EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
December 2024
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, December 2, 2024
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Following their divorce, respondent Travis W. Kalis was ordered to pay child support to appellant Leslie E. Sheey Lee. In the summer of 2015, the parties arranged that Kalis would make his child-support payments using Venmo. Each month, Lee would send Kalis a Venmo request for child-support payments, and Kalis would transfer the requested amount. At that time, Kalis’s monthly child-support obligation was $1,139. The parties had some discussions regarding reducing Kalis’s child-support obligation. Thereafter, beginning in January 2016 and lasting until May 2019, Lee began requesting and Kalis began paying by Venmo only $1,000 per month. Later, beginning in June 2019 and lasting until March 2022, Lee began requesting and Kalis began paying by Venmo only $500 per month. Eventually Kalis stopped making prompt payments, and Lee brought in respondent the County of Le Sueur, which notified Kalis that he was over $32,000 in arrears on child support payments. The bulk of the arrears were attributable to the reduction in payments between June 2019 and March 2022.
In September 2022, Father moved to modify child support, both prospectively and retroactively. A child-support magistrate (CSM) held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the parties had reached an extrajudicial agreement to limit Kalis’s obligation to $1,000 until the parties’ older child had graduated from high school and to $500 thereafter; as a result, Kalis owed nothing more for child support through March 2022. But the CSM found that the parties had abandoned that agreement when Kalis failed to pay Lee’s April 2022 request. The CSM also found that Kalis had withheld information necessary to get a full picture of Kalis’s income. Lee sought review of the CSM’s order, but the district court denied review. Lee appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the parties had reached an extrajudicial agreement that was enforceable under the framework set forth in
Kielley v. Kielley, 674 N.W.2d 770 (Minn. App. 2004).
The supreme court granted review of the following issues: (1) Are extrajudicial agreements to reduce child support enforceable or are they unenforceable because they lead to impermissible retroactive modifications of support? (2) Were the parties’ Venmo transactions contractually sound agreements to reduce Kalis’s support obligation, especially in light of Kalis’s failure to disclose his income? (Le Sueur County)
Respondent Lucas Peterson was a police officer for relator City of Minneapolis. Peterson left his employment with the City in May 2021. A month later, Peterson was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by a licensed psychologist. Peterson notified the City, which denied liability for his workers’ compensation claim. The compensation judge found that Peterson had sustained a PTSD injury and that he continued to meet the diagnosis of PTSD through the second day of the hearing. This finding was based on the compensation judge crediting the opinion of a licensed psychologist, who opined that under the most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the DSM-5-TR (as opposed to under the prior version of the DSM-5), Peterson qualified for a lifetime diagnosis of PTSD. The compensation judge ordered the City to pay workers’ compensation benefits and assessed a 30 percent penalty on certain benefits owed for frivolous denial of a claim.
The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) first referred the case back to the compensation judge to determine whether Peterson sustained a compensable consequential mental health condition as a substantial result of the original PTSD condition. The compensation judge determined that he had. The WCCA then affirmed in full.
On appeal to the supreme court, relator’s brief presents the following issues: (1) whether the WCCA committed errors of law in finding that Peterson was entitled to ongoing benefits for PTSD even though it was undisputed that he no longer met the DSM-5 criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD; (2) whether the WCCA committed errors of law in finding that Peterson had a compensable “consequential mental injury”; and (3) whether the WCCA committed errors of law in affirming the compensation judge’s award of penalties against the City for asserting a frivolous defense. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
Tuesday, December 3, 2024
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Appellant JayCee Cooper is a transgender woman who sought to compete in the women’s division of powerlifting events. Respondent USA Powerlifting rejected her application on the ground that “she enjoys strength advantages over other women due to maturation during male puberty.” She then brought multiple claims against USA Powerlifting under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01–.44 (2018). The district court, among other rulings, granted Cooper’s motion for partial summary judgment on USA Powerlifting’s liability for (a) sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations and (b) sex and sexual orientation discrimination in business. The district court also ordered injunctive relief.
In a divided decision, the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. As relevant to the issues in the supreme court, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Cooper on her claims of (a) sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations and (b) sex and sexual orientation discrimination in business. The court of appeals concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the decision of USA Powerlifting was motivated by Cooper’s transgender status and whether USA Powerlifting had a legitimate business purpose for its decision. The court of appeals therefore determined that “there is no legal basis for injunctive relief.”
