EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
November 2025
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, November 3, 2025
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Patrick Jay Sullivan, Appellant – Case No. A23-1134: Following a jury trial, Patrick Sullivan was convicted of felony domestic assault in violation of Minnesota Statutes § 609.2242, subd. 4. To support the felony charge, the State alleged two prior qualifying domestic violence-related convictions in the complaint. The parties dispute whether Sullivan stipulated to the existence of these prior convictions at trial. The State did not introduce substantive evidence about Sullivan’s prior convictions at trial; however, the district court permitted the State to use the convictions for the purpose of impeaching Sullivan’s credibility.
Sullivan appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals stayed the appeal to accommodate the filing of a petition for postconviction relief in district court. After a hearing, the district court granted Sullivan’s petition to vacate his conviction on the basis that the State failed to prove he has two or more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions. It ordered Sullivan’s release from custody. The State then moved the district court for reconsideration, which Sullivan opposed, in part, on the basis that his conviction has been vacated such that the State cannot re-prosecute him. The district court granted reconsideration and, ultimately, reinstated Sullivan’s conviction.
The court of appeals affirmed. It held: (1) double jeopardy did not preclude the postconviction court from reconsidering its first order or reinstating appellant’s conviction; (2) Sullivan did not waive his right to a jury trial on the prior qualifying conviction element; and (3) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove Sullivan’s prior qualifying convictions.
The supreme court granted review on two issues: (1) When a postconviction court enters an acquittal on the merits and vacates a criminal conviction, may that court later reinstate the conviction without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause? and (2) When a testifying defendant is impeached with prior convictions but the State introduces no substantive evidence of those prior convictions, may an appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence rely on the impeachment evidence to find an element of the offense proven? (Aitkin County)
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Bradley J. Haddy, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0387503 – Case No. A24-1439: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.
Tuesday, November 4, 2025
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Melissa Madelyne Zielinski, Appellant – Case No. A24-1837: A grand jury indicted appellant Melissa Madelyne Zielinski with first-degree intentional murder while committing an aggravated robbery, alleging an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability. A jury found Zielinski guilty as charged. The district court convicted her of first-degree intentional murder while committing a robbery and imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of release. Her conviction of first-degree intentional murder while committing a robbery was affirmed on direct appeal. In 2024, Zelinski filed a preliminary application under the felony murder accomplice review act. Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68. The district court denied the preliminary application in an order captioned “Order Summarily Denying Preliminary Application for Relief (Aid/Abet Felony Murder),” concluding that based on the facts of her case, there was not a reasonable probability that Zielinski was entitled to relief.
Zielinski’s brief presents the following issue: whether the district court erred by summarily denying Zielinski’s preliminary application where the application met the minimal requirements of the felony murder accomplice review act, where the district court relied on requirements outside those in the preliminary-application process, and where the district court engaged in conclusory, result-oriented, and unsupported reasoning. (Anoka County)
Nonoral: State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Scot Perry Christian, Appellant – Case No. A24-1026: A grand jury indicted appellant Scot Perry Christian with several offenses, including two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and two counts of first-degree intentional murder while committing an aggravated robbery, alleging an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability. A jury found Christian guilty as charged. The district court convicted him of both counts of first-degree intentional murder while committing a robbery and imposed consecutive life sentences. His convictions of first-degree intentional murder while committing a robbery were affirmed on direct appeal. In 2024, Christian filed a preliminary application under the felony murder accomplice review act. Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68. The district court denied the preliminary application in an order captioned “Order Denying Preliminary Application to Vacate Conviction,” concluding that based on the facts of his case, there was not a reasonable probability that Christian was entitled to relief.
