EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
February 2026
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, February 2, 2026
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Seven Acquisition LLC, Appellant, vs. Gregg Williams, Respondent – Case No. A24-1535: According to the allegations in a complaint brought by appellant Seven Acquisition LLC (Seven), it operated a business in a Minneapolis building it rented from a landlord. After a dispute arose between Seven and the landlord, the landlord stopped repaying the loan on its mortgage, and the lender commenced a foreclosure action. Again according to the allegations in the complaint, the lender formed a plan to illegitimately expel Seven by arranging for the appointment of a foreclosure receiver who would manage the building in a manner that would force Seven to vacate. The lender eventually secured the court-ordered appointment of respondent Gregg Williams, whom Seven alleges (1) had a prior relationship with the lender’s foreclosure agent that prevented him from being impartial in his receivership duties, and (2) made misrepresentations to the court about the extent of his previous relationship in order to secure the appointment. The district court’s order appointing Williams as receiver gave him broad powers to maintain the “uninterrupted operation” of the property, and it granted him “all protections available to a fiduciary under applicable federal and state laws, including but not limited to derivative judicial immunity.” Upon appointment as a receiver, Seven further alleges, Williams proceeded to attempt to oust Seven from the building by demanding rent Seven was not obligated to pay, by trying to evict Seven, by allowing the building to deteriorate, and by refusing to make repairs to the property unless Seven vacated. As a result of Williams’s actions, Seven alleges, it was forced to close its business and vacate the property.
Seven sued Williams, making the allegations listed above, and asserting liability on the bases that (1) Williams breached his fiduciary duty to Seven as a creditor-defendant in the foreclosure action and as a building tenant, and (2) Williams’s actions constituted negligence. Williams moved to dismiss Seven’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, arguing that Seven’s claims were barred entirely by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. The district court granted the motion as to the negligence claim but denied it as to the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. Williams appealed from the denial of the motion to dismiss the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, and the court of appeals reversed, concluding that quasi-judicial immunity applied to all of Seven’s claims.
The supreme court granted review of the following issue: Is a receiver entitled to quasi-judicial immunity when he makes material misrepresentations to the district court in order to be appointed as receiver, and then acts as an agent of the property’s mortgagor by refusing to maintain the receivership property with the specific intent to cause harm to the property’s sole tenant? (Hennepin County)
Tuesday, February 3, 2026
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
In the Matter of a Public Safety Officer Death Benefit for Eric William Groebner (Deceased) – Case No. A24-1410: Anoka County Police Department Officer Eric Groebner died of a vascular rupture in his home on the day after he worked a 12-hour shift. His widow claims eligibility for Minnesota’s public safety officer death benefit. The Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS) denied the widow’s application for line-of-duty death benefits because it concluded that Officer Groebner did not die in the line of duty as defined by Minn. Stat. § 299A.41, subd. 3. Officer Groebner’s widow initiated a contested case proceeding with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). At OAH, DPS moved for summary disposition, and the Administrative Law Judge granted that motion.
A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed. It held: (1) a survivor qualifies for line-of-duty death benefits under Minn. Stat. § 299A.41, subd. 3 if the peace officer died from vascular rupture within 24-hours after a final shift that involved stressful or strenuous law enforcement or emergency response activities that were “nonroutine,” meaning not customary, mechanically performed, or part of an officer’s regular course of procedure, and (2) the record evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact about whether Officer Groebner engaged in “nonroutine” activity.
The supreme court granted review and cross-review of two issues: (1) Whether the court of appeals erred when it did not consider the scope of a peace officer’s normal duties in defining “nonroutine” to include activities commonly associated with law enforcement; and (2) Whether the Legislature’s 2016 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 299A.41, subd. 3 added a presumption of compensability for certain heart-related deaths or whether it replaced the Johnson v. City of Plainview, 431 N.W.2d 109 (Minn. 1988) and Kramer v. State, Peace Officers Benefit Fund, 380 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 1986) “killed in the line of duty” definition for all heart-related deaths. (Office of Administrative Hearings)
Wednesday, February 4, 2026
University of Minnesota Law School
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Nicholas Norton Engel, Appellant – Case No. A24-0271: On September 30, 2021, appellant Nicholas Engel was driving a van without a rear license plate but with a valid Wisconsin-issued temporary registration tag affixed to the lower-left corner of the rear window. A police officer began following the van. The officer turned on his squad car’s emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop of the van. Engel did not stop. He continued to drive for several miles until he turned off the road and stopped.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Engel with fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. Engel moved to suppress evidence and dismiss the charge against him. He argued, in part, that his constitutional right against unreasonable seizures was violated because the officer conducted a warrantless seizure without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court denied the motion. A jury later found Engel guilty.
A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that the police officer unlawfully seized Engel because he did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity when he initiated the traffic stop, but the court of appeals concluded that Engel’s flight from the officer after the initiation of the traffic stop was admissible.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: Whether evidence of flight in response to an unconstitutional seizure is subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule. (Pennington County)
Thursday, February 5, 2026
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Arianna Anderson, et al., Appellants vs. City of Minneapolis, Respondent – Case No. A24-1082: Appellants are current or former residential tenants in North Minneapolis. Appellants sued respondent the City of Minneapolis, alleging that North Minneapolis receives less-preferential treatment than other, more affluent and less racially diverse, areas of the City with respect to enforcement of the City’s housing code. Their claims included allegations that the City violated Minn. Stat. § 363A.12, which is the public service discrimination provision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), and breached a duty under the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances. In their prayer for relief, appellants requested that the district court provide “injunctive relief requiring the City of Minneapolis to abide by its duty to enforce the Minneapolis Housing Code”; a declaratory judgment determining that the City violated the MHRA; an award of costs, disbursements, and attorney fees; and a jury trial.”
The City moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, asserting official immunity and other defenses. The district court granted the motion, determining that official immunity barred appellants’ claims under the MHRA and the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances. The court of appeals affirmed in relevant part, rejecting appellants’ arguments that (1) official immunity does not apply to claims seeking equitable relief, and (2) the Legislature has implicitly abrogated official immunity for disparate impact claims under the MHRA.
The supreme court granted review of the following issue: Whether common law official immunity applies to claims for purely injunctive and declaratory relief, or is it limited to actions “for damages.” (Hennepin County)