EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

October 2024

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Monday, September 30, 2024

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

In re the Estate of: Joanne Mary Ecklund, Decedent – Case No. A23-0210: As permitted by federal law, Minnesota administers its Medicaid program, Medical Assistance (MA), in part by contracting with private managed care organizations (MCOs) to deliver Medicaid benefits and services to eligible persons. Under this system, the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) pays MCOs a negotiated monthly per-person rate, or “capitation payment,” for covered services. MCOs then negotiate with healthcare providers to secure discounts for the cost of covered services for MA recipients.

Joanne Ecklund was a recipient of MA who received benefits through her MCO, Medica; DHS in turn made capitation payments to Medica. After Ecklund died, appellant Hennepin County was required by law to, and did, file a claim against her estate for MA benefits paid to her during her life, limited to “the amount of medical assistance rendered to recipients 55 years of age or older that consisted of nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and related hospital and prescription drug services.” Minn. Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2(a)(1) (2022). The Estate denied the claim.

The Estate and the County filed opposing motions for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the County is entitled to recover but that the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2(a) (2022), does not permit recovery from the Estate of capitation payments DHS paid to Medica; instead, it permits recovery of only the amount that Medica paid to providers for services actually provided to Ecklund. The County appealed, and appellant DHS intervened. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the statute did not permit a claim for capitation payments. In doing so, it rejected, among other arguments, DHS’s argument that the court’s interpretation would place Minnesota out of compliance with federal law.

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether state and federal law require DHS to recover MA capitation payments from Ms. Ecklund’s estate; and (2) whether Minn. Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2(a) limits an estate-recovery claim to the amounts paid for the cost of long-term care services that were provided to the MA recipient, or whether the statute allows for recovery of the portion of the capitation payments that provided coverage for those services. (Hennepin County)
 

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: L.K. and A.S., Parents – Case No. A23-1762: Respondent L.K. is the mother of twins, who were adjudicated children in need of protective services (CHIPS) and removed from her care shortly after their birth. The twins are “Indian children”—a statutory term used in the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA). They are eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe, namely respondent the Miskwaagamiiwi-Zaaga’iganing tribe—known in English as the Red Lake Nation. Upon being adjudicated CHIPS, the twins were placed in foster care with appellants N.R. and K.R. More than a year later, respondent Faribault and Martin County Human Services informed appellants that the Red Lake Nation supported permanent placement of the children with their aunt, a tribal member.

Appellants, who seek to have the twins permanently placed with them, filed an emergency motion seeking: permissive intervention; party status for the purpose of filing a custody petition; a finding that “good cause” exists to deviate from statutory placement preferences; and a declaration that ICWA and MIFPA violate the equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution by discriminating on the basis of race in, among other things, preferences for the placement of children like the twins. Appellants later filed a petition to establish third-party custody of the children, alleging that it is in the best interests of the children for appellants to be granted sole legal and physical custody. Other parties, including respondent the children’s guardian ad litem, disputed that there was good cause to place the children with appellants.

The court ordered that the twins be placed with their aunt; it later denied appellants’ request for permissive intervention and dismissed their custody petition, concluding that the children’s present placement was in their best interests. It did not express an opinion on the constitutional questions. Appellants appealed, raising multiple issues, including whether ICWA and MIFPA are unconstitutional.

The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in a divided decision. Among other things, the court of appeals concluded that the district court had applied the wrong standard in assessing the appellants’ intervention request, and that the district court misinterpreted the law regarding third-party custody petitions. But the court ruled that the district court did not err by not finding good cause to deviate from statutory placement preferences established by MIFPA, noting among other things that one of the reasons they presented for a good-cause deviation—the mother’s preference—was not supported by testimony from the mother in the proper form. The court of appeals also ruled that the placement preferences of MIFPA do not violate federal equal protection principles. Instead, it concluded that those preferences are based on membership in an Indian tribe, not race, and that MIFPA satisfies the rational basis test.

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963, and the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 260.751-260.835, violate the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection by imposing race-based placement preferences; and (2) whether the district court and court of appeals erred as a matter of law in finding that mother’s preference for placement of her children with appellants did not constitute “good cause” to deviate from the placement preferences of MIFPA, § 206.773, subd. 10(2)(i), because it was not stated in the “proper form”—despite being submitted in an affidavit. (Martin County) 
 

Tuesday, October 1, 2024

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

Deborah Jane Clapp, Respondent, vs. Rochelle Cox, in her official capacity as Interim Superintendent of Minneapolis Public Schools, et al., Appellants – A23-0360: Respondent Deborah Clapp, a homeowner and taxpayer in Minneapolis, brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a collective-bargaining agreement between Minneapolis Public Schools and its teachers’ union. According to the complaint, one provision of the agreement—a provision addressing the transfer, reassignment, and recall of teachers—violates the equal protection guarantee of the Minnesota Constitution.

