EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
January 2026
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, January 5, 2026
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Derek Alexander Knapp, Appellant, vs. Commissioner of Public Safety, Respondent – Case No. A24-1440: Respondent the Commissioner of Public Safety revoked appellant Derek Knapp’s driver’s license based on the results of a breath test conducted with a DataMaster DMT-G (DMT). Knapp petitioned the district court for review of his license revocation. Knapp’s challenge related to the 15-minute observation period that law enforcement conducts before the test. Knapp argued the DMT test results were not admissible because law enforcement failed to adequately observe him before conducting the test. A hearing was held. The sheriff’s deputy who observed Knapp before the breath test and the officer who administered the breath test testified. Over Knapp’s objection, the district court admitted the DMT test results into evidence.
The district court rescinded the revocation of Knapp’s driver’s license. According to the district court, continuously observing the driver for 15 minutes before the breath test is a procedure that is required to ensure reliability of the breath test, but the Commissioner did not establish that the deputy continuously observed Knapp during the 15 minutes before the breath test. Because the Commissioner did not demonstrate a prima facie case that the administration of the breath test conformed to the procedures necessary to ensure reliability, the court concluded that the DMT test results were unreliable.
The court of appeals reversed the district court. It held that the DMT test results were admissible because the Commissioner presented evidence that the test was conducted by a certified DMT operator and that the DMT machine was functioning properly. It further held that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the DMT test results were unreliable based only on evidence of an imperfect pretest observation period.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether the party offering the results of a chemical or scientific breath test into evidence in an implied consent hearing has the burden to show a proper observation period when establishing a prima facie case that the test is reliable and that its administration conformed to procedure necessary to ensure reliability. (Washington County)
CVC Investments LLP, et al., Respondents/Cross-Appellants, vs. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Appellant/Cross-Respondent – Case No. A24-1915: Respondents/cross-appellants CVC Investments, LLP, et al. (“property owners”) own several apartment buildings that sustained hail damage on or about April 12, 2022 and May 19, 2022. The buildings were insured by appellant/cross-respondent State Farm. The policy required that, in the event of a loss, the insured give State Farm “prompt notice” of the loss. And as required by statute, the policy contains a limitation to the effect that “[n]o suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court . . . unless all the requirements of this policy have been complied with, and unless commenced within two years after inception of the loss.” See Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, subd. 3. The policy also contains a provision for resolving disputes about the “value of the property or the amount of loss.” Under that provision, each party is required to select an appraiser within 20 days after receipt of a written demand for an appraisal, and an umpire selected by the appraisers will resolve their differences.
On April 8, 2024, the property owners submitted a claim with State Farm related to the hail damage, along with a demand to toll “the period of limitations stated in State Farm’s policy.” On April 10, the property owners demanded appraisal. On April 12, the property owners commenced suit. In their complaint, the property owners alleged that State Farm had not agreed to toll the limitations period or to appraise the matter. The complaint presented two claims: a declaratory judgment claim, seeking various declarations about the appraisal process; and a breach of contract claim, seeking relief as to “[a]ny future denial of the appraisal demand” and “[a]ny future denial to pay a valid appraisal award.” State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(a), (e), and (f), asserting that the property owners had not pleaded a justiciable controversy. The district court agreed and granted the motion. It reasoned in part that the property owners did not allege “that the parties have disagreed as to the amount of loss,” a condition precedent to appraisal; and that property owners alleged only that “potential future action” by State Farm could lead to a “possible or hypothetical” breach of contract.
The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. With respect to the contract claim, the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the contract claim was entirely dependent upon future hypothetical facts. But with respect to the declaratory judgment claim, the court of appeals concluded that the allegations in the complaint, along with reasonable inferences to be drawn from those allegations, were sufficient under the notice pleading standard to allege a justiciable controversy. It therefore reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim and remanded for further proceedings.
