on the use of evidence related to the thoroughness of the police investigation. (Hennepin County)
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Christopher James Colgrove, Appellant – Case No. A22-0718: In 2021, appellant Christopher Colgrove was charged by indictment with first-degree felony murder, second-degree intentional murder, and second-degree felony murder based on allegations that he attacked his girlfriend with a knife, and she died from stab wounds. A jury found Colgrove guilty of all charges, and the district court sentenced Colgrove to life in prison with the possibility of release after 30 years.
On appeal to the supreme court, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his first-degree murder conviction because the State did not prove that he intended to kill the victim. (Clearwater County)
Tuesday, December 6, 2022
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Elsa E. Segura, Appellant – Case No. A22-0163: A grand jury indicted appellant Elsa E. Segura with several offenses, including first-degree premediated murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability. Segura pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. After the parties presented their evidence, the district court instructed the jurors on accomplice liability and transferred intent. During the prosecutor’s closing argument, the prosecutor told the jurors that a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a drug business is violence and guns. The jury found Segura guilty as charged.
On appeal to the supreme court, the following issues are presented: (1) whether the prosecutor committed plain error by urging the jury to convict Segura for aiding a “drug business”; (2) whether the State presented insufficient evidence; (3) whether the district court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that the State needed to prove Segura had advance knowledge her accomplices intended to commit the specific crimes in the indictment; (4) whether the district court committed reversible error by using the phrase “the defendant or another (or others)” when instructing the jury on the essential elements of the charged crimes; (5) whether the district court committed plain error by including a transferred-intent instruction where the two victims were the intended victims of separate shootings; (6) whether the cumulative effect of any instructional errors deprived Segura of a fair trial; and (7) whether the district court committed plain error by allowing the State to elicit testimony that Segura was “hoping to get a plea deal” that would “limit the consequences for [her] conduct” and to impeach Segura with statements she made during her plea proffers. (Hennepin County)
RyanChrz, Relator, vs. Mower County, Self-Insured, and Minnesota Counties Intergovernmental Trust, Respondents – Case No. A22-0792: Relator Ryan Chrz was employed as a deputy sheriff for Mower County. In that position, Chrz witnessed numerous traumatic events. After an incident on February 6, 2019, Chrz was placed on administrative leave and on April 30, 2019, was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Chrz retired from his position effective March 31, 2020, and filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, beginning April 1, 2020. After this, a doctor that Chrz saw at his employer’s request issued a report on December 7, 2020, concluding that Chrz did not meet the criteria for PTSD. In March 2021, Chrz was reexamined by another doctor who had earlier diagnosed him with PTSD. The doctor this time concluded that Chrz’s condition had improved such that he no longer met the criteria for PTSD, and instead gave him a diagnosis of “other specified trauma and stress disorder.” Based on these facts, the compensation judge concluded that Chrz had diagnosed work-related PTSD on April 19, 2019, through March 30, 2021, but that from then on, the diagnosis was for “other specified trauma and stress disorder.” The compensation judge awarded benefits from April 1, 2020, to the present and continuing.
A divided panel of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed. The WCCA observed that the workers’ compensation statute limits a compensable mental injury to PTSD, and thus concluded that Chrz was no longer entitled to workers’ compensation benefits after March 30, 2021, when he was no longer diagnosed with PTSD. The dissent argued for a different rule, whereby once an employee has a compensable PTSD diagnosis, any subsequent mental health condition caused by or consequential to the PTSD diagnosis is also compensable.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the benefits awarded by the compensation judge. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)