May 2026

EN BANC CALENDAR

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court

May 2026

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office

Jordan L. Oslund, Appellant, vs. The Paint Genie, Inc., Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent – Case No. A24-1583: After appellant Jordan L. Oslund’s employment with respondent The Paint Genie, Inc. ended, he applied for unemployment benefits. The employer claimed that he was terminated for misconduct, which Oslund disputes. On April 29, 2024, respondent the Department of Employment and Economic Development mailed a determination of ineligibility to Oslund at the address listed in his application. The determination stated that it would “become final unless an appeal is filed by Monday, May, 20, 2024.” See Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f) (2022) (stating that a “determination of ineligibility is final” unless the applicant appeals “within 20 calendar days after sending”). Oslund was evicted from his housing, vacated that address at some point in late April or early May, and did not receive the determination of ineligibility. He filed an appeal of the determination on June 20, 2024; on the same day, he updated his address in his unemployment account.

An unemployment law judge concluded that Oslund did not make a timely appeal, concluded that it had no legal authority to hear and consider the appeal, and dismissed the appeal. Oslund filed a request for reconsideration, which was denied. Oslund filed a certiorari appeal, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the unemployment appeal deadline is jurisdictional and must be strictly construed, notwithstanding Oslund’s arguments that he did not receive actual notice of the determination of ineligibility and that he had good cause for his failure to file his administrative appeal within the 20-day deadline.

The supreme court granted review of the following issue: Whether Unemployment Insurance Law appeal deadlines to obtain a “de novo due process hearing” before an unemployment law judge are strict jurisdictional rules or mere limitations periods (allowing waiver and equitable tolling). (Department of Employment and Economic Development)

Christopher Dineaa Bahtuoh, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A25-1587: For his role in the 2009 fatal shooting of Kyle Parker, a jury found appellant Christopher Bahtuoh guilty of committing a crime for the benefit of a gang with an underlying crime of first-degree intentional murder committed during a felony drive-by shooting (as well as three other charges). In a consolidated direct and postconviction appeal, Bahtuoh’s conviction was affirmed in 2013.

In 2023, the Legislature created a process for challenging a felony murder conviction that is based on an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability. Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68 (“the Act”). In April 2024, Bahtuoh filed a pro se preliminary application for relief under the Act. Without holding a hearing, the district court denied the preliminary application. In August 2025, represented by counsel, Bahtuoh filed a motion to reconsider and a new preliminary application. The district court granted the motion to reconsider and summarily denied Bahtuoh’s second preliminary application. Bahtuoh appeals.

Bahtuoh’s brief presents the following issues: (1) Whether Minnesota’s amelioration doctrine and rule of lenity require courts to construe the 2023 felony-murder reform law’s “intent to cause death” requirement favorably to defendants, rather than restrictively through deference to circumstantial evidence and prior proceedings conducted under different legal standards; (2) Whether the district court erred by denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing, failing to apply the appropriate reasonable probability standard, and/or deferring to jury credibility determinations and factual findings made under superseded felony murder laws when evaluating Petitioner’s eligibility for relief under Minnesota’s ameliorative 2023 felony murder reform statute, which requires independent application of heightened intent standards; (3) Whether the district court abused its discretion by relying on peripheral circumstantial evidence as central proof of intent, and failing to independently analyze whether circumstantial evidence establishes intent to cause death under the new law’s requirements. (Hennepin County)

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor

Ryan Grant, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A24-1908: Appellant Ryan Grant pleaded guilty to second-degree felony murder. As part of his factual basis, Grant admitted that he and his codefendant decided to rob the victims and that he gave the gun to his codefendant before they attempted to commit the robbery. In 2023, the Legislature created a process for challenging a felony murder conviction that is based on aiding-and-abetting criminal liability. Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68 (“the Act”). To be entitled to relief under the Act, Grant was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not cause the death of a human being and that he was not a major participant or did not act with extreme indifference. Pursuant to the Act, Grant filed a petition to vacate his second-degree felony murder conviction. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Grant’s petition, concluding in part that Grant’s conduct, which included handing the gun to his co-defendant, demonstrated an extreme indifference to human life. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.

