EN BANC CALENDAR
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court
September 2026
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Summaries prepared by the Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office
Monday, August 31, 2026
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Mervel George Jones, III, Appellant – Case No. A24-1451: Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Mervel George Jones with several offenses, including first-degree assault. Jones pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. When Jones failed to appear for the third day of trial, the district court noted his absence for the record and asked defense counsel to try to reach him to determine the reason for his absence. The district court told defense counsel thatunder existing case law, the court had a duty to conduct an adequate investigation about the circumstances surrounding Jones’s absence. After defense counsel reported that he was unable to reach Jones, the district court decided to conduct an investigation to determine whether Jones was voluntarily absent from trial. The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which a transport court security sergeant testified that he had learned that Jones had an active Department of Corrections warrant because he allegedly violated the terms of his supervised release by cutting off his ankle monitoring bracelet and leaving the treatment facility where he resided. After listening to the testimony presented at the hearing, the district court declared a recess during which it reviewed several court records. Following the recess, the district court found that Jones had voluntarily abandoned his known right to be present at trial. The trial proceeded without Jones and the jury found him guilty of first-degree assault. On appeal, Jones argued the district court violated the bright-line rule against independent judicial investigations when it reviewed the court records during the recess. The court of appeals rejected Jones’s argument and affirmed his conviction.
The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) As a matter of first impression, is there an exception to the rule that prohibits a judge from independently investigating facts when a court is required to determine whether a defendant has waived their right to be present after failing to appear? (2) If there is no exception, must this court reverse and remand for a new trial on the ground Jones was denied his right to an impartial judge? (Mille Lacs County)
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Tommy Eastman, Appellant – Case No. A25-0382: Appellant Tommy Eastman pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court granted Eastman’s request for a downward dispositional sentencing departure, stayed execution of the presumptive 144-month prison sentence, and placed Eastman on probation subject to numerous conditions. Eastman’s probation officer subsequently alleged that Eastman had violated five separate conditions of his probation. Although Eastman admitted that he committed all five violations, he argued the district court should not revoke his probation. After considering the parties’ arguments, the district court revoked Eastman’s probation. On appeal, petitioner argued the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation without first finding that “rehabilitation had failed.” The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s revocation of Eastman’s probation.
The supreme court granted review on the following issues: (1) Since 1980, district courts considering whether to revoke probation have been told that revocation “should be used as a last resort only where treatment has failed.” In 2023, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 609.14 to provide that “revocation shall only be used as a last resort where rehabilitation has failed.” Did the changes have any substantive effect on how courts are to analyze probation violations? (2) Did the district court err by revoking petitioner’s probation for his first set of technical violations where rehabilitation had not failed? (Anoka County)
Tuesday, September 1, 2026
Rezyl Grace MoChridhe, Appellant, vs. Academy of Holy Angels, Respondent, Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, Respondent – Case No. A25-0559: The facts are as recited in the complaint of appellant Rezyl MoChridhe. Respondent Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis is a Roman Catholic archdiocese that oversees 91 Catholic schools including respondent Academy of Holy Angels. MoChridhe, who was assigned male at birth but lives and identifies as a woman, was employed by Holy Angels as a media specialist/librarian for the 2021-22 school year. She was a purely secular employee and was neither expected nor qualified to perform ministerial duties at the school. In March 2022, all Holy Angels staff were asked to submit an intention to renew their employment agreement for the next school year. MoChridhe met with the principal, who assured her that the school wanted her to return. MoChridhe then informed the principal that she had come out as transgender and was starting the process of transitioning to live as female. The principal informed her that it would not be possible for her to continue working at the school if she were determined to transition.
Later, MoChridhe was presented by the principal with a copy of “Guiding Principles for Catholic Schools and Religious Education Concerning Human Sexuality and Sexual Identity.” The Guiding Principles state, among other things, that “God uses the body to reveal to each person his or her sexual identity as male or female,” and “[a] person’s embrace of his or her God-given sexual identity is an essential part of living a fulfilled relationship with God, with oneself, and with each other.” The Guiding Principles instruct schools to “relate to each student in a way that is respectful of and consistent with each student’s God-given sexual identity and biological sex,” and direct that students will be referred to by name and pronouns, and classified for purposes of activities, based on their biological sex. The principal asked MoChridhe whether she could adhere to the Guiding Principles. She stated that she did not believe that she could; her complaint cites what she took as the Guiding Principles’ instruction to discriminate against transgender and gender-nonconforming students. MoChridhe further alleges that “what she was being told was that she would not be allowed to work at Holy Angels because she is transgender.” She also alleges that the principal told her that the Guiding Principles document was the only reason she was not being offered a renewed contract. Subsequently, Holy Angels did not, in fact, renew her contract.