The supreme court granted review of the following issues: Can a party create a justiciable controversy by requesting a tolling agreement and then filing the action before the other party responds based on an alleged “future” breach? Whether a justiciable controversy exists prior to one party expressly declaring a controversy exists under a contract under Minn. Stat. Ch. 555 and contract law? (Rice County)
Tuesday, January 6, 2026
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Laurissa Wredberg, Appellant, vs. Canvas Health, Inc., Respondent – Case No. A24-1897: Sexual assault counselor Laurissa Wredberg filed a civil complaint against her former employer Canvas Health, Inc. alleging violation of Minnesota’s whistleblower act and common law wrongful discharge. She claimed that Canvas terminated her employment after she refused to provide her supervisor with information about a sexual assault victim which the supervisor intended to share with law enforcement for use in criminal court proceedings. Wredberg asserts Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(k) prohibited her from sharing the victim’s information without the victim’s consent.
The district court granted Canvas’s motion to dismiss Wredberg’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court granted review on two issues: (1) Where Minn. Stat. § 595.02 subd. 1(k) prohibits sexual-assault counselors from disclosing “any opinion or information received from or about the victim without the victim’s consent,” does a sexual-assault counselor terminated for refusing to disclose victim information, “without the victim’s consent,” upon her employer’s demand for the information to provide to non-counselors in and outside the workplace, have a claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act?; (2) Where Minn. Stat. § 595.02 subd. 1(k) prohibits sexual-assault counselors from disclosing “any opinion or information received from or about the victim without the victim’s consent,” does a sexual-assault counselor terminated for refusing to disclose victim information “without the victim’s consent,” upon her employer’s demand for the information to provide to non-counselors in and outside the workplace, have a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy? (Washington County)
Wednesday, January 7, 2026
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Tremaine Michael Bucholz, Appellant – Case No. A25-0518: Appellant Tremaine Michael Bucholz was indicted on first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree murder while committing a drive-by shooting, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Prior to trial, the district court granted the State’s motion to preclude Bucholz from raising an alternative perpetrator defense at trial.
After a jury trial, Bucholz was found guilty of first-degree murder while committing a drive-by shooting and a lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional murder. Bucholz was acquitted of first-degree premeditated murder and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.
On direct appeal to the supreme court, Bucholz raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court denied Bucholz his constitutional right to present a complete defense, and committed reversible error, by prohibiting him from introducing alternative-perpetrator evidence at his trial; and (2) whether the district court erred by convicting Bucholz of both first-degree and the included offense of second-degree murder. (Hennepin County)
Dalvin Cook, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, vs. Gracelyn Trimble, Defendant, Daniel Cragg, et al., Appellants/Cross-Respondents – Case No. A24-1486: Dalvin Cook filed a civil complaint against the attorneys of his former girlfriend claiming defamation and invasion of privacy. Cook’s claims are based in part upon statements the attorneys made in a response to a motion in limine in a separate lawsuit. Cook alleged the attorneys filed the response publicly in violation of a protective order, that the response disclosed details of settlement negotiations, and that it contained statements that constitute defamation per se. The attorneys moved for expedited relief dismissing Cook’s claims under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 554.07–.19. The district court denied the attorney’s motion after concluding that Cook’s claims are not barred as a matter of law by either the judicial-proceedings privilege or by attorney immunity.
The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. It held: (1) the judicial-proceeding privilege protects the attorneys from defamation liability; (2) the judicial-proceeding privilege does not protect the attorneys from liability for invasion of privacy; and (3) a fact question exists as to whether Cook’s invasion of privacy claim is barred by attorney immunity.
The supreme court granted review of two issues: (1) Should a litigant be able to assert a claim for invasion-of-privacy against their opponent’s lawyers based on the filing of an opposition to a motion in limine? and (2) Did the court of appeals err in concluding that the judicial-proceedings privilege barred Cook from asserting a defamation claim relating to the attorneys’ misconduct? (Hennepin County)
Thursday, January 8, 2026
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Adam Taylor Fravel, Appellant – Case No. A25-0420: Appellant Adam Taylor Fravel was indicted on first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree murder while committing domestic abuse, second-degree intentional murder, and second-degree unintentional murder. After a jury trial, Fravel was found guilty of all charges.