Christian’s brief presents the following issues: (1) whether the Mower County district courts committed error where it held that the facts of this case show there is not a reasonable probability Christian is entitled to relief under the statute, which was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the trial record, (2) whether Christian caused the deaths of the decedents or intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with another with the intent to cause the deaths of the decedents, and (3) whether the district court erroneously held that nothing in the record supports an argument that Christian was convicted on a theory of accomplice liability. (Mower County)
Wednesday, November 5, 2025
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Minnesota Alliance for Retired Americans Educational Fund, et al., Appellants, vs. Steve Simon, Respondent – Case No. A24-1134: Minnesota law provides that “[a]ny eligible voter may vote by absentee ballot.” Minn. Stat. § 203B.02, subd. 1. It also allows a person to register to vote when they submit an absentee ballot. Minn. Stat. § 201.054, subd. 1(a)(3). When voting absentee, a signature envelope is used. Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 1. The signature envelope contains an eligibility certificate that both the voter and a witness signs. Id., subd. 3. For all voters—both those who are already registered and those who are unregistered—the witness must sign a “statement” certifying that: “(1) the ballots were displayed to that individual unmarked; [and] (2) the voter marked the ballots in that individual’s presence without showing how they were marked, or, if the voter was physically unable to mark them, that the voter directed another individual to mark them.” Id. For unregistered voters, the witness must also certify that “the voter has provided proof of residence as required by section 201.061, subdivision 3.” Id.
Appellants Minnesota Alliance for Retired Americans Educational Fund and two individuals filed suit against respondent Steve Simon, the Minnesota Secretary of State, challenging the witness requirement for absentee voting found in Minn. Stat. § 203B.07, subd. 3, and the Secretary of State’s rules implementing this requirement (witness requirement). They alleged that the witness requirement violates the vouching prohibition of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 52 U.S.C. § 10501(a), (b)(4), and the materiality provision of the Civil Rights Act (CRA), 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B).
Secretary Simon filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that appellants failed to state an actionable claim. The district court denied the motion.
Secretary Simon petitioned the court of appeals for discretionary review of the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. The court of appeals granted the petition. It then reversed the district court and remanded for entry of judgment of dismissal.
The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the witness requirement for unregistered voters seeking to vote absentee does not violate the VRA’s prohibition against requiring voters to prove their qualifications by the voucher of another party, where Minnesota law requires the witness to attest to having seen proof of the unregistered voter’s residency; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the witness requirement does not violate the materiality provision of the CRA, because the witness attestation has no bearing on a previously registered voter’s qualifications, and therefore is not material in determining those qualifications. (Ramsey County)
Monday, November 10, 2025
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. DeAntae Demond Davis, Appellant and DeAntae Demond Davis, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case Nos. A23-1612, A24-0680, A25-0435: A grand jury indicted appellant DeAntae Demond Davis with four counts, including count one that alleged first-degree premeditated murder under a principal theory of criminal liability and count two that alleged first-degree premeditated murder under an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability. Davis pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. At trial, the State presented the following evidence. Davis was in the back seat of a car with the victim when a single shot was fired. The driver looked in the rearview mirror and saw Davis holding a firearm. After the victim was removed from the car, a second man fired multiple shots at the victim. The jury found Davis guilty of counts one and two and the district court entered a judgment of conviction on count one and imposed a life sentence. Davis filed a direct appeal, which was stayed to allow him to seek postconviction relief. In his postconviction petition, Davis alleged that the State failed to disclose all evidence favorable to him as required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The district court summarily denied the petition. Davis appealed the denial of his postconviction petition. Davis’s direct and postconviction appeals were consolidated.
In this consolidated appeal, Davis’s brief presents the following issues: (1) whether Davis’s convictions must be reversed because the jury’s guilty verdicts were legally inconsistent; and (2) whether the postconviction court erred by denying Davis’s petition for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing where Davis alleged a valid Brady violation claim based on the State’s failure to disclose law enforcement discipline reports until fifteen months after Davis’s trial. (Stearns County)
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Lee Wayne Young, Jr., Appellant – Case Nos. A23-1606, A25-0334: A grand jury indicted Appellant Lee Wayne Young, Jr., for first-degree murder committed in the course of a first-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual assault and murder of a two-year-old child. At trial, Young offered evidence that an alternative perpetrator committed the crime. A jury found Young guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison. Young filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was denied by the district court. Young’s direct and postconviction appeals were consolidated.