The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, ruling that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege taxpayer standing, and the claims are not ripe. The court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals concluded that the complaint “pleaded an adequate basis for taxpayer standing, and the claims are ripe.”

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) Did the court of appeals err by holding that merely alleging that a governmental entity will utilize public funds to implement the terms of a collective bargaining agreement meets the requirements of a specific and unlawful disbursement of public funds for purposes of the taxpayer standing doctrine, as required under McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. 1977) and its progeny? (2) Did the court of appeals err in concluding that there is no ripeness because the respondent sought declaratory judgment related to a contract to which respondent is not even a party? (Hennepin County)
 

Great Northwest Insurance Company, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, vs. Hector A. Campbell, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Betty L. Campbell, Defendant – Case No. A23-0519: This appeal arises from a dispute over insurance coverage for roof repairs following a hailstorm. Respondent/cross-appellant Hector Campbell owned a home that was insured by appellant/cross-respondent Great Northwest Insurance Company. The policy covered damage to the outermost layer of roofing material; however, the policy generally excluded coverage for the repair or replacement of “any layer of roofing material, including ‘decking,’ beneath the outermost layer,” even when “required by any law or ordinance, including any building code.” In addition, the policy contained an exclusion that provided: “Overhead and profit on the materials and labor associated with roofing or the roofing system will not be covered under this policy unless the damage to the roof or roof system is a result of fire or lightning.”

The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action to determine its coverage obligations. The district court determined that the policy violates Minn. Stat. § 65A.10 (2022), which generally requires replacement cost insurance to cover the cost of replacing or repairing any “damaged property in accordance with the minimum code as required by state or local authorities.” But the district court determined that the overhead-and-profit exclusion does not implicate the statute. The court of appeals affirmed.

The supreme court granted review on the following issue in Great Northwest’s petition for review: When a storm damages the shingles but not the decking of an insured’s roof, does Minn. Stat. § 65A.10 require an insurer to cover the cost of bringing the decking up to code even when the relevant insurance policy plainly excludes coverage for the decking? The supreme court also granted review on the following issue in Campbell’s request for conditional cross-review: whether the scope of repairs mandated by Minn. Stat. § 65A.10 can be negated by an insurance policy exclusion for overhead and profit. (Ramsey County)

 

Wednesday, October 2, 2024

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

Fletcher Properties, Inc., et al., Appellants, vs. City of Minneapolis, Respondent, Poverty & Race Research Action Council, et al., Respondents, HOME Line, Respondent – Case No. A23-0191: By ordinance, respondent the City of Minneapolis makes it an “unlawful discriminatory practice” for a property owner to use “any requirement of a public assistance program” as “a motivating factor” in the refusal to rent property. Appellants, owners of multiple-unit rental properties, sued the City alleging that the ordinance effectively required them to participate in the otherwise-voluntary Section 8 housing choice voucher (HCV) program and was therefore unlawful in several ways. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellants on their claims that the ordinance violates their due process and equal protection rights under the Minnesota Constitution, but the court of appeals reversed, and this court affirmed the court of appeals. Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 947 N.W.2d 1 (2020).

The matter was remanded to the district court, which then considered appellants’ claims that the ordinance effects a taking of their property without just compensation under the Minnesota Constitution, and that the ordinance is preempted by state law—specifically, the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01–.50 (2022). The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment as to those claims, concluding that the ordinance did not on its face effect either a physical or a regulatory taking, and that it was not preempted by the MHRA.

The court of appeals affirmed. As to the physical taking issue, it relied in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), rejecting appellants’ argument that the decision in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139 (2021), was factually similar. As to the regulatory taking issue, it applied the factors set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), to conclude that appellants had not demonstrated that the ordinance on its face effects a regulatory taking. And the court of appeals concluded that there was no conflict between the ordinance and the MHRA, which also did not occupy the field of housing discrimination.

