EN BANC CALENDAR

Tuesday, September 3, 2024

Nonoral: Joel Marvin Munt, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A24-0259: Following a bifurcated jury trial, a district court convicted appellant Joel Munt of multiple offenses, including first-degree premediated murder, arising out of the shooting death of his wife and the kidnapping of their three children. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In October 2023, Munt filed his third postconviction petition, which alleges in part that the first-degree premediated murder statute is unconstitutional. According to Munt, the statute violates equal protection because it treats similarly situated men and women differently. The district court denied the petition without a hearing.

On appeal to the supreme court, Munt raises the following issue: whether the district court abused its discretion in denying his third postconviction petition without a hearing. (Blue Earth County)

Wednesday, September 4, 2024

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

Nonoral: Berry Alexander Davis, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A23-1381: Following a jury trial, a district court convicted appellant Berry Davis of multiple offenses, including first-degree premediated murder. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In March 2023, Davis filed a postconviction petition alleging several claims, including claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court denied the petition without a hearing.

On appeal to the supreme court, Davis raises the following issue: whether the district court abused its discretion in denying his postconviction petition without a hearing. (Hennepin County)

Thursday, September 5, 2024

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Larry Joe Foster, Appellant– Case Nos. A21-0070, A21-0583: The State charged appellant Larry Foster with second-degree intentional murder. The victim was killed inside his home on the evening of September 1, 2019. Prior to trial, the district court granted Foster’s motion to introduce an alternative perpetrator defense that R.J., an alleged drug dealer, killed the victim in a dispute over drugs. Foster subpoenaed R.J. to appear as a defense witness.

During voir dire, R.J. appeared with counsel, who requested a pre-trial hearing for the purpose of allowing R.J. to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The court held that hearing, and R.J. was placed under oath and testified he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right in response to any questions concerning his presence at the victim’s home or drug dealing. Foster argued that he had a right to call R.J. as a witness, who could then invoke his Fifth Amendment right in response to any incriminating questions, and that he had a right to present R.J. to the jury so it could view his body. The court denied Foster’s request to have R.J. invoke his Fifth Amendment right in front of the jury. In a motion to reconsider, Foster argued he had a right to have R.J. walk in front of the jury so it could see his gait and determine if R.J. was a person depicted in a security video walking in front of the victim’s home during the day on September 1, 2019. The district court reserved ruling on Foster’s argument regarding the security video and R.J.’s gait.

During trial, Foster never sought to call R.J. as a witness. Forster presented his alternative perpetrator defense through his own testimony and other evidence, including photographs of R.J. and witness testimony about R.J.’s presence at the victim’s house on days before the murder.

A jury found Foster guilty of second-degree murder. The court of appeals affirmed Foster’s conviction.

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether a defendant’s constitutional rights to compulsory process, due process, and a fair trial permit a defendant to call a witness to the witness stand, where that witness may invoke the right against self-incrimination in response to incriminating questions, particularly when the witness’s physical presence alone has evidentiary value. (Hennepin County)

Monday, September 9, 2024

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Edgard Francisco Talave Latino, Appellant – No. A23-0590: The State charged appellant Edgard Latino with several offenses, including misdemeanor domestic assault, for an incident with the victim on November 12, 2021. A person commits misdemeanor domestic assault if they assault another person and that person is “a family or household member as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1 (2022). Section 518B.01, subdivision 2, in turn, states that “family or household members” include “persons involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(7) (2022). That subdivision also states: “In determining whether persons are or have been involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship under clause (7), the court shall consider the length of time of the relationship; type of relationship; frequency of interaction between the parties; and, if the relationship has terminated, length of time since the termination.” Id., subd. 2(b) (2022).

Latino waived his right to a jury trial. During a court trial, the evidence showed that Latino and the victim began a romantic and sexual relationship in 2020 but that the relationship had ended at the time of the charged offense.

The district court found Latino guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Latino’s convictions.

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether “a family or household member,” for purposes of the domestic-assault statute, includes people who are no longer in a significant romantic or sexual relationship when any assault occurs. (Meeker County)

James Jurgensen, Relator, vs. Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc. and TBG Claims Services, Respondents – Case No. A24-0507: Relator James Jurgensen reached a settlement agreement with his employer and its insurer, respondents Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc. and TBG Claims Services, to settle his workers’ compensation claims. The settlement agreement called for the employer and insurer to pay $150,000. Of that amount, $26,000 was to be paid to Jurgensen’s attorney as contingent attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 176.081 (2022). The settlement agreement also called for Jurgensen’s attorney to be paid an additional $4,000 out of the $150,000 as an excess fee, which the parties agreed was fair and reasonable. The compensation judge recognized that the version of Minn. Stat. § 176.081 in effect at that time capped attorney fees at $26,000. It also recognized that the supreme court in Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132 (Minn. 1999), held that the statutory cap on fees was unconstitutional to the extent that the statute did not allow review of the fee by a court. The compensation judge applied the Irwin factors and concluded that they did not justify the additional $4,000 in requested fees. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Jurgensen’s argument that Minn. R. 1415.3200, subp. 8 (2023) required a summary decision rather than a separate review of the claim for excess fees and affirming that the compensation judge properly denied the portion of the stipulation that provided for excess fees. Jurgensen appealed to the supreme court, raising constitutional challenges, and the Minnesota Attorney General intervened.