Grant’s brief presents the following issue: Whether the Act of May 19, 2023, requires a district court to hold an evidentiary hearing before determining whether the petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief. (Hennepin County)

Thursday, May 7, 2026

Red Wing High School – Red Wing, Minnesota

Randy Dale Sixta, Appellant, vs. Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office, Respondent – Case No. A25-0304: In 2018, a petition to civilly commit appellant Randy Sixta was filed in district court. In a 2019 order, the district court found that Sixta met the criteria for civil commitment because he had a mental illness and posed a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others. The district court stayed commitment for six months on certain conditions. Sixta satisfied the conditions of his stay, and the proceedings were terminated six months later.

In 2023, Sixta applied to renew his permit to carry a firearm. The Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office denied his application, concluding that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd 2, which states, in relevant part, that individuals who are prohibited from possessing a firearm under any federal law are prohibited from receiving a permit to carry a firearm. One such federal prohibition is for any person “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). The Sheriff’s Office concluded the 2019 district court order finding Sixta posed a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others because of his mental illness met this federal prohibition. Sixta filed a petition in district court to appeal the Sheriff’s Office’s denial of his application for a permit to carry a firearm. After a contested hearing, the district court denied Sixta’s appeal.

Sixta appealed. In the court of appeals, he argued that he had not been adjudicated as a mental defective based on the 2019 stayed commitment order. In a divided panel, the court of appeals affirmed in a precedential opinion. The court of appeals concluded the definition of “mental defective” includes individuals who have been adjudicated mentally ill and a danger to themselves or others.

The court granted review of the following issue: What does the phrase “adjudicated as a mental defective” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) mean when applying federal law to Minn. Stat. § 624.714?

Monday, May 11, 2026

Minnesota Judicial Center, Courtroom 300

JPMC 2018-MINN SS TRA, LLC, Respondent, vs. County of Hennepin, Relator – Case No. A25-2133: Relator Hennepin County petitioned for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a tax court decision relating to the value of the downtown Minneapolis Hilton Hotel as of January 2, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020. The main dispute relates to which appraisal method the tax court should have used to value the hotel. The tax court used the parsing income method, which led it to conclude that Hennepin County’s assessed values overstated the market value as of each date. The tax court ordered that real estate taxes due and payable in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 be recomputed and refunds paid, together with interest from the original date of payment.

Hennepin County seeks reversal of the tax court’s order based on a number of arguments. Hennepin County challenges the tax court’s decision as to which valuation methodology should be applied, arguing its reasoning requires that the management fee method never be used to value full-service hotels, which contradicts Bloomington Hotel Investors, LLC v. County of Hennepin, 993 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. 2023). Additionally, Hennepin County argues the tax court failed to address both respondent JPMC 2018-MINN SS TRA, LLC’s reliance on the management fee method in an appraisal to secure financing and its reliance on the parsing income method in a tax court appraisal. Hennepin County further argues the tax court did not independently analyze or explain which components of the Hilton Hotel’s various businesses constitute real property and which constitute intangible property. Hennepin County also argues the record does not support the tax court’s application of a proxy rent method because there is no data on leases concerning full-service food and beverage operations like those at the Hilton Hotel. Hennepin County additionally argues that the tax court erred in ruling that the minimum assessment agreement unambiguously terminated on June 1, 2015. Hennepin County maintains the agreement applies to the 2017 assessment.

Respondent JPMC 2018-MINN SS TRA argues the tax court’s order should be affirmed, maintaining that the tax court appropriately applied the parsing income method and its rejection of the management fee approach is consistent with the Bloomington decision. JPMC also maintains the minimum assessment agreement terminated on June 1, 2015 and does not apply to the 2017 assessment.

On appeal to the supreme court, Hennepin County presents the following issues: (1) Did the tax court err in ruling that the minimum assessment agreement unambiguously terminated on June 1, 2015, despite the fact that the parties agreed to assessment values for years beyond 2015? (2) Does the basis for the tax court’s rationale for applying the parsing income method conflict with this court’s ruling in Bloomington Hotel Investors, LLC v. County of Hennepin, 993 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. 2023) and render a central holding of Bloomington Hotel dead letter? (3) Can the tax court apply the parsing income method to reduce a petitioner’s taxes when the record demonstrates that same taxpayer simultaneously relied upon the management fee method to facilitate securing financing? (4) Can the tax court apply the parsing income method when providing insufficient analysis as to how it determines what income is attributable to tangible and intangible assets, and failing to properly allocate the portion attributable to intangible assets? (5) Did the tax court err in applying a proxy rent based on stand-alone restaurant rental rates? (Minnesota Tax Court)