State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Jamie Sara Schmeichel, Appellant – Case No. A23-1905
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Ge Yang, Appellant – Case No. A24-0228
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Brian Russell Lueck, Appellant – Case No. A24-0250
Nonoral: Cedric Lamont Berry, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A25-0152
Melissa Ann Lorsung, Respondent, vs. Commissioner of Public Safety, Appellant – Case No. A24-0540
Jeremy McNitt, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, vs. Minnesota IT Services (MNIT), Appellant/Cross-Respondent – Case No. A23-1948
Rebecca A. Niebuhr, Respondent, vs. Jacob Sieberg, Defendant, Timothy Sieberg, et al., Appellants – Case No. A24-0699
State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Paul James Steichen, Respondent – Case No. A24-0097
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Johnson Kenny Sirleaf, Appellant – Case No. A24-1452
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Mohamed Abdulgani Ahmed, Appellant – Case No. A24-0037
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Shawn Michael Tillman, Appellant– Case No. A24-0952
EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
September 2025
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Tuesday, September 2, 2025
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Jamie Sara Schmeichel, Appellant – Case No. A23-1905: Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jamie Schmeichel with second-degree test refusal and third-degree driving while impaired. During a trial, Schmeichel asked the district court to instruct the jury that “in order to be found guilty of a refusal to submit to chemical testing, the defendant needs to demonstrate actual unwillingness” to take a test. The district court did not give Schmeichel’s requested jury instruction. The jury found Schmeichel guilty of test refusal and not guilty of driving while impaired. The court of appeals affirmed Schmeichel’s test-refusal conviction.
The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) whether the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s actual unwillingness to participate in the testing process in order to prove a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test, in violation of Minnesota Statutes § 169A.20, subdivision 2; and (2) if, in a refusal prosecution, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s actual unwillingness to participate in the testing process, whether the district court committed reversible error by declining to instruct the jury accordingly. (Anoka County)
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Ge Yang, Appellant – Case No. A24-0228: Appellant Ge Yang was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Yang pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. At trial, the child victim testified in part that Yang sexually penetrated her in his bedroom and in her bedroom. As part of its jury instructions, the district court did not provide the jurors a specific unanimity instruction; Yang did not request a specific unanimity instruction, nor did he object to its absence. On appeal, Yang argued the district court committed plain error by not providing the jury a specific unanimity instruction. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed Yang’s conviction.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether Yang is entitled to a new trial on his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct (one act penetration) because a non-unanimous verdict resulted due to the district court’s failure to provide a specific unanimity instruction that would have instructed jurors to choose between two alleged separate and distinct penetrative acts. (Hennepin County)
Wednesday, September 3, 2025
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Brian Russell Lueck, Appellant – Case No. A24-0250: Appellant Brian Lueck was involved in a head on collision. After the collision, law enforcement arrested Lueck on suspicion of driving while impaired. Officers obtained a search warrant for Lueck’s blood. An officer presented Lueck with the search warrant and asked him to submit to a blood draw. Lueck refused to provide a blood sample. After being asked if he was refusing both a blood and a urine test, Lueck refused to submit to testing. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Lueck with multiple offenses, including first-degree test refusal.
Lueck filed a motion to suppress, arguing, in part, that pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 2, he could not be convicted of test refusal under circumstances where law enforcement only obtained a warrant for a blood sample. The district court rejected this argument. The parties agreed to proceed with a court trial based on stipulated facts on the first-degree test refusal charge, and the State agreed to dismiss the other counts. The district court found Lueck guilty. The court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether it is constitutional to convict a driver for refusing to submit to a blood or a urine test when law enforcement did not obtain a warrant for a urine sample. (Wadena County)
Nonoral: Cedric Lamont Berry, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A25-0152: A grand jury indicted appellant Cedric Berry with first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder. The indictment alleged both principle and aiding-and-abetting criminal liability. Following a jury trial, Berry was convicted of both offenses. On appeal, appellate counsel argued the district court erred when it admitted cell-site location information (CSLI) evidence that placed Berry’s cell phone near the site of the murder. The supreme court affirmed Berry’s convictions. Berry filed a timely postconviction petition that alleged appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to (1) challenge the sufficiency of evidence, (2) argue the district court committed plain error in its jury instructions, (3) assert violations of Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 5 and 8, and (4) request a Schwartz hearing to determine whether the jurors were exposed to prejudicial material. The district court denied the postconviction petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Berry appealed.
