EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
December 2025
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, December 1, 2025
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Sela Investments, Ltd LLP, Respondent, vs. J.H., Appellant – Case No. A24-1380: In December 2023, respondent Sela Investments, Ltd. LLP filed an eviction complaint against appellant J.H., alleging breach of lease. Sela and J.H. reached a settlement agreement, which the district court approved. Sela does not dispute that J.H. fulfilled the terms of the settlement by vacating the property by the end of January 2024. In June of 2024, J.H. sought expungement of the eviction action, based on J.H.’s compliance with the settlement agreement, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 484.014, subd. 3(a)(6) (Supp. 2023) (“settlement expungement provision”), which the Legislature has renumbered as subdivision 3(a)(7). The settlement expungement provision, which was initially adopted by the Legislature in 2023, provides for mandatory expungement of an eviction case “upon motion of a defendant, if the case is settled and the defendant fulfills the terms of the settlement.”
The district court granted the request for expungement. Sela appealed, arguing that section 484.014 unconstitutionally violates separation-of-powers principles, the First Amendment, and the common law. The Attorney General intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statute. The court of appeals reversed in a precedential opinion, ruling that the settlement expungement provision is facially unconstitutional because it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by mandating district courts to expunge an eviction case court file based on a defendant filing a motion seeking that relief, infringing on the judiciary’s inherent authority to decide cases and control its own records. The court of appeals did not reach Sela’s arguments that the settlement expungement provision also violates the First Amendment and the common law. The court of appeals remanded for the district court to consider J.H.’s separate request for discretionary expungement of the eviction case file under Minn. Stat. § 484.014, subd. 2.
The supreme court granted review of the following issues: (1) Does Minnesota’s eviction expungement statute take away a district court’s right to hear and decide cases? (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in invalidating Minn. Stat. § 484.014, subd. 3(a)(6) (Supp. 2023) as facially unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine? (Hennepin County)
Tyrel Lamar Patterson, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A25-0541: A grand jury indicted appellant Tyrel Lamar Patterson with several offenses, including first-degree intentional murder while committing an aggravated robbery, under both principal and aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Patterson pleaded guilty to first-degree intentional murder while committing an aggravated robbery. As part of his factual basis, Patterson admitted that he and his accomplices planned to rob the victims in the home of one of the victims, guns were brandished when they entered the home, he removed a watch and necklace from one of the victims, it was foreseeable that the guns would be used during the robbery, and a gun was used to kill one of the victims. The district court accepted Patterson’s guilty plea and imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of release after 30 years. In 2024, Patterson filed a petition to vacate his conviction under the felony murder accomplice review act. Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864–68. The district court denied Patterson’s petition to vacate the conviction.
Patterson’s brief presents the following issue: Did the district court err when it denied Patterson’s petition to vacate his conviction for aiding and abetting felony first-degree murder based on Section 24 of the Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52 art 4, § 24, subd. 7 (1)–(2) when it considered matters outside of the record for Patterson’s case? (Scott County)
Tuesday, December 2, 2025
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Jeremiah Quan Turner, Appellant – Case No. A24-1173: Appellant Jeremiah Turner was indicted on first-degree murder committed while committing domestic abuse and second-degree unintentional murder committed in the course of a felony. Turner waived his right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a court trial on stipulated evidence, in which Turner represented himself. The district court found Turner guilty of both counts.
On direct appeal to the supreme court, Turner raises two issues: (1) whether Turner is entitled to a new trial because he did not validly waive his right to counsel and his waiver was based on misinformation provided to him by a managing attorney at the public defender’s office about the possibility of substitute counsel, which the district court failed to correct; and (2) whether Turner is entitled to a new trial because he did not validly renew his waiver of his right to counsel after the grand jury indicted him on first-degree domestic abuse murder, and he continued to represent himself without knowing that the district court’s previous directive to him that advisory counsel could not assume representation was wrong. (Hennepin County)
Nonoral: Andrew Vernard Glover, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A25-1274: A grand jury indicted appellant Andrew Vernard Glover with several offenses, including first-degree intentional murder while committing a drive-by shooting. Glover pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. The jury found Glover guilty of first-degree intentional murder while committing a drive-by shooting, and the district court imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of release after 30 years. On direct appeal, Glover’s conviction was affirmed. In February 2025, Glover filed a postconviction petition that claimed the district court failed to act impartially during his trial. Concluding that petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred, the district court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Glover’s brief presents the following issue: Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the postconviction petition? (Ramsey County)
Monday, December 8, 2025
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Nicholas Rowe, Respondent, vs. City of Minneapolis, Self-Insured, Relator– Case No. A24-1465: Respondent Nicholas Rowe, was hired as a police officer in 1997 by relator City of Minneapolis and worked for the City until 2022. During his 25-years working as a police officer, Rowe experienced multiple traumatic events.
In March 2022, Rowe underwent an evaluation by Kasey Aleknavicius, Psy.D., L.P. who opined that Rowe met the criteria for PTSD, among other diagnoses, under the DSM-5. In April 2022, Rowe hired counsel to pursue workers’ compensation benefits. The City denied primary liability, questioning the validity of the PTSD diagnosis. In August 2022, Rowe filed a claim petition seeking workers’ compensation benefits related to the PTSD diagnosis.
In November 2022, Kenneth Young, Psy.D., L.P. performed an independent psychological evaluation of Rowe at the request of the City. Dr. Young used the DSM-5 and concluded that there was no clear and consistent evidence that Rowe currently met, or had ever met, the criteria for PTSD.
