EN BANC CALENDAR

Monday, December 4, 2023

 
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Blair Benedict Oberton, Appellant – Case No. A22-1727:  The State charged appellant Blair Benedict Oberton with felony theft, alleging that he stole $1,500 from a hotel on a University of Minnesota campus.  The district court released Oberton from custody on the condition he remain law abiding, stay away from the hotel, and complete treatment.  Four days later, Oberton was arrested for trespassing at a campus recreational center.  When the district court informed Oberton that it was ordering $300 bail, Oberton began using profane language regarding the proceedings, the judge, the court, and the deputy.  The district court made a finding of contempt and imposed a 180-day sentence. 
 
On appeal, Oberton argued that in the absence of a finding of extraordinarily severe conduct, his 180-day sentence should be reduced to 90-days.  The court of appeals affirmed Oberton’s sentence.
 
The supreme court granted review on the following issues:  (1) whether district courts are required to make findings of extraordinarily severe contemptuous behavior before summarily imposing a 180-day sentence when the ordinary sanction for contempt is limited to 90 days, and (2) whether directing profanities at a district court judge is extraordinarily severe contemptuous behavior that authorizes a judge to impose an aggravated 180-day sentence when the ordinary sanction for contempt is limited to 90 days.  The court also directed the parties to address mootness in their briefs.  (Hennepin County)
 

Tuesday, December 5, 2023

 
Lisa Stone, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated, Appellant, vs. Invitation Homes, Inc., et al., Respondents, THR Property Management, L.P., et al., Defendants – Case No. A22-0928:  Appellant Lisa Stone filed a putative class-action complaint against respondent Invitation Homes, Inc., and several of its subsidiaries.  She alleges that she rented a home from Invitation Homes under an unlawful lease that required her to perform maintenance without compensation.
 
An interlocutory appeal involved several issues, including standing.  Among other rulings, the court of appeals determined that the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to show that Stone has standing to sue the subsidiaries.  The court of appeals rejected her reliance on the juridical-link doctrine, which the Eighth Circuit has described as allowing “a named plaintiff to bring a class action against parties that did not cause the named plaintiff’s injury if the plaintiffs suffered identical injuries by parties related through a conspiracy or concerted scheme and suing all parties in one action would be expeditious.”  Wong v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 789 F.3d 889, 896 (8th Cir. 2015).  The court of appeals concluded that the district court erred by denying the motion to dismiss the claims against the subsidiaries.
 
The supreme court granted review on the following issue:  whether Minnesota law already recognizes—or should it recognize—the juridical-link doctrine in the context of class-action standing.  (Hennepin County)
 
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Fong E. Lee, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0387546 – Case No. A23-0008:  An attorney discipline matter that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.
 

Monday, December 11, 2023

 
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Jerry Arnold Westrom, Appellant – Case No. A22-1679:  A grand jury indicted appellant Jerry Arnold Westrom with first-degree premeditated murder.  Westrom filed a number of pretrial motions, which the district court denied.  During the subsequent jury trial, the State presented DNA evidence.  Without objection, the prosecutor referred to the defense theory of the case as “fantasy” during closing argument.  The jury found Westrom guilty as charged.
 
On appeal to the supreme court, Westrom raises the following issues:  (1) whether the district court erred when it denied Westrom’s motion to suppress the State’s DNA evidence, (2) whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Westrom’s motion to introduce evidence of additional alternative perpetrators, (3) whether the district court abused its discretion when it excluded the testimony of defense expert Dr. Michael Nirenberg, (4) whether the State committed prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct during its  closing argument and rebuttal, (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Westrom of the charged offenses, (6) whether trial counsel’s performance was so constitutionally deficient that it likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and (7) whether the cumulative errors in the proceedings deprived Westrom of his right to a fair trial.  (Hennepin County)
 
Nicholas W. Sterry, Respondent, vs. Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC), Appellant, and Correctional Officer Ashley Youngberg, in her individual and official capacities, Defendant – Case No. A22-0829:  Respondent Nicholas Sterry brought tort claims against appellant Minnesota Department of Corrections, alleging that he was sexually harassed and assaulted by corrections officer Ashley Youngberg while he was incarcerated at a Minnesota correctional facility.  The district court dismissed the claims after determining that Youngberg was not “acting within the scope of [her] office or employment” under the State Tort Claims Act, Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 1 (2022).
 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded.  Presuming that the definition of “scope of office or employment” in Minn. Stat. § 3.732, subd. 1(3) (2022), is “consistent with the common law,” the court of appeals concluded that the “complaint alleges facts sufficient to show that Youngberg acted within the scope of her employment.” 
 
