EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
October 2025
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Chad Loran Siegel, Appellant, vs. Drew Evans, Respondent – Case No. A24-0594: In April 2013, appellant Chad Siegel was charged with attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and two counts of kidnapping. Of the charges, kidnapping is a predatory offense. A jury trial was held. After the State rested, the district court granted Siegel’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charges. The jury found Siegel guilty of attempted second-degree murder and first-degree assault. At the sentencing hearing, the district court told Siegel that he would have to register as a predatory offender. Siegel first registered as a predatory offender in March 2014.
In August 2022, Siegel sued respondent Drew Evans in his official capacity, alleging, in part, that requiring him to register as a predatory offender violates Minn. Stat. § 243.166. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Evans’ motion for summary judgment. It concluded that Siegel’s claims were barred by the six-year statute of limitations. It also addressed whether Siegel is required to register as a predatory offender “for the sake of completeness.” It determined that Siegel was not required to register as a predatory offender.
The court of appeals affirmed. It concluded that Siegel was required to register as a predatory offender and did not reach Siegel’s argument about the statute of limitations.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether the court of appeals erred by concluding that Siegel is required to register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1), because the district court entered a judgment of acquittal under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18(1)(a), on the predatory offense Siegel was charged with—kidnapping. (Ramsey County)
Petition of Minnesota Housing Finance Agency for an Order Directing Entry of New Certificate of Title After Mortgage Foreclosure Sale Certificate No. 112938 - Foster – Case No. A24-0632: Minnesota Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) was the winning bidder on real property sold at a sheriff’s foreclosure sale. Upon receipt of the Certificate of Sale, MHFA acquired ownership of the property subject to redemption rights of the owners and of junior lien holders who timely filed notice of intention to redeem.
Creative Real Estate, Inc. (Creative) gave notice of intent to redeem as a junior lienholder on the property, asserting the right through a mechanic’s lien. It redeemed and received a Certificate of Redemption from the sheriff on March 4, 2022. That same day, Creative transferred the property to E&T Property, LLC (E&T) by warranty deed.
On March 9, 2022, the sheriff mailed the redemption funds to MHFA’s attorney via check. E&T then attempted to record the Certificate of Redemption and Warranty Deed, but the examiner of titles identified a defect in Creative’s redemption and rejected the registration. On March 24, 2022, the title company notified MHFA that Creative’s redemption was invalid. On April 25, 2022, MHFA returned the funds to its attorney. On April 28, 2022, the funds were deposited into the attorney’s trust account.
MHFA petitioned Anoka County District Court for an order directing the Registrar of Titles to cancel the existing Certificate of Title (which memorialized Creative’s junior lien) and to issue a new Certificate of Title naming MHFA as the sole owner of the property. In its petition, MHFA alleged that Creative’s attempted redemption is “null and void.”
E&T answered, denying MHFA’s allegations and affirmatively asserting, in part, that MHFA waived its right to challenge Creative’s redemption because it accepted the redemption funds.
Thereafter, MHFA offered to return the redemption funds to the sheriff, deposit them with the district court, or deposit them in its attorney’s trust account. On August 9, 2022, MHFA and E&T agreed to deposit the funds into the attorney’s trust account, and the parties later filed a corresponding stipulation.
Creative answered as an interested party, denying MHFA’s allegations, raising similar affirmative defenses, and counter-petitioning for an order directing the Registrar of Titles to cancel the existing Certificate of Title and to issue a new Certificate of Title naming E&T as the sole owner of the property.
All parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted MHFA’s motion for summary judgment and denied Creative’s counter-petition. It ordered entry of a new certificate of clean title to MHFA. In its order, the district court concluded MHFA did not waive its right to challenge the validity of Creative’s redemption when it received the redemption funds.