On appeal to the supreme court, relator’s brief presents the following issues: (1) whether the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals erred by not applying Minn. R. 1415.3200, subp. 8 to the present facts and not awarding the $4,000 in agreed-upon excess fees because it does not conflict with Minn. Stat. § 176.081 or the Irwin decision; (2) whether the presumptive cap on attorney fees violates Article I, Section 11 of the Minnesota Constitution; and (3) whether the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Irwin factors were not met and whether the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals erred in denying an excess fee of 20 percent consistent with Minn. Stat § 176.081, subd. 1(a). (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)

Tuesday, September 10, 2024

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

In the Matter of the SIRS Appeal by Best Care, LLC – No. A22-1688: Appellant/cross-respondent Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) conducted a post-payment investigation and audit of claims for personal care assistance (PCA) services submitted by respondent/cross-appellant Best Care, LLC. DHS determined that Best Care was improperly paid Medicaid funds because it violated PCA program recordkeeping requirements and therefore engaged in abuse under Minn. Stat. § 256B.064 (2022). The DHS Commissioner issued a final agency order concluding that Best Care is responsible for an overpayment in the amount of $428,393.

The court of appeals reversed in part and remanded. The court of appeals held that a determination that abuse has occurred, by itself, does not allow monetary recovery under section 256B.064, subdivision 1c, because DHS also must show that the vendor was improperly paid the funds sought to be recovered as a result of the abuse. In addition, the court of appeals concluded that the Commissioner did not misapply the law by determining that provider agencies must maintain PCA Choice care plans in their records under Minn. Stat. § 256B.0659 (2022).

The supreme court granted review on the following issue raised in DHS’s petition for review: whether to recover public funds paid to a vendor of medical care, DHS is required to prove both that the vendor committed abuse of a Medical Assistance program, and separately that such abuse also caused the vendor to be improperly paid for services that were not actually provided. The supreme court also granted review on the following issue raised in Best Care’s request for conditional cross-review: whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that Best Care was required to maintain copies of PCA Choice care plans in their offices and that the failure to do so constitutes abuse. (Office of Administrative Hearings)

Nonoral: County of Hennepin, Relator, vs. Hollydale Land LLC, Respondent – Case No. A24-0170: Respondent Hollydale Land owned and operated a golf course, which qualified it for reduced tax payments under Minnesota’s Open Space Property Tax Law. Under that law, the golf course was valued and taxed each year solely with respect to its open space classification and value. See Minn. Stat. § 273.112 (2022). It was not taxed based on its highest and best use market value, although the Open Space Law still required such a valuation to be made each year. But when a property is removed from the Open Space Program, it is subject to additional taxes in the amount equal to the difference between the taxes determined by the market value and the open space tax for the last seven years. Here, the golf course’s sale triggered its exit from the Open Space Program. Relator Hennepin County then calculated the additional tax owed over the past seven years based on the market value valuations that had been made each year. Hennepin County sent notice to Hollydale of this deferred tax owed on September 21, 2021. Hollydale paid the deferred tax of over $2.5 million by the deadline, and then filed a property tax petition on November 3, 2021, alleging, among other things, that the market values used in calculating the additional tax were greater than the bona fide sale price and actual market values. Hennepin County filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the petition was an untimely appeal under Chapter 278. Generally, such petitions must be filed on or before April 30 of the year in which the tax becomes payable. See Minn. Stat. § 278.01, subd. 1 (2022).Under Minn. Stat. § 278.01, subd. 4 (2022), a party also has 60 days from the date of “notice to initiate an appeal of the property’s exempt status, classification, or valuation change.”Hennepin County argued that Hollydale needed to appeal each year as the highest and best use valuations were made if it wanted to contest those valuations.It also argued that under Minn. Stat. § 278.02 (2022), which says “[n]o petition shall include more than one assessment date,” the tax court lacked jurisdiction to assess together seven years of assessments.

The tax court rejected Hennepin County’s arguments, concluding that Hollydale’s petition was timely filed within 60 days of Hennepin County’s September 21, 2021 notice.Hennepin County then petitioned by writ of certiorari invoking Minn. Stat § 271.10, subd. 1 (2022), which provides for review by the supreme court “of any final order of the Tax Court.”

On appeal to the supreme court, relator’s brief presents the following issues: (1) whether the supreme court has jurisdiction to review the tax court’s order granting itself jurisdiction over a petition brought under Minn. Stat. § 278.01 challenging notices of deferred taxes for seven years of assessment due under the Minnesota Open Space Law; (2) whether the tax court committed legal error in determining it had jurisdiction to review a petition brought under Minn. Stat. § 278.01 challenging notices of deferred taxes for seven years of assessment due under the Minnesota Open Space Law; and (3) if the tax court properly determined it has jurisdiction, whether it committed legal error by not limiting its jurisdiction to reviewing only the calculation of additional tax due under the Open Space Law. (Minnesota Tax Court)

Wednesday September 11, 2024

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Nonoral: Ricky Darnell Waiters, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent– No. A23-1863: In 2018, a jury found appellant Ricky Waiters guilty of several offenses including first-degree murder. On direct appeal, the supreme court affirmed his convictions. In 2020 and 2021, Waiters sought postconviction relief in numerous filings, and the district court denied relief.

In 2023, Waiters filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking a new trial. He raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, erroneous evidentiary rulings, insufficient evidence, and violations of the State’s obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence as required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).The district court denied relief.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented include (1) whether appellant received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; (2) whether the State violated its Brady obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence; (3) whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in multiple ways; and (4) whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. (Winona County)