MoChridhe filed a charge of discrimination with the Department of Human Rights and eventually sued both Holy Angels and the Archdiocese in district court, alleging among other things claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA): employment discrimination (against Holy Angels) based on sex and sexual orientation/gender identity under Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2 (2022), and aiding and abetting discrimination (against the Archdiocese) under Minn. Stat. § 363A.14 (2024). The Archdiocese moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court granted the motion and dismissed MoChridhe’s claims against the Archdiocese, basing its decision on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Minnesota Constitution, and the exception to MHRA claims based on religious association under Minn. Stat. § 363A.26(2) (2022). MoChridhe appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. It based its decision only on the First Amendment, determining that, as a matter of law, the allegations in MoChridhe’s complaint establish that the “ecclesiastical abstention” or “church autonomy” doctrine protects the Archdiocese’s right to act as it allegedly did because providing a remedy for MoChridhe “would interfere with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”
The supreme court granted review of the following issues: (1) Did the court of appeals err in affirming the dismissal of MoChridhe’s employment discrimination claim against the Archdiocese on ecclesiastical abstention grounds at the motion to dismiss stage where MoChridhe is a non-ministerial employee who performs no spiritual function at the school and resolution of her claims will not require the court to interpret doctrine or decide religious questions? (2) Did the court of appeals err in determining that state-level employment discrimination claims cannot apply as a matter of law to secular employees of religious institutions? (3) Did the district court err in granting the Archdiocese’s motion to dismiss based on affirmative defenses that cannot be decided on the face of the complaint and that have not been factually developed? (Hennepin County)
Nonoral: Ricky Darnell Waiters, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A25-1913:In 2018, a jury found Ricky Waiters guilty of several offenses, including first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree felony murder, and drive-by shooting. In 2019, the supreme court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. In 2020, 2021, and 2023, Waiters sought postconviction relief in numerous filings, and the district court denied relief on each occasion.
In 2025, Waiters filed his current petition for postconviction relief, seeking a new trial, based on claims of erroneous evidentiary rulings, insufficient evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct. In October 2025, the district court denied Waiters’s petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The district court concluded that his claims were either procedurally barred or time barred and did not meet any exception to the procedural or time bars.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented include the following: (1) whether the district court erred by summarily denying Waiters’s petition for postconviction relief; (2) whether the district court erred by concluding Waiters’s claims did not meet the exception to the time bar for new interpretations of law; (3) whether Waiters’ due process rights were violated by the prosecutor’s failure to correct false evidence or testimony; and (4) whether the prosecutor committed misconduct. (Winona County)
Wednesday, September 2, 2026
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
In re Cottonwood County’s Decision on the Need for an Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Sioux Rock Quarry Expansion Project in Delton Township – Case Nos. A25-0806, A25-0821, and In the Matter of the Application of OMG Midwest, Inc. d/b/a Minnesota Paving and Materials for a Conditional Use Permit – Case No. A25-1125: OMG Midwest, d/b/a Minnesota Paving Materials (MPM) (initially appellant in A25-0821, respondent in A25-1125; now substituted out as a party), has conducted sand and aggregate rock mining operations in the Sioux Rock Quarry, in Cottonwood County, for decades. Near the quarry lie the Jeffers Petroglyphs, property listed on the state register of historic sites that is home to thousands of rock carvings, thousands of years old, made by the ancestors of today’s Native Americans. MPM applied to the Cottonwood County Board of Commissioners (County) for a permit to allow MPM to expand its mining operations. After a citizen petition regarding the project was filed under the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), Minn. Stat. ch. 116D, and the County was designated as the responsible governmental unit (RGU) to conduct environmental review, the County decided to complete an environmental-assessment worksheet (EAW), a “brief document which is designed to set out the basic facts necessary to determine whether an EIS is required for a proposed project,” Minn. R. 4410.0200, subp. 24 (2023), before deciding whether to permit the expansion. An EIS is an environmental impact statement, a more detailed document that must be prepared where “there is potential for significant environmental effects resulting from any major governmental action.” Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2a(a).