The court of appeals affirmed. It held that the district court did not err by concluding that MHFA did not waive its right to challenge Creative’s redemption “[b]ecause MHFA did not appropriate the funds to itself,” In re Petition of Minn. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. A24-0632, 2025 WL 251879, at *4 (Minn. App. Jan. 21, 2025). In reaching its decision, the court of appeals distinguished five cases on the basis that MHFA deposited the redemption check into its attorney’s trust account (and later offered to deposit the funds with the court). Thus, the court of appeals explained, MHFA did not actively solicit the redemption funds, accept them, deposit the funds into its own account, or otherwise appropriate the money to itself. Those cases are Clark v. Butts, 76 N.W. 199 (Minn. 1898), Orr v. Sutton, 148 N.W. 1066 (Minn. 1914), Grant v. Bibb, 152 N.W. 728 (Minn. 1915), Hanson v. Woolston, 701 N.W.2d 257 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 2005), and L and T Tree Servs., LLC v. Andersen, No. A24-0572, 2024 WL 4344956, (Minn. App. Sept. 30, 2024).
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: Does a holder of a sheriff’s certificate of sale from a mortgage foreclosure waive its right to contest a junior creditor’s redemption as taught by this court’s opinions in Clark, Orr, Johnson v. Melges, 203 N.W. 983 (Minn. 1925), Grant, and Leland v. Heiberg, 194 N.W. 93 (Minn. 1923), when it retains the funds tendered by the junior creditor? (Anoka County)
Tuesday, September 30, 2025
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Bryce Holstad, et al., Appellants, vs. Town of May, Respondent – Case No. A24-1113: Appellants Bryce Holstad and Jody Holstad own property in respondent Town of May. The property is abutted on the east by the St. Croix River and by land owned by the National Park Service (NPS), on the north and west by land owned by the NPS, and on the south by land owned by other private landowners (the neighbors). The property is subject to numerous federal and state regulations and easements. The nearest public roadway is State Highway 95, which lies approximately one-quarter mile to the west, but the Holstads’ property does not have access to that or any other public roadway. Instead, access to their property is possible only by river, or by crossing NPS land on foot. In June 2022, the Holstads filed a petition with the town, seeking to establish a mandatory cartway to their property under Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a). Specifically, they proposed that the town establish a cartway over most of the length of an existing private driveway that runs across the neighbors’ property from State Highway 95. From the end of the driveway, the Holstads’ proposed cartway would become very narrow and wind down the side of the river bluff to a seasonal cabin at the base of the bluff.
After inspecting the relevant properties and holding a hearing, the town board adopted a resolution establishing a cartway along a different route than the Holstads’ proposal. The resolution concluded that use of the existing driveway in an unimproved state is not feasible or consistent with public health, safety, or welfare, noting that it is very narrow, would not accommodate emergency vehicles, and would be essentially impassable during the winter months. The resolution instead endorsed an alternate route, proposed by the town engineer, that followed the initial alignment of the existing driveway eastward from State Highway 95 but eventually turned left and proceeded to the Holstad property at a point to the west of the Holstads’ proposed route, avoiding several steep slopes, ravines, and trees. The resolution reasoned that the town engineer’s proposed route was less damaging and disruptive, in part because it avoids substantial steep and narrow slopes where vehicle traffic is not feasible and avoids additional clearing, tree cutting, and excavation on some of the most ecologically sensitive areas of the neighboring property.
For damages, the resolution awarded the neighbors $200,000 for damage the cartway would cause to their property, and it required the Holstads to pay $95,500 for professional fees and other services incurred by the town. The resolution required the cartway to be two rods (33 feet) wide, and it prohibited any use of the cartway unless and until it was constructed, improved, and approved according to the conditions set by the town engineer, at the Holstads’ expense. The Holstads estimate that construction to the engineer’s preferred standards would cost at least $1.4 million. Finally, the resolution required that the Holstads secure all necessary regulatory approvals prior to any construction.
The Holstads appealed the resolution to the district court, seeking vacatur of the resolution and requesting that the district court order the town to issue a new resolution establishing the unimproved cartway route that they had sought in their petition. The district court denied their request and awarded the town attorneys’ fees associated with the appeal.