Subsequently, in a report dated July 18, 2023, Dr. Aleknavicius diagnosed the employee with PTSD (among other diagnoses) using the DSM-5-TR.
At a hearing before a compensation judge, both Dr. Aleknavicius and Dr. Young, testified regarding the PTSD diagnosis under the DSM-5 and the DSM-5-TR. The compensation judge found that even though Rowe was entitled to the presumption of compensability for a PTSD work injury, the City had provided substantial factors rebutting the presumption, relying on Dr. Young’s opinions. The compensation judge concluded Rowe had never met the diagnosis of PTSD pursuant to the DSM-5.
On appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA), Rowe asserted that the compensation judge erred by relying on Dr. Young’s report because Dr. Young did not use the DSM-5-TR. The WCCA agreed, concluding that because Dr. Young did not base his opinion on the DSM-5-TR at the time of his evaluation of Rowe, the compensation judge should not have accepted Dr. Young’s opinions. The WCCA vacated the compensation judge’s findings and order and remanded back to the compensation judge.
The City’s appeal to the supreme court presents the following issues: (1) whether the WCCA committed an error of law in excluding from evidentiary consideration the report and testimony of Relator’s expert based on an erroneous legalistic analysis of the DSM-5-TR and a factually erroneous finding that the expert purportedly “failed to utilize it”; and (2) whether the WCCA committed an error of law in vacating the compensation judge’s determination that the Relator rebutted, by substantial factors, the statutory presumption in Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 15(d) and (e). (Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Jason P. Steck, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0393077 – Case No. A24-1482: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.
Tuesday, December 9, 2025
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Alfredo Torrez, Appellant – Case No. A24-0818: After law enforcement seized methamphetamine and other paraphernalia from the home Alfredo Torrez shared with his wife and adult son, the State charged all three family members with drug-related offenses. Torrez was charged with first-degree sale and first-degree possession of a controlled substance, first-degree conspiracy to commit a controlled substance offense, and failure to affix a tax stamp. At the time of arrest, Torrez’s wife was serving probationary sentences for prior convictions.
At an omnibus hearing, the district court denied Torrez’s request for an interpreter. And at various other hearings, Torrez told the court he was “losing his mind” in the sense that his memory and attention were impaired.
Torrez entered a contingent Alford plea to the offenses of first-degree sale of a controlled substance and first-degree conspiracy to commit a controlled substance offense. The plea was contingent upon the State extending favorable treatment to Torrez’s wife, and the contingency was disclosed to the court during the plea hearing. Specifically, the State agreed to (1) not seek execution of Torrez’s wife’s probationary sentences; (2) make Torrez’s wife an offer to resolve her pending case without any prison time or additional jail time; and (3) try to accommodate a contact visit between the two before Torrez’s commitment to prison. The deal contained no agreement as to Torrez’s sentence. At the time Torrez entered the plea, his wife was 71 years old and in poor health. Torrez was 72.
Before sentencing, Torrez’s appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw Torrez’s plea. The motion stated: “The above-named defendant has changed his mind, doesn’t believe these pleas are in his best interest, and wishes to proceed to trial in this matter.” Torrez testified at the plea withdrawal hearing. At the close of the hearing, counsel argued Torrez had “changed his mind” and stated he “did not take issue with” the State’s memorandum opposing plea withdrawal. Counsel also told the court: “I don’t believe it would be an abuse of discretion no matter what you decide today.” The district court denied Torrez’s motion to withdraw his plea.
Torrez appealed asserting, in relevant part, that withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice because he entered the plea involuntarily and unintelligently. According to Torrez, the district court failed to conduct the heightened inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea that is required for a contingent plea by State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Minn. 1994), and Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Minn. 2003). Concerning intelligence, Torrez argued that he did not understand the consequences of his plea because he is disabled in communication and struggles with cognitive decline. Torrez also argued that counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the plea withdrawal hearing.
The court of appeals affirmed. It held: (1) Torrez’s pleas were intelligent because—at the plea hearing—he was informed of, and agreed that he understood, the charges against him, the rights he was waiving, and the consequences of his plea; (2) Torrez’s pleas were voluntary because “[w]hile the district court did not explicitly state that it was undertaking a separate Danh analysis, the record reflects that it engaged in sufficient inquiry” to satisfy Danh; (3) Torrez cannot show complete failure by counsel to oppose the State’s case because he alleges a lack of meaningful adversarial testing only at one point in time—the plea withdrawal hearing; and (4) counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
The supreme court granted review on three issues: (1) Was the voluntariness of Torrez’s “contingent plea” sufficiently shown where the plea offered leniency to a third party, but no benefit to Torrez, no Minn. R. Crim. P. 15 petition was signed or reviewed, and no specific inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea was conducted? (2) When reviewing the intelligence of a guilty plea must a court look to the aggregate evidence in the record, or may the court ignore an elderly defendant’s repeated concerns about dementia based on the defendant’s monosyllabic responses to leading question during the plea colloquy? and (3) Did defense counsel fail to provide effective assistance by ignoring the reasons for plea withdrawal that Torrez expressed, inaccurately stating those reasons in a way that ensured that the motion would be denied, and failing to request a Minn. R. Crim P. 20.01 evaluation after Torrez’s repeated statements regarding his dementia? (Polk County)