Berry’s brief to the supreme court presents the following issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion, erred in its findings, and erred in finding, without an evidentiary hearing, that appellant was entitled to no relief on his claim that his appellate counsel failed to argue on direct appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew his alleged coconspirators were going to commit the charged crimes and intended his actions to further the commission of those crimes; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion and erred in its findings when it concluded that appellant was entitled to no relief on his claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal that the district court committed prejudicial plain error by including a transferred intent instruction because the victims were intended victims of separate shootings; (3) whether the district court abused its discretion and erred in its findings when it concluded that appellate was entitled to no relief on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make the proper objection to the jury’s potential exposure to prejudicial material, and appellate counsel’s failure to raise the claim on direct appeal; and (4) whether the district court committed reversible error by abrogating appellant’s due process protected liberties and rule-based rights under Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 5 and 8. (Hennepin County)
Thursday, September 4, 2025
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Melissa Ann Lorsung, Respondent, vs. Commissioner of Public Safety, Appellant – Case No. A24-0540:
A police officer went to a bar, shortly after it closed, responding to a reported automobile collision. The officer learned that respondent Melissa Lorsung had bumped an intoxicated pedestrian with her car as she was backing out of a parking space. The officer also learned that Lorsung had been drinking inside the bar and had left the bar around closing time. Lorsung was smoking a cigarette when the officer first spoke with her. The officer did not smell alcohol on her breath or observe any physical indicia of alcohol impairment.
After doing additional investigation away from Lorsung, the officer walked back over to Lorsung and asked her how much she had to drink. She said she had three beers. The officer directed Lorsung to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. The officer noticed no indication of impairment during the test. A little while later, the officer asked Lorsung to take a preliminary breath test (PBT). The PBT indicated Lorsung's alcohol concentration was 0.145.
Lorsung later agreed to additional testing. Appellant the Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Lorsung's driver's license based on the results of that testing.
Lorsung filed a petition for judicial review of her license revocation. Lorsung argued, in part, that the request for the PBT violated Minn. Stat. § 169A.41, subd. 1 (authorizing an officer to require a driver to take a PBT when the officer has "reason to believe" the driver committed driving while impaired). She contended that any suspicion that she had driven while impaired had dissipated by the time the officer asked her to take the PBT. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court affirmed the revocation of Lorsung's driver's license.
The court of appeals reversed the revocation of Lorsung's driver's license, concluding there was not a reasonable suspicion that Lorsung was impaired when the officer asked her to take a PBT.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether it was error for the court of appeals to rewrite the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard by disregarding evidence obtained before a satisfactory HGN test and prohibiting the gathering of additional evidence. (Ramsey County)
Monday, September 8, 2025
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
Jeremy McNitt, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, vs. Minnesota IT Services (MNIT), Appellant/Cross-Respondent – Case No. A23-1948: In late 2021, appellant/cross-respondent Minnesota IT Services (MNIT) posted a web-developer job opening for a position within the Minnesota Department of Education. Respondent/cross-appellant Jeremy McNitt applied for the job, and MNIT subsequently offered him the position, subject to a background check. The background check revealed a 2017 conviction for possession of child pornography in 2011. MNIT determined that McNitt’s prior conviction was directly related to the position he sought, a prerequisite under a criminal offender rehabilitation statute, Minn. Stat. § 364.03 (2024), for disqualifying McNitt from the position in public employment. As required by the statute, MNIT was then required to ask McNitt for “evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness to perform the duties of the public employment sought” before disqualifying him from employment. Minn. Stat. § 364.03, subdivision 3(a). It did so, and McNitt provided documentation that he had completed the terms of his sentence, had been discharged from probation early, and remained law abiding. The statute states that “[c]ompetent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation may be established by” such documents. Id. But in March 2022, MNIT issued a notice of disqualification, informing McNitt that he had not shown that he had been sufficiently rehabilitated to preclude the disqualification.
McNitt administratively appealed MNIT’s disqualification determination pursuant to the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), and the parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing on the motions and issued a report and recommendation, finding that McNitt had provided sufficient evidence of rehabilitation, concluding that MNIT therefore lacked discretion to disqualify McNitt, and recommending that MNIT remove any record disqualifying him from employment, as well as providing him with the same or an equivalent position. On June 21, 2023, within the 30-day time limit set by Minn. Stat. § 14.62, subd. 2(a) (2022), the commissioner of MNIT issued an order in which it concluded that fact issues precluded summary disposition for either party. It therefore rejected the ALJ’s recommendation to grant McNitt’s summary disposition motion and modified the ALJ’s recommendation to deny MNIT’s summary disposition motion. The commissioner also rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that MNIT lacked discretion to disqualify McNitt based on the documentation that McNitt had submitted. And the commissioner remanded the case back to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing.