The Holstads appealed that determination to the court of appeals, which affirmed and remanded for the district court to conduct further proceedings regarding damages. The court of appeals reasoned that establishment of a cartway does not provide a license to disregard other regulations governing property; that the text of Minn. Stat. § 164.08 implies that the town has authority to impose the construction and improvement conditions it imposed; and that the town did not act arbitrarily or contrary to law or the facts by choosing the town engineer’s proposed route over the Holstads’ proposed route.
The supreme court granted review of the following issues: (1) Whether Minn. Stat. § 164.08 grants townships “implied authority” within their use of eminent domain power to place non-statutory requirements on the establishment of a cartway, including construction, third-party regulatory approval, and payment of attorneys’ fees. (2) Whether a township’s establishment of a cartway fails to give meaningful access to landlocked property and is more damaging and disruptive than the requested route when it required $1.4 million in construction in a sensitive ecological area, necessitates third-party regulatory approvals, and causes excessive burdens on the neighboring land. (Washington County)
Wednesday, October 1, 2025
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Herbert Azubuike Igbanugo, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0191139 – Case No. A24-1119: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.
In re Petition for Reinstatement of Herbert A. Igbanugo a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0191139 – Case No. A24-1103: An attorney reinstatement matter that presents the issue of whether suspended attorney Herbert Igbanugo should be reinstated to the practice of law.
Thursday, October 2, 2025
Nonoral: Theodore Lockhart, Sr., Relator, vs. Hennepin County, Respondent – Case No. A25-0497: Relator Theodore Carl Lockhart, Sr. owns property located in Hennepin County, Minnesota. Hennepin County assessed the property’s value at $849,000 for purposes of Lockhart’s property tax liability for the 2022 tax year. Lockhart maintains the property’s worth was $566,000 as of the valuation date for purposes of Lockhart’s property tax liability.
Lockhart initiated this action by filing a complaint in district court. The district court transferred the action to the tax court. Lockhart objected to this transfer. The tax court held a trial and concluded that Lockhart did not submit sufficient evidence to overcome the prima facie validity of Hennepin County’s assessed value of the property. The tax court granted Hennepin County’s motion to dismiss the complaint. Lockhart now appeals to the supreme court.
Lockhart’s brief presents the following issues: (1) Did the defendants’ liabilities go beyond tax claims and thus exceed the tax court’s jurisdiction. (2) Did the tax court procedures usurp judicial functions and deprive taxpayer of constitutional rights. (3) Did the district court improperly transfer appellant’s claims to tax court. (4) Does the supreme court have authority to hear the certiorari petition. (5) Should the supreme court reverse the specialty tax court’s final order. (Minnesota Tax Court)
Monday, October 6, 2025
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
American Family Insurance Company a/s/o Nicholas Oelke, Respondent, vs. NB Electric, Inc. dba East Side Garage Doors, Appellant, Morningstar Remodeling, LLC, Respondent – Case No. A24-0377: In July 2023, respondent American Family Insurance Company commenced a subrogation action against appellant-subcontractor NB Electric, Inc. dba East Side Garage Doors and respondent-contractor Morningstar Remodeling, LLC, in connection with a home remodeling project undertaken by American Family’s insured homeowner. A fire damaged the home in July 2020. The project continued following the fire, although NB Electric was no longer involved, and the services of the contractor were terminated in April 2021.