The supreme court granted review on the following issues, as presented in the petition for review: (1) under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, if a business or place of public accommodation admits that it denies full and equal services to members of a protected class on the basis of membership in that class, whether the denial constitutes discrimination as a matter of law; (2) under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, whether a business or place of public accommodation can escape liability for discrimination against an individual member of a protected class based on generalizations or stereotypes about that class as a whole; and (3) should the supreme court overrule
Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001). (Ramsey County)
In 2005, following a jury trial, appellant Leroy Roderick Paul was convicted of first-degree murder. More than 17 years later, in December 2023, Paul filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that respondent State of Minnesota violated the rules announced in
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), when it failed to disclose a trial witness’s deal for a specific sentence. According to Paul, his petition satisfied two exceptions to the postconviction statute of limitations: newly discovered evidence, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2) (2022), and interests of justice, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2022). The district court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the
Brady and
Giglio claims were meritless, untimely, and procedurally barred.
On appeal to the supreme court, Paul raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding Paul’s
Brady and
Giglio claims lacked merit, (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding Paul’s
Brady and
Giglio claims were untimely and procedurally barred. (Hennepin County)
Monday, December 9, 2024
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
This appeal involves a dispute over the right to bonded contract funds. Appellant Granite Re, Inc., issued payment and performance bonds for three public works projects. Following the default of the principal contractor—Molnau Trucking, LLC—Granite paid the subcontractors on the projects and sought reimbursement out of the remaining bonded contracts funds via a claim for equitable subrogation. Respondent United Prairie Bank made a competing claim to the funds based on a security interest arising from bank loans on which Molnau Trucking defaulted.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court awarded the bonded contract funds to United Prairie Bank. The court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the bank because Granite did not meet “the first prong of equitable subrogation—that it acted under a justifiable or excusable mistake of fact.” Alternatively, the court of appeals concluded that the bank retained priority over any interest that Granite could have acquired by equitable subrogation because “the bank secured its interest in Molnau Trucking’s collateral before Granite’s equitable subrogation claim attached.”
The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) the appropriate standard for evaluating whether a surety or other party is entitled to equitable subrogation after discharging the obligations of another; and (2) whether a surety making payment under a payment or performance bond has an equitable right to remaining contract funds, which takes priority over the rights of a third-party lender, regardless of the timing of UCC filings. (Carver County)
An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.
Tuesday, December 10, 2024
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Appellant Energy Transfer LP, et al. (“Energy Transfer”) brought a lawsuit against Greenpeace International, et al. (“Greenpeace”), in North Dakota court. Energy Transfer constructed and owns the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), whereas Greenpeace opposed construction of the DAPL and engaged in protests in 2016 to discourage or impede the construction of the DAPL. In the North Dakota action, Energy Transfer alleges that Greenpeace’s efforts to stop construction amounted to a civil conspiracy, and that Greenpeace engaged in tortious activity in furtherance of the conspiracy. Respondent Unicorn Riot, which is not a party to the North Dakota action, is a Minnesota-based entity that identifies itself as a non-profit media organization of journalists focusing on social and environmental struggles. Members of Unicorn Riot were present at and provided media coverage of the DAPL protests. Some members of Unicorn Riot were arrested during the protests, but any criminal charges brought against them were eventually dismissed.
In 2021, Energy Transfer served subpoenas on Unicorn Riot seeking information relating to the DAPL construction and protests. Unicorn Riot’s response asserted privilege under the Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 595.021-.025 (2022) (“MFFIA”), which prohibits the disclosure of certain protected news-gathering materials. Energy Transfer filed a motion to compel Unicorn Riot to comply with the subpoenas, arguing that the protections of MFFIA apply only to “lawful news gathering” and therefore did not apply because Unicorn Riot “engaged in unlawful conduct” by, among other things, trespassing on the DAPL construction site during the protests. The district court denied the motion to compel, rejecting any “lawful news gathering” limitation on MFFIA. But it granted Energy Transfer’s alternative request for a privilege log, ordering Unicorn Riot to produce a list of all responsive documents and answers it claimed as privileged, which would be subject to in camera review. Both sides appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the MFFIA is applicable to Unicorn Riot’s conduct, but Unicorn Riot is not required to produce a privilege log.
The supreme court granted review of the following issues: (1) Should the qualified privilege established by the MFFIA apply when a purported newsgatherer engages in unlawful or tortious conduct? (2) Should a party claiming relevant information in its possession is privileged under MFFIA be required to produce a privilege log so that the validity of its privilege claim can be contested? (Hennepin County)
An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.