On October 11, 2023, the supreme court issued its decision in In re Surveillance and Integrity Review (SIRS), 996 N.W.2d 178 (Minn. 2023), the holding of which was that “[t]he Department of Human Services does not have the authority to remand a case to an administrative law judge under Minn. Stat. § 14.62 (2022), or under any other source of implied authority, after the administrative law judge issues a final recommendation.” Id. at 179. In light of the holding in SIRS, the ALJ in this dispute concluded that they no longer had jurisdiction to conduct a contested-case hearing on remand and therefore returned the file to MNIT. In November 2023, the commissioner issued MNIT’s final order affirming its earlier determination that McNitt “failed to establish sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness to perform the duties he seeks to perform at the Department of Education,” and affirming its decision to disqualify McNitt from public employment based upon his prior conviction. The commissioner therefore dismissed McNitt’s administrative appeal.
McNitt appealed by writ of certiorari, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court of appeals rejected McNitt’s argument that, under SIRS, the remand of the matter to the ALJ was ineffective and therefore the ALJ’s original report and recommendation was the final decision in the case. But the court of appeals credited McNitt’s argument that, because he had produced evidence of sufficient rehabilitation in the statutorily prescribed form, the statute left MNIT with no discretion to disqualify him from employment.
The supreme court granted review of the following issues: (1) when an applicant provides the documents listed in Minnesota Statutes section 364.03, subdivision 3(a), does a public employer have discretion to determine whether the applicant has sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness? and (2) when the material facts are not in dispute, does the administrative law judge’s report and recommendation granting summary disposition become the final decision, in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 14.62, subd. 2(a) and In re Surveillance and Integrity Review (SIRS), 996 N.W.2d 178 (Minn. 2023), if the commissioner remands to the administrative law judge because the commissioner “rejects” the ALJ’s appropriate application of law and burden of proof? (Department of Information Technology Services)
Rebecca A. Niebuhr, Respondent, vs. Jacob Sieberg, Defendant, Timothy Sieberg, et al., Appellants – Case No. A24-0699: Trustee-respondent Rebecca Niebuhr brought a negligence action against appellants Timothy and Michele Sieberg after her son was killed in a work-related motor vehicle accident. The Siebergs’ minor son was the driver of the vehicle. On summary judgment, the district court ruled that the Siebergs may not be held vicariously liable as owners of the vehicle under the Safety Responsibility Act, Minn. Stat. § 169.09, subd. 5a, because their son is entitled to coemployee immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Minn. Stat. § 176.061, subd. 5(e).
The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The court of appeals held that vehicle owners may be held vicariously liable as principals under the Safety Responsibility Act, even if their deemed agent, the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident, is immune from liability as a coemployee under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: when a minor is entitled to immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act for a claim brought against him for the death of his employer, can the minor’s parents nevertheless be held vicariously liable for his actions solely because they owned the vehicle involved in the accident? (Blue Earth County)
Tuesday, September 9, 2025
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Paul James Steichen, Respondent – Case No. A24-0097: Respondent Paul Steichen was charged with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for coercing a vulnerable adult to engage in oral sex. Pursuant to a plea negotiation, Steichen waived his right to a jury trial and instead entered a Norgaard guilty plea to an amended charge of felony fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct in exchange for dismissal of a count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Steichen stated he did not remember the offense due to intoxication but agreed that there was a substantial likelihood that a jury would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at trial based on the State’s evidence.
Steichen appealed. In the court of appeals, he argued that his plea was invalid because it was not based on a strong factual basis. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the plea was not supported by a sufficient factual basis and was, therefore, inaccurate.
The supreme court granted review on the following issue: whether the court of appeals misapplied this Court’s Alford-lineage case law to Steichen’s Norgaard guilty plea when it determined that the factual basis supporting Steichen’s guilty plea was not strong enough. (Hennepin County)
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Johnson Kenny Sirleaf, Appellant – Case No. A24-1452: A jury found appellant Johnson Sirleaf guilty of first-degree murder committed in the course of a kidnapping, as well as other related offenses, for causing the death of a person while kidnapping another person.