After preparing the EAW, the County received public comments, including from the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) (respondent in A25-0821)—a state agency that regulates pollution, including air pollution (MPM is prohibited from operating without a permit approved by MPCA)—and the State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO), an arm of the Minnesota Department of Administration (MDA) (respondent in A25-0821, appellant in A25-1125) with duties relating to the preservation of historic sites (collectively the State Relators). The State Relators each submitted comments raising concerns about the project’s potential impacts on the Jeffers Petroglyphs and asserting that the EAW does not adequately address those potential impacts. MPCA urged the County to prepare an EIS. Instead, the County adopted a resolution determining that MPM’s project does not have the potential for significant environmental effects, and therefore an EIS is not required. The County also granted an interim-use permit (IUP), a type of conditional-use permit under the County’s zoning ordinance, for the project.
A number of parties filed certiorari appeals challenging various aspects of the County’s decisions. The State Relators challenged (in A25-0821) the decision that an EIS was not needed for the project; that appeal was later consolidated with another appeal (A25-0806) by other entities challenging the same decision. The State Relators also challenged the County’s grant of the IUP (in A25-1125). MPM moved to dismiss the appeals by the State Relators, arguing that they lacked standing to challenge the County’s decisions. The court of appeals denied the motion as to A25-0821, concluding that the State Relators have standing to challenge the EIS decision and allowing that appeal to proceed. It reasoned that when an RGU decides not to prepare an EIS, state agencies with permitting or other approval authority must either make a decision based on the limited information in the EAW or divert their own resources to additional investigation, giving them a stake in EIS decisions distinct from the interest of the public. But the court of appeals granted the motion as to A25-1125, concluding that the State Relators had not demonstrated standing to challenge the County’s issuance of the IUP, and it dismissed that appeal. The court of appeals concluded that the State Relators did not demonstrate that the County’s IUP decision affects their ability to perform their statutory duties or is otherwise specifically injurious to them.
Meanwhile MPM had assigned its lease rights to mine in the Sioux Rock Quarry to Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. and Martin Marietta Materials Real Estate Investments, Inc. (the Martin Marietta Entities). Later, MPM moved the supreme court to substitute the Martin Mariettta Entities for MPM as the proper parties to the appeal. That motion was granted, making the Martin Marietta Entities the appellants in A25-0821 and respondents in A25-1125. In briefing, the State Relators disclosed that MPM had requested that MPCA void its air emissions permit for operations at the Sioux Rock Quarry, and the MPCA obliged. The supreme court ordered the State Relators, the Martin Marietta Entities, and the County to file supplemental briefs regarding the current status of mining operations at the Sioux Rock Quarry, the interaction between the voided air emissions permit and the IUP, and whether either appeal is moot.
The supreme court granted review of the following issues in A25-0821: (1) Can a person be “aggrieved” under Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 10 (2024), of MEPA, by an RGU’s decision not to complete an EIS about a proposed land use when the person fails to show that the land use would cause an injury-in-fact to a legally cognizable interest of the person that MEPA was designed to protect? (2) Does a state agency’s authority to decide whether to permit or otherwise approve a proposed land use under one set of laws grant the agency standing to appeal an RGU’s decision not to complete an EIS about the land use before deciding whether to approve the land use under different laws? (Cottonwood County Board of Commissioners)
And the supreme court granted review of the following issue in A25-1125: If a county issues a permit without complying with its undisputed statutory duty to consult with and come to an agreement in writing with the State Historic Preservation Office, does the SHPO have standing to challenge that permit? (Cottonwood County Board of Commissioners)
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Michael Lowell Munger, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – No. A25-1983: In 2023, a jury found Michael Munger guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, as well as other lesser-included offenses, for the death of Lynnie Loucks. Munger represented himself at trial. In May 2025, Munger filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, arguing he was entitled to a new trial because his waiver of his constitutional right to counsel was not voluntary. In September 2025, the district court denied his petition for postconviction relief, concluding that Munger’s waiver of counsel was valid.