On direct appeal to the supreme court, Fravel’s brief presents the following issues: (1) whether evidentiary errors in admitting past-pattern evidence under Rule 807, expert testimony on commonalities in domestic abuse, and an expert’s opinion on the manner of death require a new trial; (2) whether the prosecutor committed reversible plain error by offering expert testimony asserting Fravel was a sexual abuser and by misleading jurors about the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard; (3) whether the cumulative effect of the errors in issues 1 and 2 requires a new trial, even if any individual error is insufficient on its own to warrant that result; and (4) whether the evidence was insufficient to prove that the victim’s death was not an accident and the convictions for premeditated murder, domestic-abuse murder, and intentional murder must be vacated. (Winona County)
Monday, January 12, 2026
Minnesota Judicial Center, Courtroom 300
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Daniel Roy O’Day, Appellant – Case No. A24-2009: Appellant Daniel O’Day was charged with five counts of failure to file tax returns and five counts of failure to pay taxes, all felonies. Minn. Stat. § 289A.63, subd. 1(a), (b). O’Day moved to dismiss the charges for lack of probable cause. The district court concluded that the complaint established a knowing failure to file tax returns and to pay taxes, but that felony-level charges also require a willful attempt to evade taxes. Because the district court concluded that the complaint did not establish a willful attempt to evade taxes, the district court granted O’Day’s motion to dismiss the 10-count complaint for lack of probable cause.
The State appealed. In a precedential opinion, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s order dismissing the complaint. The issue on appeal was whether the statutory phrase “willfully attempts to evade or defeat a tax” requires the State to prove—in addition to the failure to file a return or pay a required tax—that a defendant committed a separate willful act to establish a felony-level violation. Minn. Stat. § 289A.63, subd. 1. The court concluded the statute only requires that the State prove a defendant had an obligation to file a tax return or pay taxes due, did not satisfy their tax obligation, and failed to do so with the purpose to evade or defeat their tax obligation. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the court of appeals concluded the State does not need to prove an additional evasive act.
The court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether, under Minnesota law, felony tax evasion requires evidence of a defendant’s affirmative “attempt to evade” a tax obligation, or whether the failure to file or pay a tax with the “intent to evade” a tax obligation is adequate; and (2) whether the district court correctly dismissed the felony charges for lack of probable cause; did the court of appeals err by determining that probable cause supports the charged offenses. (Crow Wing County)
Nonoral: PASCP Inc., Relator, vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A25-1191: Relator taxpayer PASCP operates a retail business selling liquor and other products that are subject to sales tax. Respondent Commissioner of Revenue notified PASCP that it was going to be audited, and the Commissioner requested records from PASCP. Because PASCP did not furnish accurate sales records, the Commissioner conducted an indirect audit. Based upon the indirect audit, the Commissioner determined that the underreported tax exceeded 25 percent of reported taxes for the sample period. As a result, the Commissioner extended the scope of the audit period from 3.5 years to 6.5 years under Minn. Stat. § 289A.38, subd. 6 and applied a 10 percent negligence penalty for each period under Minn. Stat. § 289A.60, subd. 5. The Commissioner concluded that PASCP owed additional sales tax for the period of January 2015 through June 2020, along with penalties and interest.
PASCP administratively appealed the Commissioner’s determination. In response, the Commissioner issued a Notice of Determination on Appeal, affirming and superseding its previous decision (Tax Order). PASCP appealed to the tax court. The Commissioner moved for summary judgment arguing that its audit determinations were correct, and the extension of the audit period was proper because PASCP omitted more than 25 percent of its tax obligation for the sample year. PASCP argued the Commissioner’s method of calculating unreported tax was unsupported, the Commissioner failed to provide admissible evidence, the Tax Order was issued for periods beyond the statute of limitations, and PASCP should not be liable for any penalty. The tax court agreed with the Commissioner and granted its summary judgment motion.