On direct appeal to the supreme court, Sirleaf raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial judge created a perceived bias by attending a conference with the prosecuting attorney the week before trial, and by taking pictures with the prosecutor wearing matching hats that were posted on social media; (2) whether the district court’s admission of DNA testing results through a manager who was not present for the initial DNA testing, absent testimony from the lab analyst who performed the initial DNA testing, violated Sirleaf’s confrontation right.; (3) whether the district court erred by sanitizing three prior felonies for a prosecution witness, which included a dishonesty crime; (4) whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by introducing evidence of Sirleaf’s prior bad acts towards his mother after the district court ruled that it was inadmissible and the State agreed not to introduce this evidence prior to trial; and (5) whether Sirleaf was deprived of a fair trial by the cumulative impact of the trial errors. (Anoka County)
Wednesday, September 10, 2025
Courtroom 300, Minnesota Judicial Center
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Mohamed Abdulgani Ahmed, Appellant – Case No. A24-0037: The State charged appellant Mohamed Ahmed with conspiracy to commit first-degree sale of a controlled substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.096, subd. 1, as well as first-degree sale of a controlled substance and second-degree possession of a controlled substance. The charges required the State to prove that Ahmed sold, conspired to sell, and possessed 50 grams or more of a mixture containing fentanyl. At trial, the state presented evidence to show that Ahmed and another man sold fentanyl pills out of an apartment in East Grand Forks, Minnesota. The jury found Ahmed guilty of all three crimes.
On appeal, Ahmed argued that the district court plainly erred when it instructed the jury with a general co-conspirator liability instruction that reflected the language of Minnesota’s aiding-and-abetting statute, stating: “The defendant is guilty of a crime committed by another person when the defendant has conspired with the other to commit the crime.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.05. He also argued that the prosecutor committed plain-error misconduct by misstating the burden of proof during closing argument when he discussed conspiracy to commit first-degree sale as follows:
I don’t need to prove that the defendant knew this conspiracy involved more than fifty grams, just that there was a conspiracy to do so, and ultimately this conspiracy involved more than fifty grams.
He further argued that it was plain-error misconduct by the prosecutor when he discussed first-degree sale of a controlled substance as follows:
Now you’re required to have a unanimous jury verdict in this case. But four of you could find the defendant guilty under the co-conspirator theory, four of you could find him guilty of committing this crime personally, and four of you could find him guilty of aiding theory, and that is still a unanimous jury verdict. It’s just different ways of getting to the same result.
The court of appeals affirmed Ahmed’s conspiracy and first-degree sale convictions. It reversed Ahmed’s second-degree possession conviction as a lesser-included offense committed during a single behavioral incident.
The supreme court granted review of three issues: (1) whether it was plain error to instruct the jury that Ahmed was guilty of any other crime committed by the co-conspirator provided it was reasonably foreseeable when Minnesota’s drug conspiracy statute, Minn Stat. § 152.096, subd. 1, contains no such expansive theory of liability; (2) whether it was plain error for the prosecutor to tell the jury in closing argument that the state did not need to prove that Ahmed and the co-conspirator had an agreement to sell drugs above the statutory threshold; (3) whether it was plain error for the prosecutor to misdescribe the unanimous verdict requirement by telling the jury in closing argument that four jurors could convict Ahmed of conspiracy under a co-conspirator theory, four jurors could convict him for aiding his co-conspirator, and four jurors could convict him finding that he committed the crime personally. (Polk County)
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Shawn Michael Tillman, Appellant– Case No. A24-0952: A grand jury indicted appellant Shawn Tillman with first-degree premeditated murder. Before trial, Tillman made a pro se request for substitute counsel alleging his court-appointed attorney had a conflict of interest. Eventually, an attorney from the public defender’s conflicts panel was appointed to represent Tillman. Subsequently, Tillman made several pro se requests to remove the conflicts attorney, alleging he was ineffective, had violated attorney-client privilege, and had a conflict of interest. The district court denied these requests. In denying one of these requests, the district court observed that a conflicts attorney had already been appointed. Tillman later waived his right to counsel and represented himself at trial. The jury found Tillman guilty of first-degree premeditated murder.
On direct appeal to the supreme court, Tillman’s brief presents the following issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion when it (a) failed to conduct a searching inquiry into Tillman’s claims that his attorney was ineffective, violated attorney-client privilege, and had a conflict of interest; and (b) told Tillman that the court could not appoint different outside counsel because Tillman already had a conflict attorney, and (2) whether Tillman’s waiver of counsel was not (a) voluntary where Tillman waived his right to counsel after the court denied his requests for substitute counsel without conducting a searching inquiry into the reasons for Tillman’s requests; or (b) knowing and intelligent where Tillman told the court that he was not prepared to represent himself. (Ramsey County)