On appeal to the supreme court, Munger raises the following issue: Must Munger be granted a new trial where his waiver of his constitutional right to counsel was not voluntary? (Crow Wing County)
Tuesday, September 8, 2026
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
Rodney Dean Bjornson, Relator, vs. McNeilus Companies, Inc., and Travelers Indemnity Company of American and Property & Casualty Hartford, administered by Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Respondents – A26-0231: This workers’ compensation case involving an attorney fee dispute is currently before the supreme court for the second time. On April 30, 2025, the supreme court issued a decision in this matter regarding whether relator Bjornson’s attorney submitted sufficient evidence of the ascertainable dollar value of medical benefits awarded as a result of Bjornson’s claim petition. The supreme court determined that the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) did not consider whether a reasonable person would find certain evidence in the record, including the attorney’s testimony and exhibits, adequate to support the compensation judge’s conclusion. The supreme court remanded to the WCCA (1) with instructions to remand the case to the compensation judge to clarify whether the itemized medical bills from the Mayo Clinic were the actual itemized bills or a summary document of the voluminous medical records prepared by counsel, without reopening the record to accept additional evidence; and (2) after this clarification, the WCCA was instructed to review the evidence in the record to determine whether a reasonable mind might accept that evidence as adequate to support the compensation judge’s conclusion.
On January 30, 2026, the WCCA issued its decision on remand stating that it referred the matter to the Court of Administrative Hearings (CAH), and the compensation judge found that the claim petition and its attachments, including the itemized medical bills, were part of the record at the attorney fee hearing—not just the summary document. The WCCA also stated that it ordered CAH to submit all portions of the record not previously submitted related to the August 4, 2023, Findings and Order on Attorney’s Fees. The WCCA ordered CAH to amend the record index certified on September 11, 2023, to include all portions of the record not previously submitted. CAH submitted an amended record index, which included a document containing the March 29, 2022 claim petition with the itemized medical bills that had not been submitted to the WCCA during the first appeal in 2023. After reviewing the evidence in the record, the WCCA concluded that there was no substantial evidence in the record that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the compensation judge’s award of Roraff fees in the amount of $49,000 absent the Spaeth balance, the fee-scheduled amount of medical benefits recovered by the attorney, and an adjudication that the medical treatment was reasonable and necessary. The WCCA therefore reversed the Findings and Order on Remand of the compensation judge concluding that the evidence does not support the compensation judge’s August 3, 2023 award of $49,000 in Roraff fees.
Relator Rodney Dean Bjornson appeals to the supreme court, presenting the following issues: (1) Did the compensation judge consider the actual itemized bills from MCHS or only the summary of the bills accepted into evidence as Exhibit G? (2) Did respondents have the right to appeal the compensation judge’s clarification that she considered the actual bills from MCHS and raise the new legal issue of whether the compensation judge was prohibited from doing so? (3) Was the compensation judge prohibited from considering the itemized bills from MCHS when they were not introduced into evidence at the attorney fee hearing but were discussed extensively at the attorney fee hearing and were attached to the original Claim Petition in the record at CAH in the C-Track efiling system? (4) Was it reversible error for the WCCA to sua sponte create new, unprecedented, irrelevant and wholly unworkable elements of proof for attorneys claiming Roraff attorney fees under the statutory 20% formula following a settlement; rule that producing evidence proving these elements is a “fundamental” requirement in a claim for Roraff fees based on the statutory 20% formula after a settlement; and then rely upon these elements to reject the compensation judge’s interpretation of Attorney Wulff’s testimony and the exhibits the compensation judge relied upon in awarding Attorney Wulff the Roraff feeshe claimed? (5) Can the testimony of an attorney at an attorney fee hearing, if accepted as credible, in and of itself provide sufficient support for a compensation judge’s award of fees? (6) Is there any evidence in the record when viewed as a whole, including but not limited to the testimony of Attorney Wulff and Exhibit G, that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the compensation judge’s Finding and Order on Attorney Fees? (Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
City of Oak Grove, Petitioner, vs. Steve Simon, in his official capacity as Minnesota Secretary of State, Respondent, Tom Hunt, in his official capacity as Director of Anoka County Elections & Voter Registration, Respondent, and Pam LeBlanc, in her official capacity as Chief Officer of Anoka County Property Records and Taxation, Respondent – Case No. A26-0910: This matter involves an election dispute brought directly before the supreme court under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44. Petitioner the City of Oak Grove filed a petition asking the supreme court “for an Order declaring that the City has the authority under Minnesota Statutes section 201.225, subd. 1, to use paper rosters at the upcoming 2026 Statewide General Election, ordering the Secretary of State and Anoka County officials to accept and implement the City’s decision to use paper rosters, and prohibiting Anoka County from ordering any City officials or personnel to disobey the directions of the City Council or City staff on this matter, or from prosecuting or threaten[ing] to prosecute any City officials or personnel for doing so.” Petitioner on the one hand, and the Secretary of State and Anoka County officials on the other, disagree as to whether the city or the county gets to make the choice of voter roster format for city precincts within the county in statewide elections.