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether the court misapplied Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139 (2021), in which the United States Supreme Court held that an appropriation of private property for the use of others, even through a regulation, is a physical taking; (2) whether the court misapplied Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), by determining appellants’ claim was a facial challenge and appellants needed to demonstrate the ordinance effects a taking in all applications; and (3) whether the court erred in holding that the City’s civil rights ordinance, which requires participation in the HCV program by redefining discrimination, is not preempted by state law. (Hennepin County) 

 

Nonoral: Joshua Chiazor Ezeka, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A23-1827: Following a jury trial, appellant Joshua Chiazor Ezeka was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. In December 2022, Ezeka filed a postconviction petition alleging several claims, including claims of newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing.

On appeal to the supreme court, Ezeka raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the postconviction petition without holding an evidentiary hearing? Relatedly, whether the third prong of the test for newly discovered evidence in Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1997), applies to timely filed postconviction proceedings under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.1(1) (2022), and, if so, whether the Rainer test violates the separation of powers doctrine or otherwise needs to be expressly overruled or modified in this circumstantial evidence case; (2) whether the district court erred in holding all of Ezeka’s claims other than ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel are Knaffla barred; and (3) whether Minn. Const., Art. 1, § 6 provides greater protections than the Sixth Amendment, and alternatively, whether the Sixth Amendment provides greater protections than the prophylactic Miranda warning. (Hennepin County)

 

Thursday, October 3, 2024 – 10:00 a.m.

Rock Ridge High School – Virginia, Minnesota

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Ivan Contreras-Sanchez, Appellant – No. A22-1579: On April 26, 2021, a man working in a farm field in rural Castle Rock Township in Dakota County discovered a dead body in a drainage culvert. The deceased was identified through a forensic examination as a man who had been reported missing to Minneapolis police on April 7, 2021. The examiner determined that the manner of death was homicide.

Law enforcement sought a geofence warrant, authorizing it to obtain location-history data from Google for devices within a 65-foot-wide by 290-foot-long rectangle that encompassed the culvert and a road adjacent to the culvert. The warrant application outlined a three-step process, under which Google would provide anonymous device data pursuant to the first two steps and de-anonymized data under the third step. The district court signed the geofence warrant, which contained all three steps outlined in the warrant application.

Google provided anonymous device data to law enforcement under the first two steps of the geofence warrant. Law enforcement then applied for a new search warrant to obtain identifying subscriber data information for one device, Device A. The district court signed the second search warrant, which was not a geofence warrant.

Pursuant to the second warrant, Google told law enforcement that the account owner for Device A was “Ivan Contreras” and provided an email address associated with the account. Law enforcement later determined the subscriber associated with Device A was appellant Ivan Contreras-Sanchez.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Contreras-Sanchez with second-degree intentional murder and second-degree felony murder. Contreras-Sanchez moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the geofence warrant and all fruit of the poisonous tree, including the identification of Contreras-Sanchez. The district court denied the motion to suppress.

Following a jury trial, Contreras-Sanchez was convicted of second-degree intentional murder. The court of appeals affirmed.

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether geofence warrants are categorically prohibited as general warrants under the United States and/or Minnesota Constitution; (2) if geofence warrants are not categorically prohibited, whether this geofence warrant established probable cause to search the data of users who were merely present within the geofence boundary; and (3) whether this geofence warrant was insufficiently particular and overbroad where the warrant allowed the seizure of all users’ data over seven days in a location that encompassed a public road and where the warrant allegedly gave police unchecked discretion to determine which devices to target. (Hennepin County)

 

Monday, October 7, 2024

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

Tina Marie Lund, as conservator of the Honorable Fred Karasov, Appellant, vs. Calhoun Orange, Inc. d/b/a Orange Theory Fitness Minneapolis-Uptown, Respondent – Case No. A23-0149: Respondent Calhoun Orange, Inc., is a fitness studio operating in Minneapolis. Fred Karasov joined Calhoun Orange, at which time he signed an intake form that contained provisions purporting to relieve Calhoun Orange from liability for certain claims he might later have against it. In 2019, Karasov attended a workout class at Calhoun Orange and suffered a cardiac arrest. Calhoun Orange staff did not use available medical equipment to resuscitate Karasov. Paramedics were eventually able to resuscitate Karasov, but by that time he had suffered a permanent and debilitating brain injury. Later, Karasov’s conservator, appellant Tina Lund, sued Calhoun Orange, alleging several negligence-related claims. The district court granted, in part, Calhoun Orange’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Lund’s claims for negligence, negligent undertaking, and medical negligence were barred by the provisions in the intake form. But the district court allowed Lund’s claim for willful and wanton negligence to go to trial. The jury returned a verdict for Calhoun Orange on that claim, and Lund’s motion for a new trial was denied.