The supreme court granted review on the following issue:  whether the Minnesota Legislature intended the statutory definition of “scope of office or employment” in the State Tort Claims Act, Minn. Stat. § 3.732, subd. 1(3), to be as broad as the common law definition applied to vicarious liability claims against private employers.  (Ramsey County)
 

Tuesday, December 12, 2023

 
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Said Sharif Maye, Appellant – Case No. A22-0316:  Following a trial, a jury found appellant Said Maye guilty of second-degree unintentional murder.  The court of appeals affirmed Maye’s conviction.
 
The supreme court granted review on the following issue:  whether the district court erred by admitting evidence of anonymous threats a witness received when there was no link between appellant and the threats, and the witness was not reluctant to testify and did not alter his testimony from his previous statements to the police in response to the threats.  (Hennepin County)
 
Nonoral: Otha Eric Townsend, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A23-1100:  In 1995, appellant Otha Eric Townsend was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder.  The district court imposed a life sentence with the possibility of release and a consecutive sentence of 72 months in prison. The parties briefed the issue of custody credit, and Townsend was given 597 days of custody credit against the 72-month sentence.  Townsend subsequently filed two motions to correct his sentence, arguing the 597 days of custody credit should have been applied to his life sentence.  The district court issued orders denying the motions, which the supreme court affirmed.  In 2023, Townsend filed a third motion to correct his sentence, which the district court denied, concluding that the supreme court’s prior decisions foreclose his argument.
 
On appeal to the supreme court, Townsend raises the following issues:  (1) whether jail credit must be applied to both sentences in order to accurately reflect all the time spent in custody, between arrest and sentencing, (2) whether “new evidence” supports the jail credit being applied to both sentences, and (3) whether failure to apply the jail credit to the mandatory minimum sentence is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).  (Ramsey County)
 

Wednesday, December 13, 2023

 
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Andrew Vernard Glover, Appellant – Case No. A23-0154:  A grand jury indicted appellant Andrew Vernard Glover with several offenses, including first-degree murder while committing a drive-by shooting in connection with the fatal shooting of R.R-H.  Glover filed a number of pretrial motions, which the district court denied.  During the subsequent jury trial, the district court denied Glover’s motion to cross-examine the lead investigator about whether law enforcement had investigated a suspect involved in a prior shooting of R.R-H.  The jury found petitioner guilty of first-degree murder while committing a drive-by shooting.
 
On appeal to the supreme court, Glover raises the following issues:  (1) whether the district court erred by concluding probable cause existed to arrest Glover and to search his residence where the video evidence did not show Glover committing a crime and where police recklessly misrepresented in the search-warrant application that a confrontation occurred between Glover and R.R-H. on the video, (2) whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding the reverse Spreigl evidence where it was relevant and material to the defense and did not amount to improper propensity evidence, and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion and violated Glover’s confrontation rights by preventing him from cross-examining the lead investigator about relevant information concerning the breadth of the police investigation.  (Ramsey County)
 
Jeffrey D. Kuhn, Respondent, vs. Richard G. Dunn, et al, Appellants – Case No. A22-1298:  Rory Dunn entered into a contract for deed with his parents, appellants Richard and Paulette Dunn, to purchase the family farm.  This appeal centers on transfer restrictions in the contract for deed, which provided that Rory “may not sell, assign, or otherwise transfer” his interest in the contract or the property without the written consent of appellants.  After Rory’s death, his estate devolved to his 3-year-old son by intestate succession.
 
The personal representative of the estate initiated this action after appellants sought to cancel the contract for deed.  The district court ruled that the intestate transfer of Rory’s interest materially breached the consent-to-transfer provision.  A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed and remanded.  The court of appeals concluded that the “intestate transfer of Rory’s estate as a result of Rory’s inaction” did not violate the consent-to-transfer provision. 
 
The supreme court granted review on the following issue:  whether transferring property by intestate succession breaches a consent-to-transfer clause in a contract for deed.  (Douglas County)