Petitioners’ brief identifies the issue before the court as follows: Under section 201.225, who makes the choice of voter roster format for polling places within city limits—the city, or the county where it is located? (Original Jurisdiction)
Nonoral: Shavelle Oscar Chavez-Nelson, Appellant vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent – Case Nos. A24-0419, A25-1764: A Hennepin County grand jury indicted appellant Shavelle Oscar Chavez-Nelson for first-degree premeditated murder. Following a jury trial, Chavez-Nelson was found guilty as charged and the district court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of release. On direct appeal, Chavez-Nelson’s conviction was affirmed. Chavez-Nelson filed a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which the district court summarily denied. On appeal, the district court’s decision was affirmed. Chavez-Nelson filed a second postconviction petition alleging newly discovered evidence and a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court denied the second postconviction petition. Chavez-Nelson appealed the district court’s denial of his second postconviction petition. The court subsequently granted Chavez-Nelson’s motion to stay his appeal to allow him to file a third postconviction petition. In support of his third postconviction petition, Chavez-Nelson submitted an affidavit from Z.M. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the third postconviction petition, concluding that even when the facts alleged in Z.M.’s affidavit were viewed in a light most favorable to Chavez-Nelson, he was conclusively entitled to no relief. After Chavez-Nelson appealed the denial of his third postconviction petition, the court lifted the stay of his earlier appeals and consolidated his appeals.
Chavez-Nelson’s briefs in this consolidated appeal present the following issues: (1) whether the district court erred when it held that Chavez-Nelson’s reliance on the civil rules of procedure was misplaced and failed to amend or alter its order which contains errors of law; (2) whether the district court erred in failing to follow the statutory requirement of a postconviction evidentiary hearing and proper legal standards regarding the newly discovered evidence related to the affidavit of Z.M.; (3) whether Chavez-Nelson’s petition for postconviction relief alleged sufficient facts to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on his Brady claim; (4) whether the district court abused its discretion when it failed to properly apply the legal standards regarding newly discovered scientific evidence of blood stain pattern analysis; (5) whether the district court abused its discretion and improperly denied Chavez-Nelson’s demand for a new trial by failing to, at a minimum, grant an evidentiary hearing on his new evidence claims; and (6) whether the district court abused its discretion by improperly denying an evidentiary hearing when it made improper credibility determinations and factual conclusions concerning Z.M.’s affidavit without holding an evidentiary hearing. (Dakota County)
Wednesday, September 9, 2026
Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol Building, Second Floor
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Nathan Luhring, Appellant – Case No. A25-0710: In 2008, Nathan Luhring was convicted of misdemeanor disorderly conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.72. Because the facts underlying Luhring’s conviction involve the corporal punishment of a child residing in his home, Luhring acknowledges that the conviction is for a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and, therefore, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) unless the conviction is unconditionally expunged, he is pardoned, or his civil rights are restored. Luhring is similarly prohibited from possessing a firearm by Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(10)(viii), which incorporates the federal prohibition by reference.
After he was discharged from probation, Luhring attempted to obtain a permit for a hunting rifle. The sheriff determined Luhring’s right to possess firearms has been revoked and denied his permit application. Luhring then filed a petition in district court seeking restoration of his civil right to possess a firearm pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d, which states that “[a] person prohibited by state law from … possessing … a firearm or ammunition because of a conviction … for committing a crime of violence” may petition the district court to restore that right.
The district court denied Luhring’s petition. It determined, in part, that Luhring is not a person who is entitled to petition for restoration under Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d because his conviction does not qualify as a felony “crime of violence” as defined by Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5.
The court of appeals affirmed. It held the phrase “crime of violence” in Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d means a felony offense listed in Minn. Stat. § 624.712 subd. 5.
The supreme court granted review of one issue: What does the phrase “crime of violence” mean as used in Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d, and does that statute permit individuals permanently disqualified from possessing firearms due to misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence to petition for judicial restoration of firearm rights? (Blue Earth County)
In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Nuro B. Dedefo, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0309989 – Case No. A25-1185: An attorney discipline case that presents the question of what discipline, if any, is appropriate based on the facts of the case.