At issue is the timeliness of American Family’s defective-construction claims under the two‑year statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1, which applies to claims involving an improvement to real property. The statute specifies that a cause of action does not accrue “earlier than substantial completion, termination, or abandonment of the construction or the improvement to real property.” Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(c). The district court ruled that the claims are untimely because “termination of the construction at issue” here “occurred no later than April 2021” when the services of the contractor were terminated. A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the phrase “of the construction or the improvement to real property” in section 541.051, subdivision 1(c), refers to the project as a whole—not the work of individual contractors—and therefore, the statute of limitations was not triggered when the services of the contractor were terminated in April 2021.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(c), the defective-construction claims accrued when the insured homeowner terminated the services of the subcontractor and contractor alleged to have caused the injury to his real property and the injury already had been discovered. (Ramsey County)
Nonoral: Daniel Krumsieg, Relator, vs. Bloomington Metro Mitsubishi, and Farm Bureau Property & Casualty, Respondents – Case No. A25-0451: Relator Daniel Krumsieg sustained a traumatic brain injury as a result of falling off a ladder while working for his employer, Bloomington Metro Mitsubishi on April 9, 2007. The employer and workers’ compensation insurer admitted liability, paid benefits, and stipulated that Krumsieg was permanently and totally disabled.
After the work injury, Krumsieg experienced worsening of several different medical conditions. The employer and insurer admitted liability for some of these conditions, but disputed that other conditions of Krumsieg were related to the work injury.
Krumsieg’s claims were heard by a compensation judge who determined that Krumsieg failed to prove that his obesity, high cholesterol, sleep apnea, and low testosterone were causally related to the work injury. The compensation judge adopted Dr. Burgarino’s opinions. The compensation judge did not impose a sanction against the employer and insurer for alleged spoliation of evidence. Finally, the compensation judge denied additional permanent partial disability benefits.
On appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA), Krumsieg argued the compensation judge erred in a number of ways, including in finding that Krumsieg failed to prove that his obesity, high cholesterol, sleep apnea, and low testosterone were causally related to the work injury; in admitting and adopting the opinions of Dr. Burgarino; in not imposing a sanction against the employer and insurer for spoliation of evidence; and for denying additional permanent partial disability benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the compensation judge. Krumsieg now appeals to the supreme court.
Krumsieg’s brief includes the following issues: (1) Whether the WCCA erred in concluding that Dr. Burgarino had the necessary foundation upon which to base his opinion. (2) Whether the WCCA erred in concluding Krumsieg did not make an adequate showing as to how Dr. Burgarino’s work product was relevant or how its destruction was prejudicial. (3) Whether the WCCA erred in concluding the preponderance of the evidence failed to prove that Krumsieg’s work-related traumatic brain injury was a substantial contributing factor to his obesity, high cholesterol, sleep apnea, and low testosterone. (4) Whether the WCCA erred in creating a new rule of law that requires “significant” assistance with activities of daily life (ADLs) to qualify for the 95 percent permanent partial disability rating under Minn. R. 5223.0360, subp. 7C(5). (5) Whether the WCCA erred in concluding Krumsieg did not meet his burden in proving entitlement to the 95 percent permanent partial disability rating. (6) Whether the WCCA erred in failing to address Krumsieg’s arguments regarding whether the opinions of Dr. Sheridan, Dr. Warhol, and Dr. Bateman had the necessary foundation to be relied upon by the Compensation Judge. (Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
Tuesday, October 7, 2025
Nonoral: Joanne L. Hitchins, Relator, vs. Federal Express Corporation, Self-Insured, administered by Sedgwick CMS, Respondents – Case No. A25-0649: Relator Joanne Hitchins sustained an admitted injury to her left hip on November 28, 2018 when she fell on ice in a parking lot while working for the self-insured employer, Federal Express. On December 28, 2021, Hitchins sustained another admitted work injury to her right shoulder when she fell on ice while delivering a package.
On January 9, 2023, Hitchins hired an attorney to represent her regarding her workers’ compensation claims. The retainer agreement provided for attorney’s fees in the amount of 20 percent of benefits awarded up to a maximum of $26,000 in fees pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.081. The retainer agreement contained language stating that Hitchins agreed “… to be truthful with the firm, promptly respond to any requests by the firm, and take no action on my own regarding this matter, including settlement attempts, without prior consultation and approval of the principal attorney handling [the] case.” The retainer agreement also required Hitchins to “…promptly and fully complete forms that have been given to [her] by the firm.”