The court of appeals affirmed in a split decision. Both opinions analyzed the issue in light of the decision in Justice v. Marvel, LLC, 979 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 2022). The majority opinion reasoned that, although one of the provisions in the intake form did not meet the “strict construction” standard explained in Justice v. Marvel, another provision in the intake form did meet that standard. The majority therefore concluded that the provisions in the intake form effectively released Calhoun Orange from its own alleged negligence. The dissenting judge reasoned instead that the two provisions contradicted each other, conflicting with the requirement of strict construction that exculpatory or indemnity clauses clearly and unequivocally express the contracting parties’ intent. The dissenting judge therefore concluded that Calhoun Orange was not released from its own alleged negligence.

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: Did the court of appeals err by misapplying the strict-construction standard this court articulated in Justice v. Marvel, LLC, 979 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. 2022), in concluding the exculpatory clause barred appellant’s negligence claims? (Hennepin County)

 

Nonoral: Angeline R. Brozovich, Relator, Frank V. Brozovich, Relator, vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A24-0547: Relators Angeline Brozovich and Frank Brozovich are Minnesota residents who filed Minnesota Income Tax Returns (married, filing jointly) for tax years 2019 and 2020. On their returns, the Brozoviches claimed losses associated with a single-family home they own in the State of Washington, which they alleged they operated as a rental property. Respondent Commissioner of Revenue conducted an audit and concluded that the Brozoviches’ real estate activities were a passive activity and thus passive activity losses under the Internal Revenue Code. As such, the Commissioner determined that these losses could not offset their regular income and that the Brozoviches owed additional taxes.

The Brozoviches appealed to the tax court. Under an exception in the Internal Revenue Code, if a real estate professional meets certain participation thresholds, her real estate activities are not considered “passive activity.” The Brozoviches argued that work done by Angeline Brozovich qualified her as a “real estate professional,” such that they could deduct their losses related to the Washington property. The tax court affirmed. It concluded that Angeline Brozovich did not meet the 750-hour requirement to qualify as a real estate professional. The tax court also rejected the Brozoviches’ argument that the amount of money they charged their son for rent was at market levels and further concluded that the Brozoviches did not establish that their credit card interest payments were deductible.

On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented by the Brozoviches include: (1) whether the tax court lacked jurisdiction to rule on questions of law and fact pertaining to the federal Internal Revenue Code; (2) whether Angeline Brozovich is a real estate professional; (3) whether the tax court erred in its findings of fact and conclusions regarding deductions; and (4) whether a penalty was improperly imposed because the audit was prematurely completed. (Minnesota Tax Court)

 

Tuesday, October 8, 2024

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Eloisa Rubi Plancarte, Appellant – No. A23-0158: The State charged appellant Eloisa Rubi Plancarte with indecent exposure, Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1(1) (2022), which prohibits a person from “willfully and lewdly expos[ing] the person’s body, or the private parts thereof” “in any public place, or in any place where others are present.” Following a court trial, Plancarte was convicted of the charged offense. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the conviction.

The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether “female breasts” are “private parts” for purposes of the indecent-exposure statute; (2) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove that Plancarte “lewdly” exposed her breasts in violation of the indecent-exposure statute; and (3) whether the prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of Plancarte for an act which men are permitted to do violates the state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law. (Olmsted County)
 

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Christopher Lee Manska, Appellant– No. A23-0010: Appellant Christopher Lee Manska was charged with felony driving while intoxicated, felony unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and other related charges stemming from a traffic stop. Prior to trial, Manska sought to compel disclosure of the audit trail of the dash camera of the officer’s squad car. Manska asserted the officer used video editing software to delete footage from the traffic stop. The district court denied his Rule 9 discovery motions. A jury found Manska guilty of all charges.

The court of appeals affirmed Manska’s convictions. The court of appeals concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Manska’s motions to compel.

The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether the lower courts’ rulings were in direct conflict with settled precedent by conditioning disclosure of relevant evidence on the defendant’s ability to prove that the evidence sought would be favorable to his case. (Itasca County)

 

Wednesday, October 9, 2024

Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Nicholas James Firkus, Appellant – No. A23-0973: A grand jury indicted appellant Nicholas James Firkus with first-degree premeditated murder. Following a jury trial, Firkus was found guilty as charged. The district court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of release.

On appeal to the supreme court, Firkus raises the following issue: in this circumstantial evidence case, was the evidence insufficient to negate, beyond a reasonable doubt, every rational hypothesis other than guilt? (Ramsey County)
 

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Anders L. Odegaard, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0399628 – No. A24-0336: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the matter.