In this consolidated appeal to the supreme court, Young raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court prejudicially erred by excluding the alternative perpetrator’s statement saying that he touched the victim “in his body” and justifying why the alternative perpetrator’s DNA or semen might be found on the victim’s body; (2) whether the district court violated Young’s right to present a defense by prohibiting him from publishing a portion of an exhibit introduced by the State; (3) whether the district court violated Young’s right to present a defense by excluding alternative-perpetrator evidence that the alternative perpetrator searched for child pornography and used methamphetamine, the substance found in the victim’s blood; (4) whether the district court erred by prohibiting Young from cross-examining an expert with a learned treatise to show bias; (5) whether the postconviction court erred by failing to disclose an expert opinion before the expert testified; and (6) whether the cumulative effect of the errors denied Young a fair trial. (Blue Earth County)
Wednesday, November 12, 2025
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Serene E. Warren, as beneficiary of the 2011 Arizona NG Trust 102, 8008 Meadow Trust 102, 2011 Lafayette Trust 102, 2014 London Trust 102, and 2014 Lakeview Trust 102, Appellant, vs. ACOVA, Inc., Respondent, Mark B. Evenstad, et al., Respondents, Kenneth L. Evenstad, Defendant, Howard J. Rubin, Respondent – Case No. A24-0450: Appellant Serene E. Warren is a beneficiary of several trusts that own shares of respondent ACOVA, Inc., her family’s closely held business. Warren’s father, Kenneth Evenstad—who has since died and been replaced as a party by his widow, respondent Grace Evenstad—and Warren’s brother, respondent Mark Evenstad, were on the board of directors of ACOVA and held other leadership roles at ACOVA and its predecessor company, Upsher-Smith Laboratories (USL). Warren initiated this lawsuit, among other things bringing claims against Kenneth, Mark, and ACOVA (the “Evenstad parties”) related to decisions that Kenneth and Mark made as directors, officers, and beneficial shareholders of ACOVA and USL that she contends were unfairly prejudicial to her and improperly benefited Kenneth and Mark. Warren brought some of her claims pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b), a portion of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act that authorizes a district court to award equitable relief “[i]n an action by a shareholder.” The district court conducted a bench trial.
Following the trial, but before the district court issued its decision, the Evenstad parties notified the district court of the court of appeals’ decision in Demskie v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. A22-0077, 2022 WL 17751473 (Minn. App. Dec. 19, 2022), aff’d in part by an equally divided court, rev’d in part, 7 N.W.3d 382 (Minn. 2024). Based on the court of appeals’ decision in Demskie, the Evenstad parties for the first time challenged Warren’s standing to seek relief under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751. Specifically, they argued that because Warren is not a “shareholder” as that term is defined under the Business Corporation Act, but merely a beneficial owner, she lacks standing to bring an action under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b). The district court eventually determined, among other things, that Warren is entitled to relief under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b), and it awarded Warren’s trusts over $40 million in payments from ACOVA.
Warren appealed portions of the district court’s decision that were adverse to her, and the Evenstad parties cross-appealed, among other things, challenging the district court’s grant of equitable relief pursuant to section 302A.751, subdivision 1(b). In a precedential decision, the court of appeals concluded that the district court erred when it rejected the Evenstad parties’ argument that Warren lacks standing, as a “shareholder,” to bring an action under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b). The court of appeals relied on its previous decision in Demskie, which addressed the distinction under that statute between a shareholder and a beneficial owner. The court of appeals also concluded that this issue of standing is nonwaivable and therefore was properly before the court, even though the Evenstad parties did not challenge Warren’s standing until after the trial in the district court. The court of appeals therefore reversed in part and remanded for the district court to determine whether Warren has standing on alternative grounds.
The supreme court granted review of the following issues: (1) Does the meaning of “shareholder” in Minn. Stat. § 302A.751 encompass a beneficial owner of shares in a Minnesota closely held corporation? (2) Is statutory standing waivable? (Hennepin County)
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Kassius O. Benson, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0266632– Case No. A24-1567: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.