On appeal to the supreme court, PASCP presents the following issue: whether the tax court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner with respect to the application of the 6.5-year statute of limitations period under Minn. Stat. § 289A.38, subd. 6, and with respect to the imposition of the negligence penalty under Minn. Stat. § 289A.60, subd. 5. (Minnesota Tax Court)
Tuesday, January 13, 2026
Minnesota Judicial Center, Courtroom 300
Justin Holtzbauer, Respondent, vs. Allina Health System, Appellant – Case No. A24-1390: Respondent Justin Holtzbauer suffered an injury and was hospitalized at one of appellant Allina Health System’s hospitals. Holtzbauer did not want his former spouse to know where he was hospitalized, but when his former spouse called one of Allina’s hospitals, an Allina employee disclosed that Holtzbauer was currently hospitalized at a different Allina facility—Mercy Hospital. The employee also disclosed Holtzbauer’s room and bed numbers. Shortly thereafter, the former spouse arrived at Mercy Hospital, which caused Holtzbauer distress.
Holtzbauer sued Allina pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 144.298, subd. 2(1), which provides a cause of action if a health care provider “negligently or intentionally requests or releases a health record in violation of sections 144.291 to 144.297.” The complaint alleged that Allina violated the Health Records Act (HRA) by disclosing that Holtzbauer was a patient at Mercy Hospital and was assigned to a particular room and bed. Allina argued it was entitled to summary judgment because the disclosure did not violate the HRA. Alternatively, Allina argued it was entitled to summary judgment because Holtzbauer presented no evidence establishing that any damages were proximately caused by Allina’s disclosure. The district court concluded that Allina did not violate the HRA and granted summary judgment without reaching the causation issue. Holtzbauer appealed to the court of appeals.
The court of appeals considered whether a provider discloses a “health record” under Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(c) when it releases information that a person is a patient and is currently hospitalized at a specific facility in a specific room and bed. The court of appeals concluded that Allina did release a health record under the statute when it revealed that Holtzbauer was a patient who was hospitalized at Mercy Hospital in a specific room and bed. The court of appeals therefore reversed the district court’s entry of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
The supreme court granted review of the following issue: whether Allina’s confirmation to Holtzbauer’s former spouse that Holtzbauer was hospitalized at Mercy Hospital constituted the release of a “health record” under Minn. Stat. § 144.291, subd. 2(c) when it did not disclose Holtzbauer’s physical or mental health or condition or the treatment he received. (Hennepin County)
James Michael Green, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A25-0102: A Ramsey County grand jury indicted appellant James Michael Green with the several offenses, including first-degree felony murder. The indictment alleged both principle and aiding and abetting criminal liability. Green pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. The jury found Green guilty as charged and the district court imposed presumptive sentences. In February 2024, Green filed a preliminary application under the Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864–68 ( “the Act”), which was granted. Two months later, Green filed a petition to vacate his convictions under the Act. In his petition, Green alleged that he did not intentionally aid, advise, hire, counsel, or conspire with or otherwise procure the other with the intent to cause the death of a human being. To support his allegation, Green submitted excerpts from the trial transcript, including his testimony that he did not have a firearm or shoot anyone. The district court denied Green’s petition to vacate his convictions under the Act.
Green’s brief presents the following issues: (1) whether Minnesota’s amelioration doctrine and rule of lenity require courts to construe the Act’s “intent to cause death” requirement favorably to defendants, rather than restrictively through deference to circumstantial evidence and prior proceedings conducted under different legal standards; (2) whether the district court erred by deferring to jury credibility determinations and factual findings made under superseded felony murder laws when evaluating Green’s eligibility for relief under the Act, which requires independent application of heightened intent standards; and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion by rejecting Green’s testimony as “self-serving,” relying on peripheral flight evidence as central proof of intent, and failing to independently analyze whether circumstantial evidence establishes intent to cause death under the Act’s requirements. (Ramsey County)