Over the course of the following months, Hitchins underwent a variety of medical treatments. She also engaged in some unsuccessful settlement negotiations with the employer. Unbeknownst to her attorney, Hitchins had a medical visit with Dr. Stefano Sinicropi on August 10, 2023. Hitchins later informed her attorney of her visit with Dr. Sinicropi and also informed her attorney that she was considering filing for social security disability insurance (SSDI) benefits despite her attorney’s prior warning that filing for SSDI benefits prior to reaching a settlement could significantly impact the tax-free status of the workers’ compensation benefits she had received.
A few months later, Hitchins was contacted by her attorney’s office and asked to sign a medical records authorization, but Hitchins did not sign or return the authorization. Hitchins’ attorney then told her to pick up her file and that he was “done with [her] games.” On November 28, 2023, Hitchins’ attorney filed an attorney’s lien. On December 8, 2023, Hitchins filed an objection to the attorney’s lien. Hitchins, as a newly pro se party, signed a stipulation for settlement stating that $26,000 in attorney fees would be held in escrow until Hitchins and her former attorney resolved their dispute over distribution of that amount. An award on stipulation was filed on March 20, 2024. During his representation of Hitchins, the former attorney negotiated and obtained the settlement offer that Hitchins ultimately accepted, even though the settlement was not executed or paid until after the cessation of the attorney’s representation of Hitchins.
On June 28, 2024, a hearing was held on Hitchins’ objection to the attorney lien, and the compensation judge found that the escrowed amount of $26,000 was a reasonable fee for the attorney’s efforts. The compensation judge ordered the self-insured employer to distribute the escrowed sum to Hitchins’ former attorney.
Hitchins appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA), and the WCCA affirmed the award of attorney’s fees, but on different grounds. Hitchins now appeals to the supreme court.
Hitchins’ brief includes the following issues: (1) Whether the WCCA erred by concluding that both the 2018 and 2021 injuries were disputed. (2) Whether the WCCA and compensation judge erred in crediting attorney with a result for a declined settlement proposal prior to his withdrawal and prior to maximum medical improvement. (3) Whether the compensation judge had substantial evidence in determining good cause for attorney’s withdrawal, and whether the WCCA erred in affirming. (4) Whether the compensation judge had substantial evidence supporting the attorney’s false accusations against the relator regarding conduct and lack of cooperation. (5) Whether a client seeking a second medical opinion for a denied condition and filing for SSDI against attorney’s recommendation constitutes just cause for an attorney’s withdrawal. (6) Whether attorney should be entitled to fees from a settlement relator accepted after his withdrawal when the amount is the same as of that of an earlier proposal prior to maximum medical improvement and prior to his withdrawal. (7) Whether the attorney’s statements about the relator’s conduct and lack of cooperation constitutes bad faith and misconduct warranting attorney to disciplinary actions and barring him from recovering a fee. (Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
Wednesday, October 8, 2025
Owatonna High School – Owatonna, Minnesota
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Steven Douglas Nelson, Appellant– Case No. A23-1919: Appellant Steven Nelson was charged with six counts of attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and second-degree assault for his role in assaulting the victim with a metal pipe. At trial, the district court permitted the State to introduce into evidence a transcript of prior testimony of a witness who did not testify in Nelson’s trial. Nelson’s attorney agreed the State could introduce the transcript as an exhibit, but Nelson did not personally waive his constitutional right to confront this witness in court. After the jury trial, Nelson was found guilty of all charges.
Nelson appealed. In the court of appeals, as relevant to this appeal, he argued that the district court committed reversible plain error when it allowed the admission of the transcript of prior testimony without Nelson’s personal waiver of his constitutional right to confrontation. In a nonprecedential opinion, the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that the district court did not plainly err in its evidentiary ruling because the constitutional right to confrontation is not a right that requires an affirmative waiver in writing or on the record.
The court granted review on the following issue: Is a defendant’s right of confrontation one an attorney can affirmatively waive without his client’s express consent, where forfeiture-by-wrongdoing or disruptive courtroom conduct by the defendant has not occurred? (Isanti County)